SECOND DIVISION
ASIATRUST
DEVELOPMENT
BANK,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
130759
June 20, 2003
-versus-
CONCEPTS TRADING
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review on
Certiorari of the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 44211
affirming
on appeal with modification the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 68, in Civil Case No.
89-3789.
As culled from the records,
the facts of the case are as follows:
In March 1996, respondent
Concepts Trading Corporation obtained from petitioner Asiatrust
Development
Corporation a credit accommodation in the amount of P2,000,000 covered
by a loan agreement[3]
and secured by real and chattel mortgages.[4]
The amount was drawn from an Industrial Guarantee Loan Fund (IGLF)
account
opened by the petitioner in favor of the respondent. On March 4,
1986, the respondent executed Promissory Note (PN) No. 3574[5]
in favor of the petitioner. Under the promissory note, the
principal
amount of P2,000,000 would be charged an interest of 23% per annum,
inclusive
of 1% service fee. Attached to and made part of the promissory
note
was the schedule of amortization agreed upon by the parties.[6]
As set forth in the schedule, the payment of the loan was to be
amortized
quarterly over a period of ten years with a two-year grace period on
the
principal payment. The first payment fell due on May 15, 1986 and
the subsequent installments were to be paid every three months
thereafter.cralaw:red
In the event that the
respondent defaulted in the payment of any installment or interest
thereof,
paragraph 4 of the promissory note provided that:
. the entire amount
outstanding under this Note shall immediately, without need for any
notice,
demand, presentment, protest, or of any other act or deed, the right to
all of which is hereby waived by the undersigned: (i) become due,
payable
and defaulted; (ii) be subject to a penalty equivalent to thirty-six
percent
(36%) per annum thereof; (iii) together with said penalty, commence to
earn interest as [sic] the rate of twenty-three percent (23%) per annum
counted from the date of default until full payment thereof.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent failed
to pay the amortizations due on August 15 and November 15, 1987,
prompting
the petitioner to enforce the aforementioned acceleration clause.
On January 25, 1988, the petitioner sent a letter[7]
to the respondent demanding payment of its outstanding loan obligation,
amounting to P3,203,049 under PN No. 3574 and PN No. 4132.[8]
In its Letter to the
petitioner dated February 3, 1988, the respondent expressed its
willingness
to settle its obligation and, due to its tight financial situation,
negotiated
for a modified payment scheme.[9]
Thereafter, on March 30, 1988, the parties entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), the pertinent provisions of which read:
WHEREAS,
CONCEPTS
hereby acknowledges and affirms that it has applied and was granted by
the Bank a credit accommodation consisting of an Industrial Guarantee
Loan
Fund ("IGLF") Account in the amount of P2.0 Million dated 4 March 1986
(hereinafter, the "LOAN OBLIGATION") which, to date, is already overdue
and demandable in its entirety including all interests, penalties,
service
and other miscellaneous charges.
1. CONCEPTS
hereby
promises and undertakes to pay the BANK the LOAN OBLIGATION in the
following
manner, to wit:
(a) On 5
May
1988, the amount of P159,259.14, to be covered by a post-dated check
for
the same amount to be issued by CONCEPTS; and
(b) On 5 June
1988 and
every 5th of every succeeding month, P150,000.00 until the LOAN
OBLIGATION
shall have been fully paid. CONCEPTS hereby undertakes to cover
the
above-mentioned payments by post-dated checks, by first delivering to
the
BANK five (5) checks covering the first five (5) month period, without
prejudice to the BANK’s right to demand the delivery of another set of
five (5) checks covering the subsequent five (5) month period, 15 days
prior to the due date of the last check in the BANK’s possession, and
so
on and so forth, until the LOAN OBLIGATION shall have been fully paid.
It is likewise
understood
that upon payment of ten (10) monthly amortizations as above-indicated
or upon updating of payments of the LOAN OBLIGATION, CONCEPTS shall
have
the right to re-negotiate with the Bank the reinstatement of the
original
terms of payment under Promissory Note No. 3574.chanrobles virtual law library
3. The BANK and
CONCEPTS
hereby further agree that all other provisions and stipulations in the
existing Promissory Notes and other documents evidencing the LOAN
OBLIGATION
shall remain in force and effect, except those which are inconsistent
with
the above-mentioned Mode of Payment.
4. CONCEPTS hereby
waives
notice of dishonor and/or default of its LOAN OBLIGATION: provided,
however,
that the BANK reserves the right to grant a grace period of (15) days
for
settlement of the obligation; provided, further, that such grant of a
grace
period shall not constitute waiver of any right of the
BANK.
It shall also be understood that CONCEPTS’ default in this mode of
payment
shall likewise automatically accelerate the entire LOAN OBLIGATION.
5. It shall
likewise
be understood that this mode of payment arises out of the BANK’s
liberality
and is without prejudice and without waiver of the BANK’s accrued
rights
under the existing chattel and real estate mortgages as well as the
Continuing
Suretyship Agreement pertinent to the LOAN OBLIGATION, all of which
mortgages
and Agreement are hereby expressly continued to be in force and effect.[10]
In compliance with its
undertaking under the MOA, the respondent delivered the first check
dated
May 5, 1988 in the amount of P159,259.14 and four other checks in the
sum
of P150,000 each or for the total amount of P759,259.14. This was
followed by another batch of five checks covering the months of October
1988 to February 1989, also in the amount of P150,000 each or for a
total
amount of P750,000.
On March 30, 1989, the
petitioner wrote to the respondent requesting for the delivery of the
"last
checks to completely rehabilitate" its account in accordance with the
MOA.
When the respondent failed to make the said payments, the petitioner on
April 25, 1989 sent a final demand on the respondent to pay its entire
obligation under the IGLF in the amount of P2,361,970.10 within five
days
from receipt thereof.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent thereafter
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149, a
petition
for declaratory relief. The respondent alleged that it is up to
date
in the payment of its loan obligation and, according to its record, the
remaining balance amounted to only P316,550.48. The respondent
prayed
for the trial court to determine the rights and duties of the parties
under
the MOA to avoid the miscomputation of the loan obligation and any
breach
thereof.cralaw:red
In its answer, the petitioner
averred that as of February 15, 1988, the outstanding obligation of the
respondent amounted to P2,833,867.04. According to the
petitioner,
the monthly amortizations paid by the respondent covered only the
penalties
accruing on the loan. Further, declaratory relief as a remedy
sought
by the respondent was allegedly improper as it already committed a
breach
of its obligations. The respondent filed the action a quo merely
to defer or avoid payment of its legally contracted loan obligation
with
the petitioner. By way of compulsory counterclaim, the petitioner
prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.cralaw:red
The respondent then
filed an amended complaint alleging that as of August 1989, it had
already
paid the petitioner the total amount of P2,259,259 and that there was
an
overpayment of P100,000. The respondent prayed that the
petitioner
be ordered to refund the amount overpaid, as well as to release the
mortgages
and to pay damages and attorney’s fees.cralaw:red
After due trial, the
trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
(a)
ordering
the subject complaint DISMISSED for lack of merit:
(b)
ordering the
plaintiff to pay to the defendant the amount of P395,210.30 to earn
interest
at 22% per annum from the date of this decision;
(c)
declaring
the Real Estate Mortgage and the Chattel Mortgage as valid and
subsisting
which may be foreclosed by the defendant in case of non-payment of the
aforestated obligation after demand;chanrobles virtual law library
(d)
ordering the
plaintiff to pay to the defendant the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[12]
On appeal by the
petitioner,
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision of
the
trial court. The CA found that the respondent’s outstanding
obligation
to the petitioner amounted only to P309,298.58. The CA likewise
reduced
the penalty accruing thereon from 36% to 3% per annum. The
dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the lower court dated
December
14, 1992 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the outstanding balance
of plaintiff-appellee as of September 5, 1989 is P309,298.58 subject to
a penalty of 3% per annum, and together with said penalty, the whole
amount
is subject to an interest of 23% per annum inclusive of service
charges,
until the entire amount has been fully paid. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the
petitioner
now comes to this Court alleging that: A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN RULING THAT ASIATRUST WAIVED COLLECTION OF
ACCRUED
PENALTIES AND CHARGES DUE FROM CONCEPTS UNDER PN 3574 BY EXECUTING THE
MOA, BECAUSE THE MOA DID NOT EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR SUCH WAIVER, AND
STIPULATED
THAT, UNLESS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MOA MODE OF PAYMENT, "ALL OTHER
EXISTING
PROVISIONS AND STIPULATIONS IN THE EXISTING PROMISSORY NOTES X X X
SHALL
REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT."
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH §20
OF RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN FINDING WITNESS REBECCA DE LA
CRUZ’
UNREBUTTED IDENTIFICATION OF ASIATRUST’S EXHIBIT "7" AS A STATEMENT OF
ACCOUNT, AND HER UNREBUTTED IDENTIFICATION OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE
EXHIBIT,
AS INSUFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION OF THAT EXHIBIT, AND IN RELYING ON
TESTIMONY
READ FROM A LEDGER NEITHER IDENTIFIED NOR OFFERED IN EVIDENCE.[14]
The petition is bereft
of merit.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner maintains
that the CA erred in holding that the petitioner waived collection of
accrued
penalties and miscellaneous charges under PN 3574 by entering into the
MOA. No such waiver was expressed in the MOA and, in fact,
paragraph 3 thereof expressly provides that "all other provisions and
stipulations
in the existing promissory notes and other documents evidencing the
LOAN
OBLIGATION shall remain in force and effect, except those which are
inconsistent
with the above-mentioned mode of payment." Further, the
petitioner’s
consistent application of the payments respondent made to the
penalties,
charges and interests is a plain manifestation of its contractual
intent,
and is properly cognizable as evidence of that intent under Article
1371
of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1371. In order
to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.cralaw:red
The petitioner likewise
avers that the CA erred in not according probative value to the
statement
of account which the petitioner offered in evidence. The
petitioner
contends that, contrary to the holding of the CA, the statement of
account
was properly identified by its witness, Rebecca de la Cruz.cralaw:red
The Court does not agree
with the petitioner.cralaw:red
It is a time-honored
rule of evidence that when the terms of an agreement are reduced to
writing,
it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of
such
terms can be admitted other than the contents of the agreement itself.[15]
This rule allows exceptions, in that a party may present parole
evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts
in issue in his pleadings:
(a)
An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b)
The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement
of the parties thereto;
(c)
The validity of the written agreement; or
(d)
The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors-in-interest
after the execution of the written agreement.[16]
A careful perusal of
the MOA reveals that it fixed the respondent’s loan obligation to the
petitioner
at P2,000,000 which was already due and demandable in its entirety,
including
"all interests, penalties, service and other miscellaneous
charges."
Further, Paragraph 1 thereof set forth the manner by which the loan
obligation
was to be paid, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library
1. CONCEPTS
hereby promises and undertakes to pay the BANK the LOAN OBLIGATION in
the
following manner, to wit:
(a) On 5 May 1988,
the amount of P159,259.14, to be covered by a post-dated check for the
same amount to be issued by CONCEPTS; and
(b) On 5 June
1988 and every 5th of every succeeding month, P150,000.00 until the
LOAN
OBLIGATION shall have been fully paid. CONCEPTS hereby undertakes
to cover the above-mentioned payments by post-dated checks, by first
delivering
to the BANK five (5) checks covering the first five (5) month period,
without
prejudice to the BANK’s right to demand the delivery of another set of
five (5) checks covering the subsequent five (5) month period, 15 days
prior to the due date of the last check in the BANK’s possession, and
so
on and so forth, until the LOAN OBLIGATION shall have been fully paid.cralaw:red
It is likewise understood
that upon payment of ten (10) monthly amortizations as above-indicated
or upon updating of payments of the LOAN OBLIGATION, CONCEPTS shall
have
the right to re-negotiate with the Bank the reinstatement of the
original
terms of payment under Promissory Note No. 3574.[17]
However, the MOA failed
to state the exact amounts of interests, service charges and penalties
accruing on the loan obligation. To determine the same, the CA
relied
on the testimony of the petitioner’s comptroller, Rebecca de la Cruz,
who
testified thereon as follows:
Atty. Ortiz:
Q: Now,
as of the date January 25, 1988 what was the total obligation of the
plaintiff
to the defendant?
COURT: (to the
witness)
According to your ledger
it could be any date closer to January 25, 1988?
WITNESS:chanrobles virtual law library
A:
The date which is closer to January 25, 1988 is April 28, 1988.
It
says here if you still have a 2 MILLION PESO principal balance.
We
have here an interest of P24,000.00 and still we have service charges.cralaw:red
COURT:
Service charges of how
much?
WITNESS:
A:
P123,000.00 and still we have unpaid penalties of P76,000.00, Your
Honor.[18]
Based on the foregoing,
the CA correctly fixed the respondent’s outstanding balance to the
petitioner
as of the execution of the MOA at P2,223,000 consisting of the
principal
obligation of P2,000,000, penalties of P76,000, service charges of
P123,000
and interests of P24,000:
After a thorough review
of the MOA, We are convinced that plaintiff-appellee’s obligation
consists
of its original P2 million loan under PN No. 3574 including interests
and
service fees but excluding penalty and other miscellaneous charges.cralaw:red
Thus, the MOA itself
provides:
"1. CONCEPTS hereby
promises and undertakes to pay the BANK the LOAN OBLIGATION in the
following
manner, to wit:"chanrobles virtual law library
(p. 2, MOA; Exhs. "B"
and "10," pp. 5 and 45, Folder of Exhibits)
In the MOA’s first whereas
clause, the term "loan obligation" was referred to as "the amount of P2
Million, which to date, is already overdue and demandable in its
entirety
including all interests, penalties, service and other miscellaneous
charges."
(p. 1, MOA; pp. 4 and 44, ibid.). The MOA, therefore,
acknowledged
that plaintiff-appellee, having failed to pay several amortizations
under
the PN, was liable for the entire amount of P2 million plus interest in
arrears, penalties and other charges in accordance with the
acceleration
clause of the PN.cralaw:red
However, due to the
bank’s liberality, it waived the demandability of the entire loan by
entering
into the MOA, allowing plaintiff-appellee to continue paying its
amortization,
this time on a monthly basis. By such waiver, plaintiff-appellee
has effectively not been rendered in default thereby waiving likewise
the
penalty imposable on the loan in the event of default.cralaw:red
Accordingly, under the
MOA, plaintiff-appellee continues to be liable for its obligation under
the note, i.e., principal amount of P2 million plus interests and
service
fees, as if it was not yet in default. The first installment
under
the MOA in the amount of P159,259.14 including several of the monthly
installments
of P150,000 were applicable to interest and service fees in arrears
while
the remaining monthly amortizations covered the principal and interest
falling due thereon.[19]
The petitioner nonetheless
assails the above figures, insisting that the CA erred in holding that:
However, due to the
bank’s liberality, it waived the demandability of the entire loan by
entering
into the MOA, allowing plaintiff-appellee to continue paying its
amortization,
this time on a monthly basis. By such waiver, plaintiff-appellee
has effectively not been rendered in default thereby waiving likewise
the
penalty imposable on the loan in event of default.[20]chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner asserts
that the respondent continued to be liable for penalty charges as
provided
under the promissory note notwithstanding the execution of the
MOA.
This contention is untenable. Under the schedule of amortization
contained in the promissory note, the respondent obliged to pay the
principal
obligation in quarterly amortizations over a period of ten years and
that
in case of default, the entire amount shall be due and demandable in
its
entirety. On the other hand, under the MOA, a new mode of payment
was agreed upon, i.e., the payment by the respondent of the initial
amount
of P159,259.14 and subsequent payments of P150,000 every month until
full
payment of the loan obligation. The MOA, in effect, rendered the
loan no longer due and demandable in its entirety at the time of its
execution,
precisely because it allowed the respondent under the new schedule of
payments
to pay the same by monthly installments. It bears stressing that
the MOA provided that the mode of payment arose "out of the BANK’s
liberality."
To allow the petitioner to collect penalty charges as if the respondent
were in default, notwithstanding the existence of a new payment
schedule,
would be inconsistent with the aforesaid agreement.cralaw:red
It must be stressed,
however, that the foregoing should not be construed as to mean that the
respondent could no longer be held in default and that the petitioner
completely
waived collection of penalty charges in case of default.
Non-payment
by the respondent of any of the monthly installments as provided under
the MOA would render it in default and the petitioner could collect the
penalty charges therefor. As will be shown later, the CA did in
fact
determine the exact time when the respondent defaulted on its
obligation
under the MOA and accordingly reckoned therefrom the penalty charges
due
the petitioner.cralaw:red
The records show that
the respondent, in accordance with the MOA, made the initial payment of
P159,259.16 on May 5, 1988. Thereafter, the respondent made
payments
in the amount of P150,000 every month up to September 1989. The
CA
then tabulated these payments[21]
as follows:
Principal
Interest
Service Charge
Penalty
Subtotal
Payment
Total
4/28/88 P2,000,000.00
P24,000.00
P123,000.00
P76,000.00
P2,063,740.86
P159,259.14 P2,063,740.86
1.
2,063,740.90 37,835.25
1,719.78
2,103,295.90
150,000.00
1,953,295.90
2.
1,953,295.90 35,810.42
1,627.75
1,990,734.00
150,000.00
1,840,734.00
3.
1,840,734.00 33,746.79
1,533.94
1,876,014.70
150,000.00
1,726,014.70
4.
1,726,014.70 31,643.60
1,438.34
1,759,096.60
150,000.00
1,609,096.60chanrobles virtual law library
5.
1,609,096.60 29,500.10
1,340.91
1,639,937.60
150,000.00
1,489,937.60chanrobles virtual law library
6.
1,489,937.60 27,315.52
1,241.61
1,518,494.70
150,000.00
1,368,494.70chanrobles virtual law library
7.
1,368,494.70 25,089.07
1,140.41
1,394,724.10
150,000.00
1,244,724.10chanrobles virtual law library
8.
1,244,724.10 22,819.94
1,037.27
1,268,581.30
150,000.00
1,118,581.30chanrobles virtual law library
9.
1,118,581.30
20,507.32
932.15
1,140,020.70
150,000.00
990,020.70chanrobles virtual law library
10.
990,020.70
18,150.38
825.02
1,008,996.00
150,000.00
858,996.00chanrobles virtual law library
11.
858,996.00
15,748.28
715.83
875,460.11
150,000.00
725,460.11
12.
725,460.11
13,300.10
604.55
739,364.76
150,000.00
589,364.76
13.
589,364.76
10,805.02
491.14
600,660.91
150,000.00
450,660.91
14.
450,660.91
8,262.12
375.55
459,298.58
150,000.00
309,298.58
As noted by the CA,
after the last payment of P150,000 on September 1989, the respondent
still
owed the petitioner the sum of P309,298.58. The respondent’s
non-payment
of the amortizations due after the said date rendered the balance due
and
demandable in its entirety, in accordance with the acceleration clause
under the MOA. Further, since the respondent defaulted in its
monthly
payments after September 1989, it was only then that it could be
rightfully
imposed the penalty charges in accordance with the promissory
note.
Thus, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the CA did not rule that
the MOA operated as a waiver by the petitioner of its right to collect
penalty charges.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner faults
the CA for reducing the penalty charges from 36% to 3% per annum on its
finding that the former rate was too excessive, considering that the
petitioner
had already charged an interest rate of 23% per annum and that the
principal
obligation had been partly complied with.cralaw:red
This Court does not
agree with the petitioner. Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1229.
The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal
obligation
has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even
if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by
the
courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.cralaw:red
Indeed, this Court had
equitably reduced the penalty in not a few cases. In the recent
case
of Ligutan v. Court of Appeals,[22]
the Court affirmed the reduction of the penalty charges by the CA upon
its finding that the debtors therein had partially complied with their
obligation. In Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[23]
the Court tempered the penalty charges after taking into account the
debtor’s
pitiful situation and its offer to settle the entire obligation with
the
creditor bank. In Insular Bank of Asia and America v. Spouses
Salazar,[24]
the Court reduced the penalty charge on a loan of P42,050, considering
that the debtor spouses paid a total of P68,676.75 which the creditor
bank
applied to satisfy the penalty and interest charges.cralaw:red
Given the peculiar circumstances
in this case, particularly that the principal obligation had been
partially
complied with by the respondent, the Court sees no justifiable reason
to
modify the reduction by the CA of the penalty charges made by the CA.chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the second issue,
the petitioner insists that the CA should have relied on the
petitioner’s
statement of account[25]
to determine the amount owed by the respondent. According to the
said statement, the respondent still owed the petitioner P5,665,906 as
of June 29, 1990, since previous payments made were applied only to the
penalties and service charges. The Court does not agree.
The
MOA clearly provides that the loan obligation of P2,000,000 shall be
paid
by the respondent by issuing the post-dated checks in the amount of
P150,000
every month beginning June 5, 1998 until the same shall have been fully
paid. Thus, the monthly payments made by the respondent were for
the satisfaction of the principal loan obligation, not merely as
payments
of the penalties and service charges.cralaw:red
Further, as correctly
pointed out by the CA, the petitioner’s statement of account could not
be given any probative value because it was belied for the most part by
its key witness, comptroller Rebecca de la Cruz. Even the trial
court
gave scant consideration to this statement of account, upon its finding
that certain entries therein were inconsistent with the terms of the
promissory
note. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
trial
court’s and the CA’s assessment of the probative value of the
same.
After all, it is not this Court’s function under Rule 45 of the Rules
of
Court, as amended, to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the
probative
value of the evidence presented.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
July
18, 1997 and Resolution dated September 12, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 44211 are AFFIRMED in toto.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fermin N. Martin, Jr., with Associate
Justices
Ruben T. Reyes and Omar U. Amin concurring.
[2]
Penned by Eriberto Rosario, Jr. who was later promoted as Associate
Justice
of the Court of Appeals.
[3]
Exhibit "2," Folder of Exhibits, p. 27.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Exhibits "8" & "9," id. at 36-39.
[5]
Exhibit "A," id. at 1.
[6]
Exhibit "A-1," id. at 2-3.
[7]
Exhibit "4," id. at 31.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
The latter promissory note in the amount of P400,000 is not subject of
the present litigation.
[9]
Exhibit "14," id. at 62.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Exhibit "B," id. at 4-7.
[11]
Exhibit "12," id. at 52-53.
[12]
Records, pp. 247-248.
[13]
Rollo, p. 48.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Id. at 10 & 14.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
[16]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
TSN, 4 February 1992, pp. 19-20.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 39-40.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Rollo, p. 45.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
G.R. No. 138677, February 12, 2002.
[23]
289 SCRA 292 (1998).chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
159 SCRA 133 (1988).
[25]
Exhibit "7," Folder of Exhibits, p. 35.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Bautista v. Puyat Vinyl Products, Inc., 363 SCRA 794 (2001). |