THIRD DIVISION
ELEUTERIO,
ANATALIA,
JOSELITO, ROGELIO, EVANGELINE, NOEL,GUILLERMO, LORENZO,
DOMINGO, AMADO, and VICTORIA,ALL SURNAMED LOPEZ,
Petitioners, |
G.R.
No.
127827
March 5, 2003
-versus-
THE
HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, AND SPOUSES MARCELINOAND CRISTINA S.
LOPEZ, FELISA LOPEZ AND RAMON CORTEZ,ZOILO LOPEZ,
LEONARDO
LOPEZ AND LEONILA LOPEZ ANDSPOUSES ROGELIO
M. AMURAO AND NOAMI T. AMURAO,
Respondents.
|
D E C I S I
O N
PUNO, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision[1]
dated September 30, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
43837,
which affirmed with modification the Decision dated March 30, 1993 of
the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Civil Case No.
677-A.
The evidence shows that
in 1920, Fermin Lopez occupied, possessed, and declared for taxation
purposes
a parcel of public land containing an area of 19 hectares, 48 ares, 88
centares, more or less, situated in Makatubong, Barrio De la Paz,
Antipolo,
Rizal. He filed a homestead application over the land, but his
application
was not acted upon until his death in 1934. When he died, he was
survived by the following: (1) Hermogenes Lopez, now deceased, leaving
his children, respondents Marcelino, Felisa, Zoilo, and Leonardo, all
surnamed
Lopez, as his heirs; (2) petitioner Eleuterio Lopez; (3) Juan Lopez,
now
deceased, leaving his children, Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado, and
Victoria, all surnamed Lopez, as his heirs;[2]
and (4) Nazario, now deceased, leaving his wife, petitioner Anatalia,
and
children, petitioners Joselito, Rogelio, Evangeline and Noel, all
surnamed
Lopez, as his heirs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Following Fermin's death,
Hermogenes, being the eldest child, worked and introduced additional
improvements
on the land. In 1936, he inquired from the Bureau of Lands the status
of
his late father's application for a homestead grant. An official[3]
of the bureau informed him that the application remained unacted upon
and
suggested that he file a new application. Following the suggestion,
Hermogenes
filed a homestead application in his own name, which was docketed as
No.
138612. After ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any
private
person, the Bureau approved his application. In 1939, Hermogenes
submitted
his final proof of compliance with the residency and cultivation
requirements
of the law. The land was surveyed and a resulting plan, H-138612, was
approved
by the Director of Lands, who thereafter ordered the issuance of the
homestead
patent. The patent was later transmitted to the Register of Deeds of
Rizal
for transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title
in his name.cralaw:red
Unaware that he has
been awarded a homestead patent, Hermogenes executed on February 11,
1956
an Extra-judicial Partition of the disputed land with his brothers -
petitioner
Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario. On September 12, 1958, however, the three
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their share in the land in favor of
Hermogenes. The succeeding year, Hermogenes applied with the Land
Registration
Commission for the registration of the property in his name. This was
docketed
as LRC Case No. 2531. To his surprise, he found that the land has been
registered in the names of Fernando Gorospe, Salvador de Tagle, Rosario
de Tagle, Beatriz de Suzuarrequi and Eduardo Santos, who collectively
opposed
his application.cralaw:red
In December 1959, Hermogenes
filed a complaint for the annulment of the free patent and title
against
these persons before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,[4]
docketed as Civil Case No. 5957. Some of the defendants moved for its
dismissal
alleging that Hermogenes was not a real party in interest since he
previously
sold his right to the land to one Ambrocio Aguilar on July 31, 1959.
The
case was dismissed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aguilar instituted on
November 18, 1976 a new civil action before the CFI of Rizal,[5]
docketed as Civil Case No. 24873. It was similar to Civil Case No. 5957
except for the change in plaintiff and the addition of the Bureau of
Lands
as co-defendant. On April 15, 1982, the lower court declared Aguilar as
the absolute owner of the land and OCT No. 537 and all subsequent
certificates
of title emanating therefrom as void ab initio. This decision was
affirmed
in toto by the Court of Appeals. In G.R. No. 90380, we affirmed the
decision
of the appellate court in a decision promulgated on September 13, 1990.[6]
After the April 15,
1982 decision of the CFI, and while the case was on appeal, respondent
Lopezes, as heirs of Hermogenes (who died on August 20, 1982), filed a
complaint against Aguilar before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The July
14,
1984 complaint was for the cancellation of the deed of sale executed by
Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar dated July 31, 1959 and/or reconveyance.
It was docketed as Civil Case No. 463-A. On February 5, 1985, the lower
court declared the deed of absolute sale null and void ab initio and
the
respondents as the true and absolute owner of the disputed land.
Aguilar
sought relief with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the
decision
of the RTC in a Decision promulgated on August 18, 1987.[7]
In G.R. No. 81092, we denied Aguilar's petition for review in a
resolution
dated April 6, 1998 for having been filed late.cralaw:red
On April 25, 1985, after
the RTC of Antipolo rendered its February 5, 1987 decision in Civil
Case
No. 463-A and pending its appeal, respondent Lopezes sold a large
portion
of the disputed property to respondent spouses Amurao.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 31, 1985, petitioners
Eleuterio, Anatalia, Joselito, Rogelio, Evangeline and Noel, all heirs
of Nazario Lopez, along with Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado, and
Victoria,
all heirs of Juan Lopez, instituted the present action against the
respondents
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, docketed as Civil Case
No.
677-A. They prayed, among others, that they be declared co-owners of
the
property subject matter hereof and that private respondents be ordered
to reconvey to them 3/5 thereof as its co-owners, or in the
alternative,
to pay its value. On June 26, 1985, respondents filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim alleging that they are the absolute owners of
the
contested land on the basis of the homestead grant to their
predecessor-in-interest,
Hermogenes.cralaw:red
After the pre-trial
on November 27, 1987, trial ensued. In the August 28, 1986 hearing
petitioners'
counsel failed to appear, causing the case to be dismissed. The
dismissal,
however, was reconsidered upon motion of petitioners' counsel, and the
case was again set for hearing. In the scheduled hearing of October 17,
1986, counsel for respondent was absent. Upon proper motion,
petitioners
were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte on December 5,
1986.
Following the presentation of ex-parte evidence, the case was deemed
submitted
for resolution.cralaw:red
On June 25, 1987, the
court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners ordering
the
division of the disputed lot in equal portions among the four children
of Fermin or their heirs. Respondents failed to appeal the decision but
on September 10, 1987, they filed a petition for relief from judgment,
alleging that accident/excusable negligence prevented them from
attending
the trial and that they have a good, substantial and meritorious
defense.
On December 28, 1989, the court a quo set aside its decision dated June
25, 1987 and ordered a pre-trial conference.cralaw:red
On January 30, 1990,
respondents filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer alleging for the
first
time that petitioners have already sold to Hermogenes their shares in
the
contested property. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that
the
amendments constituted substantial alteration of the theory of the
defense.
On February 13, 1990, the court a quo allowed respondents to amend the
answer. When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners
elevated
the issue directly to this court via a Petition for Certiorari. On
April
25, 1990, we denied the petition for failure to comply with the
requirements
of Circular 1-88, with a further pronouncement that, "besides, even if
the petition were admitted, the same would still be dismissed as the
Court
finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by public
respondent."
Trial on the merits once more proceeded in the court a quo.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While the case was on
trial, complainants therein Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado and
Victoria,
all children of Juan Lopez, entered into a compromise agreement with
the
respondent Lopezes, heirs of Hermogenes, recognizing the latter's
ownership
and possession of the property subject of the case. They
confirmed
the sale made by their father Juan to Hermogenes. On July 20, 1992, the
court a quo rendered a partial decision approving the compromise
agreement.[8]
On March 30, 1993, the
court a quo rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint, the
dispositive
portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the dismissal
of the case;
2. Declaring Hermogenes
Lopez as the exclusive owner of the property in question;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs
to pay the defendants the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
4. Ordering plaintiffs
to pay the costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Feeling aggrieved, petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
above Decision, thus:
"Finally, We have to
delete and disallow the award of attorney's fees for want of factual
and
legal premise in the text of the appealed Decision.cralaw:red
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification that the
award
of attorney's fees is deleted. Costs against the appellants."[10]
Hence, the present course
of action where petitioners contend:
"I. The
Honorable
Court of Appeals in ruling that the propriety of the grant of
respondents'
petition for relief from judgment has been rendered moot is not in
accord
with the decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
II. The Court of
Appeals'
ruling that Fermin Lopez, the common predecessor-in-interest, was not
entitled
to the grant of the homestead patent, hence petitioners are not
co-owners
of the disputed property is not in accord with the evidence and the
decisions
of this Honorable Supreme Court.
III. The Court of
Appeals'
ruling that the statement or declarations in the extra-judicial
partition
(Exh. N); the special power of attorney (Exh. O); and the letter dated
January 11, 1984 (Exh. Q) were based on a wrong assumption that the
property
is owned by their common predecessor-in-interest -- is not in accord
with
the evidence and decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
IV. The Court of
Appeals
committed reversible error in ruling that the forged absolute deed of
sale
dated September 12, 1958 has no bearing on the respondents' claim over
the disputed property.
V. The Court of
Appeals
in not ruling that the remedy of partition is available to the
petitioners
is not in accord with law.
VI. The Court of
Appeals'
ruling that laches applies to the herein (sic) who are close relatives
is not in accord with the decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court."[11]
First, the procedural
issue.
Petitioners contend that the grant of relief from judgment is erroneous
as the respondents did not substantiate their allegation of fraud,
accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence which unjustly deprived them of a
hearing.
They add that while respondents had ample opportunity to avail of other
remedies, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, from the
time
they received a copy of the decision on July 10, 1987, yet they did not
do so.
Rule 38 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure governs the petition for relief from judgment.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Rules provide:
"Section 2. Petition
for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside."[12]
"Section 3. Time for
filing petition; contents and verification. - A petition provided for
in
either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed
within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order
or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after
such judgment or final order was entered or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake
or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioners'
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be."[13]
We find that respondents
were deprived of their right to a hearing due to accident. In the
October
17, 1986 hearing, their counsel was absent due to asthma, which
disabled
him and made it difficult for him to talk. Similarly, when petitioners
presented their evidence ex-parte on December 5, 1986, the counsel for
the respondents again failed to appear as he experienced another severe
asthma attack. On both occasions, his absence is clearly excusable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nor is there any doubt
that respondents were able to show that they have a good and
substantial
defense. They attached to their affidavit of merit the following
documents:[14]
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No.
5957 entitled "Hermogenes Lopez v. Fernando Gorospe, et al."; the
decision
also of the Pasig CFI, in Civil Case No. 24873, entitled "Ambrocio
Aguilar
v. Fernando Gorospe"; the decisions of the lower and appellate courts
in
the case of Marcelino Lopez, et al. v. Ambrocio Aguilar"; the
decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo in the case of "Ambrocio
Aguilar
v. Santos"; and the Deed of Sale executed by and between Hermogenes and
his brothers - petitioner Eleuterio, Nazario and Juan. The ruling
in the foregoing cases recognized the absolute ownership and possession
of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes Lopez. The deed
showed
that petitioner Eleuterio, Juan and Nazario sold their rights and
interests
in the contested lot to their brother Hermogenes.cralaw:red
Time and again, we have
stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
strict
and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help
secure
and not override substantial justice.[15]
If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve
the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.[16]
We now address the substantive
issues. The most pivotal is the petitioners' contention that the
appellate
court erred in holding that they are not co-owners of the disputed
property.
They argue that Fermin, their predecessor-in-interest, has complied
with
all the requirements of the Public Land Act pertaining to a homestead
grant,
and is therefore entitled to a patent as a matter of right. They
claim that Fermin filed a homestead application over the land,
cultivated
at least one-fifth of it, and resided on it for at least one
year.
Upon his death, they argue that they became its co-owners through
succession.cralaw:red
We do not agree. Homestead
settlement is one of the modes by which public lands suitable for
agricultural
purposes are disposed of.[17]
Its object is to provide a home for each citizen of the state, where
his
family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune,
and
to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are
essential
to the maintenance of free institutions.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The record is bereft
of any evidence as to when Fermin exactly filed his homestead
application
over the lot in controversy, but it must have been filed after 1920,
the
year he first occupied and possessed the land, and before 1934, the
year
he died. During this period, Act No. 2874 was the governing law.[19]Section 12 thereof provides:
"Sec. 12. Any citizen
of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, over the age of
eighteen
years, or the head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four
hectares of land in said Islands or has not had any benefit of any
gratuitous
allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the
occupation
of the Philippine Islands by the United States, may enter a homestead
of
not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public
domain."[20]
A person who is legally
qualified has to file his application for a homestead patent with the
Bureau
of Lands. If in order, the application shall be approved by the
Director.
The applicant will be authorized to enter the land upon payment of an
entry
fee of five pesos.[21]
Within six months after approval of the application, the applicant has
to improve and cultivate the land.[22]
He must cultivate at least one-fifth of the land for a period of not
less
than two years nor more than five years from the date of approval of
the
application.[23]
He must also continuously reside in the same municipality where the
homestead
is located, or in an adjacent municipality, for at least one year.[24]
He must finally present his final proof to the Bureau of Lands that he
has complied with the cultivation and residency requirements.[25]
It bears emphasis that
Act No. 2874 requires that for an application to be valid, it must be
approved
by the Director of Lands. This is expressly mandated by Section 13 of
the
law, viz:
"Sec. 13. Upon filing
of an application for a homestead, the Director of Lands, if he finds
that
the application should be approved, shall do so and authorize the
applicant
to take possession of the land upon the payment of ten pesos,
Philippine
currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after the date of
the
approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the
homestead,
otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land."[26]
(Emphasis supplied)
This provision gives
the Director of Lands discretion to approve or deny an application. He
is not a mere automaton who must perfunctorily approve an application
upon
its filing. He is tasked to satisfy himself that, among others, the
application
papers meet the requirements of the law, the land is a disposable
public
land, and the land is not subject of a previous valid application.[27]
Only when he finds the application sufficient in form and substance
should
he favorably act on it. Otherwise, he should deny it.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The application of Fermin
unfortunately remained unacted upon up to the time of his death. It was
neither approved nor denied by the Director, as the Bureau failed to
process
it. Hence, he could not have acquired any vested rights as a homestead
applicant over the property because his application was never acted
upon.cralaw:red
Reliance on the cases
of Davao Grains, Inc. v. IAC[28]
and Balboa v. Farrales[29]
by the petitioners is misplaced. Those two had different factual
backdrops.
In both Davao Grains, Inc. and Balboa, the disputed lots were subject
of
valid applications for public land grants. The valid applications
became
our bases for ruling that once an applicant has complied with the
cultivation,
residency and other requirements of Act No. 2874, which entitle him to
a patent for a particular tract of land, "he is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of
the government for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued
in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts - an
application
therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No.
2874."[30]
A valid application
is sadly lacking in the case of Fermin. This circumstance prevented him
from acquiring any vested right over the land and fully owning it at
the
time of his death. Conformably, his heirs did not inherit any property
right from him.[31]
Had the application
of Fermin been duly approved, his heirs would have succeeded him in his
rights and obligations with respect to the land he has applied for.
Sec.
103 of Act No. 2874 covers such a contingency, thus:
"Sec. 103. If at any
time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the
patent
or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or
while
the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the
Government,
in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and
obligations
with respect to the land applied for or granted or leased under this
Act
by his widow, who shall be entitled to have issued to her the patent or
final concession if she shows that she has complied with the
requirement
therefore, or in case he has left no widow or the widow refuses the
succession,
he shall be succeeded by the person or persons who are his heirs by law
and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the
purposes
of this Act."[32]
The failure of the
Bureau of Lands to act on the application of Fermin up to the time of
his
death, however, prevented his heirs to be subrogated in all his rights
and obligations with respect to the land applied for.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Perforce, at the time
Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed property, it
was still part of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his
own
name, his application inures to his sole benefit. After complying with
the cultivation and residency requirements, he became a grantee of a
homestead
patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and exclusive owner.[33]
Petitioners, however,
claim that Hermogenes and his heirs, respondent Lopezes, recognized
their
rights as co-owners of the disputed property, as shown by the following
documents: an Extra-judicial Partition of the real property executed by
Hermogenes and his brothers - petitioner Eleuterio, Nazario, and Juan;[34]
a Special Power of Attorney to sell the lot in question executed by
petitioner
Eleuterio, Nazario and Juan in favor of Hermogenes;[35]
and a letter dated January 16, 1984, which contains the statement that
petitioners are co-heirs of the property, and which respondent
Marcelino
Lopez signed.[36]
Petitioners argue that respondents are precluded from denying the
contents
of these documents based on the principle of estoppel by deed. They add
that while only Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant, nonetheless,
there was an agreement among the brothers that his application was for
and in behalf of all them.cralaw:red
These arguments fail
to impress. Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from
asserting
as against the other party and his privies any right or title in
derogation
of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted
in
it.[37]
The principle is that when a man has entered into a solemn engagement
by
deed, he shall not be permitted to deny any matter which he has
asserted
therein, for a deed is a solemn act to any part of which the law gives
effect as the deliberate admission of the maker.[38]
It promotes the judicious policy of making certain formal documents
final
and conclusive of their contents.[39]
A void deed, however,
will not work, and may not be the basis of, an estoppel.[40]
Covenants do not work an estoppel unless the deed in which they are
contained
is itself a valid instrument.[41]
In the case at bar, the deed and instruments at issue were void. The
extra-judicial
partition and the special power of attorney to sell did not have an
object
certain, which is the subject matter of the deed. The disputed land
cannot
be their object because petitioners do not have any right or interest
over
it. They are not its co-owners as it is owned absolutely by Hermogenes.
Well to note, the two instruments were executed on the mistaken
assumption
that Hermogenes and his brothers inherited the property from Fermin.
Moreover,
at the time the documents were made, Hermogenes was unaware that he was
granted a homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the appellate court,
estoppel does not operate to confer property rights where there are
none.[42]
Apropos the letter dated
January 16, 1984,[43]
suffice it to state that we agree with the trial court's pronouncement
that respondent Marcelino Lopez signed it merely "to gain the favors of
his uncle Eleuterio Lopez and in no way does it constitute an admission
that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are co-owners of the property."[44]
Under these circumstances, respondents cannot be held guilty of
estoppel
by deed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The claim of the petitioners
that Hermogenes filed the application in behalf of all the heirs of
Fermin
pursuant to a previous agreement does not hold water. There is paucity
of evidence in support of this allegation. Aside from the
uncorroborated
testimony of petitioner Eleuterio, petitioners were not able to present
other proof of the agreement. Besides, we cannot easily give credence
to
such a claim considering that under Act No. 2874, an applicant must
personally
comply with the legal requirements for a homestead grant. He must
possess
the necessary qualifications. He must cultivate the land and reside on
it himself. It would be a circumvention of the law if an individual
were
permitted to apply "in behalf of another," as the latter may be
disqualified
or might not comply with the residency and cultivation requirements.cralaw:red
In respect of the fourth
assigned error, we find that petitioners' attack on the authenticity
and
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 12, 1958, where
petitioner
Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario allegedly sold their share in the disputed
property to Hermogenes, bereft of merit. It did not change the fact
that
no co-ownership existed among Hermogenes and his brothers.
Hermogenes
is the absolute owner of the disputed property just as his brothers do
not own any share in it. Hence, they cannot validly sell anything to
Hermogenes
by virtue of the deed.cralaw:red
Prescinding from the
lack of co-ownership, petitioners' argument that they are entitled to
have
the land partition must be rejected. Partition, in general, is the
separation,
division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom
it
may belong.[45]
The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership.[46]
It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner,
vesting
in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a
right
to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.[47]
Not being co-owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its
partition. They do not have any interest or share in the property upon
which they can base their demand to have it divided.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners' last argument
that they are not guilty of laches in enforcing their rights to the
property
is irrelevant. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right
within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[48]
It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally
an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become
under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.[49]
Petitioners' insistence that they are not negligent in asserting their
right over the property proceeds from the wrong premise that they have
a right to enforce over the disputed property as co-owners. There can
be
no delay in asserting a right where the right does not exist.cralaw:red
IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding
no cogent reason to reverse the impugned Decision of the Court of
Appeals,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Panganiban, and
Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., no part.
Corona, J., on official
leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Per JJ. Vasquez, Jr., Buena and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
[2]
Juan's heirs were originally plaintiffs in this case but they later
executed
with the respondent Lopezes a compromise agreement, on the basis of
which
the trial court rendered a Partial Decision.
[3]
Mr. Teodoro Cajumban, then Public Land Investigator at Land District
No.
VII, Bureau of Lands, Manila.
[4]
Branch 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Branch 22.
[6]
Santos v. CA, 189 SCRA 550 (1990).
[7]
CA-GR CV No. 06242.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
The dispositive portion of the Partial Decision states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Finding
the foregoing compromise agreement not to be contrary to law, morals
and
public policy, the same is APPROVED and judgment is hereby rendered in
accordance therewith.
The
parties are enjoined to strictly comply and abide with the terms and
conditions
therein set forth.
SO
ORDERED."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Decision, Civil Case No. 677-A, p. 13; Rollo. p. 97.
[10]
Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 43837, p. 7; Rollo p. 67.
[11]
Petition, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[12]
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
[13]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
These documents were presented in the hearing of the petition.
[15]
Samoso v. CA, 178 SCRA 654 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Basco v. CA, 326 SCRA 768 (2000).
[17]
Sec. 11 of Act No. 2874 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Sec.
11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.
For homestead settlement;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2.
By sale;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3.
By lease;
4.
By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
By judicial legalization;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b)
By administrative legalization (free patent)."
[18]
Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA, 217 SCRA 554 (1993), citing
Jocson
v. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375 (1923).
[19]
The homestead system was introduced in the country through Act No. 926,
passed by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1903 [Noblejas and
Noblejas,
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds (1986), p. 347]. Act No. 2874,
which
took effect on November 29, 1919, supersededchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Act
No. 926. The new law was more comprehensive in scope and modified the
requirements
for homestead grants [Peña, Philippine Law on Natural Resources
(1997), p. 18]. Finally, on November 7, 1936, Commonwealth Act No. 141
was passed by the National Assembly. It took effect on December 1, 1936
and remains effective until today. It is a mere re-enactment of Act No.
2874 with slight revision to conform with the nationalistic provisions
of the 1936 Constitution [Noblejas and Noblejas, supra, p. 347].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Sec. 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Sec. 13.
[22]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Sec. 14.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
Sec. 13.
[27]
See Secs. 87-90.
[28]
171 SCRA 612 (1989).
[29]
51 Phil. 498 (1928).
[30]
Davao Gains, Inc. v. IAC, supra, citing Susi v. Razon, et al., 48 Phil.
424 (1926).
[31]
See Arts. 774 and 776, Civil Code of the Philippines.
[32]
Sec. 103.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
See Santos v. CA, supra note 6.
[34]
Exhibit "N."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Exhibit "M."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Exhibits "Q" and "Q-1."
[37]
IV Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 666.
[38]
See Hilco Property Services, Inc. v. U.S., 929 F.Supp. 526 (1996),
cited
in 28 Am. Jur. 2d Sec 4.
[39]
See Mc Laughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W. 2d 370 (1985), cited in 28 Am.
Jur.
2d Sec 4.
[40]
See Curthis v. Steele 131 S.E. 2d 344 (1963).
[41]
See Alt v. Banholzer, 40 N.W. 830 (1888).
[42]
Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 66.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
Supra note 36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 95.
[45]
Art. 1079, Civil Code of the Philippines.
[46]
Noceda v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 514 (1999).
[47]
Villamor v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 574 (1988).
[48]
Ignacio v. Basilio, G.R. No. 122824, September 26, 2001.
[49]
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 178
(1998). |