THIRD DIVISION.
.
ARMANDO M.
MENDOZA,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-02-1712
(Formerly IPI No.
01-1110-RTJ)
December 8, 2003
-versus-
JUDGE ELIODORO G.
UBIADAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 72, OLONGAPO
CITY,
Respondent. D E C I S I O N
VITUG,
J.:
An administrative complaint
for gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality was filed against
Judge
Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72,
Olongapo
City, in connection with his issuance in Civil Case No. 427-0-99,
entitled
"Alexander Panganiban, et al. v. Angelito Sacro, et al.," of a
temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. It would appear
that on 21 October 1999, therein plaintiff Alexander Panganiban and his
co-plaintiffs filed a Complaint[1]
with the RTC for "Declaration of Nullity of the Election of the Board
of
Directors and Committee Officers of the Olongapo Subic Castillejos San
Marcelino Transport Service and Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.," with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a
writ
of preliminary injunction, against the incumbent members of the Board
of
Directors, including its Chairman Armando M. Mendoza (herein
complainant),
and other officers of the cooperative. Also impleaded co-defendants
were
the officers of the Cooperative Development Authority of the San
Fernando
extension office in Pampanga.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their complaint before
the RTC, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants "were elected
members
of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative, through the unlawful
interference
by [the co-defendants] and other officials of the Cooperative
Development
Authority (CDA), Pampanga Extension Office, in the internal affairs of
the cooperative"; that "the conduct of the elections by and under the
direct
control and supervision of the CDA-Pampanga Extension Office violated
the
provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, the order (of)
25
November 1998 of the CDA Central Office, and other laws which guarantee
the autonomy and organizational integrity of the cooperative"; and that
the defendants had performed acts prejudicial to the interest of the
general
membership of the cooperative.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 28 October 1999,
respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
members
of the Board of Directors and officers of the cooperative, including
persons
acting in their behalf, from performing any act for and in behalf of
the
cooperative for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt of the order.
Respondent judge likewise scheduled a hearing on the petition for the
issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, requiring the defendants to appear
and show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent judge
directed the sheriff to immediately serve a copy of the order, together
with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, to the defendants. On 29
October 1999, the defendants filed an "Urgent Motion to Dissolve
Temporary
Restraining Order" on the ground that, unless the TRO were lifted,
"chaos,
confusion and disruption of peace and order [could] ensue among the
members
of the cooperative."
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 03 November 1999,
the plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Clarificatory Order" seeking to
prevent
the officials of the cooperative appointed by the defendants from
discharging
their functions pursuant to the restraining order and asked that, "in
order
to maintain the status quo, the cooperative officials next-in-line,
namely,
Administrative Officer Mrs. Lorna Gayatin and/or Cashier/Treasurer Elsa
Amante, be designated officers-in-charge duly authorized to perform the
functions necessary to ensure the smooth day-to-day operations of the
cooperative."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The scheduled hearing
on 10 November 1999 was later reset to 12 November 1999. No hearing,
however,
evidently took place, and all that the records would indicate was that
respondent judge resolved to consider "all the pending incidents, i.e.,
the plaintiffs' Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
and the defendants' Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss," submitted for
resolution. When the documentary evidence for the plaintiffs was
admitted,
respondent judge denied the defendants' "Motion to Dismiss;" it held
that
the court had jurisdiction over the case under Article 124 of the
Cooperative
Code of the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 17 November 1999,
respondent judge issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary
injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, thereby enjoining the
defendants,
including herein complainant, from discharging their duties and
functions
either as members of the Board of Directors or as officers of the
cooperative.
It also appointed Lorna Gayatin, the treasurer of the cooperative, to
be
the officer-in-charge of the cooperative under the supervision of Atty.
