SECOND DIVISION
SPOUSES TIMOTEO
RECAÑA,
JR. AND ESTER RECAÑA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
123850
January 05, 2001
-versus-
THE
COURT OF APPEALS
AND AURORA PADPAD, LUCILA ARBOLEDA,ENRIQUE ARBOLEDA,
AGUSTIN, REYNALDO, RODOLFOAND ROLANDO ALL
SURNAMED ARBOLEDA IN REPRESENTATIONOF THEIR FATHER
ERNESTO ARBOLEDA,
Respondents
|
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45
seeks to set aside the decision[1]
Rollo, pp. 35-43. of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 13,
1995
and its resolution[2]
Id. at 45. dated February 7, 1996, which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The decision of the respondent court affirmed with
modification
the decision[3]
Id. at 46-50. of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 03, in
Civil
Case No. 91-56327.
The subject of this
case is Lot 6 of Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land which the Land
Tenure
Administration, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1597,[4]
An Act Providing For The Subdivision Of The Tondo Foreshore Land Into
Lots
And The Sale Of Said Lots To Their Lessees Or To Bona Fide Occupants Of
Said Land, And For Other Purposes; enacted June 16, 1956. sold to
Macario
Arboleda, petitioner-spouses’ predecessor-in-interest. The lot was
covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 7676 issued on February 1, 1962 in
the name of Arboleda. Petitioner Ester Recaña and private
respondents
are the children and heirs of Macario Arboleda.[5]
Rollo, p. 35.cralaw:red
For many years, realty
taxes on the lot had not been paid both before and after the death of
Arboleda.
Thus, on August 26, 1980, the City Treasurer of Manila auctioned the
lot
for sale due to tax delinquency, under Presidential Decree No. 464.[6]
Enacting A Real Property Tax Code; took effect June 1, 1974. Spouses
Cirilo
and Miguela Montejo purchased the lot at a public auction and were
issued
a transfer certificate of title.[7]
Rollo, pp. 35-36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On April 25, 1984, the
Montejos sold the property to petitioner spouses, who also refunded the
amount equivalent to the delinquent taxes paid and other expenses
entailed.
Petitioners thus became the owners of the subject lot, evinced by
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1464015.[8]
Id. at 36.cralaw:red
On March 5, 1991, private
respondents Aurora Padpad et al. filed Civil Case No. 91-56327 for
declaration
of co-ownership and partition against petitioners in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.[9]
Id. at 51-54. They claimed co-ownership of the subject lot with
petitioners,
asserting that the repurchase by the latter of the lot redounded to
their
benefit as co-heirs and now as co-owners. In their complaint, they
based
their claim of co-ownership on the conditions of transfer in the deed
of
sale executed between Macario Arboleda and the Land Tenure
Administration
providing, inter alia, as follows:
"2. "Every conveyance
shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal
(heirs)
within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance; "
5. That this contract
shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors,
and assigns of the respective parties thereof; and
6. That the condition
contained in paragraph 2 hereof shall be annotated as encumbrance on
the
certificate of title to be issued in favor of the VENDEE and/or his
successor-in-interest."[10]
Rollo, p. 52.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private respondents
also invoked the rule that redemption by a co-owner of auctioned
property
arising from foreclosure redounds to the benefit of all co-owners.[11]
Mariano vs. CA, 222 SCRA 736, 740 (1993).cralaw:red
After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents, then
plaintiffs. It disposed -
WHEREFORE, judgment
is rendered for the plaintiffs:
1) Declaring Lot 6,
Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land, covered now by TCT No. 1464015, of
the Registry of Deeds of Manila, in the name of Ester A. Recaña
and Timoteo Recaña, as owned-in-common with equal shares by the
plaintiffs and defendants " Aurora A. Padpad; Lucila Arboleda, Enrique
Arboleda; the deceased Ernesto Arboleda, represented by his legal heir,
Nenita Agustin, Reynaldo, Rodolfo and Rolando; Ester Recaña; and
Milagros A. Clar[a]val;
2) Ordering Register
of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 1464014 in the name of Timoteo and
Ester Recaña, and to issue in lieu thereof a new Transfer
Certificate
of Title in the names of all the aforementioned co-owners with equal
pro-indiviso
shares thereon;
3) Ordering the defendants
to pay the costs of the suit, andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4) Dismissing the defendants’
counterclaim for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."[12]
Rollo, p. 50.cralaw:red
On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, we affirm
the decision of the lower court with modification and judgment is
hereby
rendered:
1) Declaring Lot 6,
Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land, covered now by TCT No. 164015 of
the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, in the name of Ester A. Recaña and
Timoteo Recaña, as owned-in-common with equal shares by the
plaintiffs
and defendants " Aurora A. Padpad; Lucila Arboleda, Enrique Arboleda;
the
deceased Ernesto Arboleda, represented by his legal heirs, Nenita
Agustin,
Reynaldo, Rodolfo and Rolando; Ester Recaña; and Milagros A.
Claraval;
2) Ordering the Registry
of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 164015 in the name of Timoteo and
Ester Recaña, and to issue in lieu thereof a new Transfer
Certificate
of Title in the names of all the aforementioned co-owners with equal
pro-indiviso
shares thereon;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3) Ordering the appellees
to reimburse appellants for the expenses incurred by appellants in the
repurchase of the land proportionate to their respective pro-indiviso
shares.cralaw:red
4) Ordering appellants
to pay the costs of the suit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."[13]
Id. at 42.cralaw:red
Hence, the present petition.cralaw:red
It is petitioners’ contention
that the last paragraph of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1597,
substantially
reproduced in the deed of sale between the Land Tenure Administration
and
Macario Arboleda, does not apply to the attendant facts and
circumstances
in this case. Instead, they insist that it is Section 78 of P.D. No.
464
which is applicable. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1597, the law
governing
the subdivision of the Tondo Foreshore Lands from which the subject
property
emanated, provides "chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Sec. 4. Lands acquired
under this Act shall not, except in favor of the Government or any of
its
branches or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations,
be subject to encumbrance or alienation within 15 years after the date
of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title to the purchaser,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period; Provided, however, that such
lands
may be mortgaged even before said period has expired.cralaw:red
Every conveyance shall
be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs
within
a period of 5 years from the date of conveyance."
Private respondents
argue that since petitioners repurchased the property from the Montejo
spouses well within the five-year period specified in the deed of sale
and in Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, they are deemed to have redeemed the
property for all the co-owners, themselves including.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners, however,
insist that it is Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 which should apply. This
Section
provides for a one-year redemption period for properties foreclosed due
to tax delinquency, thus:
"Sec. 78. Redemption
of real property after sale. - Within the term of one year from
the
date of the registration of the sale of the property, the delinquent
taxpayer
or his representative, or in his absence, any person holding a lien or
claim over the property, shall have the right to redeem the same by
paying
the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy the total amount
of
taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the costs of sale
and the interest at the rate of twenty per centum on the purchase
price,
and such payment shall invalidate the sale certificate issued to the
purchaser
and shall entitle the person making the same to a certificate from the
provincial or city treasurer or his deputy, stating that he had
redeemed
the property.cralaw:red
x x x"
Thus, according to petitioners,
their repurchase of the property beyond the one-year redemption period
under P.D. No. 464 was outside the ambit of a redemption of foreclosed
property, hence, not for the benefit of all co-owners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In addition, petitioners
assert that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 does not apply to the present
case
because it refers to an alienation outside the purview of foreclosure
due
to tax delinquency. They aver that Section 4 refers to a voluntary
alienation,
conveyance and encumbrance made in favor of the government, its
agencies
and instrumentalities within 15 years from the date the certificate of
title was issued to the purchaser. These conveyances, they add, are
subject
to repurchase within five years from the date of conveyance. In
contrast,
they allege that the conveyance involved in this case is an involuntary
conveyance, not covered by Section 4.cralaw:red
Petitioners also stress
that R.A. No. 1597 is a special law enacted to apply to the Tondo
Foreshore
Lands. They further point out that P.D. No. 464 is likewise a special
law
governing the collection of real property tax, regardless of whether
the
owner acquired the property from a private person or from a government
entity. They claim that no distinction whatsoever is found in the
decree
on the nature and source of the tax delinquent property, whether
express
or implied.cralaw:red
Lastly, petitioners
claim that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 has been expressly repealed and
abrogated
by P.D. No. 464, by virtue of the following provision:
"Sec. 111. Repealing
Clause. " Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred Seventy, as amended;
the
pertinent provisions of the charters of all cities; Section two
thousand
ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code; and all acts, laws or
decrees
or parts of acts, laws or decrees inconsistent with the provisions of
this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, petitioners
maintain that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, being inconsistent with
Section
78 of P.D. No. 464, was abrogated and repealed by the latter law, which
took effect later on June 1, 1974.cralaw:red
In our view, the issue
in this case is which of the two laws should apply in so far as the
redemption
period of the subject property is concerned? More specifically, is
Section
4 of R.A. No. 1597 already repealed by Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, such
that the latter provision governs the redemption period?
On one hand, we note
that R.A. No. 1597 is a special law enacted specifically to govern all
incidents of the subdivision of the Tondo Foreshore Land. On the other
hand, P.D. No. 464 covers all real property titled to individuals who
become
delinquents in paying real estate tax. P.D. 464 is a law of general
application.
Its provisions have substantially been adopted by the Local Government
Code of 1991, a general statute.[14]
J.C. Vitug. COMPENDIUM OF TAX LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 404 (3rd ed. 1993).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Basic in statutory construction
is the rule that the enactment of a later legislation which is a
general
law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law unless expressly
so stated. Well-settled in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that a
"special
statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed
by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
applications,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of
the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special
law."[15]
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 56
(1995).cralaw:red
We find no such intent
to expressly repeal R.A. No. 1597 in the provisions of P.D. 464. Its
repealing
clause, Section 111, specifically mentions Commonwealth Act No. 470;
the
pertinent provisions of the charters of all cities; Section 2092 of the
Revised Administrative Code; and all acts, laws or decrees or parts
thereof
inconsistent with P.D. 464, as having been repealed or modified
accordingly.
However, it is settled that a declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number and title is repealed, is an express repeal; all other repeals
are
implied repeals.[16]
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500, 504 (1992). R.A. No. 1597
was not specifically mentioned in the repealing clause, Section 111 of
P.D. 464.cralaw:red
Neither can Section
4, R.A. No. 1597 be considered to have been repealed impliedly. Repeal
of laws should be made clear and expressed.[17]
Supra, note 14. Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are
presumed
to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing
on the subject.[18]
City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353, 360
(1999).
Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless
it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it.[19]
Intia, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, 306 SCRA 593, 609 (1999). The
failure
to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy
exist in the terms of the new and old laws.[20]
Id. at 608 (1999). We find no such inconsistency or repugnancy between
Section 4 of R.A. 1597 and Section 78 of P.D. No. 464. The former law
is
of special and exclusive application to lots acquired from the Tondo
Foreshore
Land only. The latter is a law or decree of general application.
We concur in the view of the trial court and the respondent court that
R.A. No. 1597 has not been repealed.[21]
Rollo, p. 41.cralaw:red
Petitioners insist that
Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 refers to voluntary conveyances, while
Section
78 of P.D. No. 464 refers to involuntary conveyances. This
distinction
is of no moment. Concerning encumbrances and alienations therein
mentioned, Section 4 makes no distinction between voluntary and
involuntary
conveyances. There should also be no distinction in the application of
the law where none is indicated.[22]
Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636, 638 (1946). Where the law does not
distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere
debemos.[23]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. COA, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215 (1993).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The deed of sale between
the then Land Tenure Administration and Macario Arboleda contains
provisions
which preclude the application of Section 78, P.D. 464. As raised by
private
respondents in their complaint before the trial court, Paragraph 2 of
the
Deed of Sale contains the proviso of Section 4, R.A. 1597, that every
conveyance
of the lot "shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or
his legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance."
Paragraph 5 thereof also provides that the contract "shall be binding
upon
the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the
respective
parties thereof."[24]
Rollo, p. 55. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Section 4
should
be deemed superseded, we have held that where a contract is entered
into
by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or
amendment
of said law will not affect the terms of the contract, nor impair the
right
of the parties thereunder.[25]
Insular Government vs. Frank, 13 Phil. 236, 239 (1909); Aisporna vs.
Court
of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481, 494-495 (1981). This rule applies even if one
of the contracting parties is the government.[26]
Insular Government vs. Frank, 13 Phil. 236, 239 (1909).26 The
stipulations
in Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 5 being integral parts of the original
contract
between Arboleda and the Land Tenure Administration, the five-year
redemption
period in Section 4, R.A. 1597 becomes all the more pertinent and
decisive
of the controversy in the present case.cralaw:red
In the light of Section
4 of R.A. 1597, we hold that the respondent court committed no
reversible
error when it affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Petitioners’
repurchase
of the subject lot within the five-year redemption period of Section 4
of R.A. No. 1597 is within the purview of a redemption by a co-owner
which
inures to the benefit of all other co-owners of the property.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October
13, 1995, and its resolution dated February 7, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No.
37751
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 35-43.
[2]
Id. at 45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id. at 46-50.
[4]
An Act Providing For The Subdivision Of The Tondo Foreshore Land Into
Lots
And The Sale Of Said Lots To Their Lessees Or To Bona Fide Occupants Of
Said Land, And For Other Purposes; enacted June 16, 1956.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Rollo, p. 35.
[6]
Enacting A Real Property Tax Code; took effect June 1, 1974.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[8]
Id. at 36.
[9]
Id. at 51-54.
[10]
Rollo, p. 52.
[11]
Mariano vs. CA, 222 SCRA 736, 740 (1993).
[12]
Rollo, p. 50.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id. at 42.
[14]
J.C. Vitug. COMPENDIUM OF TAX LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 404 (3rd ed. 1993).
[15]
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 56
(1995).
[16]
Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500, 504 (1992).
[17]
Supra, note 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353, 360
(1999).
[19]
Intia, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, 306 SCRA 593, 609 (1999).
[20]
Id. at 608 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Rollo, p. 41.
[22]
Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636, 638 (1946).
[23]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. COA, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215 (1993).
[24]
Rollo, p. 55.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Insular Government vs. Frank, 13 Phil. 236, 239 (1909); Aisporna vs.
Court
of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481, 494-495 (1981).
[26]
Insular Government vs. Frank, 13 Phil. 236, 239 (1909). |