EN BANC
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
P-02-1651
(formerly OCA
I.P.I.
No. 00-1021-P)
August 4, 2003
-versus-
SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR,
Respondent.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The facts, mostly conceded,
would appear to be a little less than adequate to respond to some
fundamental
issues spawned by the case. The controversy involves Soledad S.
Escritor,
a court interpreter of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas,
Branch
253, who, admittedly, has since 1980 and while married to another, been
cohabiting with Luciano Quilapio Jr., himself married to another.
Escritor
and Quilapio have a nineteen-year old son. Private complainant,
Alejandro
Estrada, is not personally related to Escritor nor does he personally
know
her. He, however, would have her relationship with Quilapio adjudged by
this Court to be immoral in consonance with the pertinent provisions of
the Administrative Code.[1]
In her defense, Escritor contends that under the rules of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, a religious sect of which she is a member, the act of
signing
a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness,[2]
is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be classified
as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor alleges that in compliance with
the
foregoing rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging
Faithfulness
in 1991 and by virtue of such act, they are, for all purposes, regarded
as husband and wife by the religious denomination of which they are
devout
adherents.
The ponencia has thus
justifiably discussed the ramifications of the constitutionally
protected
right of freedom of religion clause on the issue. Nevertheless, one
cannot
help but have a few misgivings. Escritor has admitted to having lived
with
Quilapio since 1980, or for a period of twenty-three years, yet she has
signed the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness only on 28 July 1991,
or
a total of eleven years since her questioned cohabitation. The delay
might
be attributed to a number of reasons. One possibility would be that
Escritor
and Quilapio have tried to comply with the rules of the religious sect
which, as can be so gleaned from the wordings of the Declaration,
requires
one with an impediment to legalize a subsequent union to do "all within
his ability to obtain recognition of the relationship by the proper
authorities."
The facts do not show that either Escritor or Quilapio, complied with
the
foregoing requisite by seeking the annulment of their respective
marriages
during the first eleven years of the questioned union. It may be of no
moment that Escritor has joined the judiciary only in 1999, already
then
a widow, and thus capacitated to enter into another marriage because
then
and now Quilapio remains married to another. Does the act of Escritor
in
signing the declaration pledging faithfulness, long after the actual
union,
a fait accompli, serve to legitimize what might not originally be? I
fear
that the focus would have to instead be on Escritor's freedom of
personal
belief, i.e., whether the invoked provision in the Administrative Code
would impinge on Escritor's freedom of an honestly held belief that her
conduct is morally acceptable and justifiable. The issue then is the
meaning
of "immorality," the standards that can be used to measure it and the
role
that society must be perceived to play. Not all moral norms are covered
by law nor are all laws moral norms.chanrobles virtual law library
It is established that
adultery and concubinage constitute criminal offenses. Thus, I shall
not
delve on the legal and philosophical intricacies that surround them.
The
question should rather be, given the settings, whether under the basic
facts and circumstances thus far disclosed, such "immoral conduct"
should
be dealt with and sanctioned by law. If so, one might likewise examine
under what "moral" authority the law purports to so act.chanrobles virtual law library
The ponencia has taken
pains to distinguish between secular and private morality, and reached
the conclusion that the law, as an instrument of the secular State
should
only concern itself with secular morality. I agree with its
well-written
dissertation emphasizing, in particular, that the state can interfere
with
"private immoralities" to the extent that they affect the general or
the
common good. Defining, however, the line where an immoral conduct
crosses
the private sphere to the realm of a general concern could be a most
daunting
task. Can it be argued, for instance, that there having been no private
offended party, their respective legal spouses never having filed any
criminal
or civil complaint against them, the relationship between Escritor and
Quilapio should be confined solely to the sphere of private morality?
This
question but typifies the thorny relationship, in turn, between law and
morality that has engaged philosophers for centuries — Does society
possess
the right to pass judgment on matter of morals? Second, if it has the
right
to pass such judgment, has it also the right to use the weapon of law
to
enforce it?
Philippine laws on the
subject are veritable repositories of moral laws that sanction immoral
conduct which, at first glance, could appear to be private and to cause
no harm to larger society but nevertheless dealt with. Examples of such
instances include general references to "good moral character" as a
qualification
and as a condition for remaining in public office, and sex between a
man
and a prostitute, though consensual and private, and with no injured
third
party, remains illegal in this country. Until just about a month ago,
the
United States Supreme Court has outlawed acts of sodomy or consensual
sexual
relations between two consenting males, even if done in the privacy of
the bedroom.[3]
Are moral laws such as these justified? Do they not unduly impinge on
one's
own freedom of belief? chanrobles virtual law library
Law and Morals
Law and morals, albeit
closely connected, may proceed along different planes. Law is primarily
directed at man's behavior while morals are directed at his animus or
state
of mind.[4]
While the law often makes reference to one's state of mind, it does
not,
however, punish the existence of immoral intent without more. It
requires
only that at the risk of punitive sanctions for disobedience, one must
refrain from the temptation to act in accordance with such intent to
the
detriment of another. The ethical principle is generally cast,
affirmatively
or negatively, in the form of a direct command, whereas the legal rule
speaks, generally, of the consequences that attend the violation of a
duty.[5]
As to purpose, law and morals further diverge. Morals strive for
individual
perfection, while law aim at harmony in the community.[6]chanrobles virtual law library
Not all societal mores
are codified into laws. We have yet to see a law outlawing vanity,
pride,
gluttony or sloth. Nor are all laws necessarily moral. Slavery is
outlawed
but not so in our distant past. Laws allowing racial segregation
prejudicial
to blacks or denying the right to suffrage to women may seem to be
relics
of a long gone uncivilized society if one forgets that the abolition of
these "immoral laws" is but less than a century ago.chanrobles virtual law library
The observation brings
to the fore some characteristics of morals, which make it unwise to
insist
that it be, at all times, co-extensive with law — First, morals are not
entirely error free. To insist that laws should always embody the
prevailing
morality without questioning whether the morals sought to be upheld are
in themselves right or wrong would be a dangerous proposition. Second,
morals continuously change over time, often too slowly to be
immediately
discerned. To ensure that laws keep pace with the ever-changing
moralities
would be quite a perplexed, if not a futile, an endeavor. Third,
standards
of morality vary. Modern society is essentially pluralist. People of
different
faiths owe common allegiance to the State. Different moral judgments
flow
from varying religious premises that, obviously, the law cannot all
accommodate.[7]
The Common Origin
of Morality and the Law
That law and morals
are closely intertwined is a traditionally held belief. One school of
thought
even go as far as calling a law without morality as not law at all; but
naked power, and that human beings not only have a legal, but also the
moral obligation to obey the law.[8]
It suggests that where law clashes with morality, it can impose no
obligation,
moral or otherwise, upon anyone to obey it; one may actually be morally
bound to disobey such law.[9]
The ancient role held by the Christian Church as being the ruler of
both
spiritual and temporal affairs of men has laid that groundwork for the
impression. The Judaic-Christian God is thought to be the source of
both
law and morality and man has come to know of His law and morals through
the human soul, the human conscience and the human mind.[10]
With the rise of the secular state in the 16th and 17th centuries and
the
corresponding decline in the authority of the Church, legal thinkers
such
as Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui would establish legal systems
based
on scientific principles deduced from the nature of men and things,
that
would guide the behavior of the metaphysical man in directions that
promote
political order and assure a measure of protected individual dignity.[11]
Such treatises on natural law have offered model political systems
based
on scientific principles logically deduced from the nature of man and
the
nature of things, serving to give a kind of scientific legitimacy to
the
newly formed nation states emerging in the 17th and 18th centuries
under
human sovereigns. Not surprisingly, sovereigns of that era promulgated
natural law codes consisting of religious commandments, quasi-human
moral
values and civic virtues all couched in the language of legal
proscriptions
proclaimed and enforced by secular states.[12]
Human conduct condemned by God's law and forbidden by the sovereign's
law
would be said to be morally, as well as legally, reprehensible or malum
in se.[13]
As the law of the state
became inexorably intertwined with higher moral law, based on both
divine
law and the law of nature, so, also, human law was seen to carry the
moral
authority of both.[14]
Jurisprudential ramifications could hardly be contained.cralaw:red
In the last 19th century,
legal reformers have consciously inculcated moral concepts such as
fault,
intent, and extenuating circumstances into both civil and criminal law.
Law and morals have been drawn closer together so that legal
accountability,
more accurately than not, would likewise reflect moral culpability.[15]
Vestiges of these reforms are still enshrined in our laws. In the
Revised
Penal Code, for example, mitigating, extenuating or aggravating
circumstances
that may either decrease or increase the penalties to be meted on an
offender
are all based on the moral attributes of the crime and the criminal.chanrobles virtual law library
The Academic
Polemic
With the emergence of
the secular state, the greatest contribution of liberals to the issue
is
not the discovery of a pre-existing, necessary distinction between law
and morality; rather, it is their attempt at separation, the building
of
the wall to separate law from morality, whose coincidence is sublimely
monstrous.[16]
Liberals attempt to divorce law from morality by characteristically
adhering
to some form of "harm" principle: public authority may justly use law
as
coercive factor only to prevent harm to non-consenting third parties.
More
specifically, the main distinguishing feature of liberalism is its
opposition
to morals law or the legal interference up to and including (sometimes)
prohibition of putatively "victimless" immoralities such as sodomy,
prostitution,
fornication, recreational drug use, suicide and euthanasia.[17]
Liberals argue that moral laws are, in principle, unjust.cralaw:red
This surge of liberalism
has set the trend in the courts to adopt a neutral and disinterested
stand
in cases involving moral issues, often at the expense of obscuring the
values which society seeks to enforce through its moral laws. This
matter
brings to mind the case of Grisworld vs. Connecticut[18]
where the US Supreme Court, despite a presupposition that contraception
is always wrong, nevertheless, has invalidated that state's
anti-contraceptive
law. In so deciding, the US Supreme Court has not met head-on the issue
of whether the use of contraception is immoral but instead has struck
down
the law as being invalid on the ground of marital privacy. Should
Grisworld
then be taken to sanction a moral right to do a moral wrong?
Into the
Twentieth
Century: the Devlin-Hart Debate
On September 1957 in
England, the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution chaired
by Sir John Wolfenden has recommended in its report to the British
Parliament
that homosexual behavior between two consenting adults in private
should
no longer be a criminal offense. The thesis holds that it is not the
duty
of the law to concern itself with immorality as such. The report has
proposed
to resolve questions of the legitimacy of legally enforcing moral
obligations
by distinguishing immoralities that implicate public interests from
immoralities
that are merely private.[19]
The Wolfenden Report would spark an academic debate that persists to
this
day.chanrobles virtual law library
Patrick Devlin, then
a High Court judge, has argued at the British Academy's 1959 Maccabaean
Lecture that it would be a mistake to posit a private sphere of
immorality
into which the law ought not to venture. Devlin's legal moralism hinges
on the theory that moral offenses insofar as they affect common good
are
fit subjects for legislation. Whether behavior, private or public may
affect
common good in such a manner that endanger the fabric of society and
should
thus be suppressed by law is a question of fact, which can be answered
only after a full consideration of the conditions prevailing in a given
society.[20]
To Devlin, morals are not merely a matter of private judgment; society
should be in a position to enforce its moral standards as a means of
self-preservation,
"whatever its morality happens to be."[21]
Devlin would thus become the forerunner of ethical relativism which
suggests
that there is no "right" and "wrong" in any absolute sense, that right
or wrong depend entirely on the culture in which one happens to live.[22]
Devlin then would tolerate individual freedom only as far as possible
and
as long as it is consistent with the integrity of society.[23]
Hence, while privacy is respected, it may be forfeited where one person
injures another.[24]
H.L.A. Hart refutes
Devlin's suggestion that immorality, even if private, can be likened to
treason, against which it is permissible for society to take steps to
preserve
itself.[25]
Hart sees Devlin's view of people living in a single society as having
common moral foundation as overly simplistic. To Hart, societies have
always
been diverse. With the rise of democracy, society could more accurately
be called a collectivity of ideas and attitudes, an assemblage or
gathering
of people who live together and work together and govern themselves
collectively
in spite of the great diversities that divide them.[26]
Hart places emphasis on the right to privacy and freedom of action
which
ought to be protected and should be interfered with only when private
behavior
ceases to be private and becomes a menace to the public or to some part
of the public.[27]
One may deduce from Hart's arguments that private consensual moral
offenses
should not be legally prohibited because of the difficulties in
enforcing
such laws and the near impossibility of detecting most offenses without
an unconscionable invasion of privacy.[28]chanrobles virtual law library
Hart criticizes attempts
to impose the morality of the majority on a few. Justification for
punishment
especially when applied to conduct not harmful to others represents a
value
to be pursued at the cost of human suffering, the bare expression of
moral
condemnation and treats the infliction of suffering as a uniquely
appropriate
mode of expression. The idea that we may punish offenders against a
moral
code not to prevent harm but simply as a means of venting or expressing
moral condemnation is uncomfortably close to human sacrifice as a form
of religious worship.[29]
To Hart, Vox populi does not necessarily translate to Vox Dei.[30]
Hart particularly singles out laws aimed at enforcing sexual morality
as
oppressive — "Laws designed to enforce sexual morality to the extent
that
they interfere with certain forms of sexual expression and restrict the
sexual outlet that may be available, impose an acute form of suffering
upon those who are thus deprived of the only outlet available to them."
Such laws and the coercive measures that may be used to enforce them
"may
create misery of quite a special degree. All restraints then must be
justified
by strong reasons."[31]
Quoting John Stuart Mill in his essay "On Liberty", Hart expounds —
"The
only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any
member
of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. He
cannot be rightfully compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the
opinion
of others, to do so would be wise or right."[32]
Arriving at an
Acceptable
Middle Ground
But Hart is not without
his critics, among them being Robert P. George. George acknowledges
that
laws per se cannot make men moral; laws can only succeed in commanding
outward conformity to moral rules but cannot compel internal acts of
reason.
Such an instance would be a law requiring all people to contribute to
the
charities. While fear of sanctions would force one to make such
contribution,
the same does not necessarily make him charitable. George, however,
contends
that laws can be utilized to make men moral by: (1) preventing further
sell-corruption, (2) preventing bad example (3) helping to preserve the
moral ecology and (4) educating people about right and wrong.[33]
Thus, to him, moral laws punishing victimless sexual immoralities, for
example, proceed from the conviction that the acts are truly wrong and
that they damage the characters of the people who perform them, block
the
path to virtue, and in specific ways offend against the common good.[34]
George cites Aristotle who, centuries ago, had long anticipated but
criticized
and firmly rejected the doctrine of mainstream contemporary liberalism,
namely the belief that the law should merely be a guarantor of men's
rights
against another — instead of being, as it should be, a rule of life
such
as will make the members of the polis good and just.chanrobles virtual law library
Robert George submits,
and I agree, that while morality cannot be legislated, laws can help
make
men moral by creating a "moral ecology" and profoundly affecting
notions
in society about what is morally acceptable, forbidden and required.
People
shape their own lives and often treat others very differently in the
light
of these notions. The point is, "a good moral ecology benefits people
by
encouraging and supporting their efforts to be good, a bad moral
ecology
harms people by offering them opportunities and inducements to do
things
that are wicked."[35]
To illustrate, the decision of US Supreme Court in Brown vs. Topeka
Board
of Education in 1954 and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has primarily
been responsible in changing society's perception on forced segregation
or interracial marriage.cralaw:red
It might then be deduced
that moral laws are justified when they (1) seek to preserve the moral
value upheld by society and (2) when the morality enforced in a certain
case, is true and correct. It is within these standards that the
provision
against "immorality" in the Administrative Code must be examined to the
extent that such standards can apply to the facts and circumstances in
the instant case before the Court. As a rule then, moral laws are
justified
only to the extent that they directly or indirectly serve to protect
the
interests of the larger society. It is only where their rigid
application
would serve to obliterate the value which society seeks to uphold, or
defeat
the purpose for which they are enacted, would a departure be justified.chanrobles virtual law library
The Morality of
Marriage
Marriage is one area
where law and morality closely intersect. The act of respondent
Escritor
of cohabiting with Quilapio, a married man, can only be called
"immoral"
in the sense that it defies and transgresses the institution of
marriage.
Society having a deep interest in the preservation of marriage,
adultery
is a matter of public, not merely private, concern, that cannot readily
be ignored.[36]
This deep seated interest is apparent in our Civil Code so replete with
rules as in defining the parties' legal capacity to marry, in laying
down
the essential requisites of the union, in regulating the rights and
duties
of the spouses, even their property relations, and in protecting the
rights
of children. Marriage has acquired a legal definition as early as the
12th
century that has since grown towards a cherished institution with
Gregorian
Reform of the 11th and 12th centuries.cralaw:red
With the separation
of the Church and State, marriage has retained its status as a legally
protected viculum because it is perceived to be imbued with societal
interest
as a foundation of the family and the basic unit of society. While
Islamic
states recognize polygamous marriages and, in Western countries,
divorce
is acceptable, in the Philippines, however, absolute monogamy is still
the order of the day. Societal interest in monogamous unions is
grounded
on the belief that the cohesiveness of the family is better protected,
and children, prized for their role in the perpetuation of the future
of
the community, are better reared when spouses remain together. These
societal
interests are embodied in moral laws geared towards protecting the
monogamous
nature of Philippine marriages.[37]
But I do not endeavor to examine whether Philippine society is correct
in viewing monogamy as the better means for the protection of societal
interest on the family but I do would focus myself on, given the facts
of the case, whether or not societal interest is rightly served.cralaw:red
Thus, I, in conscience,
would take exception to the 1975 case of De Dios vs. Alejo.[38]
In De Dios, respondents Elias Marfil and Julieta O. Alejo, deputy
sheriff
and stenographer of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
respectively,
were administratively found guilty of immorality for living together
despite
Marfil's prior existing marriage with another woman. Never mind if
Marfil
exerted valiant efforts to save his marriage by enduring the
recriminations,
unhappiness and extreme incompatibility he had with his wife. Never
mind
if notwithstanding his efforts, his wife abandoned him and their four
children
to live with another man. Never mind if Alejo took on the duties and
responsibilities
of being the mother to his children, rearing them as though they were
her
very own long after their natural mother had left them. Never mind if
the
children had, in fact, regarded her as their very own mother. Never
mind
if she was a good wife to the man she was living with, fulfilling the
wifely
duties long after the legal wife had abdicated them. Never mind if in
all
respects, they had become a family. Did not the Court in adjudging them
guilty of immorality and in ordering them to put an end to their
relationship,
destroy a de facto family? Did not its narrow-minded view of marriage
as
a contractual transaction and its exacting application of the standards
of monogamy, in effect, defeat the very moral purpose for which the law
was put into place?
Are we not sacrificing
the substance of marriage — that is a union of man and woman in a
genuine,
loving and respectful relationship and, in effect, the substance of a
family,
for a mere shell of intricate legality? Lest I be misunderstood, I am
not
advocating for a departure from the elevated concept marriage as being
a legally protected union. I merely express concern that a blanket
application
of moral laws affecting marriage, without regard to the peculiarities
of
every case, might defeat the very purpose for which those laws are put
into place.cralaw:red
Thus, I vote for the
remand of the case to allow a thorough examination on whether a strict
application of the provision in the administrative code prohibiting
immorality,
under the facts and circumstances of the case, would defeat the very
purpose
which it seeks to serve. A remand would allow the parties to assess the
factual issues, to adduce further evidence, if necessary, and to make
out
their case towards this direction.
____________________________
Endnotes:
VITUG, J.chanrobles virtual law library
[1]
Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Section 46(b) (5) of the Revised
Administrative
Code provides; viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec.
46. Discipline: General Provisions — (a) No officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided
by law and after due process.
(b)
The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx
xxx
xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(5)
disgraceful and immoral conduct
[2]
DECLARATION PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS
I,
Soledad S. Escritor, do hereby declare that I have accepted Luciano D.
Quilapio, Jr., as my mate in marital relationship; that I have done all
within my ability to obtain legal recognition of this relationship by
the
proper public and that it is because of having been unable to do so
that
I therefore make this public declaration pledging faithfulness in this
marital relationship.chanrobles virtual law library
I
recognize this relationship as a binding tie before Jehovah God and
before
all persons to be held to and honored in full accord with the
principles
of God's Word. I will continue to seek the means to obtain legal
recognition
of this relationship by the civil authorities and if at any future time
a change in the circumstances makes this possible, I promise to
legalize
this union.
Signed
this 28th day of July, 1991.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Lawrence, et al. v. Texas, US Supreme Court, 26 June 2003.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Louis Altman, Calimann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and
Monopolies,
(4th Edition) Current through the Spring 2003 Supplement
[5]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Norman St. John-Stevas, "Law and Morals," Hawthorne Books Publishers,
N.Y.
1st Edition, October 1964, at p. 18.
[8]
Calvin Woodard, Symposium: The Moral Lawyer. "Thoughts on the Interplay
Between Morality and Law in Modern Legal Thought." Notre Dame Law
Review
1989.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Ibid.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Jeanne L. Schroeder and David Gray Carlson, "Review Essay: Kenneth
Starr:
Diabolically Evil?" California Law Review, March 2000.
[17]
Gerard Bradley, "Plural Perfectionism: A Review Essay of Making Men
Moral",
Notre Dame Law Review, 1996.
[18]
381 US 479 (1965).
[19]
Robert P. George, "Making Men Moral", Civil Liberties and Public
Morality,"
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.
[20]
Norman St. John-Stevas, supra, at p. 27.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Gerard V. Bradley, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Burton M. Leiser, Liberty, Justice and Morals: Contemporary Value
Conflicts,"
MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1973, at p. 12.
[23]
Ibid., p. 25.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Ibid., p. 13.
[25]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Ibid., pp. 28-32.
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Hart, infra, at 65-66.
[30]
Hart, infra, at p. 79.
[31]
Leiser, supra., at p. 15.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
H.L.A. Hart, "Law, Liberty and Morality," Stanford University Press,
Stanford
California, 1963, pp. 4-5.
[33]
Robert P. George, supra., at p. 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Bradley, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
Bradley, supra.
[36]
Leiser, supra., at p. 12.
[37]
Crimes against chastity under our Revised Penal Code include adultery,
concubinage, and bigamy. Under our Civil Code, divorce is not allowed.
Annulment of marriage, which capacitates a person to contract a
subsequent
marriage, is granted only in very limited instances.
[38]
68 SCRA 354. |