EN BANC
GREGORIO LIMPOT
LUMAPAS,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-99-1519
June 26, 2003
-versus-
JUDGE CAMILO E.
TAMIN, PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, BRANCH 23,
9TH JUDICIAL REGION,
MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA
DEL SUR,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
PER
CURIAM:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Because of the obstinate
refusal of Respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, to issue a writ of execution
of
the final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820, complainant
Gregorio
Limpot Lumapas charged respondent of grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law.[1]
Complainant also averred that the respondent’s action is in defiance of
this Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519, dated June 27, 2000[2]
where this Court ordered the respondent to pay a fine for failing to
fulfill
the ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution in CA-G.R. CV No.
31820
and to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals
ordering
him to issue a writ of execution. The dispositive portion of our
Resolution
in Lumapas v. Tamin reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
for refusing to fulfill a ministerial duty and to obey an order issued
by a superior court, respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, presiding judge
of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, is
ordered
to pay a fine of P20,000.00. He is further warned that a commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with even more
severely.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Complainant averred
that
following this Court’s denial on September 13, 2000[4]
of the respondent’s motion for reconsideration,[5]
he filed with the trial court on September 19, 2000 another motion for
execution[6]
of the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820. As previously mentioned, the
respondent
denied the motion by Order[7]
dated September 22, 2000.
In his comment,[8]
the respondent challenged this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the
instant
Complaint. According to him, what is essentially involved is a question
of law because it calls for an interpretation of the complainant’s
right.
The administrative complaint being an original action, to entertain it
is against the settled rule that a judicial matter involving a question
of law cannot be raised to the Supreme Court through an original action
but only through either appeal or certiorari pursuant to Section 5(2)(e)[9]
of Article VIII of the Constitution. He contended that a division of
the
Supreme Court has no constitutional jurisdiction to impose disciplinary
sanction upon judges of lower courts.[10]
Also, respondent judge
claimed that the Court of Appeals awarded to the complainant only a
conditional
right of possession to the land in question, conditioned upon the
validity
of his title to be determined in an appropriate proceeding. Since the
complainant
had yet to institute the proper proceedings in court to determine the
validity
of his title to the land in question, the issuance of a writ of
execution
was premature. According to the respondent, the situation poses a
dilemma
for him. On one hand, if he issues the writ of possession before the
complainant
has complied with the suspensive condition imposed in the Court of
Appeals
decision, he would be liable for illegally issuing the writ of
possession.
On the other hand, if he does not issue the writ of possession, the
Office
of the Court Administrator would prosecute the instant administrative
case.[11]
Finally, the respondent
asserted that the instant administrative case had placed him in double
jeopardy.[12]chanrobles virtual law library
By resolution[13]
dated September 17, 2001, this Court resolved to treat this matter as a
supplementary complaint and referred this matter to Court of Appeals
Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of this Court) for investigation,
report and recommendation.cralaw:red
On January 9, 2002,
the parties submitted the case for decision on the basis of the record
and the verbal manifestation of the respondent that he is invoking the
defense of double jeopardy.[14]
In her report,[15]
Justice Carpio Morales found the respondent liable for grave abuse of
authority
and gross ignorance of the law. She recommended that respondent be
suspended
for six (6) months without pay. We are in agreement with her
recommendation,
except as to the penalty to be imposed.cralaw:red
As hereafter discussed,
the penalty appears less than commensurate to the administrative
offenses
found. At the outset, respondent’s insistence that the present
administrative
case may only be brought to this Court by appeal or certiorari deserves
scant consideration. It must be rejected outright for being baseless.cralaw:red
This administrative
matter involves the exercise of the Court’s power to discipline judges.
It is distinct from its power of appellate review under Section 5,
paragraph
2(e). An administrative case is not a continuation or an appeal from
the
main case, and it involves different issues although the two cases may
have arisen from related facts. Administrative cases are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, i.e., to maintain the faith
and
confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities.cralaw:red
When this Court acts
on complaints against judges or any personnel under its supervision, it
acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court
judging justiciable controversies.[16]
In this case the issue is whether the respondent should be held
administratively
liable for his continued refusal to perform a ministerial duty and to
obey
the lawful order of a superior court, not whether the complainant is
entitled
to the land in question or to its possession-the issues in CV No.
31820.
Hence, what is involved is not this Court’s power to review, revise,
reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of
lower courts in cases involving only questions of law. The present
administrative
case does not call for the exercise of this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction.chanrobles virtual law library
Likewise unmeritorious
is the respondent’s insistence that this Court’s previous Resolution in
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519, is not valid. He challenges this Court’s
jurisdiction
to impose disciplinary sanctions, through one of its Divisions. Such
effrontery
on the part of respondent only reveals ignorance of precedents with
regard
to administrative powers of this Tribunal.cralaw:red
In People v. Hon. Gacott,
Jr.,[17]
this Court made the following pronouncements:
x x xThe very text of
the present Section 11[18]
of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations
envisaged
therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a
declaration
of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of
the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not
therein
intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and
decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as
will
hereafter be explained.cralaw:red
The second clause, which
refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the
Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the
case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the
administrative
case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.cralaw:red
Pursuant to the first
clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en
banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted,
entitled
"Bar Matter No. 209. - In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification
of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter
alia:chanrobles virtual law library
For said purpose, the
following are considered en banc cases:
x
x x
6. Cases where the penalty
to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a
period
of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P 10,000.00, or both.cralaw:red
x
x x
This resolution was
amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted
provision
was maintained.cralaw:red
Indeed, to require the
entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative
matters
or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would
result
in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving
the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
This
would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a
systematic
plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending
in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, and the very purpose of
authorizing
the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven
members.
(underscoring supplied.).chanrobles virtual law library
In his attempt to muddle
and confuse the final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 31820, the respondent relies on the penultimate
paragraph
in said decision, which states as follows:
What we are saying is
that, although appellee has not sufficiently proved his filiation to
the
late Guillermo Lumapas, the fact that he has a legal title over the
subject
land entitles him to the possession thereof, pending the final
determination
of the validity of the title issued to him in an appropriate proceeding.[19]
In Edwards v. Arce,[20]
this Court has clarified that the dispositive portion is the only
portion
of a judgment which becomes the subject of execution. Here, the
dispositive
portion of the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820 is unequivocal and
requires
no interpretation as regards the absolute and unconditional nature of
the
complainant’s right of Possession over the subject lot. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered as
follows:
(1)
Declaring that Gregorio Lumapas has not sufficiently proved that he is
the son of Guillermo Lumapas;
(2)
Declaring Gregorio [Lumapas] to have the right of possession over lot
4329;
and,
No pronouncement
as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
(underscoring supplied.).
Clearly therefore, the
complainant has the right of possession pending the determination of
the
validity of his title. Moreover, it is absurd to recognize the right of
possession of the complainant and in the same stroke makes it dependent
on a determination of the validity of his title. Lastly, respondent’s
interpretation,
which would render nugatory the complainant’s right to possession, is
no
longer called for.
The respondent’s invocation
of double jeopardy is likewise unavailing. The instant administrative
case
involves the respondent’s second refusal to issue the writ of
execution,
hence with distinct sanction. That the respondent was administratively
punished in this Court’s previous Resolution dated June 27, 2000, for
refusing
to perform a ministerial act will not shield him from another instance
of administrative discipline in the present case.chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, the respondent’s
fear that the adverse party in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820 would
administratively
charge him for illegally issuing the writ of possession if he issues a
writ of possession in favor of the complainant is baseless, at most
merely
speculative. He invents a false dilemma from an erroneous premise.cralaw:red
Coming now to the question
of the respondent’s administrative liability, this Court finds the
imposition
of administrative penalties proper. It is the respondent’s ministerial
duty to issue the writ of execution following the finality of the CA
decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820, and after the CA issued in a separate case, a
writ of mandamus ordering the issuance of said writ of execution. As
this
Court stated in its Resolution dated June 27, 2000, respondent had no
option
but to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the CA and to issue the writ
of execution, its refusal to obey being "a clear violation of the order
of, and a manifest disrespect towards, a court of superior
jurisdiction."
This directive notwithstanding, up to now the respondent has
obstinately
refused to issue a writ of execution.cralaw:red
It is hardly necessary
to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders and
decisions
of higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from
which
all other courts should take their bearings.[22]
A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere
request,
nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.[23]
If at all, this omission not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
respondent’s
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court’s lawful
orders
and directives which is only too deserving of reproof.[24]chanrobles virtual law library
The delay in the execution
of the Court of Appeals’ decision despite its having attained finality
as early as March 13, 1995 works great injustice to the complainant. It
is an injustice that this Court cannot countenance. Indeed, it is
frustrating
for the complainant to be declared that he possesses the legal right to
occupy a piece of land and have that same right trampled upon by
respondent.
If the people believe that they cannot expect justice from the courts,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos might be the result.[25]
Courts exist to promote justice.[26]
The adage that justice delayed is justice denied finds particular
application
in this case. We have often said that every officer or employee in the
judiciary is duty-bound to obey the orders and processes of this Court
without the least delay and to exercise at all times a high degree of
professionalism.[27]
Indifference or defiance
to the Court’s orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal,
suspension,
or fine as warranted by the circumstances.[28]
Gross ignorance of the law is also punishable by: (1) dismissal from
the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office,
including government owned and controlled corporations; (2) suspension
from office without pay and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but
not
exceeding P40,000 under Section 11,[29]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under the present circumstances, we
find
that the recommendation of the Investigating Justice needs to be
upgraded.
Having been previously warned, respondent judge deserves the ultimate
administrative
penalty, i.e. dismissal from the service.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, for refusing
to fulfill a ministerial duty and for disobedience to an order issued
by
a superior court, as well as for gross ignorance of the law, respondent
Judge Camilo E. Tamin, Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture
of all benefits due him except for accrued leave benefits, if any. He
is
also declared DISQUALIFIED from employment in any position in the
government
service including government-owned or controlled corporations. He is
hereby
ordered to VACATE his sala upon receipt of this decision, which is
effective
immediately.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 225-226.
[2]
Lumapas v. Tamin, 334 SCRA 391 (2000).
[3]
334 SCRA 397.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Rollo, pp. 205-206.
[5]
Id. at 193-197.
[6]
Id. at 227-231.
[7]
Id. at 233-234.
[8]
Id. at 213-221.
[9]
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2)
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of
lower courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(e)
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
[10]
Rollo, p. 216.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Id. at 218-220.
[12]
Id. at 281.
[13]
Id. at 247-248.
[14]
Id. at 281-282.
[15]
Id. at 285-299.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 95642,28 May 1992, 209 SCRA
377,
383.
[17]
316 Phil. 85, 94-96 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Sec. 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy
years
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts,
or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Rollo,p. 100.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
98 Phil. 688, 692 (1956).
[21]
Supra, note 19.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Guerrero v. Judge Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466, 10 December 2002, p. 7.
[23]
Josep v. Judge Abarquez, 330 Phil. 352, 359 (1996).
[24]
Supra, note 22.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Cuaresma v. Enriquez, A.M. No. MTJ-91-608, 20 September 1995, 248 SCRA
454, 459.
[27]
Martinez v. Zoleta, A.M. No. MTJ-94-904, 29 September 1999, 315 SCRA
438,
449.chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Guerrero v. Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466, 10 December 2002, p. 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty ofa serious
charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include
accrued leave credits;
2.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3.
A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.chanrobles virtual law library
B.
If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
following
sanctions shall be imposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2.
A fine of more than P 10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00chanrobles virtual law library
C.
If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following
sanctions
shall be imposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.
A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/orchanrobles virtual law library
2.
Censure;chanrobles virtual law library
3.
Reprimand;
4.
Admonition with warning. |