SECOND DIVISION
SPOUSES BEDER
MORANDARTE
AND MARINA FEBRERA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
NO.
123586
August 12, 2004
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AND SPOUSES VIRGINIO
B. LACAYA AND NENITA
LACAYA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks
the reversal of the decision,[1]
dated August 23, 1995, of the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) in
CA-G.R.
CV No. 36258, affirming the decision, dated November 5, 1991, rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7), Dipolog City,
Zamboanga
del Norte (RTC for brevity) in Civil Case No. 3890, declaring Free
Patent
No. (IX-8) 785[2]
and Original Certificate of Title No. P-21972, in the name of
petitioner
Beder Morandarte (Morandarte for brevity), and all its derivative
titles,
null and void ab initio.
The factual antecedents
are as follows:
Morandarte filed an
application for free patent, dated December 5, 1972, before the Bureau
of Lands, Dipolog City District Land Office (BOL for brevity), covering
a parcel of land located at Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City with an area of
4.5499 hectares and described as a portion of Lot 1038 of Dipolog
Cadastre
No. 85.[3]
On July 27, 1976, the
District Land Officer of the BOL approved the free patent application
of
Morandarte and directed the issuance of a free patent in his favor.[4]
Accordingly, Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 for Lot No. 7,
Csd-09-05-00078-D
was issued in the name of Morandarte. On September 20, 1976, the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte issued the corresponding
Original
Certificate of Title No. (P-21972) 5954.[5]
Subsequently, Morandarte
caused a subdivision survey of the lot, dividing the same into Lot No.
6781-A, with an area of 13,939 square meters, and Lot No. 6781-B, with
an area of 32,819 square meters. As a result of the subdivision
survey,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-1835 and T-1836 covering Lots
6781-A
and 6781-B, respectively, were issued in favor of Morandarte on May 12,
1980 by the Registry of Deeds of Dipolog City.[6]chanrobles virtual law library
On May 22, 1981, Morandarte
and his wife, Marina Febrera, executed a real estate mortgage over Lot
6781-B, subject of TCT No. 1836, in favor of the Development Bank of
the
Philippines, Dipolog City branch (DBP for brevity), in consideration of
a loan in the amount of P52,160.00.[7]
More than ten years
after the issuance of the OCT in Morandarte’s name, or on March 19,
1987,
respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic for brevity),
represented
by the Director of Lands, filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Annulment
of Title and Reversion against the Morandarte spouses, the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City,
and
DBP, docketed as Civil Case No. 3890.[8]
The Republic alleged
that the BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the
Miputak
River which cannot be validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of
man and beyond the authority of the BOL to dispose of. It claimed
that the Morandarte spouses deliberately and intentionally concealed
such
fact in the application to ensure approval thereof. Considering
that
the Morandarte spouses are guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the
procurement of their title, the Republic stressed that their title is
void.[9]
The Register of Deeds
of Dipolog City filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated April 7, 1987, praying
for the dismissal of the complaint as against her since the complaint
failed
to state a claim against her.[10]
In their Answer dated
April 13, 1987, the Morandarte spouses denied the allegations of the
complaint
and claimed that they were able to secure the title in accordance and
in
compliance with the requirements of the law. They alleged that
the
land is a portion of inherited property from Antonio L. Morandarte
whose
ownership thereof is covered by Tax Declaration No. 2296.chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the Miputak
River, they argued that the river changed its course brought about by
the
fact that a portion of the Miputak River was leased by the Bureau of
Fisheries
(BOF for brevity) to a certain Aguido Realiza whose rights were
subsequently
transferred to Virginio Lacaya. They alleged that they indicated
in their survey plan the actual location of the Miputak River in
relation
to the property but the BOL returned the survey with the directive that
the existence of the river should not be indicated as the original
survey
did not show its existence, to which they complied with by submitting a
new survey plan which did not indicate the existence of the river.cralaw:red
In the alternative,
they alleged that inclusion of the Miputak River should not render the
title void; only the portion of the property covered by the Miputak
River
should be nullified but their title to the remaining portion should be
maintained.[11]
For its part, DBP filed
its Answer dated April 13, 1987 praying for the dismissal of the
complaint
as against it since it had nothing to do with the issuance of the title
to the spouses.[12]
DBP interposed a cross-claim against the spouses for the payment of
their
outstanding obligations.[13]
The Morandarte spouses filed an Answer to the Crossclaim dated April
29,
1987.[14]
No answer was filed
by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte.cralaw:red
On March 4, 1988, upon
prior leave of court, herein respondent spouses Virginio B. Lacaya and
Nenita Lacaya filed their Complaint-In-Intervention which alleged that
they are holders of a fishpond lease agreement covering a fishpond area
of about 5.0335 hectares, 1.2681 hectares of which have been included
in
the title issued to the Morandarte spouses. Considering that the
land of the Morandarte spouses encroaches on the area leased to them,
the
Lacaya spouses submit that the former’s title thereto is void.[15]chanrobles virtual law library
In their Answer to the
complaint-in-intervention, dated March 19, 1988, the Morandarte spouses
denied the allegations of the Lacaya spouses.[16]
They maintained that the portion of the fishpond originally belonged to
Antonio L. Morandarte, their predecessor-in-interest, and the Lacaya
spouses
have never been in possession thereof but are actually squatters
therein.cralaw:red
On the other hand, the
Republic, in its Answer to the complaint-in-intervention, dated March
21,
1988, adopted the allegations of the complaint-in-intervention to
further
support its claim that the title of the Morandarte spouses is void.[17]
The Lacaya spouses filed their Reply and Answer on March 30, 1988,
denying
the arguments of the Morandarte spouses and reiterating the allegations
in their complaint-in-intervention.[18]
Following trial on the
merits, on November 5, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision[19]
in favor of the Republic and the Lacaya spouses. The RTC declared that
while fraud in the procurement of the title was not established by the
State, Morandarte’s title is, nonetheless, void because it includes a
portion
of the Miputak River which is outside the commerce of man and beyond
the
authority of the BOL to dispose of. In addition, the RTC
sustained
the fishpond rights of the Lacaya spouses over a portion included in
Morandarte’s
title based on a Deed of Transfer of Fishpond Rights from Felipe B.
Lacaya
and a Fishpond Lease Agreement with the BOF.cralaw:red
The dispositive portion
of the decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring null and void ab initio Free Patent No. (IX-5) (sic) 785 and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-21972 in the name of Beder
Morandarte,
as well as all derivative titles issued thereafter;chanrobles virtual law library
2.
Ordering defendants spouses Beder Morandarte and Marina Febrera to
surrender
their owner’s duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
T-1835
and T-1836, which were the derivative titles of Original Certificate of
Title No. P-21972;
3.
Directing the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte to cancel
Original
Certificate of Title No. P-21972 in the name of Beder Morandarte, and
the
Register of Deeds of Dipolog City to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title
Nos. T-1835 and T-1836 in the name of the same defendant;
4.
Ordering the reversion of the land in question to the state, free from
liens and encumbrances;chanrobles virtual law library
5.
Enjoining defendants spouses Beder Morandarte and Marina Febrera from
exercising
any act of ownership or possession of the subject property;
6.
Dismissing the Cross-Claim of defendant Development Bank of the
Philippines
against Cross Defendants Spouses Beder Morandarte and Marina Febrera,
for
being premature, but ordering the latter cross defendants to give a
substitute
security in favor of DBP as indicated in this decision;
7.
Declaring valid and enforceable the Lease Agreement for a period of
twenty
five years over the fishpond area of Intervenors;
chan
robles virtual law
8.
Denying Intervenors’ prayer for damages against defendants-spouses
Morandarte;
and
9.
Dismissing, for lack of merit, the counterclaim and prayer for damages
of defendants spouses Morandarte against the Intervenors.
No costs against
defendant-spouses
Morandarte.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[20]
Dissatisfied, the
Morandarte
spouses appealed to the CA.[21]
In a Decision dated August 23, 1995, the CA affirmed the decision of
the
RTC,[22]
ratiocinating, as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
The present controversial
Miputak River used to occupy the area adjacent to the northern and
western
boundaries of Lot No. 6781 Cad-85 (Exh. J). As time passed, it changed
its course and occupies (sic) Lot No. 6781 Cad-85 (identical to Lot 7,
Exh. H). This will explain Beder Morandarte’s argument that when he
applied
for the Sales Patent Lot 7 (identical to Lot 6781), the original
technical
description did not show the Miputak River. But it is inescapable
though, that while originally, Lot 6781 is not occupied by the river,
at
the time that the Sales Application was filed by Beder Morandarte, the
Miputak River was actually occupying said Lot 6781 or Lot 7 covered by
his Sales Application and the titles sought to be annulled in this case.cralaw:red
Rivers and their natural
beds are undoubtedly properties of public dominion (Art. 502 par. 1,
Civil
Code of the Philippines). Whether navigable or not, rivers belong
to the public and cannot be acquired by prescription (Com vs. Meneses,
38 O.G. 2839, Paras, Civil Code, p. 328, Vol. II, 12th Edition).
In fact, a stream located within private land is still property of
public
dominion, even if the Torrens Title of the land does not show the
existence
of said stream (Talion vs. Sec. of Public Works and Highways, L-24281,
May 16, 1967; Paras, supra).cralaw:red
Correspondingly, Art.
462 of the same Civil Code provides:
Art.
462.
Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes, opens a new
bed
through a private estate, this bed shall become of public dominion.chanrobles virtual law library
The rule is the same
that
even if the new bed is on private property. The bed becomes
property
of public dominion. Just as the old bed had been of public
dominion
before the abandonment, the new riverbed shall likewise be of public
dominion
(Hilario vs. City of Manila, L-19570, April 27, 1967).[23]
On October 10, 1995,
the Morandarte Spouses filed a motion for reconsideration.[24]
In its Resolution dated January 19, 1996, the CA found no justifiable
cause
or reason to modify or reverse its decision.[25]
Hence, the instant petition
for review anchored on the following assigned errors:
A.
RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED
A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN APPLYING ARTICLE 462 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THIS
CASE WHEN THE CHANGE IN COURSE OF THE OLD MIPUTAK RIVER WAS NOT DUE TO
NATURAL CAUSES BUT WAS ACCIDENTAL.
B.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO
THAT
THE CHANGE OF COURSE OF THE OLD MIPUTAK RIVER WAS DUE TO NATURAL CAUSE
ONLY A PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OF PETITIONERS WAS AFFECTED
THEREBY
SO THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS TO THE REMAINING PORTION IS VALID AND
CANNOT BE NULLIFIED AS IT REMAINED PRIVATE PROPERTY.
C.
RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED IN ORDERING THE REVERSION OF LOT 7, CSD-09-05-00078-D TO THE
PUBLIC
DOMAIN.
D.
RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE LEASE AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF INTERVENORS.
E.
RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT CONSIDERING THAT NO FRAUD OR
MISREPRESENTATION
WAS EMPLOYED BY THE SPOUSES MORANDARTE IN OBTAINING THE TITLE.[26]
The Morandarte spouses
emphatically argue that the CA failed to take into consideration the
true
state of the present Miputak River in relation to Lot 7. They
contend
that the Miputak River changed its course due to the closure of the
river
bed through the construction of dikes by the Lacaya spouses, forcing
the
river to be diverted into Lot 6781-B. Thus, they submit that the
applicable
provision is Article 77 of the Law of Waters, which provides that
“[l]ands
accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers and
other streams shall continue to be the property of their respective
owners.”
Furthermore, they staunchly
claim that the Miputak River does not actually correspond to Lot
7.
The Miputak River occupies only 12,162 square meters of Lot 7 which has
an area of 45,499 square meters. Also, they insist that the lower
courts made capital, albeit erroneously, of their agreement to a
reversion.
The reversion agreed to refers only to the 12,162 square meters portion
covered by the Miputak River, which should be voided, while the portion
unaffected by the Miputak River is valid and their title thereto should
be maintained and respected.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, they vigorously
contend that the CA erred in sustaining the validity of fishpond rights
of
the Lacaya spouses. They aver that the Lacaya spouses violated
the
terms of the lease agreement by constructing dikes for the fishponds
which
caused the Miputak River to traverse the property of the Morandarte
spouses.cralaw:red
Prefatorily, it must
be stated that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of
law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.[27]
Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the
CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and generally
will
not be reviewed on appeal.[28]
Inquiry upon the veracity of the CA’s factual findings and conclusion
is
not the function of the Supreme Court for the Court is not a trier of
facts.[29]
While this Court has
recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the
findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the
case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by
the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion,[30]
none of these exceptions find application here.cralaw:red
A complaint for reversion
involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation
committed against the government and it seeks the return of the
disputed
portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the original
certificate
of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title,
including
the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because
the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation.[31]chanrobles virtual law library
The State, as the party
alleging that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for
free patent, bears the burden of proof. The circumstances
evidencing
fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate
it in each case. It assumes different shapes and forms and may be
committed in as many different ways.[32]
Therefore, fraud and misrepresentation are never presumed but must be
proved
by clear and convincing evidence;[33]
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.[34]
In this case, the State
failed to prove that fraud and misrepresentation attended the
application
for free patent. The RTC, in fact, recognized that no fraud
attended
the application for free patent[35]
but declared reversion based on the judicial admission of the
Morandarte
spouses that reversion is warranted due to the inalienability of the
Miputak
River. Ordinarily, a judicial admission requires no proof and a
party
is precluded from denying it except when it is shown that such
admission
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[36]
In this case, the exception finds application since the records lay
bare
that such admission was made through mistake and not in the context it
was considered. As reflected in the Order dated May 25, 1998,[37]
the Morandarte spouses essentially agreed only to a reconveyance of the
portion covering the Miputak River. Undoubtedly, such
acquiescence
to return the portion covering the Miputak River is not, and cannot be
considered, an admission that fraud and misrepresentation attended the
application for free patent. This fact, standing alone, does not
prove fraud and misrepresentation.chanrobles virtual law library
Besides, it is undisputed
that the original survey plan submitted by Morandarte to the BOL
reflected
the true state of the Miputak River in Lot 1038 but the BOL did not
approve
the plan because a 1916 survey did not so indicate the existence of a
river
traversing Lot 1038 such that Morandarte was directed to submit an
amended
plan deleting the existence of the Miputak River. This mothered the
subsequent
error of the BOL of approving the amended plan as CAS-09-05-000078-D.cralaw:red
This error could have
been discovered through a thorough ocular inspection of the property
claimed
under the free patent application. However, Aurelio F. Bureros,
Hearing
Officer I of the BOL, surprisingly failed to notice the existence of
the
river traversing Lot 1038 in the field investigation he conducted on
January
10, 1976.[38]
Neither did Bureros
note the 13,339 square meter portion already covered by an existing
fishpond
lease agreement granted by the BOF in favor of Felipe B. Lacaya, the
predecessor-in-interest
of the Lacaya spouses.[39]
The records reveal that
as early as 1948, 4.6784 hectares[40]
of the public land have been leased for fishpond purposes. Aguido
S. Realiza was the initial grantee of a fishpond lease agreement.[41]
Amor A. Realiza, Aguido’s son, acquired his fishpond permit on May 29,
1953.[42]
Amor A. Realiza transferred his fishpond rights to Felipe B. Lacaya on
May 14, 1956.[43]
By 1960, the public land leased for fishpond purposes had increased to
5.0335 hectares.[44]
Felipe B. Lacaya transferred his fishpond rights to Virgilio B. Lacaya
on October 25, 1977.[45]
Thus, the fishpond rights have been in existence since 1948, prior to
the
1972 free patent application of Morandarte.chanrobles virtual law library
Regardless of the foregoing,
Aurelio F. Bureros, concluded that Morandarte is a qualified applicant
and recommended that a free patent be granted to him. This error
culminated in the erroneous grant of a free patent on July 27, 1976
covering
the Miputak River and land subject of the fishpond rights of Felipe B.
Lacaya.[46]
Be that as it may, the
mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard
cannot
be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public
domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.[47]
It is well-recognized
that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which
includes,
by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
system,
or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because
it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said
certificate
of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally
included.[48]
Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of
registration
and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.[49]
The present controversy
involves a portion of the public domain that was merely erroneously
included
in the free patent. A different rule would apply where fraud is
convincingly
shown. The absence of clear evidence of fraud will not invalidate
the entire title of the Morandarte spouses.cralaw:red
Accordingly, the 12,162-square
meter portion traversed by the Miputak River and the 13,339-square
meter
portion covered by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya spouses
which
were erroneously included in Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 and Original
Certificate
of Title No. P-21972 should be reconveyed back to the State.cralaw:red
The Morandarte spouses
cannot seek refuge in their claim that Antonio A. Morandarte, their
predecessor-in-interest,
was already the owner of that portion of Lot 1038 when the fishpond
application
of Aguido S. Realiza was approved in 1948 because Lot 1038 was still
part
of the public domain then. It was only in 1972, through Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1257, which was approved August 14, 1972,
when
Lot 1038 was declared alienable or disposable property of the State.[50]
It is a settled rule
that unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable
or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of
land
remains part of the public domain. Hence, Antonio A. Morandarte’s
occupation
thereof, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.[51]
The Morandarte spouses
also unsuccessfully harp on the inapplicability of Article 462 of the
Civil
Code by claiming that the change of course of the Miputak River was due
to a man-made cause and not by natural means. They offered no
iota
of evidence to substantiate this claim, other than the bare testimony
of
Beder Morandarte. Neither is there proof that the movement of the
river was caused by accident or calamity, such as a typhoon, and not by
the natural movements thereof. General statements, which are mere
conclusions
of law and not proofs, are unavailing and cannot suffice.chanrobles virtual law library
Besides, at the time
of the filing of the application for free patent in 1972, a portion of
the Miputak River was already in its present course, traversing Lot
1038,
particularly Lot 7 of the amended plan submitted by Morandarte.cralaw:red
We need not delve on
the question of whether the Lacaya spouses violated the terms of the
fishpond
lease agreement. It is not material in this case in the sense
that
it was not made an issue by the parties. Neither is there
evidence
to corroborate the bare allegation of petitioners that the Lacaya
spouses
constructed dikes for the fishponds which caused the Miputak River to
traverse
Lot 7. What is significant here is the established fact that
there
was an existing fishpond lease agreement between Felipe Lacaya and the
Bureau of Fisheries at the time of Morandarte’s application for free
patent;
in effect, proving that the area covering the fishpond belongs to the
Government
and petitioners have no rights thereto.chanrobles virtual law library
In closing, we cannot
but decry the carelessness of the BOL in having issued the Free Patent
in Morandarte’s favor which covered the Miputak River and the fishpond
rights of Felipe B. Lacaya. Surely, a more diligent search into
their
records and thorough ocular inspection of Lot 7 would have revealed the
presence of the Miputak River traversing therein and an existing
fishpond
right thereon. Had more vigilance been exercised by the BOL, the
government agency entrusted specifically with the task of administering
and disposing of public lands, the present litigation could have been
averted.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is partly GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 23, 1995, in CA G.R. No. 36258 is REVERSED insofar only as
it affirmed the nullity of Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 and Original
Certificate
of Title No. P-21972, in the name of petitioner Beder Morandarte. In
its
stead, petitioners Spouses Beder Morandarte and Marina Febrera are
directed
to reconvey to the respondent Republic of the Philippines within thirty
(30) days from the finality of this Decision the 12,162-square meter
portion
traversed by the Miputak River and the 13,339-square meter portion
covered
by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya spouses. No
pronouncement
as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Emeterio C. Cui and Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now Justice of the
Supreme
Court).
[2]
Erroneously referred to as Free Patent No. (IX-5) 785 by the RTC in the
dispositive portion of its decision.
[3]
No. XI-12903-A, Exhibit “A,” Original Records, p. 158.
[4]
Id., p. 163.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Exhibit “B,” id., p. 164.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Exhibits “C’ and “D,” id., pp. 166-167.
[7]
Exhibit “E,” id., p. 168.
[8]
Id., p. 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Id., p. 4.
[10]
Id., p. 10.
[11]
Id., p. 11.
[12]
Id., p. 15.
[13]
Id., p. 18.
[14]
Id., p. 27.
[15]
Id., p. 51.
[16]
Id., p. 74.
[17]
Id., p. 78.
[18]
Id., p. 82.
[19]
Id., p. 294.
[20]
Id., pp. 313-315.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo, p. 23.
[22]
Id., p. 107.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Id., p. 111.
[24]
Id., p. 120.
[25]
Rollo, p. 38.
[26]
Id., p. 15.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Tsai vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 324, 334 (2001); Producers Bank of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 326, 334 (2001); and,
Roble
vs. Arbasa, 362 SCRA 69, 79 (2001).
[28]
Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 308, 311 (2001); Garrido vs.
Court
of Appeals, 370 SCRA 199, 206 (2001); Santos vs. Reyes, 368 SCRA 261
(2001);
Yu Bun Guan vs. Ong, 367 SCRA 559, 567 (2001); Fernandez vs. Fernandez,
363 SCRA 811, 823-824 (2001); and, Nagkakaisang Kapisanan Kapitbahayan
sa Commonwealth Avenue vs. Court of Appeals, 361 SCRA 614, 619 (2001).
[29]
First Metro Investment Corporation vs. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve,
Inc.,
369 SCRA 99, 111 (2001).
[30]
Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, 347
SCRA 542, 549 (2000); Nokom vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
336
SCRA 97, 110 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Embroidery
and
Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc., 305 SCRA 70, 74 (1999); and, Sta.
Maria
vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351, 357 (1998).
[31]
Republic vs. Sebastian, 166 SCRA 140, 144 (1988).chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, St., 393 SCRA 361, 367 (2002),
citing
Siguan vs. Lim, 218 SCRA 725 (1999), and Destura vs. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 341 (2000).
[33]
Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 645, 671 (1996); Atilano vs.
Inclan,
45 Phil. 246, 252 (1923).
[34]
Palmares vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 422, 434 (1998); Inciong, Jr.
vs.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, 586 (1996); and, Cu vs. Court of
Appeals,
195 SCRA 647, 657 (1991).
[35]
RTC Decision, p. 14; Original Records, p. 306.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court.
[37]
Original Records, p. 87.chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Id., p. 162.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Exhibit “5” of Intervenor, id., p. 274.
[40]
Exhibit “1” of Intervenor, id., p. 266.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
Exhibits “1,” “1-A” and “1-B” of Intervenor, id., pp. 266-268.
[42]
Exhibit “2” of Intervenor, id., p. 269.chanrobles virtual law library
[43]
Exhibit “3” of Intervenor, id., p. 271.
[44]
Exhibit “5” of Intervenor, id., p. 274.
[45]
Exhibit “7” of Intervenor, id., p. 281.
[46]
Id., p. 163.chanrobles virtual law library
[47]
Gordula vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 617, 633 (1988); Republic vs.
Court
of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156, 161-162 (1985); Director of Lands vs. Court
of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689, 693 (1984); Republic vs. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186,
191-192
(1983); and, Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648, 656 (1979).chanrobles virtual law library
[48]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742, 748 (1990); Republic vs.
Animas,
56 SCRA 499, 503 (1974); Vda. de Alfafara vs. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125
(1954);
and, Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769 (1926).chanrobles virtual law library
[49]
Gordula vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Turquesa vs. Valera, 322 SCRA 573,
583 (2000); Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, 304 (1990);
and,
Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679, 693 (1987).chanrobles virtual law library
[50]
Exhibit “11” of Intervenor, Original Records, p. 288.chanrobles virtual law library
[51]
Seville vs. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112, 115 (2001);
Menguito
vs. Republic, 348 SCRA 128, 139 (2000); Republic vs. De Guzman, 326
SCRA
574, 580 (2000); Ituralde vs. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293, 296 (1999);
Republic
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 412, 419 (1987). |