John V. Aquino, Branch Clerk of Court, of the Olongapo City RTC. The
pertinent
portions of the order read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"From the evidence
and arguments presented by the parties, this Court hold[s] that
petitioners
have shown a clear legal right to the injunctive relief prayed for,
which
includes continuing to enjoin the private respondents and other
individuals
appointed by them or acting in their behalf from discharging their
duties
and functions as cooperative directors and/or officials. Without
prejudging
the main issue of the validity of the election of private respondents
as
directors of the cooperative, this Court holds that they must be
restrained
in the meantime from sitting as members of the Board of Directors, if
only
to maintain the status quo, prevent any irreparable injury on the part
of the petitioners and the cooperative itself and not render
ineffectual
whatever judgment may be rendered by this Court on the merits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"At the outset, it
must
be emphasized that respondents failed to present evidence, testimonial
or documentary, other than the bare allegations contained in their
pleadings,
to rebut petitioners' claim that it is the very participation of
private
respondents as cooperative directors in the management of the affairs
of
the cooperative that brings about the irreparable injury sought to be
avoided
by this application for injunctive relief. In other words, petitioners
have provided the required 'sampling' of their evidence to buttress
their
allegations of mismanagement whereas on the other hand, respondents
failed
to prove otherwise but instead relied on the lame excuse that such
matters
should be referred instead to the CDA. This Court cannot ignore the
pleas
of the petitioners because respondents have not given it any reason to
believe otherwise.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"This Court holds
that
petitioners [who] represent the members of the cooperative in this
class
suit is concerned, their legal rights as members will be injured if the
private respondents are allowed to resume discharging their duties and
functions as Directors or officials thereof. The undisputed acts of
mismanagement
which they have undertaken present a real danger of jeopardizing the
continued
viability of the cooperative. As part owners of the cooperative,
petitioners
and its other members have every right to ensure that their hard-earned
savings are not dissipated and its assets not squandered unnecessarily.
To hold otherwise may bring about a situation where there is no longer
any cooperative to speak of after the main issue regarding the election
of its Board of Directors is finally resolved. The equitable remedy of
injunction is available to prevent the violation of a
legally-guaranteed
right.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioners
having
established the requisites necessary for the issuance of [a writ of]
preliminary
injunction, namely: the existence of the rights to be protected and the
facts against which the injunction are to be directed are violative of
said right (Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership vs. Ruiz, 148 SCRA
226),
they are therefore entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The issuance of
the
injunctive relief is intended to ensure that the cooperative remains
operational
and viable while the leadership issue has not yet been resolved. It is
for this reason that this Court hereby designates Mrs. Lorna Gayatin
(being
the officer of the cooperative next-in-line to those who were appointed
by the private respondents), as officer-in-charge duly authorized to
transact
as signatory of the cooperative with its depository banks and perform
all
other related functions necessary to ensure the smooth day-to-day
operations
of the cooperative. Atty. John V. Aquino in his capacity as Clerk of
Court
of the Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City is designated as Court
representative
to oversee and otherwise assist Mrs. Gayatin to ensure that she
regularly
informs this Court regarding all the official acts she may have entered
into as officer-in-charge and bring to its attention any urgent
problems
that may be encountered.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, upon
filing
of a bond of P500,000.00 by the petitioners in favor of the respondents
to answer for any damages should it turn out that petitioners are not
entitled
thereto, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining private
respondents
or any individuals appointed by them or acting in their behalf from
performing
or discharging any duties and functions either as members of the Board
of Directors or officers of the cooperative, until otherwise directed
by
this Court."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The defendants
forthwith
moved to have the order of 17 November 1999 reconsidered and
additionally
sought the inhibition of respondent judge.
On 25 November 1999,
complainant Mendoza addressed a letter-complaint against respondent
judge
to the Presidential Action Center, Office of the President (of former
President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada), in Malacañang, Manila. On 16 December
1999, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the
letter-complaint
through an indorsement from Atty. Jonathan F. Baligod of the
Presidential
Action Center. The complaint charged respondent judge (a) with having
violated
Section 3, Rule 58, of the New Rules on Cooperative Procedure and
Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 of the Court for the issuance of a temporary
restraining
order without prior notice and hearing; (b) with having appointed one
Lorna
M. Gayatin Officer-in-Charge of the cooperative despite the latter's
pending
estafa cases in other courts,[4]
allegedly prompting a number of cooperative members not to pay their
respective
dues and obligations; and (c) with having exhibited bias in favor of
the
plaintiffs and gross ignorance of the law for his cognizance of Civil
Case
No. 427-0-99, an intra-cooperative dispute, which was a matter beyond
the
court's jurisdiction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 20 December 1999,
respondent judge inhibited himself from proceeding with Civil Case No.
427-0-99. The case was then re-raffled to Branch 74, of Olongapo City
RTC,
presided over by Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala. On 31 May 2000, Judge
Asdala
granted the defendants' motion for reconsideration and nullified the
writ
of preliminary injunction earlier issued by respondent judge. The
defendants
were thereupon directed to submit their comment on the plaintiffs'
application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 14 June 2000,
the defendants filed their comment contending that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the
following theses; viz:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"1)
Petitioners'
action [is] not in behalf of the majority members of the cooperative as
they have no authority from the said majority to file the petition, in
short, they are not the real parties in interest;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"2) Petitioners
are
in bad faith because the petition was filed pending the resolution of a
similar complaint involving the same parties and cause of action,
before
the Cooperative Development Authority, docketed as CDA-DO No. 99-003;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"3) Petitioners'
remedy
should be [one for] quo warranto and not [for] injunction;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"4) Petitioners'
claim
that the private respondents have dissipated, squandered and wasted
cooperative
funds by allocating loans and honorarium to themselves are not
sufficient
grounds for the issuance of a writ of injunction. Assuming that they
are,
the Cooperative Act and the By Laws of the cooperative provide for the
procedure and remedies against erring members of the Board of Director
or officers of the cooperative;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"5) Under the same
law,
the general membership of the cooperative and not the 13 petitioners
[have]
the right to question the perceived improper acts of the officers of
the
cooperative;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"6) Even assuming
that
private respondents' acts are improper, the acts will not cause
irreparable
damage and injury to the petitioners, as they can be adequately
compensated
by way of damages, if so found. Moreover, petitioners have not stated
in
their application any specific injury to themselves which are
irreparable
and having been caused by the acts of the private respondents;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"7)
Intra-cooperative
disputes, as well as questions about the election of the Board of
Directors
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development
Authority
as provided for under Sec. 3, Rule 2, Rules of Procedure of the
Cooperative
Act;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"8) The majority
members
of the cooperative are not even impleaded as co-petitioners, hence,
petitioners
cannot ask injunctive relief in behalf of the majority;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"9) Petitioners are
in estoppel, having previously recognized by their prior acts and
representations,
the election of the Board of Directors on June 26, 1999;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"10) Issuance of
preliminary
injunction is a virtual removal of the private respondents from the
office
to which they have been duly elected by the majority of the general
membership;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"11) The validity
and
legality of the election of the private respondents has been previously
upheld by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Resolution dated December
8, 1999 in OMB-ADM-1-99-0526 and by the Cooperative Development
Authority;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"12) The issuance
of
a preliminary injunction in effect would dispose of the main case and
is
equivalent to their virtual removal from office."[5]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Resolving the issues,
Judge Asdala, in her order, dated 26 June 2000, rejected the plea for
injunction
and held:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"After a closer
look
at the allegations in the herein petition, however, it appears that
injunction
is not reasonably necessary under the given circumstances, as
petitioners
failed to establish any existing legal right on their part, which must
be protected, pending the determination of the main case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"There is also no
doubt
that the 13 applicants herein do not represent the interest of the
cooperative.
The phrase in the caption of the petition 'and other members of the
OSCSMTSMPC,
Inc.' as petitioners, does not make the unnamed members of the
cooperative
parties-in-interest in the herein application. The general membership
of
the cooperative consists of, on the basis of Estelita Trapsi's
testimony,
one thousand seven hundred eight (1,708) members. The thirteen (13)
petitioners
herein, barely make up even a quorum, if not the majority, to represent
the interest of the cooperative. Even if such number constitutes a
majority
for purposes of representation, the absence of any special authority to
institute this suit in behalf of the unnamed members, makes
petitioners'
claim of representation questionable and illegal. This suit cannot
therefore,
be deemed as a suit in behalf of the general membership's interest,
neither
the cooperative's interest against the private respondents. Not
representative
of the cooperative's interest, then, petitioners have no personality to
seek for injunctive relief for the cooperative.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
" x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
"Moreover,
petitioners
have not specifically established any legal right on their part to be
protected
by injunction pending litigation. While petitioners pinpoint several
alleged
acts of abuses and mismanagement committed by the private respondents,
the applicant has not sufficiently shown hard and convincing evidence
to
establish that these acts are in violation of any existing right.
Instead
of proving that petitioners have their legal rights to be protected
from
the perceived acts the private respondents are doing or is procuring or
suffering to be done, petitioners allude to the interest of the
cooperative.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"What is required to
be established in an application for preliminary injunction is the
applicant's
right to be protected and not that of a third [person] or a neighbor or
a group, or one who has never been impleaded as a party-in-interest. In
alluding to the interest of the cooperative, instead of establishing
what
pertains to them, convinces this Court that there is no particular
right
on their part that must be protected. Petitioners' belief that their
own
personal interest is the interest of the entity called the cooperative
and this cooperative is them, will not earn them any injunctive relief.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"During the
summary
hearing, petitioners referred to several instances and documents to
prove
their claims of dissipation of funds by the private respondents, abuses
and excessive acts of management and fraud. However, petitioners have
not
been able to show the legal right, clear and positive that is required
for the writ to issue.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"That the services
of
Yusi, Atienza and De los Santos were terminated, was admitted by the
private
respondent, claiming management prerogative. Petitioners consider their
termination greatly prejudicial and damaging to the cooperative, but no
proof of such prejudice or damage was presented. Again assuming that
there
was damage, for argument's sake, was the damage suffered by the
cooperative
caused by the alleged acts of the private respondents violative of
their
personal legal, clear and positive right? What rights are those?
Unfortunately,
petitioners miserably failed to specify the specific rights they have
requiring
protection by way of an injunctive relief.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"There is no doubt
that
petitioners are unable to establish that they suffered any personal
irreparable
injury caused by the perceived acts of abuses of the private
respondents.
Nevertheless, assuming that they did, an action for damages would
adequately
compensate the injuries caused.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The Cooperative
Code
(R.A. 6939) provides for the procedure and remedy against erring
officers
of the cooperative. Surprisingly, petitioners opted not to avail of
those
fully, or if availed, were abandoned when they came to seek relief from
this Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Private
respondents
were elected as Board of Directors of the cooperative in an election
participated
by the majority of the membership held on June 26, 1999. While duly
elected,
hence, must correspondingly perform their duties as officers of the
cooperative,
petitioners want them to be stopped by an injunctive writ from this
Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
" x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
"While the herein
petitioners
have categorically prayed for the declaration of the nullity of private
respondents' election to the Board of the cooperative on June 26, 1999,
they want the latter at the same time enjoined from performing the
functions,
to which they have been called by the mandate of the majority in that
exercise.
To enjoin the private respondents from further performing their duties
as members of the Board of Directors and officers of the cooperative
until
the main case is disposed of, is virtually removing them from office.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
" x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
"There is no doubt
that
issuance of a preliminary injunction herein will in effect dispose of
the
main case without trial, and this Court is not inclined to do that. The
issue of whether or not private respondents in this case should
continue
as members of the Board of Directors and officers of the cooperative or
stop functioning as such, is to be resolved in the main action.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE,
finding
no sufficient basis to grant the herein application for preliminary
injunction,
the application is hereby denied. Pending the resolution of the merits
of the main case, this Court finds no legal impediment for the private
respondents to sit and function as elected members of the Board of
Directors
and officers of the cooperative."[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Comment of 18
January 2000, respondent judge made reference to the order he issued on
17 November 1999, insisting that the same had been made in accordance
with
applicable rules. As regards the appointment of Lorna M. Gayatin as
Officer-in-Charge
of the cooperative, respondent judge explained that Gayatin was the
officer
next in line from among the list submitted by complainant himself and
his
co-defendants in Civil Case No. 427-0-99, and that they had never
informed
him about the pending criminal cases filed against Gayatin. He added
that
Atty. John V. Aquino, the RTC Branch Clerk of Court of Olongapo City,
was
appointed the court representative to oversee and assist Gayatin in all
her official acts and urgent other concerns. Respondent judge said that
if any of the parties had felt aggrieved, they could have elevated the
case to the appellate court for appropriate review. He pointed out
that,
upon motion of the defendants, he had inhibited himself from hearing
the
case and that the case had since been re-raffled and assigned to Judge
Asdala of RTC Branch 74.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge to be administratively
liable;
it then recommended that the judge be ordered to pay a fine of
P5,000.00
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt
with severely.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Regrettably, respondent
judge must indeed be sanctioned.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rule 58, Section 4 and
Section 5, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, incorporating the Court's Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 made effective on 1 October 1995 and providing for
special
rules in the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary
injunction, emphasizes the need for hearing and prior notice to the
party
or person sought to be enjoined. The rules provide:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Sec. 4.
Verified
application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining
order.- A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be
granted only when:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
"(c) When an
application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order
is
included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed
in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in
the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any
event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied
by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or
initiatory
pleading and the applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party
in the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"However, where
the
summons could not be served personally or by substituted service
despite
diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the
requirement
of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"(d) The application
for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only
after
all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted
within
twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff's return of service and/or the
records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the
records shall be transmitted immediately.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Sec. 5.
Preliminary
injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary
injunction
shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person
sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty
(20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined,
except
as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
order
said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why
the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly
issue the corresponding order (as amended by En Banc Resolution of the
Supreme Court, Bar Matter No. 803, dated February 17, 1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"However, and
subject
to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of
a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective
only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service
of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is
pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary
injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of the
effectivity
of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including
the
original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In the event that
the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within
the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed
automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not
extendible
without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court
shall
have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which
it was issued."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In fine, Section 5
of Rule 58 proscribes the grant of preliminary injunction without
hearing
and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. (The
original
provision under Section 5 of Rule 58 where the term "ex parte"
described
the nature of a judge's issuance of the twenty-day temporary
restraining
order had been deleted pursuant to an amendment made by the Court en
banc
in its resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 of 17 February 1998.) The
rules,
however, authorize the court to which an application for preliminary
injunction
is made to issue a temporary restraining order if it should appear from
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that "great or
irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice." The temporary restraining order shall be effective for a
period
of twenty days from notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined.
Within the twenty-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to
consider
the propriety for the issuance of an injunction or a preliminary
injunction.
The twenty-day period for the efficacy of a temporary restraining order
is non-extendible; the order automatically terminates at the end of
such
period without the need of any judicial declaration to that effect and
the courts have no discretion to extend the same.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An executive judge of
a multiple-sala court or a presiding judge of a single-sala court may,
in an extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice or
an irreparable injury, issue a temporary restraining order ex parte
which
shall have a duration of only seventy-two hours. The judge shall
immediately
comply with Section 4 thereof by serving the summons and the
accompanying
documents. Within seventy-two hours, he shall conduct a summary hearing
to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended
until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. It might
bear stressing that the total period of effectivity of the temporary
restraining
order, inclusive of the seventy-two hour period, is not to exceed
twenty
days.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this instance, the
complaint, filed on 21 October 1999, sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction against
herein
complainant and the members of the Board of Directors and officers of
the
cooperative. Respondent judge would appear to have issued, on 28
October
1999, the temporary restraining order in favor of the plaintiffs and
while
he did so in view of the perceived urgency of the case involved, he,
however,
failed to conduct a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction within the time prescribed therefor. Respondent
judge offered no explanation on why the scheduled hearing on 12
November
1999 did not take place before the writ of preliminary injunction was
granted
on 17 November 1999, constraining Judge Asdala, to whom the case was
re-raffled
following respondent judge's inhibition, to nullify the writ of
preliminary
injunction issued by respondent judge for having been effected without
prior notice and hearing.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A disregard of the rules
would not just be ignorance of the law; to a large extent, it would be
grave abuse of judicial authority,[8]
and an act prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.[9]
It is true that judges should not be disciplined on account merely of
occasional
mistakes or errors of judgment; however, it is equally imperative that
they should be conversant with basic rules in order to merit the
confidence
of the citizenry.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The suggested fine of
P5,000.00 on respondent judge recommended by the OCA is reasonable and
appropriate.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Anent the appointment
of Lorna Gayatin Officer-in-Charge of the cooperative, the Court agrees
with the findings of the OCA that the complainant has failed to
sufficiently
establish any abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Olongapo
City is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority or misconduct, and he
is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00)
with WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts of infraction
will be dealt with severely.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 427-0-99, entitled "Alexander Panganiban, et
al. v. Angelito Sacro, et al."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
To wit: a) unjustifiably withholding loans of the other members while
approving
their own loans; b) approving unreasonable allowances/honorarium for
themselves
from the cooperative funds; c) terminating the employment of some
officers,
members and employees of the cooperative who have expressed opposition
to the actions taken by therein private respondents; d) naming persons
to various positions even if they do not possess the necessary
qualifications;
and e) allowing disbursements to one of its officers as payment for
communications
equipment, but which were in fact diverted to the personal use and
benefit
of the said officer, in fraud of the Cooperative.
[3]
RTC order dated 17 November 1999, pp. 3–4, Annex B of the Comment of
respondent
judge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
The MTC, Branch 77, Olongapo City (5 counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22),
the MTC, Branch 78, Olongapo City (5 counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22),
and the Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office (I.S. No. 99-2290).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Order dated 26 June 2000 of Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, pp. 4–5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Order dated 26 June 2000 of RTC, Branch 74, pp. 8–12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Golden Gate Realty Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 74289, 31 July
1987, 152 SCRA 684.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
See Lim v. Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1705, 05 May 2003 citing Monterola
v.
Caoibes, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1620, 18 March 2002, 379 SCRA 334.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Adao v. Lorenzo, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1496, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 570;
Abundo
v. Manio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416, 06 August 1999, 312 SCRA 1;
Golangco
v. Villanueva, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1355, 04 September 1997, 278 SCRA 414.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |