SECOND DIVISION
JULIE
C. PITNEY,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-03-1748
(formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 02-1576-RTJ)
November 11, 2003 -versus-
JUDGE
ZEUS C.
ABROGAR,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 150, MAKATI
CITY,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
The instant administrative
case arose when Julie C. Pitney wrote a letter-complaint dated January
8, 2002, charging respondent Judge Zeus C. Abrogar, Regional Trial
Court,
Makati City, Branch 150, with bias and partiality relative to Civil
Case
No. 01-1415 entitled Arturo Rocha, Jr. vs. International School of
Manila,
Inc.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The complainant, as
the Vice-President of the Board of Trustees of the International School
of Manila (ISM), assailed the Order dated December 10, 2001 issued by
the
respondent judge granting the plaintiff's application for preliminary
injunction.
The complainant asserted that in so doing, the respondent judge
violated
the fundamental rules of evidence, and failed to act on their unopposed
Motion to Dismiss filed on October 11, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In another Letter dated
January 15, 2002, the complainant alleged that the respondent judge's
bias
in favor of the plaintiff was apparent, thus:
Our lawyers
filed a Motion to Inhibit on 09 January 2002, a Motion to Resolve the
Motion
to Inhibit on 11 January 2002, and even a Second Motion to Inhibit on
15
January 2002. Please find copies of these three (3) Motions attached as
Annexes "B," "C," and "D," respectively. However, the presiding Judge
has
not yet resolved these Motions, in the same way that he has not yet
resolved
our Motion to Dismiss, which we lodged on the grounds that Mr. Rocha
did
not allow the Board of Trustees to act on the matter, prior to his
suing
the School. The Handbook of Student Regulations is clear that the
penalty
of being dropped from the rolls can only be imposed by the Board of
Trustees,
but before that happened, and before Mr. Rocha had exhausted the avenue
of a subsequent appeal to the Board, he had filed his complaint in
court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This inaction by
the
presiding judge gives us real cause for concern, since our experience
so
far is that he has shown an interest only in taking up and resolving
those
issues raised by Mr. Rocha. It appears that he is oblivious to the
School's
Motion to Dismiss and Inhibit. He has no concern for the School's
compelling
need to uphold the integrity and efficacy of its drug testing program.
He takes no account of the fact that there is no provision in our
Handbook
for students to take private tests to weigh against those organized
through
the School. He chooses to ignore indisputable evidence that the two
tests
used by the school and arranged through separate, independent
laboratories
are far more sensitive and accurate than the drug test used by Mr.
Rocha's
chosen laboratory. x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
The presiding
judge
has made clear his intentions. What lies at the back of his mind is
that
the penalty of being dropped from the rolls for a second violation of
the
School's drug rules and policies is not commensurate with the offense.
It is obvious that, even if the second drug offense is proved, the
judge
will nevertheless prohibit the School from sanctioning Mr. Rocha
according
to our rules.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In both letters,[2]
the complainant apologized to the court for taking the instant course
of
action, "instead of trusting the normal judicial review process over a
judge's actions." The complainant went on to explain that under the
circumstances,
however, unless the respondent judge inhibits himself, the ISM's
endeavors
to ensure that it is a drug-free community would be mocked, since it is
most likely that the respondent judge would rule in favor of the
plaintiff,
Mr. Rocha.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Comment dated
February 15, 2002, the respondent judge averred that the complainant's
letter was "unfair, premature and highly improper, if not malicious,
intended
solely to harass the Court and clearly designed to trample on its
judicial
independence."[3]
The respondent explained that in issuing the assailed Order dated
December
10, 2001, he took into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence,
and used his sound discretion. As to his failure to resolve the motion
to dismiss filed on October 11, 2001, based on the court records, the
plaintiff
had until January 2, 2002 within which to file his comment/opposition.
Since none was filed, the incident was deemed submitted for decision
and
the court had until April 3, 2002 within which to resolve the same.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondent further
explained, thus:
Another
reason
why said motion as well as the other pending incidents, including
defendant's
motion for inhibition and plaintiff's motion to show cause complaining
about defendant's refusal to honor the writ of injunction and the order
dated January 8, 2002 issued by the Court, have remained unacted up to
the present was the parties' oral manifestation that they are on the
point
of amicably settling the case. In fact, hearings on these incidents
have
been postponed several times (January 16, 18, 23, 30, February 7, 12,
2002)
upon agreement of the parties on the ground of alleged talks of
amicable
settlement. In this regard, let it be stated in passing that in the
last
hearing of the pending incidents on February 12, 2002, the parties and
their respective counsel were again seen conferring with one another
inside
the Courtroom but left before their case was called, prompting the
Court
to issue the following order:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"When
called,
none of the parties is in Court. Although they were seen earlier inside
the courtroom they left even before their case was called.
Wherefore,
counsel for
both parties are hereby directed to explain in writing five (5) days
from
receipt of this Order why they should not be cited in contempt for
their
disrespect towards the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED."[5]
In a Report dated
October
2, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator found the complaint to
be
without sufficient basis and recommended its dismissal.
In the instant case,
complainant questions Judge Abrogar's appreciation of the evidence
presented.
Such issue is purely judicial that arose from the exercise by
respondent
judge of his judicial functions hence, it is beyond the scope of our
administrative
jurisdiction. Unless the issues are resolved with finality and the
findings
indicate an illicit or improper motive in the actuations of the Judge,
going after him in an administrative proceeding is premature. If a
party
is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the proper
court for the proper judicial actions and not with the Office of the
Court
Administrator by means of an administrative complaint (Equatorial
Realty
Dev. Inc. vs. Anunciacion, Jr., 280 SCRA 571).[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pursuant to the Court's
Resolution dated December 16, 2002, the respondent manifested his
willingness
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.
The complainant, on the other hand, was required to show cause why she
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt, in view of
her failure to comply with the said resolution.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In behalf of the complainant,
Atty. Juan Jose Rodom T. Fetiza apologized to the Court in a Letter
dated
August 27, 2003. He explained that it was the complainant's lack of
understanding
of the procedures in administrative complaints, which led to the
latter's
failure to comply with the Court's resolution, "rather than an intent
to
be disrespectful, contumacious or nonchalant."[7]
Atty. Fetiza also manifested that his study of the records of the case
revealed that all the pertinent documents had already been submitted in
the complainant's letters to the Court. The complainant herself
apologized
to the Court in another Letter dated September 4, 2003, where she also
manifested her willingness to submit the case for resolution.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree with the recommendations
of the Office of the Court Administrator.cralaw:red
As a matter of policy,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary
action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or
administrative
- for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith.[8]
Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad
faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively
sanctioned.[9]
To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against
the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher
court for review and correction.[11]
An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial
recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an
appeal,
or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is
tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A perusal of the records
failed to indicate any improper motive on the part of the respondent
when
he rendered the assailed decision. A judge's failure to interpret the
law
or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily
render
him administratively liable.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the Court held recently
in Linda MSacmar v. Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio:[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An
administrative
complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the
judicial
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or
judgment.
Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial
review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the
same has not yet been resolved with finality. For until there is a
final
declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or
judgment
is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether
respondent
judge is administratively liable.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court will not
shirk
from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees and
judges
alike; but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits
that serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the instant
administrative complaint against respondent Judge Zeus C. Abrogar is
DISMISSED
for lack of merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Letter-Complaint, pp. 1–2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id. at 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Comment, p. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Report, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Letter, p. 2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Castanos v. Escano, 251 SCRA 174 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Dr. Isagani A. Cruz v. Judge Philbert IIturralde, A.M. No. RTJ No.
03-1775,
April 30, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Linda MSacmar v. Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766,
March
28, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Edgardo D. Balsamo v. Judge Pedro L. Suan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1656,
September
17, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Spouses De Guzman v. Judge Vil Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, June
26,
2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Mina v. Judge Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1264, February 4, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Supra, citing Nelson Rodriguez and Ricardo Camacho v. Judge Rodolfo
Gatdula,
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252, December 17, 2002, and Joaquin T. Borromeo, 311
Phil.
441 (1995).
[15]
Id. at 5. (Emphasis ours.).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Dr. Isagani A. Cruz v. Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |