THIRD DIVISION
CARLOS SUPER DRUG
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
126711
March 14, 2003
-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALSAND BANK
OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
CARPIO-MORALES,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 1978, private
respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), then owner of the BPI
Cubao Arcade[1]
in Cubao, Quezon City, leased two units in the arcade, designated as
Bays
4 and 5, to petitioner Carlos Super Drug Corporation (CSDC).
On August 9, 1985, following
purported non-payment of rentals by CSDC, BPI filed a complaint against
it for unlawful detainer (the first case) before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 35-48285.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The parties later entered
into a compromise agreement, which was approved on May 8, 1989 by
Branch
35 of the MeTC, the pertinent provision of which reads:
3.
That effective November 16, 1988 for a term of one year, defendant
agrees
to pay a new monthly rate of P26,116.39. For this purpose, a new
contract of lease shall be executed by the parties.cralaw:red
On May 15, 1989 and
thereafter, however, CSDC paid BPI only P9,564.64 corresponding to the
rental of Bay 4, it harping on the remark, before the forging of the
compromise
agreement on May 2, 1989, of Atty. Alfonso B. Versoza, the then BPI
counsel,
to Rolando Carlos, the then president and general manager of CSDC,
"that
there should already be an imaginary line between Bays 4 and 5 on May
15,
1989."[2]
On March 29, 1990, BPI
filed before MeTC, Branch 35 a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution
of the decision based on the compromise agreement on the ground that
CSDC
refused to pay the P26,116.39 monthly rental and to sign a new contract
of lease. The MeTC, Branch 35 granted the motion over the
objection
of CSDC. And a writ of execution was issued. BPI later
filed
a "Motion to Direct the Sheriff" to eject CSDC. CSDC also filed a
"Motion to Quash, Vacate and/or Set Aside Order/Writ of Execution."
By Order of May 31,
1990, the MeTC, Branch 35 denied BPI's "Motion to Direct the Sheriff to
Eject" in this wise:[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x
Plaintiff have (sic)
executed to the full satisfaction the arrearages and allegedly
defendant
failed to pay the monthly rental for which reason plaintiff corporation
sought for the eviction of defendant. The compromise agreement
however
does not speak of ejection in case of violation. Plaintiff in its
motion, in effect seeks to modify the compromise agreement. A
compromise
agreement is considered final and executory and as held in the case of
Sps. Santiago vs. IAC, I-73202, April 9, 1986, a Decision being final
and
executory can no longer be altered, modified or reversed by the trial
court
nor by the appellate court.cralaw:red
While Article 2041 of
the Civil Code provides for a remedy to a party in a compromise
agreement
to either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon
his original demand should one of the parties fails or refuses to abide
by the compromise, this cannot hold water to herein plaintiff who have
(sic) already sought enforcement of the compromise agreement.cralaw:red
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the Motion for Execution directing the Sheriff to eject the defendant
filed
by plaintiff on April 19, 1990 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.cralaw:red
x x x (Underscoring
supplied)
On June 18, 1990, BPI
filed another complaint against CSDC for unlawful detainer (the second
case) before the Quezon City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 2996, on
the grounds that the lease contract had expired and that CSDC had not
paid
the agreed rentals.cralaw:red
In its Answer (to the
complaint in the second case) with Counterclaim, CSDC contended that,
among
other things, the lease contract had not yet expired, and BPI "has no
cause
of action because its right or cause of action is with [the first case]
before M[e]TC, Branch 35 which approved the compromise agreement."
Branch 38 of the MeTC
dismissed the second case by decision of June 26, 1992,[4]
it finding that "the lease contract has not yet expired until and
unless
a new contract of lease shall have been formally executed by the herein
parties." It however, ordered CSDC to pay BPI:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
the sum of P39,864.98
as compensation for its use and occupancy ofBay 4 and 5plus
the sum of P26,116.39 thereafter as monthly rentalsfor Bay 4.[5]
Both parties appealed
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. By Decision of June
14,
1993[6],
Branch 81 of the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the second case but on a
different ground, to wit: that, as contended by CSDC, MeTC Branch 38
had
no jurisdiction over the second case, BPI having therein sought to
enforce
the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement forged in the
first
case, hence, BPI's remedy was to seek enforcement of the compromise
agreement
in the first case before MeTC Branch 35, citing Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals.[7]
On appeal, the Court
of Appeals, by Decision of November 29, 1995[8]
sustained the jurisdiction of the MeTC, Branch 38 in this wise:
Basic is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is conferred by law
and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine
or conveniently set aside (La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals,
226 SCRA 78). Under Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", as amended by
Section
3 of Republic Act No. 7691, municipal trial courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.cralaw:red
The action of the petitioner
in filing a separate suit for ejectment before the M[e]TC, Branch 38
was
predicated upon the violation by the private respondent of the terms
and
conditions of the lease contract embodied in the compromise agreement
and
after the M[e]TC, Branch 35, which rendered the compromise judgment,
correctly
rejected BPI's motion to eject CSDC from the premises of Bay(s) 4 and 5
on the ground that ejectment is not a remedy provided for under the
compromise
in case of violation of its terms by the private respondent and to
grant
such plea would amount to modifying its final judgment. The
M[e]TC,
Branch 35 could not have ruled otherwise without doing violence to the
settled rule that a court can no longer amend, modify, much less set
aside
its judgment once the same has become final. (Emphasis in the
original;
nderscoring supplied.)[9]
It accordingly reversed
the Decision of the RTC, it finding that the lease agreement had
expired
and as CSDC "continues to enjoy the premises leased with the
acquiescence
of [BPI], an implied new lease is created for the period mentioned in
Art.
1687, Civil Code, [and] [t]he other terms of the original contract are
revived."[10]
It thus ordered CSDC to immediately vacate the leased premises and
return
the possession thereof to BPI, and to pay the rentals due thereon in
accordance
with the compromise agreement.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, CSDC filed the
present petition for review on certiorari on November 21, 1995 which
raises
the following issues:
I. WHETHER
OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN VALIDLY FILE AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE
(CIVIL
CASE No. 2996) BEFORE THE M[e]TC, BRANCH 38, QUEZON CITY,
NOTWITHSTANDING
THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES IN AN
EARLIER
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (CIVIL CASE No. 48285) BEFORE THE M[e]TC-BRANCH
35, QUEZON CITY;
II. WHETHER OR NOT
THE
LEASE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT HAD EXPIRED;
III. WHETHER OR
NOT
THE PETITIONER MAY BE ORDERED TO VACATE THE SUBJECT PREMISES.[12]
In its comment to the
petition,
BPI argued that CSDC was challenging the trial court's decision and not
that of the Court of Appeals, prompting CSDC to file on March 31, 1996
an Addendum[13]
to the petition and assign the following errors:
I. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 3 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691;
[AN ACT AMENDING THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980].
II. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FILING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE
METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 38 IS THE PROPER REMEDY TAKEN BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS;
III. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT CANNOT BE UPHELD;
IV. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED
TO QUESTION THE BELIEF OF THE PETITIONER THAT THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THEM AS TO THE LATTER'S RELINGUISHING [SIC] OF ITS RIGHTS TO
BAY
5;
V. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT CSDC IS STILL OCCUPYING BAY 5.
In the main, CSDC
contends that since BPI seeks the enforcement of the compromise
agreement
forged in the first case, "what [BPI] should have done is to move for
the
issuance of a writ of execution." In any event, CSDC contends
that
the filing of the second case is improper because the parties had
agreed
on CSDC's relinquishing of Bay 5 and that the lease contract had not
expired.cralaw:red
With respect to CSDC's
contention that BPI should have filed a Motion for Execution before the
MeTC Branch 35, did not BPI file one which CSDC, however, opposed?
As regards the alleged
impropriety of the filing of the second case upon the ground provided
by
CSDC: A reading of the allegations in BPI's complaint[14]
in the second case determines BPI's cause of action. Consider the
following
pertinent allegations:
x x x
3. That on May 2, 1989,
plaintiff [BPI] and defendant [CSDC] entered into a compromise
agreement
in Civil Case No. 35-48285 whereby defendant agreed to lease the
aforementioned
property for a term of one year from November 16, 1988 and to pay a
monthly
rental of P26,116.39. A copy of said compromise agreement is hereto
attached
as Annex "A".cralaw:red
4. That the said lease
agreement contained in the compromise agreement expired last November
16,
1989 and the defendant likewise failed to pay the agreed rent which as
of May 31, 1990 amounted to P39,864.98.cralaw:red
5. That despite the
expiry of the lease agreement and plaintiff's demands to settle its
obligation,
defendant failed to pay his back rents and refused to vacate the
abovementioned
premises. A copy of the final demand letter is hereto attached as Annex
"B".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x (Emphasis and
nderscoring supplied)
BPI thus anchored its
cause of action in the second case, in the main, on the expiration of
the
lease contract reflected in the compromise agreement, CSDC's failure to
pay back rentals, and CSDC's refusal to vacate the leased units, hence,
the complaint for unlawful detainer.cralaw:red
Since the one year lease
agreement had expired (on November 16, 1989), CSDC was already
unlawfully
withholding possession of the leased premises from BPI to entitle the
latter
to file (on June 18, 1990) an unlawful detainer case.[15]
CSDC's assertion that
the lease period provided for in the compromise agreement had not yet
expired
to abate the filing of an unlawful detainer case fails, for paragraph 3
of the compromise agreement reading:
3.
That effective November 16, 1988 for a term of one year, defendant
agrees
to pay a new monthly rental rate of P26,116.39. For this purpose, a new
contract of lease shall be executed by the parties. (Emphasis supplied)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
indicates otherwise.cralaw:red
As for CSDC's assertion
that BPI is estopped from claiming in the courts below that their lease
contract covers both Bays 4 and 5 (to entitle BPI to a total monthly
rental
of P26,116.39), BPI having "kept silent as to [CSDC's] relinquishment
of
[B]ay 5 until the filing of the [second] case":[16]
The Court of Appeals, however, held that, and this was not assailed by
CSDC, when CSDC conveyed its request to BPI for the relinquishment of
Bay
5, it (CSDC) was notified of its subsequent disapproval by the bank's
management.[17]
CSDC's claim of estoppel, does not thus lie. More importantly,
CSDC
knowingly entered into the judicially approved compromise agreement
under
which it undertook to pay a monthly rental rate of P26,116.39
representing
monthly rentals for the two units leased.cralaw:red
In fine, CSDC has failed
to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in its
assailed
decision.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DENIED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Now owned by the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary.
[2]
CA Rollo at 70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo at 18-19.
[4]
CA Rollo at 28-40.
[5]
Id. at 39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 16-20.
[7]
49 SCRA 429 (1973).
[8]
CA Rollo at 69-76.
[9]
Id. at 72-73.
[10]
Id. at 74.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Id. at 75-76.
[12]
Rollo at 25-26.
[13]
Id. at 59-60.
[14]
CA Rollo at 21-22.
[15]
Vide Villegas v. C.A., 168 SCRA 553 (1988).
[16]
Rollo at 64.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
CA Rollo at 70.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |