SECOND DIVISION.
OSCAR SANTOS Y
PANGANIBAN,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
126624
November 11, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALSAND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Before the Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Oscar Santos y
Panganiban
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated March 15, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15858,
which affirmed in toto the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of frustrated
homicide.
Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate court's
Resolution
of October 1, 1996, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The case stemmed from
two Informations charging the petitioner with two counts of frustrated
homicide. The accusatory portion of the first Information docketed as
Criminal
Case No. 1929-M-90 reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or
about the 15th day of May, 1990, in the municipality of Paombong,
province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a jungle bolo and with
intent
to kill one Roy de Borja did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
attack, assault and hack with the said jungle bolo he was then provided
the said Roy de Borja, inflicting upon him physical injuries which
ordinarily
would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that
is,
by the timely medical assistance rendered to said Roy de Borja which
prevented
his death.[3]
The accusatory portion
of the second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1930-M-90
reads:
That on or
about the 15th day of May, 1990, in the municipality of Paombong,
province
of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a jungle bolo and with intent to
kill
one Loreto Hernandez did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
attack, assault and hack with the said jungle bolo he was then provided
the said Loreto Hernandez, inflicting upon him physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of homicide as a
consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is, by the timely medical assistance rendered to said
Loreto
Hernandez which prevented his death.[4]
At his arraignment, the
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges
against
him. A joint trial of the cases ensued.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As culled from the trial
court's decision, the evidence for the prosecution, consisting mainly
of
the testimonies of the victims Roy de Borja and Loreto Hernandez,
established
the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At 7:00
p.m.
on May 15, 1990, Loreto Hernandez, a resident of Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
Paombong,
then employed with the Manila Hotel as a security guard and his
companion
Roy de Borja, were walking along a narrow footpath on their way home
from
a visit to a mutual friend, Fely Jumaquio. Upon reaching that portion
of
the footpath in front of the house of Rufino Panganiban (a maternal
uncle
of petitioner Oscar P. Santos), the petitioner and his brother Pedro
Santos,
Jr. suddenly emerged into view and effectively blocked their way.
Hernandez
greeted the petitioner by his name "Ka Oscar" but, without much ado,
Pedro,
Jr. aimed a .45 calibre automatic pistol at the face of Hernandez, and
squeezed the trigger of the gun which, fortunately, did not fire.
Forthwith,
the petitioner hacked Hernandez twice with a jungle bolo. Hernandez was
struck; first, at the right forearm which he defensively raised to
parry
the blow and, second, at the right side of the head. Hernandez fell to
the ground semi-unconscious, blood oozing from his wounds. The
petitioner
then turned to De Borja who attempted to flee. The petitioner stabbed
De
Borja at the back, near the waistline. De Borja fell to the ground, and
saw the petitioner hack another person whom he could not identify. The
petitioner even told his brother, "Utol, Jr. alis na tayo; patay na ang
mga iyan. "chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As soon as the
petitioner
and his brother left the premises, De Borja, although himself already
injured,
endeavored to help Hernandez to his feet. The two crossed a river and
proceeded
to the barangay road where, at the foot of a bridge, Hernandez was left
behind, as De Borja went to look for any available vehicle that would
take
them to the hospital. While Hernandez was waiting for De Borja, a
tricycle
appeared. Hernandez boarded the same and proceeded to the De Leon
Clinic
in Paombong, where he was refused admission for undisclosed reasons.
Thereafter,
Hernandez boarded another tricycle which brought him to the provincial
hospital at Malolos where he was administered blood transfusion and
extended
first-aid treatment. Due presumably to the inadequacy of the medical
facilities
of the provincial hospital, Hernandez was transferred aboard an
ambulance
in the early morning of the ensuing day (May 16) to the Jose Reyes
Memorial
Medical Center in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Hernandez underwent immediate
surgical
operation of the complete fracture of the ulnar bone of his right
forearm
and confined for medical treatment until his discharge therefrom on
June
5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Alex Castillo operated
on Hernandez and issued a medico-legal certificate, which contains the
following findings:
Wound
hacked
9 cm. temporo-parietal left sutured
S/P open reduction
and
internal fixation (K-wire pinning and circlage wiring)
Open fracture
complete
proximal third ulna right
Abscess proximal
third
forearm right
Wound lacerated 3
cm.
dorsal aspect wrist right
SURGICAL
PROCEDURE:
Open reduction and K-wire pinning and circlage wiring ulna right.[5]
Because of the
eventual
onset of massive infection of the injury inflicted on his right
forearm,
Hernandez underwent a second surgical operation of the affected area on
December 20, 1990[6]
which necessitated his confinement once more at the Jose Reyes Memorial
Medical Center from December 19 to 26 of that year.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his
hospitalization
and medical treatment, Hernandez incurred expenses in the aggregate
amount
of P16,237.71.[8]
As a result of the injuries sustained by him, Hernandez was
incapacitated
to perform his customary work as security guard of the Manila Hotel[9]
from May 16, 1990, until he took the witness stand on December 17,
1990.
In fact, he was being readied at the time for a contemplated third
surgical
operation of the same injured forearm.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hernandez
testified
that upon boarding a Ford Fiera pick-up, he lost consciousness. He
regained
consciousness only at the provincial hospital in Malolos where he
received
initial medical treatment. In the early morning of May 16, he was
brought
via an ambulance to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center where he was
surgically operated on for the various injuries he sustained, and was
confined
therein up to May 20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Renato Vergara
treated
and attended to De Borja. According to the medico-legal certificate he
issued, De Borja sustained a 15-cm. hacking wound at the right
posterior
lumbar region of the body which penetrated the right hemidiaphragm as
well
as the right lobe of the liver, necessitating medical attention for
more
than thirty days. De Borja underwent post-operative treatment at the
provincial
hospital in Malolos and, on the whole, incurred medical expenses in the
amount of P20,000, more or less, the receipts for which were lost when
their house was ruined by a typhoon.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The testimonies of Hernandez
and De Borja on the hacking incident were corroborated by Aurelio
Dionisio
and Antonio Bonton who, shortly before the incident, were requested by
the wife of Hernandez to fetch the latter at the house of Jumaquio. It
was while they were on their way to fulfill the errand that Dionisio
and
Bonton were able to witness the hacking incident.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Having been hacked himself
by the petitioner during the same incident resulting in lacerated
wounds
on the left cheek, left shoulder and base of the fingers of the left
hand
for which he was confined in a hospital for five days, Bonton similarly
filed a separate complaint for frustrated homicide against the
petitioner
with another branch of the trial court.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his part, the petitioner
interposed self-defense. He claimed that he hacked Hernandez and De
Borja
only as an act of self-defense. The trial court summarized the
petitioner's
testimony as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Testifying
on his behalf, the accused declared that having been off-duty on May
15,
1990, he invited his fellow security guard Primo Oria and the latter's
wife to his hometown of Paombong to attend a barrio fiesta. Travelling
all the way from Pasay City, the group arrived in Paombong at about
noon
of that day. In the evening, the accused, his wife and children and Mr.
and Mrs. Oria attended mass at a chapel in Brgy. San Isidro where the
fiesta
was being celebrated, after which they returned to his house at Brgy.
Sto.
Rosario.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Because his TV set
was
out of order at the time, the accused and the Oria spouses repaired
[sic]
to the nearby house of Pedro Santos, Jr. in order to view the
championship
game between "Añejo Rum 65" and "Shell" in connection with the
then
on-going phase of the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA)
competitions.
That basketball game was marred by a walk-out staged by "Añejo
Rum
65" even before the match was over, which led to the proclamation of
the
"Shell" team as champion. Thus, the accused and his guests went back to
his house for dinner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the wife
of the accused was preparing supper at around 8:30 o'clock that night,
a group of men were heard shouting from outside the house. Curious, the
accused peeped thru a window of the house to see for himself who the
persons
shouting were. With the light emanating from the terrace of the house,
he was able to see the persons of Loreto Hernandez, Roy de Borja,
Antonio
Bonton and Aurelio Dionisio who were already inside the frontyard of
his
house; three (3) other males whom he was not able to identify were seen
near the river beyond the yard. When he was seen peeping thru that
window,
the accused heard Aurelio Dionisio remark: "Ayan si Oscar, barilin mo
na."
That utterance prompted the accused and Oria to turn off the lights
inside
the house in order that the interior would be completely dark as a
precautionary
measure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While the
commotion
outside the house was taking place, the accused heard Dionisio in
particular
utter the following statements: "Putang ina mo. Lumabas ka riyan.
Papatayin
ka namin. Iisa-isahin ko ang mga kasama mong ipinagmamalaki. Huwag kang
magtago [sic] sa saya ng asawa mo. Magpakalalake ka. Putang ina mo."
Apparently
irked by the refusal of the accused to confront them, the group of
Hernandez
and De Borja started pelting the house with stones, causing some window
panes to break and the plaster finish of the walls to chip off as
depicted
by colored photographs (Exhs. 12, 20-A, 21-A & 22-A).
Rather than be
taunted
into a likely violent encounter, the accused sneaked out of his house
thru
a backdoor to seek outside help. Under cover of the darkness of night,
the accused went to the house of ex-barangay captain Rey Salamat, but
did
not find him there. The accused proceeded to the house of Juanito
Salamat,
a policeman brother of the ex-barangay captain, but also failed to see
him. The accused next knocked at the door of the house of Julian (one
of
the Salamat brothers) to whom he reported the presence of the group of
troublemakers at his yard. After expressing the assurance that he will
immediately and personally summon his brother Juanito (who was then on
duty at the municipal building), Julian advised the accused to return
to
his house inasmuch as something untoward might have already befallen
the
members of his family. Taking heed of Julian's advice, the accused
decided
to go back home by taking that pathway in front of the house of his
uncle,
Rufino Panganiban.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On his way home,
the
accused met Carmelita Panganiban who, after having been apprised of the
trouble taking place within the yard of his house, directed the accused
to hurry home. However, when the accused was about a meter away from
the
gate of Rufino Panganiban's house, he met the group of Loreto
Hernandez,
Antonio Bonton, Roy de Borja, Aurelio Dionisio and several others, who
lurked beyond a bend of the pathway. As he came face to face with the
accused,
Hernandez blurted out: "Eto pala ang hinahanap natin." Already
apprehensive,
the accused took a step backward but, at that instant, Hernandez drew a
gun from his waist and from a distance of some 2 meters aimed the
weapon
at the head of the accused. Almost simultaneously, the accused heard
someone
(whom he suspected to be Aurelio Dionisio) exclaim: "Sige, barilin mo
na
ang putang inang yan." Realizing that his life was in imminent danger
and
because it was all but impossible for him to run away by then, the
accused,
with the use of the bolo with which he armed himself when he stepped
out
of his house to seek assistance from his neighbors, hacked Hernandez's
outstretched arm gripping the gun. Because of the hacking blow, the
firearm
which Hernandez pointed at the accused was flung somewhere; Hernandez
himself
fell to the ground by the seat of his pants [sic].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the time,
Bonton
and Dionisio were each armed with a piece of 2"x 2" wood, while De
Borja
was holding a fanknife [sic]. Seeing Hernandez subdued, the trio
menacingly
rushed towards the accused who kept flailing his bolo aimlessly in
order
to keep his attackers at bay. Even as the accused cannot determine
whether
he struck anyone in the process, his attackers "moved backward". Given
such opportunity, the accused ran away and proceeded directly to the
municipal
hall to report the incident. He did not surrender his bolo to the
police
authorities because, in his confusion, he must have thrown the weapon
away
somewhere along his route.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner's
testimony
was corroborated by his first degree cousin Restituto Cardenas, his
uncle
Rufino Panganiban, the latter's daughter-in-law Carmelita Panganiban,
Julian
Salamat, Primo Oria, as well as other witnesses whose respective
testimonies
were synthesized by the trial court, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
2) Mario Robles,
chief
barangay tanod of Sto. Rosario and one of his barangay tanods, Pedro
Santos,
Jr. (a brother of the accused), panting and visibly frightened, arrived
at his house between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. on May 15, 1990 to seek his
help
because the group of Aurelio Dionisio alias "Boy Kano" attacked the
residence
of the accused challenging him to a fight-to-death. Responding to the
call
for assistance, he sought out barangay councilman Oscar Salamat and
both
went to the scene of the reported incident, but found no one in the
place
anymore. They investigated the premises of the house of the accused and
saw
for themselves the stones thrown at the house, the broken window panes
and marks of damages on a wall of the house.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3) Marcelo
Salamat,
a barangay councilman of Sto. Rosario, who testified that on May 16,
1990,
he and barangay tanod chief Mario Robles allegedly recovered near a
creek
beside the footpath where the hacking incident transpired) the plastic
toy gun which the defense represented as the same weapon which
Hernandez
aimed at the accused, thus, precipitating the said hacking incident.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
8) SPO1 Reynaldo
D.
Cruz, a 55-year old policeman of Paombong, who presented in Court the
black
plastic toy gun (Exh. 5) that resembles a .45 calibre automatic pistol
together with a foot-long 2"x 2" wooden club (Exh. 6) which were turned
over to him as desk officer on May 16, 1990 by Pablo Santos Senior and
Junior, Ramon Salamat and Marcelo Salamat; the foregoing items were
represented
by the defense as the weapons which Hernandez and Bonton were armed
with
during the incident complained of.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court
rendered
a decision convicting the petitioner of two counts of the crime of
frustrated
homicide. It gave scant consideration to the petitioner's plea of
self-defense,
but appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
The decretal portion of the trial court's decision reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
in Crim. Case No.
1929-M-90
finding accused
OSCAR
SANTOS y PANGANIBAN of Sto. Rosario, Paombong, Bulacan, guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide as charged in the Information
and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional,
as maximum, plus the accessory penalties provided by law and to
indemnify
complainant Roy de Borja for actual damages in the amount of P20,000.00
representing medical expenses incurred by the latter for the injuries
sustained
by him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
in Crim. Case No.
1930-M-90
finding accused
OSCAR
SANTOS y PANGANIBAN of Sto. Rosario, Paombong, Bulacan, guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide as charged in the Information
and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional,
as maximum, plus the accessory penalties provided by law and to
indemnify
the complainant Loreto Hernandez for actual damages in the amounts of
P16,237.71
representing medical expenses incurred by the latter for the injuries
sustained
by him and P21,000.00 representing his lost earnings covering the
period
May 16, 1990 to December 17, 1990 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the
petitioner
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA). The appellate
court,
finding no reversible error in the findings and conclusions of the
trial
court, affirmed the petitioner's conviction.[14]
Like the trial court, the CA found the prosecution's version of the
incident
more credible, characterizing the petitioner's claim of self-defense as
unsubstantiated by evidence. The assailed decision of the CA stated in
part, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In view of
the foregoing, we are fully in accord with the trial court that
appellant's
story to establish self-defense is incongruent with the ordinary,
observations
and experience of man and discordant with the nature and ways of
things.
It is for that reason doubtful and unconvincing and should be rejected.
That appellant
intended
to kill Hernandez and De Borja was evidenced by his use of a jungle
bolo
— a lethal weapon — and the parts of the victim's bodies which he hit.
According to undisputed evidence, the wound of Hernandez on his right
forearm
and wound of De Borja in his back waist are both life threatening.
Therefore,
the elements of frustrated homicide were fully proven in both cases.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner moved
for
a reconsideration of the assailed decision but the CA, in the
Resolution
16 of October 1, 1996, denied the same.
The petitioner now comes
to the Court alleging that the CA erred (a) in not acquitting him of
the
crime charged on his plea of complete self-defense; (b) in not
appreciating
in his favor the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense
and
voluntary surrender; (c) and in not finding that the prosecution failed
to prove the propriety and factual basis for any civil liability for
the
crimes charged.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the first issue,
the petitioner avers that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's
assessment
on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the
probative
weight thereof, and sustaining its findings on the issue of whether or
not the petitioner acted in self-defense. The petitioner asserts that
as
fortified by his evidence, Loreto Hernandez and Roy de Borja were the
unlawful
aggressors, which impelled him to defend himself. He asserts that
Hernandez,
at close range, aimed his .45 caliber automatic pistol, which turned
out
to be a toy gun, at the head of the petitioner, even as one of his
companions,
Aurelio Dionisio, who was armed, urged Hernandez on: "Sige, barilin mo
na and putang inang iyan." The petitioner hacked Hernandez with his
jungle
bolo, hitting the latter on the right arm when he parried the thrust.
In
the process, the bolo of the petitioner likewise hit the right side of
Hernandez' head. When Hernandez fell to the ground, his gun was flung
somewhere
else. At that point, Roy de Borja, who was armed with a fan knife,
Antonio
Bonton and Aurelio Dionisio, each armed with a 2" x 2" (dos por dos)
piece
of wood, rushed towards the petitioner to kill him. To defend himself
against
their collective assault, the petitioner swung his bolo aimlessly to
keep
his attackers at bay. In the process, the tip of the petitioner's bolo
hit De Borja at the back when the latter and his cohorts turned as they
fled from the scene. The petitioner claimed that he must have thrown
away
his bolo when he rushed to the police station to surrender.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court disbelieved
the petitioner's submission and gave credence and probative weight to
the
testimonies of Hernandez and De Borja, thus:
For more
reasons
than one, the Court finds for the prosecution.
Firstly, having
been
privileged with the singular opportunity of having observed the
deportment
of all the witnesses presented in the instant cases, the Court finds no
reason to doubt the testimonies of the complainants and their
eyewitnesses
whom the Court keenly noted to have testified in a straightforward and
unrehearsed fashion. On the other hand, if for his cockiness alone,
herein
accused was rated by the Court as a witness who hardly inspires belief.
With respect to the purported eyewitnesses for the defense, the Court
considers
their testimonies impaired by bias which motivated them, as their
interests
so persuaded, to testify as they did. Briefly said, the Court found the
complainants and their eyewitnesses relatively more credible than the
accused
and his own eyewitnesses.
Secondly, the
testimonies
of the accused and his eyewitnesses, regarding the manner by which the
accused adroitly defended himself and the use by Hernandez of a toy gun
are too good to be true. This dimension of the case for the defense
must
have been inspired by the current crop of inane action-movies which
have
bred entertainment celebrities of the likes of Fernando Poe, Jr., Lito
Lapid and Robin Padilla. Such derring-do to be sure, pertains to the
theater
of the absurd! The Court simply cannot bring itself to believe the
pretense
of the defense that Hernandez, in carrying out his alleged desire to
cause
the accused bodily harm, would have armed himself for that end with a
mere
toy gun; after all, if the version of the defense is to be believed,
Hernandez
was acting for real and not in accordance with a movie script. To this
extent, the theory of the defense is flawed in no small measure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thirdly, and of
transcendent
significance, as between the protagonists, it is the accused who had an
axe to grind, so to speak. Both the prosecution and the defense
revealed
that sometime in 1981 at Pasay City, Hernandez stabbed the accused
somewhere
at the back. Even as such prior incident had already been amicably
settled,
it is not difficult to imagine that herein accused, as the victim of
that
previous assault, would harbor ill-will against Hernandez and nurture
the
hope of eventually getting even. That obsession is but a manifestation
of the known machismo of the Filipino. This sour note in his
relationship
with Hernandez is wholly inconsistent with the avowed self-defense of
his
person invoked by the accused. Stated differently, Hernandez could not
have been the aggressor in the hacking incident involved in the cases
at
bar; the accused was.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, and let
alone
the foregoing pronouncements, the Court holds the view that the
evidence
adduced is insufficient to sustain the contention that the accused
validly
acted in self-defense when he inflicted the injuries upon complainants
Hernandez and De Borja. Not even "incomplete self-defense" obtains.[17]
Like alibi,
self-defense
is inherently a weak defense which, as experience has demonstrated, can
easily be fabricated.[18]
To merit approbation, the accused is burdened to prove with clear and
convincing
evidence the confluence of the following essential requisites for
self-defense:
(a) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that
the
means employed to prove or repel such aggression was reasonable; and
(c)
there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending
himself.[19]
Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack
on the life and limb of a person or an imminent anger thereof; and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[20]
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, where there is no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The accused must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the prosecution for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak,
the same can no longer be disbelieved after the accused has admitted
killing
or injuring the victim.[22]
Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense is essentially an
issue
of fact best addressed to the trial court.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The legal aphorism is
that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonial
evidence of the parties and its assessment of the probative weight of
the
evidence of the parties especially if affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the Court unless
the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored, misunderstood,
misconstrued
or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will change the outcome of the case. The trial court and
the
CA gave no credence and probative weight to the collective testimonies
of the petitioner and his witnesses.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After an incisive consideration
of the evidence on record, the Court finds no basis to deviate from the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
The petitioner's evidence
to support his plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete is
implausible,
if not incredible.
First. The
testimony of the petitioner is belied by the physical evidence on
record.
He testified that when Hernandez aimed his gun at his head, the
petitioner
raised his right hand, and holding his bolo, swung it downwards.
Hernandez
then raised his right hand to parry the thrust of the petitioner. In
the
process, the petitioner's bolo hit Hernandez' right forearm and the
right
side of his head above the right ear.[24]
However, Dr. Castillo who operated on Hernandez, belied the
petitioner's
testimony and stated that the latter sustained an open fracture on his
right forearm and a hacked wound on the temporo-parietal (left) portion
of his head, that is, from the middle of the left side of the skull
going
down to the temple. Hernandez also suffered a third wound, a 3 cm.
lacerated
wound on the dorsal aspect of the wrist near the joint.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Second. The
petitioner
wanted the trial court to believe that Hernandez, upon the proddings of
Aurelio Dionisio, threatened to shoot him with a toy gun although the
petitioner
was armed with a bolo. It is, indeed, incredible that Hernandez would
have
the temerity to threaten the petitioner who was armed with a lethal
weapon,
such as a bolo, with a mere toy gun.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Third. The
petitioner
threw away the bolo that he used in hacking Hernandez and De Borja.
This
circumstance negates the petitioner's plea of self-defense.[26]
Fourth. The
petitioner
testified that he did not know that he was able to hit and injure De
Borja.
What he recalls is that De Borja was armed with a knife and Antonio
Bonton
and Aurelio Dionisio, were each armed with a 2" x 2" piece of wood.
When
the three rushed towards the petitioner, he swung his bolo
indiscriminately
from right to left, to prevent Hernandez and his cohorts from attacking
him. The petitioner did not know how De Borja was injured. He only
heard
rumors that De Borja was injured:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Another
thing,
Mr. Witness, you said that de Borja was also a participant in that
incident
where Bonton and Hernandez were injured. Now, my question to you is, do
you know if in that same incident Borja was also injured?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A I do not know,
sir.
On that particular night I did not come to know that he sustained any
injury.
I only know that injury from rumors eventually.
COURT
Q By the way,
during
the entire incident were you the only one armed with a bolo?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. SIPIN
Q Now, why is it
that
you know Borja claimed that you hacked him? Do you know of any reason?
A I do not know
of any
reason, sir.
Q During that
incident,
you wielded your bolo, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How?
A When I saw that
they
are going to rush towards me I swung my bolo and my eyes were closed
and
I do not know how I rotated the same. (witness demonstrating with his
right
hand and wielded the bolo horizontally).[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner's
testimony
is thus inconsistent with his plea that he hacked De Borja to defend
himself.[28]
Fifth. If the
petitioner
indeed indiscriminately swung his bolo as De Borja, Aurelio Dionisio
and
Antonio Bonton rushed to attack him, then De Borja should have been hit
on the front portion of his body. However, De Borja was hit on his
back,
more specifically at the right posterior lumbar region of his
body:Hacking
wound 15 cm. posterior lumber right, penetrating right hemidiaphragm by
3 cm. incising right lobe of liver by 2 cm. Hemoperitoneum 1,500 cc.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Surgical Procedure:
Closed
Tube Theracostomy right, Phrenicarrhaphy, Hepatorrhaphy.[29]
Considering the location
of the wound sustained by De Borja, his back was clearly against the
petitioner
when the latter hacked him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner's insistence
that he did not intend to kill any of the two victims because even
after
the latter had been hacked and had fallen to the ground, the petitioner
and his brother Pedro Santos, Jr. left the scene, does not hold water.
In People v. Delim,[30]
this Court held that evidence of intent to kill may consist inter alia
in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number
of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors
before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.
In this case, the petitioner used a bolo and inflicted mortal wounds on
the victims, which could have caused their deaths were it not for
timely
medical intervention. Hernandez sustained a complete open fracture on
the
right ulnar bone which, according to the orthopedic surgeon who
attended
to him, would have been fatal were it not for the timely medical
treatment.
The hack wound on Hernandez located on the temporo-parietal region of
his
head could have caused his death were it not for timely medical
treatment.
The wound inflicted on De Borja penetrated his right hemidiaphragm as
well
as the right lobe of his liver. The presence of these wounds, their
location
and their seriousness would not only negate self-defense; they likewise
indicate a determined effort to kill.[31]
The petitioner even told his brother Pedro, Jr. after hacking Hernandez
and De Borja: "Utol, Jr. alis na tayo, patay na ang mga iyan." Thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q After the
second and the other injury that you received, what happened to you?
A I fell to the
ground,
sir.
Q You fell to the
ground?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you lose
consciousness?
A I sort of felt
dizzy
because of the blood oozing from my wounds on my head.
Q After that
dizziness
was gone, what did you do, if you did anything?
A I heard words
"Utol,
Jr., alis na tayo patay na ang mga iyon."
ATTY. SIPIN
We move for
the
striking out of the answer on the ground of immateriality.
COURT
Let it
remain
on record. This is an indictment for frustrated homicide.
PROSECUTOR
Q So, after
hearing
that remarks, "utol, etc.,"
COURT
Q Do you know who
uttered
the remarks?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who uttered that
remarks?
A Oscar Santos,
sir.
COURT
Alright,
proceed.
PROSECUTOR
Q After
that
x x x After hearing that remarks, what did you
do, if you did anything?
A I did not do
anything
except that I felt Roy de Borja tried to help me stand up, sir.[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the
petitioner
asserts that in the remote event that he is not acquitted, he submits
that
the appellate court committed reversible error in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This submission is
erroneous.
As affirmed by the CA, the trial court in fact appreciated the
mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Proper
Penalties
for the Felonies
The trial court sentenced
the petitioner for each crime to an indeterminate penalty, from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional,
as maximum, taking into account the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary
surrender in favor of the petitioner. The penalties imposed by the
trial
court are not correct. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal in its full range.
Since the petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide, the penalty must
be reduced by one degree, namely, to prision mayor with a range of six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The maximum of the
indeterminate
penalty should be taken from the minimum period of prision mayor
because
of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, absent any
aggravating
circumstance. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty,
prision
mayor should be reduced by one degree, which is prision correccional,
with
a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum
of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of
prision
correccional. Accordingly, the petitioner should be sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty, from two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one
(1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Civil Liabilities
of the Petitioner
In Criminal Case No.
1929-M-90, the trial court directed the petitioner to indemnify
complainant
Roy de Borja the amount of P20,000 as actual damages representing
medical
expenses incurred by the latter for the injuries sustained by him. In
Criminal
Case No. 1930-M-90, the trial court directed the petitioner to
indemnify
complainant Loreto Hernandez actual damages in the amount of P16,237.71[33]
representing the medical expenses incurred by the latter for the
injuries
he sustained, and P21,000 representing his lost earnings as security
guard
of the Manila Hotel covering the period of May 16, 1990 to December 17,
1990 at the rate of P3,000 per month. The trial court failed to award
moral
damages in favor of the two victims.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court has to modify
these awards. The actual damages in the amounts of P20,000 in favor of
complainant De Borja representing his medical expenses and P21,000 in
favor
of Hernandez representing his lost earnings, were unsupported by
documentary
evidence. Nonetheless, where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined
because of the absence of documentary evidence to prove the same, but
it
is shown that the heirs of the victims are entitled thereto, temperate
damages may be awarded.[34]
The Court finds that the amounts equal to one-half of that claimed by
the
victims are sufficient temperate damages. The victims are also entitled
to moral damages under Article 2219(1), New Civil Code.[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, the petitioner
shall indemnify Roy de Borja the amount of P10,000 as temperate damages
in Criminal Case No. 1929-M-90. Similarly, the petitioner shall
indemnify
Loreto Hernandez the amounts of P16,237.71 representing the medical
expenses
incurred by him and P10,000 as temperate damages in lieu of his
unsubstantiated
lost earnings.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated March 15, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15858,
finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
Frustrated
Homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For each count, the petitioner
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty, from two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional in its minimum period, as
minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum
period,
as maximum. Further, the petitioner shall indemnify Roy de Borja the
amounts
of P30,000 as moral damages; and P10,000 as temperate damages in
Criminal
Case No. 1929-M-90. Similarly, the petitioner shall indemnify Loreto
Hernandez
the amounts of P30,000 as moral damages; P16,237.71 representing the
medical
expenses incurred by him; and P10,000 as temperate damages in Criminal
Case No. 1930-M-90.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino, with Associate Justices
Jainal D. Rasul and Hector L. Hofileña, concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge D. Roy A. Masadao, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Records, p. 1 (Crim. Case No. 1929-M-90).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Records, p. 1 (Crim. Case No. 1930-M-90).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Exh. "A," Records, p. 61 (Crim. Case No. 1929-M-90).
[6]
Exh. "D," id. at 67.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Exh. "E," id. at 68.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Exhs. "B," "B-1" to "B-105" and Exhibits "H," "H-1" to "H-29."
[9]
He was earning a basic salary of P3,000.00 per month.
[10]
RTC Decision, p. 5; Records, p. 214 (Crim. Case No. 1929-M-90).
[11]
Records, pp. 214–216.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 216–218.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id. at 220–221.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Rollo, p. 18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id. at 80.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at 223.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Rollo, pp. 91–92.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
People v. Noay, 296 SCRA 292 (1998).
[19]
People v. Geneblazo, 361 SCRA 572 (2001).
[20]
Calim v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 559 (2001).
[21]
People v. Camacho, 359 SCRA 200 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Jacobo v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 270 (1997).
[23]
Calim v. Court of Appeals, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
TSN, 2 October 1992, pp. 9–10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
TSN, 18 February 1991, pp. 18–20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
TSN, 28 October 1992, pp. 46–48.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
See note 20, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Exh. "A," Records, p. 10 (Crim. Case No. 1930-M-90).
[30]
G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
People v. Quening, 373 SCRA 42 (2002).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
TSN, 17 December 1990, pp. 18–20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Exhibits "H," "H-1" up to "H-29."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
People v. Orucula, Sr., 335 SCRA 129 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Article 2219. Moral Damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x
x
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |