FIRST DIVISION
MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
118249
February 14, 2003 - versus -
COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. EDITA M. MULINGTAPANG,
PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY
CITY,METRO MANILA, BRANCH
115, AND K SERVICES
COMPANY,
Respondents. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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D E C I S I O N
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CARPIO,
J.: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryredThe
Case chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Before this Court is
a petition for review[1]
assailing the Amended Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated December 2, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32419
that upheld the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 115, in its Orders[3]
dated January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993 in Civil Case No. 9500. The
questioned
orders of the trial court enjoined the Manila International Airport
Authority
("MIAA" for brevity) from terminating the porterage concession of K
Services
Company ("K Services" for brevity). chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Antecedent
Factschanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
K Services began
providing
porters for the domestic passenger terminal of the Manila International
Airport (now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport) under a
provisional
permit for the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976. MIAA and
K Services subsequently executed a contract effective from May 1976 to
April 30, 1977 that was renewed yearly until December 1984.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although the parties
did not renew their contract for the succeeding year, K Services
continued
as porterage contractor from January 1985 until February 1987. Sometime
in February 1987, however, MIAA gave notice that the services of K
Services
would be terminated on February 20, 1987. In response, K Services filed
a petition for injunction on February 26, 1987 with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 4692-P.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 26, 1989,
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, rendered a decision
in Civil Case No. 4692-P ruling that MIAA could terminate its contract
with K Services at any time. On April 12, 1991, K Services appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 23053. The Court of Appeals also denied K
Services’
subsequent motion for reconsideration. As K Services did not appeal,
the
decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. Thus, the
issue as to whether MIAA could terminate the contract with K Services
became
res judicata.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Shortly after, K
Services
received a letter dated May 31, 1991 from then MIAA General Manager
Eduardo
Carrascoso, the relevant portion of which stated:
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"Due to certain
administrative
problems that are preventing us from taking over, please continue
operating
said service until further notice from us.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In connection thereto,
please be advised also that PAL Authorities and the MIA Authority have
come to an agreement whereby the latter shall operate and manage the
Domestic
Terminal II which necessarily includes the operation of the porterage
and
other concessions therein. In this regard, you may take over the
operation
of the porterage service therein since the flights being operated in
this
Terminal II used to be a part of your contract. Please coordinate this
with the Manager of the Domestic Passenger Terminal and the PAL
Authorities
concerned.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Please understand
however
that in continuing the operation of the porterage service, you will be
charged the monthly Concession Privilege Fee in the amount of
P45,000.00
for each Terminal or a total of P90,000.00 per month; further, you will
also abide by the terms and conditions of your expired contract."[5]
(Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
K Services alleged
that it was initially hesitant to accept MIAA’s offer. However, it
continued
to provide porters for Domestic Terminal I and expanded its operations
to cover Domestic Terminal II upon the alleged verbal assurance of
MIAA’s
officers that MIAA’s policy was to relinquish porterage operations to
the
private sector. K Services likewise claimed that MIAA officers also
gave
verbal assurance that K Services would not be replaced with another
porterage
contractor without a public bidding in which K Services could
participate.[6]
In support of its contention, K Services cited the memorandum dated
August
28, 1992 from General Manager Guillermo G. Cunanan to the MIAA Board of
Directors. The memorandum stated that "Management has decided to
relinquish
the management of these concessions and award them to the private
sector
at fair and reasonable fees x x x."[7]
The memorandum recommended to the MIAA Board of Directors the approval
of a schedule of concession fees chargeable to concessionaires of
porterage
and other services. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, on December
1, 1992, General Manager Cunanan gave written notice to K Services to
"wind
up" its operations as "Management has decided to take over the
aforecited
services at the Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II."[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
K Services opposed
the takeover. It filed on December 18, 1992 a Petition for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order[9]
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 115, docketed as
Civil
Case No. 9500. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance,
the trial court issued on December 28, 1992 a temporary restraining
order
against MIAA. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by K Services, as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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"WHEREFORE, the Court,
after careful evaluation and consideration of the evidence adduced by
the
parties, so finds that this is a proper case where a Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction should issue and let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
issued
to restrain and prevent the respondent Manila International Airport
Authority
or anyone acting for in (sic)
its own behalf, from terminating the porterage services of the
petitioner
K Services Company until further order from this Court provided,
however,
that the petitioner files before this Court a bond with sufficient
sureties
in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSANDS (sic)
PESOS (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency, executed to the respondent to
answer and pay for whatever damages the respondent may sustain pending
the hearing on the merits of the main case by reason of the injunction
if the Court should finally decided (sic) that the petitioner was not
entitled
thereto."[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
MIAA’s legal department
duly received a copy of the trial court’s order. However, the Office of
the Solicitor General ("OSG" for brevity) did not receive a copy of the
injunctive writ, despite having already entered its appearance as
counsel
for MIAA during previous hearings before the trial court. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 11, 1993,
the OSG filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by K Services on
the grounds that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action;
or (2) assuming the existence of a cause of action, a prior judgment
barred
the same.cralawAt
the time MIAA filed the instant petition before the Court, this motion
to dismiss, opposed by K Services, was pending consideration by the
trial
court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On July 7, 1993, K
Services filed a motion to cite MIAA’s General Manager Cunanan for
contempt
as the latter ostensibly attempted to oust and replace K Services with
another porterage contractor. It
was only upon receipt of a copy of the contempt motion that the OSG
supposedly
learned of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court.On
July 23, 1993, the OSG filed an Omnibus Motion[11]
which mainly alleged that: (1) the injunctive writ lacked legal and
factual
basis; and (2) K Services was using the injunction as a shield to
violate
the terms of the porterage agreement by charging fees in excess of the
amount authorized by the contract. The Omnibus Motion prayed for
reconsideration
of the order of January 20, 1993 and for the lifting of the injunction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On August 5, 1993,
the trial court denied MIAA’s Omnibus Motion, ruling that: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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"2. The allegations
that the complaint states no cause of action, and that the issuance of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction has no factual and legal basis to
the
mind of this Court, are not tenable. A hearing on the question of
whether
or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction should be issued was held
wherein
the parties and their counsels were allowed to go on oral arguments and
this Court after a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced thereat
found
that there is a case where a writ of preliminary injunction should
issue.
Evidence adduced shows that the petitioner is servicing the respondent
as a porterage contractor and that a notice of termination was sent to
the petitioner. The allegation of the petitioner and presented before
this
Court is one for which a Court can make a valid judgment. Certainly,
this
Court has to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to avoid any
irreparable
loss that might be caused to the plaintiff. Nonetheless, to legally
equate
the respondent, this Court directed the petitioner to file a
P500,000.00
bond to answer for whatever damage the respondent might sustain pending
hearing of the case on the merits."[12]
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The OSG, on MIAA’s
behalf, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Court of
Appeals
assailing the trial court’s orders of January 20, 1993 and August 5,
1993.
The OSG argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of
preliminary injunction and denied the Omnibus Motion without sufficient
factual and legal basis. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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The Ruling
of
the Court of Appealschanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In its Decision of
December 22, 1993,[13]
the Court of Appeals set aside the questioned orders of the trial court
for lack of sufficient basis, to wit:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In the case at bar,
while the right of petitioner to terminate the lease contract is clear,
and in fact ruled upon with finality or is res judicata, private
respondent’s
mere claim of an extended/expanded contract is unclear and disputed, to
the effect that the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction at
this
stage of the proceeding, being based on the doubtful genuineness and
validity
of the alleged extended agreement, has not been successfully
established."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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"Thus, the court a
quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the questioned orders hereby RECONSIDERED and
SET
ASIDE."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While the motion for
reconsideration filed by K Services before the Court of Appeals was
pending,
MIAA attempted to oust K Services based on the appellate court’s
decision.
Upon motion of K Services, the trial court issued an order to preserve
the status quo ante by reinstating K Services as the porterage
contractor
of Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
MIAA filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order
or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from
implementing
the status quo ante order. The Court of Appeals denied MIAA’s motion in
its Resolution of March 10, 1994.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 2, 1994,
the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision reversing its
earlier
decision of December 22, 1993 and dismissing MIAA’s petition for
certiorari.
Citing "misapprehensions of fact," the Court of Appeals ruled:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In the case at bar,
the evidence submitted by both parties, as well as the issues raised in
the oral arguments, also by both parties, were the very bases upon
which
the writ of preliminary injunction was issued 'to avoid any irreparable
loss that might be caused to the plaintiff.' Thus, it has been ruled
that
it is well-established that no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed
to a judge or body in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
where a party was not deprived of its day in court as it was heard and
had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses (Santos vs.
CA,
214 SCRA 162).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated December 22, 1993, object of respondent’s motion for
reconsideration,
is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE, and a new one rendered DISMISSING
the instant petition."[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 26, 1995,
the OSG filed with the Court a petition for review and prayed for: (1)
the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals; (2) the
annulment
of the assailed orders issued by the trial court; and (3) the issuance
of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
trial court from implementing its assailed orders.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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The Issuechanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The MIAA raises this
sole issue:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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WHETHER THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BY THE TRIAL COURT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The central question
for resolution is whether K Services was entitled to the writ of
preliminary
injunction granted by the trial court. The Court shall deal only with
the
questioned writ and not with the merits of the case pending before the
trial court. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Ruling
of the Courtchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
petition
is meritorious. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whether
MIAA’s petition for certiorari chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
should
be considered barred by laches.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
K Services contends
that MIAA’s right to question the trial court’s order of January 20,
1993
is barred by laches. K Services points out that eight months had
elapsed
between the receipt by MIAA of the order of January 20, 1993 and the
filing
of the petition for certiorari questioning the order before the Court
of
Appeals.
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K Services’ argument
is incorrect. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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MIAA’s petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought to set aside two orders
of
the trial court. These are the injunctive order of January 20, 1993,
and
the later order of August 5, 1993 denying MIAA’s Omnibus Motion before
the trial court. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Laches is the failure,
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It
is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has
abandoned or declined to assert it.[15]
We have held that, in establishing laches, what should be considered is
the interval after the rendition of the last order sought to be set
aside.[16]
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Thus, what matters
is the intervening period after the trial court’s order of August 5,
1993
- the last order MIAA assailed in its petition for certiorari - to the
time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals. The records show
that some seventy-seven days elapsed from MIAA’s receipt on August 6,
1993
of the order of August 5, 1993 before MIAA’s petition for certiorari
was
filed with the Court of Appeals on October 22, 1993.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court prevailing at the time did not fix a specific period for
filing
a special civil action for certiorari. Jurisprudence then simply
required
that petitions for certiorari should be filed within a reasonable time
from receipt of the questioned judgment or order.[17]
The Court then found three months to be reasonable, although courts
were
not precluded from entertaining petitions filed beyond the three-month
period if warranted by the demands of justice and provided laches had
not
set in.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the period of
seventy-seven
days in this instance was well within the three-month period regarded
as
reasonable by jurisprudence then, MIAA’s petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals could not be considered as barred by laches.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We note that K Services
likewise assailed before the trial and appellate courts the timeliness
and validity of MIAA’s Omnibus Motion filed on July 23, 1993. However,
both courts correctly opted to tackle the issues raised by MIAA. The
Omnibus
Motion may be regarded as akin to a memorandum assailing the trial
court’s
lack of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ, which may be ruled
on,
considering that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time.[19]
Alternatively, the Omnibus Motion may be treated as a motion for
dissolution
of the preliminary injunction authorized under Section 6, Rule 58 of
the
old Rules of Court,[20]
which may be raised at any stage prior to final judgment. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whether the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
when it granted the writ of preliminary injunction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
MIAA asserts that K
Services has not shown any clear and unmistakable right to the
protection
of a writ of preliminary injunction. MIAA calls attention to the trial
court’s order of January 20, 1993, which failed to state in particular
the basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in
favor
of K Services. MIAA argues that the effect of the injunction is to
force
MIAA to extend the life of a contract that already expired by operation
of its own provisions. For these reasons, MIAA contends that the trial
court, in granting the injunctive writ, acted with grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand,
K Services maintains that it has the right to continue as the porterage
contractor of MIAA under the extension conferred on it by MIAA through
General Manager Carrascoso. K Services further alleges that MIAA
officers
verbally assured K Services that MIAA’s policy was to privatize the
porterage
and other services, and in any case, K Services would not be replaced
without
a public bidding.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find for MIAA.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 3, Rule 58,
of the old Rules of Court, which was applicable at the time, prescribed
that a preliminary injunction could be granted provided:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"(a) That the plaintiff
is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained
of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period
or perpetually;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b) That the commission
or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the
non-performance
thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
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(c) That the defendant
is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to
be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights
respecting
the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The requisites
necessary
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the
existence
of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an
urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[21]
The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary
injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the
grant
of an injunction are present in the case before it.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the instant case,
however, the trial court’s order of January 20, 1993 was, on its face,
bereft of basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
There
were no findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that
any
of the elements essential for the grant of a preliminary injunction
existed.
The trial court alluded to hearings during which the parties marked
their
respective exhibits and the trial court heard the oral arguments of
opposing
counsels. However, it cannot be ascertained what evidence was formally
offered and presented by the parties and given weight and credence by
the
trial court. The basis for the trial court’s conclusion that K Services
was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction is unclear.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In its order of August
5, 1993, the trial court stated that it issued the injunction to
prevent
irreparable loss that might be caused to K Services. Once more,
however,
the trial court neglected to mention what right in esse of K Services,
if any, was in danger of being violated and required the protection of
a preliminary injunction. The trial court stated merely that K Services
was servicing MIAA as a porterage contractor and that a notice of
termination
was sent to K Services. Absent a preliminary finding by the trial court
that K Services possessed the right to continue as MIAA’s
concessionaire,
MIAA’s termination of K Services’ was not sufficient in itself to
establish
that there was an invasion of K Services’ right.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering the
far-reaching
effects of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court should
have
exercised more prudence and judiciousness in its issuance of the
injunction
order. We remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a writ
of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking
cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed in the
exercise
of such discretion.[22]
The discretion of the court a quo to grant an injunctive writ must be
exercised
based on the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[23]
Thus, the Court declared in Garcia v. Burgos:[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"It has been consistently
held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate,
which
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more
dangerous
in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the
strong
arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great
injury,
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Every court should
remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action
of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It
should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law
permits
it and the emergency demands it." (Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The records before the
Court do not reveal a clear and unmistakable right on the part of K
Services
that would entitle the latter to the protection of an injunctive writ.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The available records
show, and the parties do not dispute, that the last contract between
MIAA
and K Services had already expired. K Services’ claim to an
"Extended/Expanded
Contract" is anchored on the letter of May 31, 1991 from General
Manager
Carrascoso. However, this letter expressly stipulated that the
extension
would only be "until further notice"[25]
from MIAA. We find the argument of the OSG on this matter persuasive:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"While it may be
conceded
that private respondent was allowed to continue operating the porterage
service after the expiration of the contract as the above letter shows,
there is no question, however, that private respondent was only allowed
to operate up to a certain time, specified therein as "until further
notice
from us." Indeed, there is nothing in said letter to indicate that
private
respondent has until forever to operate the porterage service as
private
respondent would like to make it appear. The fact that the authority to
continue the porterage service was specified up to a certain period is
a clear indication that petitioner did not intend to allow private
respondent
to operate the porterage service for as long as it pleases. Perforce,
it
limited such privilege to a certain period or until further notice. x x
x"[26]
Where the terms of a
contract are clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the
contracting
parties, the Court has held that the literal meaning of the
stipulations
shall control.[27]
The phrase "until further notice" prescribed a limit to the extension
of
the contract conditioned on a future event, specifically, the receipt
by
K Services of notice of termination from MIAA. In effect, the phrase
provided
a resolutory facultative condition.[28]
It should be noted that "until" is a "word of limitation, used
ordinarily
to restrict that which precedes to what immediately follows it, and its
office is to fix some point of time or some event upon the arrival or
occurrence
of which what precedes will cease to exist."[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Significantly, MIAA
General Manager Carrascoso also explained in his May 31, 1991 letter
that
the extension was being offered because MIAA had administrative
problems
that prevented it from taking over the porterage operations of the
domestic
passenger terminals. Further, K Services itself admitted in its initial
petition for prohibition filed before the trial court that it hesitated
to accept the offer "because of the transiency and impermanence of the
‘extension’."[30]
Taken together, these factors indicate that the parties intended and
understood
that the extension was merely a temporary arrangement. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is likewise no
basis for K Services’ contention that its services as the porterage
contractor
cannot be terminated unless a public bidding is held to determine its
replacement.
MIAA’s charter, as provided for in Executive Order No. 903, grants the
MIAA ample authority to take over directly porterage operations within
the airport.[31]
Against this law, K Services’ claims of verbal assurances from MIAA’s
officers
cannot prevail. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, General Manager
Carrascoso’s letter also expressly stated that K Services "should abide
by the terms and conditions of your expired contract."[32]
Article X of the contract dated April 27, 1984, the last contract
executed
between MIAA and K Services, stated that: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"10.02. Notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary MIAA shall have the right to terminate or
rescind this Contract without need of judicial intervention by giving
at
least thirty (30) days written notice to that effect upon the
CONCESSIONAIRE,
which notice shall be final and binding on both parties; x x x" (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, even assuming
that General Manager Carrascoso’s letter of May 31, 1991 extended the
porterage
contract, still MIAA had the right to terminate K Services’ porterage
services
by mere 30-days written notice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Both the trial court,
in its order of August 5, 1993, and the Court of Appeals, in its
Amended
Decision, found that the injunctive writ was necessary to prevent
serious
damage or irreparable loss to K Services. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court has ruled,
however, that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
actual
existing right is not a ground for an injunction.[33]
Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is
not
proper. Absent a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive
relief
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, the trial court's
grant of the injunctive writ in favor of K Services despite the lack of
a clear and unmistakable right on the part of K Services constitutes
grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A finding that
the
applicant for preliminary injunction may suffer damage not capable of
pecuniary
estimation does not suffice to support an injunction, where it appears
that the right of the applicant is unclear or disputed. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, in deciding
to dismiss MIAA’s petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals cited
the
Court’s pronouncement in Santos v. Court of Appeals.[35]
We clarify that Santos does not constitute an exception to the
requirement
of a clear and unmistakable right before an injunction may issue. On
the
contrary, the Court in Santos expressly declared that all the
requisites
for the proper issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction were
present,
and the right of the government to the injunctive writ was clear,
well-defined
and certain. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of December 2, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 32419 is SET ASIDE. The Decision of December 22, 1993
of the Court of Appeals in the same case, setting aside the Orders
dated
January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay
City, Branch 115, in Civil Case No. 9500, is REINSTATED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug,
Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Penned by Justice Jorge S. Imperial and concurred in by Justices Pacita
Canizares-Nye and Eduardo S. Montenegro.
[3]
Issued by Judge Edita M. Mulingtapang.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision of December 2, 1992, Rollo, p. 29.
[5]
Rollo, p. 257.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Ibid., p. 329.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Ibid., p. 147.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Ibid., p. 146.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Ibid., p. 37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Ibid., p. 72.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Ibid., p. 176.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Ibid., p. 18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
CA Rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 32419, p. 133.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Rollo, p. 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Gaston v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 546 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Ibid., citing People v. Castañeda, 165 SCRA 327 (1988).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
People v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 705 (1999), citing Philgreen
Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 719 (1997).
[18]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Garcia v. Burgos, 291 SCRA 546 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Reiterated, with revisions, in Sec. 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil
Procedure.
[21]
Ong Ching Kian Chuan v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 145 (2001).
[22]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Inter-Asia Services Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 408 (1996).
[24]
291 SCRA 546 (1998) citing Olalia v. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665 (1991).
[25]
Rollo, p. 257.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 354.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Buce v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 151 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil. 873 (1922).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Black’s Law Dictionary p. 1380 (5th ed., West Publishing Co., 1979)
citing
Empire Oil and Refining Co. v. Babson, 182 Okl. 336 77 P.2d 682, 684.
[30]
Rollo, p. 132.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Executive Order No. 903, series of 1983, provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Sec.
5. Functions, Powers, and Duties. The Authority shall have the
following
functions, powers and duties:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x
x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(m)
To provide services, whether on its own or otherwise, within the
Airport
or the approaches thereof, which shall include but not shall be limited
to, the following: x x x
(3)
Passenger handling and other services directed towards the care,
convenience
and security of passengers, visitors and other airport users; and
(4)
Sorting, weighing, measuring, warehousing or handling of baggage and
goods."
[32]
Rollo, p. 257.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Heirs of Asuncion v. Gervacio, Jr., 304 SCRA 322 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
214 SCRA 162 (1992).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |