SECOND DIVISION
ELVIRA YU OH,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
125297
June 6, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALSAND PEOPLE
OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before this Court is a
Petition for Review on
Certiorari
of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 16390, promulgated on
January
30, 1996, affirming the conviction of petitioner Elvira Yu Oh by the
Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City, and the Resolution dated May
30, 1996 which denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts as borne by
the records are as follows:
Petitioner purchased
pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc., a
company
engaged in jewelry trading. Due to her failure to pay the
purchase
price, Solid Gold filed civil cases[2]
against her for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold, through
its general manager Joaquin Novales III, entered into a compromise
agreement
to settle said civil cases.[3]
The compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court, provided that
petitioner shall issue a total of ninety-nine post-dated checks in the
amount of P50,000.00 each, dated every 15th and 30th of the month
starting
October 1, 1990 and the balance of over P1 million to be paid in lump
sum
on November 16, 1994 which is also the due date of the 99th and last
postdated
check. Petitioner issued ten checks at P50,000.00 each, for a
total
of P500,000.00, drawn against her account at the Equitable Banking
Corporation
(EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City Branch. Novales then deposited
each
of the ten checks on their respective due dates with the Far East Bank
and Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were dishonored
by
EBC for the reason "Account Closed." Dishonor slips were issued
for
each check that was returned to Novales.[4]
On October 5, 1992,
Novales filed ten separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos.
92-26243 to 92-36252 before the RTC of Quezon City charging petitioner
with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing
Checks Law.[5]
Except for the dates and the check numbers, the Informations uniformly
allege:
That on or
about the.in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue
to JOAQUIN P. LOVALES III to apply on account or for value Equitable
Banking
Corp. Grace Park Caloocan Branch Check No. x x x dated x x x payable to
SOLID GOLD INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC. in the amount of P50,000.00,
Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she/he/they
did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented
for payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency
of funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
said accused failed to pay said SOLID GOLD INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC.
the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.chanrobles virtual law library
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The cases were
consolidated
and subsequently raffled to Branch 99 of the said RTC. Upon
arraignment,
accused pleaded not guilty.[7]
Trial then ensued. On December 22, 1993, the RTC rendered its
decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
this Court finds the accused GUILTY of ten counts of violation of BP 22
and hereby sentences her to a penalty of one year imprisonment for each
count, or a total of ten years, to be served in accordance with the
limitation
prescribed in par. 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code and to
indemnify
complainant the amount of the checks in their totality, or in the
amount
of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals alleging that: the RTC has no jurisdiction
over
the offense charged in the ten informations; it overlooked the fact
that
no notice of dishonor had been given to the appellant as drawer of the
dishonored checks; it failed to consider that the reason of "closed
account"
for the dishonor of the ten checks in these cases is not the statutory
cause to warrant prosecution, much more a conviction, under B.P. Blg.
22;
it failed to consider that there is only one act which caused the
offense,
if any, and not ten separate cases; and it disregarded the definition
of
what a ‘check’ is under Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.[9]
Finding the appeal to
be without merit, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial
court with costs against appellant.chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, herein petition
raising the following errors:
I
THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BY UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING HER OF THE LEGAL BENEFITS OF GIVING RETROACTIVE
EFFECT
TO THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INFERIOR
COURTS TO COVER THE OFFENSES INVOLVED IN THESE CASES PURSUANT TO ART.
22
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THUS IN EFFECT RENDERING THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION
PROMULGATED BY THE TRIAL COURT BELOW AND AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS
PATENTLY NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.
II
THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE FACT THAT NO
NOTICE
OF DISHONOR HAD BEEN GIVEN HER AS DRAWER OF THE DISHONORED "CHECKS"
PURSUANT
TO THE REQUIREMENT EXPRESSLY PROVIDED UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22.
III
THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE PROVISIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 CONTRARY
TO THE WELL-ESTABLISHED RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT "PENAL
STATUTES,
SUBSTANTIVE AND REMEDIAL OR PROCEDURAL, ARE, BY THE CONSECRATED RULE,
CONSTRUED
STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE, OR LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED" AND
THAT
"IT IS ALWAYS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EVIDENCE
UPON A THEORY OF INNOCENCE RATHER THAN UPON A THEORY OF GUILT WHERE IT
IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO", AND IN SO DOING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM
INDULGED
ITSELF IN "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION" TO FAVOR THE PROSECUTION AND TO WORK
GRAVE
INJUSTICE TO THE ACCUSED.
Simply worded, the issues
of this case may be stated as follows: (1) whether or not the appellate
court erred in not granting retroactive effect to Republic Act No. 7691[10]
in view of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); (2) whether or not
notice of dishonor is dispensable in this case; and (3) whether or not
the appellate court erred in construing B.P. Blg. 22.cralaw:red
We will resolve the
first and third issues before considering the second issue.cralaw:red
First issue
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving
retroactive
effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC.chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner argues that:
the failure of the appellate court to give retroactive application to
R.A.
7691 is a violation of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of the felony; R.A. 7691 is a penal law in the
sense
that it affects the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of
criminal
cases; taken separately, the offense covered by each of the ten
Informations
in this case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal
Trial Court under Sec. 2 of R.A. 7691; and the Court of Appeals is
guilty
of judicial legislation in stating that after the arraignment of
petitioner,
said cases could no longer be transferred to the MTC without violating
the rules on double jeopardy, because that is not so provided in R.A.
7691.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General,
in its Comment, counters that the arguments of petitioner are baseless
contending that: penal laws are those which define crimes and
provides
for their punishment; laws defining the jurisdiction of courts are
substantive
in nature and not procedural for they do not refer to the manner of
trying
cases but to the authority of the courts to hear and decide certain and
definite cases in the various instances of which they are susceptible;
R.A. No. 7691 is a substantive law and not a penal law as nowhere in
its
provisions does it define a crime neither does it provide a penalty of
any kind; the purpose of enacting R.A. No. 7691 is laid down in the
opening
sentence thereof as "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial
Court" whereby it reapportions the jurisdiction of said courts to cover
certain civil and criminal case, erstwhile tried exclusively by the
Regional
Trial Courts; consequently, Art. 22 of the RPC finds no application to
the case at bar; jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the
time of the filing of the complaint, and once acquired, jurisdiction is
not affected by subsequent legislative enactments placing jurisdiction
in another tribunal; in this case, the RTC was vested with jurisdiction
to try petitioner’s cases when the same were filed in October 1992; at
that time, R.A. No. 7691 was not yet effective;[12]
in so far as the retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7691 is concerned, that
same is limited only to pending civil cases that have not reached
pre-trial
stage as provided for in Section 7 thereof and as clarified by this
Court
in People vs. Yolanda Velasco,[13]
where it was held: "[a] perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show
that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not
yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso
nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application
to criminal cases pending or decided by the RTC prior to its
effectivity."[14]
On this point, the Court
fully agrees with the Solicitor General and holds that Article 22 of
the
Revised Penal Code finds no application to the case at bar.cralaw:red
Said provision reads:
ART.
22.
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.
A penal law, as defined
by this Court, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts
and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines
crime,
treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.[15]
R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for
its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its
punishment.
Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22
of the RPC does not apply in the present case.chanrobles virtual law library
B. P. Blg. 22, which
took effect on April 24, 1979, provides the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a fine of
not
less than but not more then double the amount of the check which fine
shall
in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the
discretion of the court.cralaw:red
R.A. No. 7691 which
took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and vested on the
Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction
to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years.[16]
Since R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that
said
law is substantive.[17]
In the case of Cang
vs. Court of Appeals,[28]
this Court held that "jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law,
the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement
of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court."[19]
R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of
the
cases in the trial court. It took effect only during the pendency
of the appeal before the Court of Appeals.[20]
There is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No.
7691
should be retroactively applied to this case and the same be remanded
to
the MTC. The Court has held that a "law vesting additional
jurisdiction
in the court cannot be given retroactive effect."[21]
Third issue
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erroneously construed B.P.
Blg. 22.chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner insists that:
penal statutes must be strictly construed and where there is any
reasonable
doubt, it must always be resolved in favor of the accused;[22]
the Court of Appeals, in construing that B.P. Blg. 22 embraces cases of
"no funds" or "closed accounts" when the express language of B.P. Blg.
22 penalizes only the issuance of checks that are subsequently
dishonored
by the drawee bank for "insufficiency" of funds or credit, has enlarged
by implication the meaning of the statute which amounts to judicial
legislation;[23]
a postdated check, not being drawn payable on demand, is technically
not
a special kind of a bill of exchange, called check, but an ordinary
bill
of exchange payable at a fixed date, which is the date indicated on the
face of the postdated check, hence, the instrument is still valid and
the
obligation covered thereby, but only civilly and not criminally;[24]
the trial court also erroneously cited a portion in the case of Lozano
vs. Martinez[25]
that the "language of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad enough to cover all
kinds
of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in
payment
of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange
for something of value," since the same is mere obiter dictum;[26]
in the interpretation of the meaning of a "check", where the law is
clear
and unambiguous, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition
or subtraction.[27]
The Solicitor General
counters that a postdated check is still a check and its being a
postdated
instrument does not necessarily make it a bill of exchange "payable at
a fixed or determinable future time" since it is still paid on demand
on
the date indicated therein or thereafter just like an ordinary check.[28]
It also points out that the doctrine laid down in Lozano vs. Martinez
was
reiterated in People vs. Nitafan,[29]
hence, it can no longer be argued that the statement in the case of
Lozano
regarding the scope of "checks" is mere obiter dictum.chanrobles virtual law library
Again, we agree with
the Solicitor General and find petitioner’s claim to be without merit.cralaw:red
The rationale behind
B.P. Blg. 22 was initially explained by the Court in the landmark case
of Lozano vs. Martinez[30]
where we held that:
The gravamen of the
offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions,
the making or worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed
by law. The law punished the act not as an offense against
property,
but an offense against public order.[31]
The effects of the
issuance of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the
parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee
or holder but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold,
can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.[32]
The same is reiterated
in Cueme vs. People[33]
where we pronounced that:
B.P. Blg. 22 was purposely
enacted to prevent the proliferation of worthless checks in the
mainstream
of daily business and to avert not only the undermining of the banking
system of the country but also the infliction of damage and injury upon
trade and commerce occasioned by the indiscriminate issuances of such
checks.
By its very nature, the offenses defined under B.P. Blg. 22 are against
public interest.[34]
In Recuerdo vs. People,
this Court also held that the terms and conditions surrounding the
issuance
of the checks are irrelevant since its primordial intention is to
ensure
the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual
substitutes
for currency.[35]chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner’s claim that
cases of "closed accounts" are not included in the coverage of B.P.
Blg.
22 has no merit considering the clear intent of the law, which is to
discourage
the issuance of worthless checks due to its harmful effect to the
public.
This Court, in Lozano vs. Martinez, was explicit in ruling that the
language
of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether
present
dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations
or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.[36]
In People vs. Nitafan,[37]
the Supreme Court reiterated this point and held that:
B.P. Blg. 22.does
not distinguish but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or
draws
and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank.which check is
subsequently dishonored. x x x shall be punished by imprisonmentx x
x Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.cralaw:red
But even if We retrace
the enactment of the "Bouncing Check Law" to determine the parameters
of
the concept of "check", we can easily glean that the members of the
then
Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include all
checks
drawn against banks.[38]chanrobles virtual law library
In this light, it is
easy to see that the claim of petitioner that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
include
‘postdated checks’ and cases of ‘closed accounts’ has no leg to stand
on.
The term "closed accounts" is within the meaning of the phrase "does
not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank".cralaw:red
Anent the second issue:
whether or not notice of dishonor is dispensable in the case at
bar.
Petitioner failed to show any cogent reason for us to disturb the
findings
of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
B.P. Blg. 22 or the
Bouncing Check’s Law seeks to prevent the act of making and issuing
checks
with the knowledge that at the time of issue, the drawer does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment and the checks
were subsequently dishonored upon presentment.[39]
To be convicted thereunder, the following elements must be proved:
1. The accused makes,
draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused
knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or
credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[40]
For liability to attach
under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough that the prosecution establishes
that
checks were issued and that the same were subsequently
dishonored.
The prosecution must also prove that the issuer, at the time of the
check’s
issuance, had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or credit in
the bank of payment thereof upon its presentment.[41]
Since the second element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of
B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as
follows:
Sec. 2. Evidence
of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing
and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because
of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.chanrobles virtual law library
Based on this section,
the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds
is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had
received
a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its
payment.[42]
The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section
cannot
arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to
the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning
the crucial 5-day period.[43]
In this case, it is
not disputed that checks were issued by petitioner and said checks were
subsequently dishonored. The question however is, was petitioner
furnished a notice of dishonor? If not, is it sufficient
justification
to exonerate petitioner from her criminal and civil liabilities for
issuing
the bouncing checks?
The trial court ruled
that the second element is present because:
x x x the accused knew
at the time of issuance of the checks that she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with her drawee bank for the payment of the checks
in
full upon their presentment [as] admitted by her in the
Counter-Affidavit
she executed during the preliminary investigation of these criminal
cases
(Italics ours), to wit:
4. That
the time of the issuance of the said checks, due notice and information
had been so given to Solid Gold anent the actual status of the checks
that
the same might not be able to cover the amount of the said checks so
stated
therein. x x x (Exhibit "N", "1", Underscoring supplied).cralaw:red
This fact became evident
again during the cross-examination by the accused’s counsel of the
prosecution’s
witness, Joaquin Novales III:
ATTY. TAGANAS:chanrobles virtual law library
Q: And the
reason you agreed to the terms and conditions for the issuance of
post-dated
checks because you are also aware the particular time the accused Mrs.
Elvira Yu Oh did not also have enough funds or money in the bank within
which to cover the amount of the checks?
A:
I am not aware, sir.cralaw:red
Q: To your
knowledge when the accused had already admitted to you that she had not
enough money to pay you?chanrobles virtual law library
A:
That is the terms and promise and agreed upon, sir.cralaw:red
Q: But inspite
of the fact that she already told you about that, that you never
suspected
that she did not have enough money to cover the checks agreed upon and
issued to you?
A:
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q: And inspite
of the fact she told you you never suspected that she did not have
enough
money to cover you.cralaw:red
Q: You still
believe that although she does not have enough money she still issued
checks
to you?
A:
Yes, sir. (TSN, April 6, 1993, pp. 24-26)
At any rate, there is
already prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds on
the part of the accused from her failure to pay the amount due on the
checks
or to make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within
five
banking days after she received notice of their dishonor, each of the
checks
having been presented within ninety days from their respective dated
(B.P.
Blg. 22, Sec. 2). The defense did not controvert this
evidence.
(Italics ours)[44]
Although the trial court
in its decision, mentioned that herein petitioner received notices of
dishonor,
nowhere in the records is there proof that the prosecution ever
presented
evidence that petitioner received or was furnished a notice of
dishonor.
The notices of dishonor that were presented in court and marked as
Exhibits
"D-2", "E-2", "F-2", "G-2", "H-2", "I-2", "J-2", "K-2", "L-2", "C-2"[45]
were all sent to the private complainant, Solid Gold, and not to
petitioner.
In convicting petitioner, the trial court, gave probative weight on the
admission of petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit which she submitted
during
the preliminary investigation that at the time of issuance of the
subject
checks, she was aware and even told private complainant that the checks
might not be able to cover the amount stated therein.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals
sustained the RTC, to wit:
Neither can We
agree that accused-appellant was still entitled to notice of dishonor
of
the bouncing checks as she had no more checking account with the drawee
bank at the time of the dishonor of the ten checks in question.
Accused-appellant
must have realized that by closing her checking account after issuing
the
ten postdated checks, all of said checks would bounce. Knowing
that
she had already closed her checking account with the drawee bank,
certainly
accused-appellant would not have expected, even in her wildest
imagination,
that her postdated checks would be honored by the drawee bank.
Thus,
accused-appellant need not be notified anymore of the obvious dishonor
of her rubber checks. (Italics ours)[46]
Based on the law and
existing jurisprudence, we find that the appellate court erred in
convicting
petitioner.cralaw:red
In cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, it is necessary that the prosecution prove that the
issuer
had received a notice of dishonor. Since service of notice is an
issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the
fact
of service. Basic also is the doctrine that in criminal cases,
the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence,
for cases of B.P. Blg. 22 there should be clear proof of notice.[47]chanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, this requirement
cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an opportunity
for
the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing on the check,
within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of
said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude
criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due process
demands
that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In
the
case at bar, appellant has a right to demand - and the
basic
postulate of fairness requires - that the notice of
dishonor
be actually sent to and received by her to afford her to opportunity to
aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[48]
The Solicitor General
contends that notice of dishonor is dispensable in this case
considering
that the cause of the dishonor of the checks was "Account Closed" and
therefore,
petitioner already knew that the checks will bounce anyway. This
argument has no merit. The Court has decided numerous cases where
checks were dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed"[49]
and we have explicitly held in said cases that "it is essential for the
maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she
could
pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the
period
prescribed by law"[50]
and omission or neglect on the part of the prosecution to prove that
the
accused received such notice of dishonor is fatal to its cause.[51]
A perusal of the testimony
of the prosecution witness Joaquin Novales III, General Manager of
complainant
Solid Gold, discloses that no personal demands were made on appellant
before
the filing of the complaints against her.[52]
Thus, absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the
dishonor
of her checks and was given the opportunity to make arrangements for
payment
as provided for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict
her
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to
prove
that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear
ground
for her acquittal.[53]
Moreover, as understood
by the trial court itself in the herein aforequoted portion of its
decision,
General Manager Novales knew of the non-availability of sufficient
funds
when appellant issued the subject checks to him. This Court has
held
that there is no violation of B.P. 22 if complainant was told by the
drawer
that he has no sufficient funds in the bank.[54]chanrobles virtual law library
For these reasons, we
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s
conviction of petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This is
without
prejudice, however, to her civil liability towards private complainant
Solid Gold in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interest thereon at the
rate
of 12% per annum from date of finality of herein judgment.[55]
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh is ACQUITTED of the offense of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on ten counts for insufficiency of
evidence.
However, she is ordered to pay complainant Solid Gold International
Traders,
Inc. the total amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) with
12% interest per annum from date of finality of herein judgment.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices
Jorge A. Imperial and B.A. Adefina-dela Cruz (former Ninth Division).
[2]
Docketed as Civil Cases No. 58907-59366.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Records, pp. 25-29.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[5]
Effective April 24, 1979.
[6]
Rcords, pp. 1-20.
[7]
Records, p. 78.
[8]
Rollo, p. 55.
[9]
Id., pp. 42-43.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE
BATAS PAMBANS BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATIO
ACT OF 1980", Approved March 25, 1994.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 17, 19-21.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Rollo, pp. 70-73.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
G.R. No. 110592, 252 SCRA 135 (1996).
[14]
Rollo, p. 74.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 128096, 301 SCRA 298,
323 (1999).
[16]
Sec. 2, Rep. Act No. 7691.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
DENR vs. Damaran, G.R. No. 125797, February 15, 2002, and Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Matas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-836, 247 SCRA 9,
18 (199) and DOH vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113212, 251 SCRA 700, 707 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
G.R. No. 105308, 296 SCRA 128 (1998).chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Id., p. 141. See also Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
92326,
205 SCRA 256, 362 (1992).
[20]
Rollo, p. 14, Petition, p. 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Largado vs. Masaganda, L-17624, 5 SCRA 522 (1962).
[22]
Rollo, p. 25.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Id., p. 27.
[24]
Rollo, p. 31.
[25]
146 SCRA 323 (1986).
[26]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[27]
Id., pp. 33-34.
[28]
Id., p. 78.
[29]
215 SCRA 83 (1992).
[30]
G.R. No. L-63419, 146 SCRA 323 (1986).
[31]
Id., p. 338.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Id., p. 340.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
G.R. No. 133325, 334 SCRA 795 (2000).
[34]
Id., p. 803.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
G.R. No. 133036, January 22, 2003, citing Meriz vs. People, G.R. No.
134498,
November 13, 2001.
[36]
Supra, p. 330.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
G.R. No. 75954, 215 SCRA 79 (1992).
[38]
Id., p. 83.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Lagman vs. People, G.R. No. 146238, December 7, 2001.
[40]
Danao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122353, 358 SCRA 450, 457-458
(2001).
[41]
Victor Ting "Seng Dee" vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140665, 344 SCRA
551, 557-558 (2000).
[42]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[43]
Danao vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 458-459.
[44]
Rollo, pp. 52-53.chanrobles virtual law library
[45]
Records, pp. 132-141.
[46]
Rollo, p. 44.chanrobles virtual law library
[47]
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 561.chanrobles virtual law library
[48]
Id., p. 559 citing Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572
(1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[49]
Caras vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129900, 366 SCRA 371, 380 (2001);
Danao vs. Cout opf Appeals, G.R. No. 122353, 358 SCRA 450 (2001); Ting
vs. Court of Appeals, supra, n. 15; Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R.
No. 139292, 347 SCRA 75 (2000) and King vs. People, G.R. No. 131540,
319
SCRA 654 (1999).
[50]
Caras case, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[51]
Id., p. 381.chanrobles virtual law library
[52]
TSN, April 6, 1993, pp. 18-19.chanrobles virtual law library
[53]
Id., pp. 383-384, citing King vs. People, G.R. No. 131540, 319 SCRA
654,
670 (1999).
[54]
Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA
73, 79 (2000).
[55]
Magno vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, 210 SCRA 471, 482 (1992). |