FIRST DIVISION.
.
QUIRINO
GONZALES
LOGGING CONCESSIONAIRE,QUIRINO
GONZALES
AND EUFEMIA GONZALES,
Petitioners,
G.
R.
No. 126568
April 30, 2003
-versus-
THE COURT OF
APPEALS
(CA) AND REPUBLIC PLANTERS
BANK,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES,
J.:
In the expansion
of its logging business, Petitioner Quirino Gonzales Logging
Concessionaire
(QGLC), through its Proprietor, General Manager - co-petitioner Quirino
Gonzales, applied on October 15, 1962 for credit accommodations[1]
with respondent Republic Bank (the Bank), later known as Republic
Planters
Bank.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Bank approved
QGLC’s
application on December 21, 1962, granting it a credit line of
P900,000.00[2]
broken into an overdraft line of P500,000.00 which was later reduced to
P450,000.00 and a Letter of Credit (LC) line of P400,000.00.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pursuant to the grant,
the Bank and petitioners QGLC and the spouses Quirino and Eufemia
Gonzales
executed ten documents: two denominated "Agreement for Credit in
Current
Account,"[4]
four denominated "Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of
Credit,"[5]
and four denominated "Trust Receipt."[6]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners’
obligations
under the credit line were secured by a real estate mortgage on four
parcels
of land: two in Pandacan, Manila, one in Makati (then part of
Rizal),
and another in Diliman, Quezon City.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In separate transactions,
petitioners, to secure certain advances from the Bank in connection
with
QGLC’s exportation of logs, executed a promissory note in 1964 in favor
of the Bank. They were to execute three more promissory notes in
1967.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In 1965, petitioners
having long defaulted in the payment of their obligations under the
credit
line, the Bank foreclosed the mortgage and bought the properties
covered
thereby, it being the highest bidder in the auction sale held in the
same
year. Ownership over the properties was later consolidated in the
Bank on account of which new titles thereto were issued to it.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 27, 1977,
alleging non-payment of the balance of QGLC’s obligation after the
proceeds
of the foreclosure sale were applied thereto, and non-payment of the
promissory
notes despite repeated demands, the Bank filed a complaint for "sum of
money" (Civil Case No. 106635) against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The complaint listed
ten causes of action. The first concerns the overdraft line under which
the Bank claimed that petitioners withdrew amounts (unspecified) at
twelve
percent per annum which were unpaid at maturity and that after it
applied
the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to the overdraft debt, there
remained
an unpaid balance of P1,224,301.56.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Bank’s second to
fifth causes of action pertain to the LC line under which it averred
that
on the strength of the LCs it issued, the beneficiaries thereof drew
and
presented sight drafts to it which it all paid after petitioners’
acceptance;
and that it delivered the tractors and equipment subject of the
LCs
to petitioners who have not paid either the full or part of the face
value
of the drafts.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Specifically with respect
to its second cause of action, the Bank alleged that it issued LC No.
63-0055D
on January 15, 1963 in favor of Monark International Incorporated[9]
covering the purchase of a tractor[10]
on which the latter allegedly drew a sight draft with a face value of
P71,500.00,[11]
which amount petitioners have not, however, paid in full.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under its third cause
of action, the Bank charged that it issued LC No. 61-1110D on December
27, 1962 also in favor of Monark International covering the purchase of
another tractor and other equipment;[12]
and that Monark International drew a sight draft with a face value of
P80,350.00,[13]
and while payments for the value thereof had been made by petitioners,
a balance of P68,064.97 remained.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under the fourth cause
of action, the Bank maintained that it issued LC No. 63-0182D on
February
11, 1963 in favor of J.B.L. Enterprises, Inc.[14]
covering the purchase of two tractors,[15]
and J.B.L. Enterprises drew on February 13, 1963 a sight draft on said
LC in the amount of P155,000.00 but petitioners have not paid said
amount.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On its fifth cause of
action, the Bank alleged that it issued LC No. 63-0284D on March 14,
1963
in favor of Super Master Auto Supply (SMAS) covering the purchase of
"Eight
Units GMC (G.I.) Trucks"; that on March 14, 1963, SMAS drew a sight
draft
with a face value of P64,000.00[16]
on the basis of said LC; and that the payments made by petitioners for
the value of said draft were deficient by P45,504.74.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Bank thus prayed
for the settlement of the above-stated obligations at an interest rate
of eleven percent per annum, and for the award of trust receipt
commissions,
attorney’s fees and other fees and costs of collection.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The sixth to ninth causes
of action are anchored on the promissory notes issued by petitioners
allegedly
to secure certain advances from the Bank in connection with the
exportation
of logs as reflected above.[17]
The notes were payable 30 days after date and provided for the solidary
liability of petitioners as well as attorney’s fees at ten percent of
the
total amount due[18]
in the event of their non-payment at maturity.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The note dated June
18, 1964, subject of the sixth cause of action, has a face value of
P55,000.00
with interest rate of twelve percent per annum;[19]
that dated July 7, 1967 subject of the seventh has a face value of
P20,000.00;[20]
that dated July 18, 1967 subject of the eighth has a face value
of
P38,000.00;[21]
and that dated August 23, 1967 subject of the ninth has a face value of
P11,000.00.[22]
The interest rate of the last three notes is pegged at thirteen percent
per annum.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On its tenth and final
cause of action, the Bank claimed that it has accounts
receivable
from petitioners in the amount of P120.48.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their Answer[24]
of March 3, 1977, petitioners admit the following: having applied for
credit
accommodations totaling P900,000.00 to secure which they mortgaged real
properties; opening of the LC/Trust Receipt Line; the
issuance
by the Bank of the various LCs; and the foreclosure of the real
estate
mortgage and the consolidation of ownership over the mortgaged
properties
in favor of the Bank. They deny, however, having availed of the credit
accommodations and having received the value of the promissory notes,
as
they do deny having physically received the tractors and equipment
subject
of the LCs.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As affirmative
defenses,
petitioners assert that the complaint states no cause of action, and
assuming
that it does, the same is/are barred by prescription or null and void
for
want of consideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
By Order of March 10,
1977, Branch 36 of the Manila RTC attached the preferred shares of
stocks
of the spouses Quirino and Eufemia Gonzales with the Bank with a total
par value of P414,000.00.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finding for petitioners,
the trial court rendered its Decision of April 22, 1992 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered as follows:
1. All the claims
of
plaintiff particularly those described in the first to the tenth causes
of action of its complaint are denied for the reasons earlier mentioned
in the body of this decision;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. As regards the
claims
of defendants pertaining to their counterclaim (Exhibits "1", "2" and
"3"),
they are hereby given ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the
torrens
title to plaintiff and before the transfer thereof in good faith to a
third
party buyer within which to ask for the reconveyance of the real
properties
foreclosed by plaintiff;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. The order of
attachment
which was issued against the preferred shares of stocks of
defendants-spouses
Quirino Gonzales and Eufemia Gonzales with the Republic Bank now known
as Republic Planters Bank dated March 21, 1977 is hereby dissolved
and/or
lifted; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. Plaintiff is
likewise
ordered to pay the sum of P20,000.00, as and for attorney’s fees, with
costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
In finding for
petitioners,
the trial court ratiocinated:[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Art. 1144
of
the Civil Code states that an action upon a written contract prescribes
in ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. Art. 1150
states that prescription starts to run from the day the action may be
brought.
The obligations allegedly created by the written contracts or documents
supporting plaintiff’s first to the sixth causes of action were
demandable
at the latest in 1964. Thus when the complaint was filed on January 27,
1977 more than ten (10) years from 1964 when the causes of action
accrued
had already lapsed. The first to the sixth causes of action are thus
barred
by prescription.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the
seventh
and eight causes of action, the authenticity of which documents were
partly
in doubt in the light of the categorical and uncontradicted statements
that in 1965, defendant Quirino Gonzales logging concession was
terminated
based on the policy of the government to terminate logging concessions
covering less than 20,000 hectares. If this is the case, the Court is
in
a quandary why there were log exports in 1967? Because of the
foregoing,
the Court does not find any valid ground to sustain the seventh and
eight
causes of action of plaintiff’s complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the ninth
cause of action, the Court is baffled why plaintiff extended to
defendants
another loan when defendants according to plaintiff’s records were
defaulting
creditors? The above facts and circumstances has (sic) convinced this
Court
to give credit to the testimony of defendants’ witnesses that the
Gonzales
spouses signed the documents in question in blank and that the promised
loan was never released to them. There is therefore a total absence of
consent since defendants did not give their consent to loans allegedly
procured , the proceeds of which were never received by the alleged
debtors,
defendants herein.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Plaintiff did not
present
evidence to support its tenth cause of action. For this reason, it must
consequently be denied for lack of evidence.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the matter of the
counterclaims of defendants, they seek the return of the real and
personal
properties which they have given in good faith to plaintiff. Again,
prescription
may apply. The real properties of defendants acquired by plaintiff were
foreclosed in 1965 and consequently, defendants had one (1) year to
redeem
the property or ten (10) years from issuance of title on the ground
that
the obligation foreclosed was fictitious.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x
On appeal,[26]
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the trial court by
Decision[27]
of June 28, 1996 which disposed as follows:[28]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed decision (dated April 22, 1992) of
the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 36) in Manila in Civil Case No. 82-4141 is
hereby REVERSED---and let the case be remanded back to the court a quo
for the determination of the amount(s) to be awarded to the [the
Bank]-appellant
relative to its claims against the appellees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With regard to the
first
to sixth causes of action, the CA upheld the contention of the Bank
that
the notices of foreclosure sale were "tantamount" to demand letters
upon
the petitioners which interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the seventh
to ninth causes of action, the CA also upheld the contention of the
Bank
that the written agreements-promissory notes prevail over the oral
testimony
of petitioner Quirino Gonzales that the cancellation of their logging
concession
in 1967 made it unbelievable for them to secure in 1967 the advances
reflected
in the promissory notes.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With respect to petitioners’
counterclaim, the CA agreed with the Bank that:[31]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Certainly, failure
on the part of the trial court to pass upon and determine the
authenticity
and genuineness of the Bank’s documentary evidence [the trial court
having
ruled on the basis of prescription of the Bank’s first to sixth causes
of action] makes it impossible for the trial court to eventually
conclude
that the obligation foreclosed (sic) was fictitious. Needless to say,
the
trial court’s ruling averses (sic) the well-entrenched rule that
‘courts
must render verdict on their findings of facts." (China Banking Co. vs.
CA, 70 SCRA 398)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, the defendants-appellees’
herein petitioners’ counterclaim is basically an action for the
reconveyance
of their properties, thus, the trial court’s earlier ruling that the
defendants-appellees’
counterclaim has prescribed is itself a ruling that the
defendants-appellees’
separate action for reconveyance has also prescribed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The CA struck down the
trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for lack of legal basis.[32]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, petitioners
now press the following issues before this Court by the present
petition
for review on certiorari:
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1. WHETHER
OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT-APPELLEES
(SIC.)
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK’S FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH
CAUSES OF ACTION HAVE NOT PRESCRIBED CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER
COURT, RTC BRANCH 36 THAT THE SAID CAUSES OF ACTION HAVE ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT RESPODNENT-APPELLEES (SIC.) REPUBLIC
PLANTERS
BANK’S SEVENTH, EIGHT AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION APPEARS (SIC.) TO BE
IMPRESSED
WITH MERIT CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT RTC BRANCH 36
THAT
THE SAID CAUSES HAVE NO VALID GROUND TO SUSTAIN THEM AND FOR LACK OF
EVIDENCE.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT
COURT [ERRED] IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH
36 OF MANILA THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANT (SIC.) MAY SEEK THE RETURN OF
THE
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES WHICH THEY MAY HAVE GIVEN IN GOOD FAITH AS
THE SAME IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANT
(SIC.)
HAD ONE (1) YEAR TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY OR TEN (10) YEARS FROM ISSUANCE
OF THE TITLE ON THE GROUND THAT THE OBLIGATION FORECLOSED WAS
FICTITIOUS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT PEITIONERS-APPELLANTS SIC ARE NOT
ENTITLED
TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petition is partly
meritorious.
On the first issue.
The Civil Code provides that an action upon a written contract, an
obligation
created by law, and a judgment must be brought within ten years from
the
time the right of action accrues.[33]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The finding of the
trial court that more than ten years had elapsed since the right to
bring
an action on the Bank’s first to sixth causes had arisen[34]
is not disputed. The Bank contends, however, that "the notices of
foreclosure
sale in the foreclosure proceedings of 1965 are tantamount to formal
demands
upon petitioners for the payment of their past due loan obligations
with
the Bank, hence, said notices of foreclosure sale
interrupted/forestalled
the running of the prescriptive period."[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Bank’s contention
does not impress. Prescription of actions is interrupted when
they
are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial
demand
by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt
by the debtor.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The law specifically
requires a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors which is
absent
in the case at bar. The contention that the notices of
foreclosure
are "tantamount" to a written extrajudicial demand cannot be
appreciated,
the contents of said notices not having been brought to light.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
But even assuming
arguendo
that the notices interrupted the running of the prescriptive period,
the
argument would still not lie for the following reasons:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With respect to the
first to the fifth causes of action, as gleaned from the complaint, the
Bank seeks the recovery of the deficient amount of the obligation after
the foreclosure of the mortgage. Such suit is in the nature of a
mortgage
action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage
contract.[37]
A mortgage action prescribes after ten years from the time the right of
action accrued.[38]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The law gives the mortgagee
the right to claim for the deficiency resulting from the price obtained
in the sale of the property at public auction and the outstanding
obligation
at the time of the foreclosure proceedings.[39]
In the present case, the Bank, as mortgagee, had the right to claim
payment
of the deficiency after it had foreclosed the mortgage in 1965.[40]
In other words, the prescriptive period started to run against the Bank
in 1965. As it filed the complaint only on January 27, 1977, more than
ten years had already elapsed, hence, the action on its first to fifth
causes had by then prescribed. No other conclusion can be reached even
if the suit is considered as one upon a written contract or upon an
obligation
to pay the deficiency which is created by law,[41]
the prescriptive period of both being also ten years.[42]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the promissory
note subject of the sixth cause of action, its period of prescription
could
not have been interrupted by the notices of foreclosure sale not only
because,
as earlier discussed, petitioners’ contention that the notices of
foreclosure
are tantamount to written extra-judicial demand cannot be considered
absent
any showing of the contents thereof, but also because it does not
appear
from the records that the said note is covered by the mortgage
contract.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Coming now to the second
issue, petitioners seek to evade liability under the Bank’s seventh to
ninth causes of action by claiming that petitioners Quirino and Eufemia
Gonzales signed the promissory notes in blank; that they had not
received
the value of said notes, and that the credit line thereon was
unnecessary
in view of their money deposits, they citing "Exhibits 2 to 2-B,"[43]
in, and unremitted proceeds on log exports from, the Bank. In
support
of their claim, they also urge this Court to look at Exhibits "B" (the
Bank’s recommendation for approval of petitioners’ application for
credit
accommodations), "P" (the "Application and Agreement for Commercial
Letter
of Credit" dated January 16, 1963) and "T" (the "Application and
Agreement
for Commercial Letter of Credit" dated February 14, 1963).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The genuineness and
due execution of the notes had, however, been deemed admitted by
petitioners,
they having failed to deny the same under oath.[44]
Their claim that they signed the notes in blank does not thus lie.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners’ admission
of the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes
notwithstanding,
they raise want of consideration[45]
thereof. The promissory notes, however, appear to be negotiable
as
they meet the requirements of Section 1[46]
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Such being the case, the notes are
prima
facie deemed to have been issued for consideration.[47]
It bears noting that no sufficient evidence was adduced by petitioners
to show otherwise.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Exhibits "2" to "2-B"
to which petitioners advert in support of their claim that the credit
line
on the notes was unnecessary because they had deposits in, and
remittances
due from, the Bank deserve scant consideration. Said exhibits are
merely
claims by petitioners under their then proposals for a possible
settlement
of the case dated February 3, 1978. Parenthetically, the proposals were
not even signed by petitioners but by certain Attorneys Osmundo R.
Victoriano
and Rogelio P. Madriaga.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In any case, it is no
defense that the promissory notes were signed in blank as Section 14[48]
of the Negotiable Instruments Law concedes the prima facie authority of
the person in possession of negotiable instruments, such as the notes
herein,
to fill in the blanks.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As for petitioners’
reliance on Exhibits "B", "P" and "T," they have failed to show the
relevance
thereof to the seventh up to the ninth causes of action of the Bank.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the third issue,
petitioners asseverate that with the trial court’s dismissal of the
Bank’s
complaint and the denial of its first to sixth causes of action,
it is but fair and just that the real properties which were mortgaged
and
foreclosed be returned to them.[49]
Such, however, does not lie. It is not disputed that the
properties
were foreclosed under Act No. 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of
Property
under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages),
as amended. Though the Bank’s action for deficiency is barred by
prescription,
nothing irregular attended the foreclosure proceedings to warrant the
reconveyance
of the properties covered thereby.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As for petitioners’
prayer for moral and exemplary damages, it not having been raised as
issue
before the courts below, it can not now be considered. Neither
can
the award attorney’s fees for lack of legal basis.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the CA
Decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Republic Bank’s
Complaint
with respect to its first to sixth causes of action is hereby
DISMISSED.
Its complaint with respect to its seventh to ninth causes of action is
REMANDED to the court of origin, the Manila Regional Trial Court,
Branch
36, for it to determine the amounts due the Bank thereunder.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno,
J., (Chairman)
,
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona,
JJ.
,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Records at 128.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id. at 129.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Vide "Complaint," Records at 100.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Dated December 26, 1962 (Records at 134) and February 10, 1964 (Records
at 135).
[5]
Records at 136, 143, 149 and 154.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Dated: January 15, 1963, Records at 141; January 15, 1963, Records at
148;
February 13, 1963, Records at 151; and March 14, 1963, Records at 159.
[7]
Records at 100.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 103.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at 104.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
One unit of used caterpillar D7 tractor, Serial No. 3T10074.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Exhibits "H" and "H-1" (Records at 140).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
One unit of used CAT D7 Tractor with Serial No. 3T13002 equipped with
Hydraulic
Angledozer and D7N Hyster Winch; two pieces of Cat D8 Track Link
Assembly;
and two pieces of D8 Sprocket Rim (Records at 106-107).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Exhibits "M" and "M-1" (Records at 146).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Records at 108-109.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Two Units D7 Crawler Tractors with Angledozer Blades Bearing Serial
Nos.
5T179 and 4T2567.
[16]
Records at 157.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
The Bank acted as an intermediary or agent of petitioners in the export
transactions.
[18]
Records at 160, 161, 162 and 163.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Id. at 160.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Id. at 161.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id. at 162.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Id. at 163.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Id. at 161, 162 and 163.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id. at 121.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Id. at 323-324.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
The Bank filed a notice of appeal on May 13, 1992 (Records at 326)
while
petitioners filed their own on May 14, 1992 (Records at 328).
[27]
CA Rollo at 84-98.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
CA Rollo at 98.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Id. at 93.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Id. at 94-95.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Id. at 96-97.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Id. at 98.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[33]
Civil Code, Art. 1144.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Records at 323.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Rollo at 95.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Civil Code, Art. 1155.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 741,
754 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Civil Code, Article 1142. The right of action accrues when there exists
a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises
or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect
such
right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative
of the right of the plaintiff (Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 727, 739 [1997]; Espanol v. Chairman,
Philippine
Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314, 318 [1985] [citations omitted]).
[39]
DBP v. Tomeldan, 101 SCRA171, 174 (1980) (citations omitted); See also
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Mirang, 66 SCRA 141, 144-145
[1975],
citing Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Tomas de Vera 6 SCRA 1026 (1962).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
See id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
Civil Code, Art. 1144.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
Vide, Petition, Rollo at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Rules of Court, Rule 8 Section 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 171, 181-182 (1998) (citations
omitted).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
SECTION 1. Form of negotiable instruments. - An instrument
to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b)
Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c)
Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(d)
Must be payable to order or to bearer; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(e)
Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or
otherwise
indicated therein with reasonable certainty.
[47]
Negotiable Instruments Law, Section 24.0chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Blanks; when may be filled. - Where the instrument is
wanting
in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a
prima
facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein.
And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the
signature
in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument
operates
as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. In
order,
however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced
against
a person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be
filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a
reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is
negotiated
to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes
in
his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly
in
accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Vide Petition, Rollo at 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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