EN BANC
JOHN SIY LIM,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-02-1705
May 5,
2003 -versus-
JUDGE ANTONIO J.
FINEZA,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Litigation must at some
time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors, for public
policy
dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable,
the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by
some subterfuge devised by the losing party.[1]
In a sworn Letter-Complaint[2]
dated November 27, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator
(OCA), John Siy Lim charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Caloocan City, with gross
ignorance
of the law and grave misconduct for his refusal to issue a writ of
execution
in Civil Case No. 14542.cralaw:red
Complainant alleged
that he is the defendant in Civil Case No. 14542, "Tomas See Tuazon vs.
John Siy Lim," raffled to respondent judge’s sala. On December 2,
1991, respondent decided the case in his favor. Dissatisfied with
the verdict, both parties seasonably filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. On November 16, 1992, respondent issued an Order
reversing his Decision. Thus, complainant appealed to the Court
of
Appeals. On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision
reversing respondent’s assailed Order and reinstating his Decision,
prompting
plaintiff Tomas See Tuazon to file with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari. Complainant also alleged that on October 3,
2000, this Court rendered its Decision[3]
denying the petition and affirming the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Plaintiff Tuazon filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied
in a Resolution dated March 7, 2001 for having been filed out of
time.
On March 16, 2001, an Entry of Judgment was issued and eventually the
records
of the case were remanded to the lower court for execution of the
judgment.cralaw:red
On June 14, 2001, complainant
filed with respondent’s court a motion for execution. On June 22,
2001, plaintiff Tuazon filed an opposition thereto contending that his
Motion to Recall Resolution dated March 7, 2001 and the Entry of
Judgment
is still pending resolution by this Court.chanrobles virtual law library
On June 28, 2001, plaintiff
Tuazon filed with respondent’s court a motion for leave to file
memorandum
to expound his grounds alleged in his opposition. This motion was
granted by respondent judge.cralaw:red
Complainant further
alleged that on September 10, 2001, respondent judge issued an order
denying
his motion for execution for being premature. Respondent was not
being honest considering that as early as August 13, 2001, this Court
ordered
that plaintiff’s Motion to Recall Resolution dated March 7, 2001 and
Entry
of Judgment be expunged from the records.cralaw:red
In his comment[4]
on the complaint, respondent denied the charges leveled against him,
claiming
that complainant’s allegations are untrue and misleading. He
explained
that he denied complainant’s motion for execution because it was
prematurely
filed. Moreover, he did not resolve complainant’s motion for
execution
immediately because he filed a wrong pleading. He should have
submitted
a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his motion for
execution.
Instead, he filed a Manifestation and Comment informing respondent that
this Court dismissed plaintiff’s Motion to Recall Resolution dated
March
7, 2001 and Entry of Judgment.cralaw:red
On March 17, 2002, the
OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, submitted
its Report[5]
recommending that respondent judge be held liable for gross ignorance
of
the law and that a fine of P10,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a
warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more
severely.cralaw:red
Pursuant to the Resolution
dated June 26, 2002 of this Court (Third Division),[6]
this case was re-docketed as a regular administrative case and was
referred
to Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole of the Court of Appeals for
investigation,
report and recommendation.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 3, 2002,
Justice Dadole submitted her Report. Her findings and recommendation
are
reproduced hereunder:
x
x xchanrobles virtual law library
"There is no dispute
that the subject decision in Civil Case No. 14542 had already become
final
and executory. In fact, an entry of judgment was already
issued
by the Honorable Supreme Court where this case was elevated. Hence, as
such, execution of the said decision should have been issued as a
matter
of right, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
procedure,
as amended, which reads:
‘Section 1. Execution
upon judgment or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a
matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the
action
or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected.’
"In other words, it
becomes a ministerial duty on the part of the court to order execution
of its final and executory judgment. This is basic legal
principle
which every trial judge ought to know.chanrobles virtual law library
"In denying the issuance
of the writ of execution in compliance with the clear mandate of the
above-quoted
procedural law, respondent judge either deliberately disregarded this
law
or demonstrated ignorance thereof. Judge Fineza’s justification that
said
Motion for Execution was prematurely filed considering plaintiff Tomas
See Tuazon’s Motion to Recall Supreme Court Resolution dated 7 March
2001
and Entry of Judgment dated 16 March 2001 was still pending before the
Supreme Court is thus misplaced. Basic is the rule that a
judge
cannot amend a final decision. There was nothing more to be done,
in such a case, except to execute the judgment.cralaw:red
"The explanation of
Judge Fineza that it is not true that he incurred a delay in resolving
complainant’s motion for writ of execution deserves scant
consideration.
The records reveal that complainant’s Motion for Execution was filed by
complainant on 14 June 2001 with a denial for trivial and flimsy
reasons.
A total of eight-eighty (88) days was, therefore, incurred by
respondent.
An actuation suggestive not only of bad faith on his part but also
manifest
delay in the administration of justice. For a Motion for
Execution
is an uncontroverted and non-litigious pleading, most especially if the
subject decision is already final and executory. Thus, respondent
judge clearly deprived the complainant of what is due him under the
judgment
which was already final and executory.cralaw:red
"Moreover, with respondent
judge’s state of being an RTC Judge for quite a number of years
already,
Investigating Justice cannot believe that he does not know how to
distinguish
a motion that is filed for justifiable and valid reason from that which
is filed merely for the purpose of delay.cralaw:red
"In the same vein, respondent
judge exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he assumed that
plaintiff’s
Motion to Recall Supreme Court Resolution dated 7 March 2001 and Entry
of Judgment dated 16 March 2001 could stay a final and executory
decision
by the Honorable Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that once a
judgment
has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the
fruits
of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same
parties or by orders for clarification by the magistrates themselves
(Buaya
vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., 342 SCRA 576 [2000]).chanrobles virtual law library
x
x xchanrobles virtual law library
"Even assuming arguendo
that respondent cannot be faulted for ignorance of the law, he
deliberately
allowed himself to be used as a tool or instrument of the losing party
in that civil case by deliberately favoring the latter in order to
frustrate
the enjoyment of complainant’s right by virtue of a favorable decision.cralaw:red
"While judges should
not be disciplined for inefficiency on account of occasional mistakes
or
errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be
conversant
with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the
confidence
of the citizenry. Respondent judge has shown lack of
familiarity
with our laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public
confidence
in the integrity of the courts (Cacayoren vs. Suller, 344 SCRA 159, 167
[2002]; Rodriguez vs. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519 [2000]).
"RECOMMENDATIONchanrobles virtual law library
"On the basis of the
foregoing evaluation and the evidence presented by both the complainant
and the respondent, the undersigned Investigating Justice recommends
that
respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza be made to pay a fine in the amount
of P30,000 for gross ignorance of the law in connection with his
refusal
to issue an Order for the Execution of the Judgment in Civil Case No.
14542,
with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely."[7]
(Emphasis supplied.)
While we agree with
Justice Dadole that respondent judge should be administratively
sanctioned
for "his refusal to issue an Order for the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 14542," we cannot go along with her conclusion that he
did
so due to "gross ignorance of the law." We believe that
respondent
knew very well that the subject judgment was final and executory and
that,
therefore, he should grant complainant’s motion for execution, but he
deliberately
refused to do so.cralaw:red
Justice Dadole correctly
stated that "it is a basic legal principle which every trial judge
ought
to know" that once a final judgment becomes executory, "it becomes a
ministerial
duty on the part of the court to order its execution." The rule is so
elementary
that it is highly unlikely not to be known by respondent judge. In
denying
complainant’s motion for execution, Justice Dadole accurately found
that
respondent judge "deliberately allowed himself to be used as a tool or
instrument of the losing party in that civil case by deliberately
favoring
the latter in order to frustrate the enjoyment of complainant’s right
by
virtue of a favorable decision." Such actuation, as she aptly
concluded,
is "suggestive not only of bad faith on his (respondent judge’s) part
but
also manifest delay in the administration of justice." Undoubtedly,
respondent
judge is guilty of gross misconduct.cralaw:red
Gross misconduct has
been defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence.[8]
In Spouses Adriano and Hilda Monterola vs. Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.,[9]
we ruled that "the observance of the law, which respondent judge ought
to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; x x x failure
to consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or principle in the
discharge
of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and the title he holds or is too viscious that the oversight
or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial
authority."chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent should be
reminded that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges
are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.[10]
When the judge himself becomes a transgressor of the law which he is
sworn
to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for
the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary
itself.[11]
Under Section 8(3),
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, gross misconduct is
classified as a serious administrative offense punishable by any of the
sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule, thus:
"Sec.
11.
Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
"1.
Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations;
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include
accrued leave benefits;
"2. Suspension
from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not
exceeding six (6) months; or
"3. A fine of
more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00."chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, the fine
of P30,000.00 recommended by Justice Dadole is in order.
chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Antonio J. Fineza is found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and is
hereby
FINED in the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition
of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115829, June 5, 1995, 245 SCRA 20.
[2]
Rollo at 41-43.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Tuazon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119794, October 3, 2000, 341 SCRA
707.
[4]
Rollo at 26-33.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 1-5.
[6]
Id. at 57.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Id. at 104-118.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Manuel vs. Judge Calimag, Jr., 367 Phil. 162, 166-167 (1999); Quiroz
vs.
Orfila, 338 Phil. 828, 835 (1997) citing Office of the Court
Administrator
vs. Bucoy, 235 SCRA 588, 595 (1994) and Amosco vs. Magro, 73 SCRA 107,
108-109 (1976); Arcenio vs. Pagorogon, A.M. No. MTJ-89-270, July 5,
1993,
224 SCRA 246, 254.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1620, March 18, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Vedaña vs. Judge Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 329 (1998).
[11]
Id. at 331. |