THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES ARTURO
AND
JOSEFINA DE GUZMAN,
Complainants,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-02-1736
June 26, 2003 -versus-
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL
PAMINTUAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 3, BAGUIO
CITY,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
A judge may not always
be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision
he renders. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy
where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for
reconsideration,
an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
decision
is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. This is
the
standing policy of this Court.[1]
This administrative
case stemmed from a sworn Letter-Complaint of Spouses Arturo and
Josefina
de Guzman, charging Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, with gross ignorance of the law,
gross
incompetence, manifest favoritism and/or misconduct.chanrobles virtual law library
Records show that Arturo
de Guzman filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio an
application
for a writ of demolition of the house of Wilson Gomez built without
permission
on complainants’ residential lot. On March 26, 2001, the Office
of
the City Mayor issued Demolition Order No. 22.cralaw:red
After the service of
the Demolition Order upon Gomez, he filed with respondent’s court Civil
Case No. 4918-R for specific performance with prayer for a temporary
restraining
order and preliminary injunction against complainants and the City
Mayor
of Baguio.cralaw:red
Gomez alleged, among
others, in his complaint that spouses De Guzman promised to give him a
portion of their residential lot in exchange for the services he
rendered
as "caretaker gratis" of the property; and that they allowed him to
build
concrete wall and galvanized roof on his shanty.cralaw:red
On April 26, 2001, respondent
judge issued a temporary restraining order and on May 10, 2001, a writ
of preliminary injunction. On May 18, 2001, Gomez posted an
injunctive bond in the sum of P 100,000.00 through the Pacific Union
Insurance
Company (Pacific Union). Considering that the Assistant Clerk of
Court found the bond to be in order, respondent judge approved the same.cralaw:red
On May 24, 2001, the
Clerk of Court issued a Certification that the bond is defective
because
the clearance attached thereto pertains to Mega Pacific Insurance
Company,
the sister company of Pacific Union. Upon being apprised of the
mistake,
Pacific Union filed with respondent’s court a letter of apology
explaining
that the bond was inadvertently "typed" on the forms of Mega Pacific.cralaw:red
Meanwhile, on May 25,
2001, the Assistant Officer-in-Charge in the Legal Office of the Court
Administrator issued a Certification quoted as follows:
"This is to
certify that the latest certification issued by this Office to MEGA
PACIFIC
INSURANCE CORPORATION certifying that it has no pending obligation with
respect to criminal and civil cases in the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio
City was dated April 6, 2001 and valid up to May 2, 2001 only.
Thereafter
this Office has not issued a similar certification."chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, on June 8, 2001,
complainants filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction
previously issued by respondent judge on the ground that the bond is
defective.
In view of the continuing objection of the complainants, Pacific Union
decided to withdraw the bond.chanrobles virtual law library
Gomez posted another
bond, this time, through BF General Insurance Company. However,
defendant
City Mayor of Baguio filed an opposition on the ground that the person
who signed the bond was not authorized by the company.cralaw:red
On June 14, 2001, the
Clerk of Court submitted to respondent judge a manifestation that the
said
bonding company has a pending liability before Branch 6 "in connection
with confiscated bonds issued by it in Criminal Cases Nos. 18146-R and
18147-R." Hence, respondent judge ordered its cancellation.cralaw:red
On June 21, 2001, complainants
filed a supplemental motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction.
In an Order dated July 25, 2001, respondent judge denied the motion.cralaw:red
Thereafter, Gomez secured
another bonding company, the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
(Capital
Insurance). Again, the bond posted was found to be
defective.
The OCA certified that Capital Insurance has a pending liability and
therefore
can not transact business.cralaw:red
On August 8, 2001, complainants
instituted the instant administrative complaint. On August 16,
2001,
they filed with respondent’s court a motion for inhibition. On
September
18, 2001, respondent judge issued an order denying the same.chanrobles virtual law library
In his Report and Recommendation
dated September 6, 2002, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found
that respondent judge, by failing to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction,
is liable for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority
and
recommended that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon him with a stern
warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.cralaw:red
In a Resolution dated
November 11, 2002, this Court ordered that this case be docketed as an
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest, within 20
days
from notice, whether they are submitting the case for decision on the
basis
of the pleadings already filed.cralaw:red
Both parties filed their
respective manifestations that they are willing to have the case so
decided.cralaw:red
The sole issue for our
resolution is whether respondent judge is administratively liable as
charged
for denying complainants’ motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction
he issued in Civil Case No. 4918-R.cralaw:red
It is the established
doctrine and policy of this Court that an administrative action is not
the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or
decision
issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a
motion
for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.
Disciplinary
proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory of, nor
a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary.
For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged
act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at
all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for
every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would
be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable.
To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is
only
where the error is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty
that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.[2]chanrobles virtual law library
In Flores vs. Abesamis,[3]
we held:
"As
everyone
knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities
being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be
regarded
as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence,
or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or
legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of
a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal.
The
extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise
of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
actions
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition
for change of venue, as the case may be.
"Now, the
established
doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute
for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry
of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites
for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges
concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an
inquiry
into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to
have
opened, or closed.chanrobles virtual law library
"Flores
(complainant)
resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal
actions)
as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeals or
review
provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the
Judges’ orders had caused him ‘undue injury.’ This is
impermissible,
as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and
logic
decree that ‘administrative or criminal remedies are neither
alternative
nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and
must
wait on the result thereof’ (See In Re: Wenceslao Laureta,
148 SCRA 382, 417-418 [1987]; In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405
[1995]. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not
be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative
sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance
of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be
recognized
independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts
done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that
exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if ‘there be a
final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the
manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and x
x x also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence,
on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order’ or under
the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code
(see
In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, at pp. 464-465).
"x
x
x. In fine, Flores filed his administrative and criminal
complaints
prematurely, before ascertainment of the existence of foundation
therefor;
x x x." (Emphasis added.)chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case,
complainants
did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent
judge’s order denying the motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Following our settled pronouncements cited above, we find the instant
administrative
complaint vulnerable to dismissal for being premature.
Moreover, to constitute
gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence, but were motivated by bad faith,
fraud,
malice or dishonesty.[4]
Here, we can not discern from the records any taint of those defects on
the part of respondent judge in denying complainants’ motion to
dissolve
the writ of preliminary injunction. At the very least, his act
constitutes
an error of judgment correctible by a motion for reconsideration and
other
applicable subsequent remedies under the Rules.cralaw:red
Complainants moved that
respondent judge inhibit himself inasmuch as an administrative
complaint
was filed against him. Suffice it to state that a mere filing of
an administrative case against a judge is not a ground for
disqualifying
him from hearing a case.[5]chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, as to the allegations
of bias and partiality, we find no reason to delve into these matters
as
they are not sustained by evidence but are only based on the opinion of
complainants. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough.
There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove this
charge.
The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent
as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice[6]
which is not present here.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the instant
administrative complaint against respondent Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan
is hereby DISMISSED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Panganiban,
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Abraham L. Mendova vs. Crisanto B. Afable, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1402,
December
4, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[2]
Mendova vs. Afable, supra, citing Santos vs. Orlino, 357 Phil. 102
(1998);
In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 311 Phil. 441 (1995); Rodrigo vs. Quijano,
A.M. No. 731-MJ, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 10, 12; Dizon vs. De Borja,
A.C. No. 163-J, January 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 46, 52; Urbina vs. Maceren,
156
Phil. 402 (1974).
[3]
A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302, 316-317.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Dayot vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1282, March 1, 2001, 353 SCRA 280.
[5]
Cruz vs. Joven, 415 Phil. 598 (2001).chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Philippine Geriatics Foundation, Inc. vs. Layosa, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1249,
September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 287. |