THIRD DIVISION
BENJAMIN NAVARRO
AND ROSITA FORTEA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
129428
February 27, 2003
-versus-
SECOND LAGUNA
DEVELOPMENT
BANK,
AND
SPOUSES ISAAC
GUZMAN AND VILMA ESPORLAS,
Respondents. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated April 21, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44240
affirming
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch
148, Makati City in Civil Case No. 90-849, "Spouses Benjamin Navarro
and
Rosita Fortea vs. Second Laguna Development Bank, spouses Domalito
Velasco
and Esther Navarro, Luciana Navarro and spouses Isaac Guzman and Vilma
Esporlas," for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage and consolidation
of
ownership and damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Subject of this suit
is the 1/6 portion of a parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa,
known as Lot No. 1513-A, Plan Psd-51043, consisting of 345 square
meters
and covered by TCT No. (244200) 114525 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati
City.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Records show that the
late Catalino Navarro and his wife Consuelo Hernandez originally owned
Lot No. 1513-A. On December 4, 1968, they sold 5/6 of the unsegregated
portion of the lot to their children, namely, Leticia, Esther,
Benjamin,
Luciana and Leoniza, all surnamed Navarro. By virtue of the sale, TCT
No.
244200 was issued in their names. Spouses Benjamin and Rosita Navarro,
herein petitioners, are listed therein as co-owners of the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On March 18, 1978,
without the knowledge and consent of petitioners, spouses Donalito
Velasco
and Esther Navarro, conspiring with the latter’s sister Luciana
Navarro,
executed a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear
that the entire lot was sold to said spouses Velasco for P35,000.00.
TCT
No. 244200 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 114526 was
issued
in the names of spouses Velasco. Subsequently, they mortgaged the
property
to respondent Second Laguna Development Bank to secure payment of a
loan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On June 30, 1987, upon
failure of spouses Velasco to pay their loan, respondent bank had the
mortgage
foreclosed. On August 8, 1988 and January 5, 1990, petitioners,
introducing
themselves as attorneys-in-fact of Esther Navarro-Velasco, wrote
respondent
bank, offering to redeem the property for P450,000.00. However, they
failed
to do so. Hence, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of
respondent
bank under TCT No. 168230 issued on February 1, 1990.
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On March 26, 1990,
petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint against respondent bank and
spouses Velasco (docketed as Civil Case No. 90-849) praying for the (a)
annulment of the mortgage; (b) cancellation of TCT No. 168230 in the
name
of respondent bank; and (c) award of damages and attorney’s fees. In
their
complaint, petitioners alleged that the sale of the lot with respect to
their 1/6 share (59 square meters) is void ab initio considering that
their
signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1978
were falsified. Consequently, the mortgage contract involving their
share
executed by spouses Velasco and respondent bank is likewise void.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On April 3, 1990,
respondent
bank sold the lot to respondent spouses Isaac Guzman and Vilma Esporlas
and on May 18, 1990, TCT No. 169929[3]
was issued in their names. Thereupon, petitioners impleaded spouses
Guzman
as additional defendants in Civil Case No. 90-849. Petitioners alleged
that said spouses were purchasers in bad faith because they knew of the
pending litigation concerning the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On July 29, 1991, the
trial court declared spouses Velasco in default for their failure to
file
an answer.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On September 29, 1993,
the trial court rendered its Decision[4]
dismissing petitioners’ complaint; upholding the validity of the
foreclosure
of mortgage and declaring respondent spouses Guzman the lawful owners
of
the property; ordering petitioners to pay said spouses P50,000.00 as
actual
damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P35,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
ordering petitioners to pay respondent bank P25,000.00 as attorney’s
fees;
and ordering spouses Velasco to pay petitioners P268,000.00
corresponding
to the value of the latter’s 1/6 share in the property and P20,000.00
as
attorney’s fees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards of actual and
moral
damages as well as attorney’s fees in favor of defendant spouses Vilma
Esporlas Guzman and Isaac Guzman, and the award of attorney’s fees in
favor
of defendant Second Laguna Development Bank.
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With the above
modifications,
the judgment below is AFFIRMED in all other respects.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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No pronouncement as
to costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Inevitably, the core
of the controversy is the determination of whether or not defendant
spouses
Vilma Esporlas and Isaac Guzman are purchasers in good faith.
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Apart from appellants’
bare assertion, we find no evidence to establish appellees’ bad faith.
It is settled jurisprudence that whoever alleges bad faith in any
transaction
must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person
takes
ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been
entered
in good faith.
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Clearly, we find
appellants
wanting in this respect.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this connection,
it is essential to point out that prior to the foreclosure sale,
appellants
had the opportunity to object to the validity of the mortgage over the
property in controversy.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is beyond dispute,
as disclosed by evidence, that on June 4, 1986, appellant Benjamin
Navarro
wrote a certain ‘Oscar’ of defendant-appellee bank, asking for the
Statement
of Accounts of defendant Esther Navarro.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On August 8, 1988,
appellant spouses wrote defendant-appellee bank, introducing themselves
as the attorneys-in-fact of defendant Esther Navarro.
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Again, on January 5,
1990, appellant Benjamin Valerio (believed to be Benjamin Navarro by
the
court a quo per his signature) wrote the Far East Bank & Trust
Company,
the owner of defendant bank, requesting the latter to allow redemption
of the land for (P450,000.00).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On all these occasions,
appellants did not even bother to question the validity of the
purchasers’
title over the property. Hence, we agree with the court a quo that
these
acts of appellants were tainted with laches and estoppel. They failed
for
an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence
could or should have been done earlier. They neglected or omitted to
assert
their right within a time reasonable under the premises, thereby
warranting
a presumption that they have abandoned such right.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, we find no
sufficient justification for the awards of actual and moral damages as
well as attorney’s fees by the court a quo.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Needless to emphasize,
actual damages refer to those recoverable because of pecuniary loss,
which
include the value of the loss suffered and unrealized profits (8
Manresa
100). Actual damages must be proved and the amount of damages must
possess
at least some degree of certainty (Tomassi vs. Villa-Abrillee, L-7047,
August 21, 1958, in relation to Chua Teck Hee vs. Philippine Publishing
House, 34 Phil. 447).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Reviewing the records,
we find no evidence whatsoever adduced by defendants-appellees to prove
the actual loss suffered by them. All the court a quo did, in awarding
actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00, is to state that
defendants-appellees
Isaac Guzman and Vilma Esporlas are entitled to actual damages for they
were not able to enjoy their lawfully acquired property. This reason is
simply not enough basis to award actual damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the claim
for moral damages and attorney’s fees, the court a quo likewise erred
in
awarding them. In Dela Pena vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 456, it was
held that it is improper to award them on the sole basis of an action
later
declared to be unfounded in the absence of deliberate intent to cause
prejudice
to the other. No proof has been introduced that the action filed by
appellant
spouses was deliberately intended to prejudice defendants-appellees. At
the most, what we see here is appellants’ legitimate and genuine desire
to seek redress through the judicial system and to obtain complete
relief
by including spouses Vilma Esporlas and Isaac Guzman and the Second
Laguna
Development Bank as party defendants.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners filed a
partial motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but
it was denied in the Resolution[7]
dated June 11, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, the instant petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the sale
of
the property between respondent bank and spouses Guzman and declaring
that
they are estopped from questioning the validity of the mortgage and its
foreclosure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their separate comments,
respondents practically reiterated the findings and conclusion of the
Court
of Appeals in its assailed Decision.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petition lacks merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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In Rural Bank of
Compostela
vs. Court of Appeals,[8]
this Court held that the rule that persons dealing with registered
lands
can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks
because
their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust
money
belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by
not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good
faith.
Thus, in Cruz vs. Bancom Finance Corporation,[9]
this Court stressed that a mortgagee-bank is expected to exercise
greater
care and prudence before entering into a mortgage contract, even those
involving registered lands. The ascertainment of the status or
condition
of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard
and
indispensable part of its operations.
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In entering into the
mortgage contract with spouses Velasco, there was no indication that
respondent
bank acted in bad faith. Spouses Velasco presented to the bank their
TCT
No. 114256 showing they were then the absolute owners thereof. Indeed,
there were no circumstances or indications that aroused respondent
bank’s
suspicion that the title was defective.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to the validity of
the sale of the property to respondent spouses Guzman, this Court
agrees
with the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioners are estopped
from assailing the same.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 1431 of the
Civil Code states that "through estoppel an admission or representation
is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A person, who by his
deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner, is
barred
from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct
that
thereby causes loss or injury to another.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It bears reiterating
that in their two letters to respondent bank earlier mentioned,
petitioners
did not state that spouses Velasco falsified their signatures appearing
in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Nor did they question the validity of the
mortgage and its foreclosure. Indeed, those letters could have led
respondent
bank to believe that petitioners recognized the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the mortgage as well as its subsequent foreclosure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. The challenged Decision dated April 21, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44240 is AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Puno, J.,
(Chairman),
Panganiban and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.chan
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Corona, J.,
on leave.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:cralaw:red
[1]
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Penned by Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, with Justices Artemon D. Luna and
Hector L. Hofileña concurring (all had retired).
[3]
RTC records at 35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo at 65-91.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 35-36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at 101.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
271 SCRA 76, 88 (1997), citing Tomas vs. Tomas, 98 SCRA 280, 286
(1980).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
G.R. No. 147788, March 19, 2002 citing Cavite Development Bank vs. Lim,
324 SCRA 346 (2000), Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,
331 SCRA 267 (2000), and Sunshine Finance and Investment Corp. vs. IAC,
203 SCRA 210 (1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association, Inc.,
G.R.
No. 146807, May 9, 2002; Macahilig vs. Magalit, 344 SCRA 838,
851(2000);
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239, 255-256 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |