Republic
of the Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC .
.
FRANCISCO ALONSO
(DECEASED),
SUBSTITUTED
BYMERCEDES V ALONSO,
TOMAS V. ALONSOAND
ASUNCION V.
ALONSO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
130876
December 5, 2003
-versus-
CEBU COUNTRY
CLUB,
INC.,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
In our Decision
dated January 31, 2002, We declared that:
x
x x neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son
Francisco
M. Alonso or the latter's heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in
dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able
to
establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution
of
a title is simply the reissuance of a lost duplicate certificate of
title
in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve
the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A
reconstituted
title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
on which basis, the
dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE the decision of
the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
Branch
08.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN LIEU THEREOF,
we
DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the parties in Civil Case No.
CEB 12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the
Banilad
Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251,
232,
and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners and
respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing a
different aspect of the decision.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners, in their
Motion for Reconsideration dated March 6, 2002, vigorously argue that:
(a) the majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property
without due process of law and "in a manner shocking to good
conscience";
(b) in invalidating the sale of Lot 727 to the late Tomas Alonso, the
ponencia
unfairly deviated from established doctrine to favor a mere obiter
dictum
as misapplied in Liao vs. Court of Appeals, using as basis factual
findings
either unsupported by the evidence or contradicted by the appellate
court's
findings of fact; (c) the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction
afflicting the reconstitution of respondent Cebu Country Club's title
were
not squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and damage of the
petitioners;
and (d) the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it
presents
a more balanced, sober, factually accurate, and juridically precise
approach
to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and laches.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, respondent
Cebu Country Club, Inc., in its Motion for Reconsideration dated March
5, 2002, staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that
"Lot
727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to the
Government
of the Republic of the Philippines". Respondent argues that the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), as representative of the Government,
has
not intervened nor has it been impleaded in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
nor during the appeal in the Court of Appeals, and, the Torrens
Certificate
of Title, TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) of respondent, covering Lot 727,
Banilad
Friar Lands Estate, cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in
this
case at bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find no merit in
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The matters raised in the
motion
have already been substantially discussed in the decision.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It must be emphasized
that in civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by
preponderance
of evidence is on the plaintiff who is asserting the affirmative of an
issue. He has the burden of presenting evidence required to obtain a
favorable
judgment, and he, having the burden of proof, will be defeated if no
evidence
were given on either side.[3]
Inasmuch as petitioners pray for the "Declaration of Nullity and
Non-Existence
of Deed/Title, Cancellation of Certificates of Title and Recovery of
Property"
against the respondent, they had the burden to establish their claims
of
ownership of the subject property which they failed to do in this case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 18 of Act No.
1120 or the Friar Lands Act[4]
unequivocally provides: "No lease or sale made by the Chief of the
Bureau
of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of
this
Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior
(now,
the Secretary of Natural Resources). Thus, petitioners' claim of
ownership
must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of
the
Secretary of Interior. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot
simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is
explicit
in its mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State
Multi-Products
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals[5]
and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of Appeals.[6]
Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a
deviation
from this rule.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to
petitioners'
protestations, we squarely resolved the core issues of fraud and want
of
jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent's title. While
we held that the issue of the validity of respondent's title is factual
which cannot be reviewed on appeal, nevertheless, we have answered each
ground raised by petitioner in assailing respondent's title.[7]
Needless to stress, mere allegations of fraud are not enough.[8]
Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence,[9]
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.[10]
As we have held in Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, contentions must be
proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party's
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense.[11]
Petitioners failed to discharge that burden.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, it cannot
be over-accentuated that Tomas Alonso, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest,
never asserted any claim of ownership over the disputed property during
his lifetime. When he was alive, Tomas Alonso did not exert any effort
to have the title of the disputed property reconstituted in his name or
seek recovery thereof from the respondent which was in possession since
1931.[12]
Significantly, Tomas Alonso had caused the reconstitution of his title
on Lot 810, which is adjacent to the disputed property, sometime in
1946
and yet petitioners failed to show that Tomas Alonso exerted the same
effort
to reconstitute his alleged title to the subject property. As
successors-in-interest,
petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of Tomas Alonso. They cannot
claim a right greater than that of their predecessor. Notably, Tomas
Alonso
and his son Francisco Alonso were not ordinary or unschooled men. They
were learned men of the law. They belonged to the landed gentry and,
thus,
had adequate financial resources at their disposal. Tomas Alonso was
even
a member of Congress. The length of time that has elapsed, spanning six
decades, before the institution of the suit to recover the property,
begs
for a valid explanation, of which none was convincingly offered.
Petitioners'
silent acquiescence for several decades and belated invocation of an
alleged
right speak strongly of the staleness of their claim. Their claims can
hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt. "If eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot
sleep
on one's right for more than a tenth of a century and expect it to be
preserved
in its pristine purity".[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We likewise find no
merit in respondent's motion for reconsideration insofar as the
decision
declared that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally
belongs
to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It must be borne in
mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over which
the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or
patrimonial
property of the Government[14]
and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements
of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sections 11, 12 and
18 of Act No. 1120 provide:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 11.
Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon and
occupant
of any portion of said lands x x x desire to purchase
the land so occupied by him, he shall be entitled to do so at the
actual
cost thereof to the Government, and shall be allowed ten years from the
date of purchase within which to pay for the same in equal annual
installments,
if he so desires, all deferred payments to bear interest at the rate of
four per centum per annum on all deferred payments.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Section 12.
When
the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained the Chief of the
Bureau
of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate
which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell
to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the
prize so fixed, payable as provided in this Act x x
x
and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued
interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the
said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be
issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one
hundred
and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 18. No
lease
or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions
of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It was thus primordial
for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear and
convincing
evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential
for
both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private
property. Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier,
petitioners
have not succeeded to prove their claim of ownership over the subject
property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the part of
respondent,
it failed to shed light on how its predecessor in interest, United
Services
Country Club, Inc., acquired its title. Surprisingly, there is not even
one evidence to show when and how its predecessor in interest, United
Services
Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from anybody. It may be true
that records were destroyed during the war, but respondent has not
offered
any clear evidence, testimonial or documentary, on the circumstances
surrounding
the acquisition of Lot 727, thereby creating a wide chasm in its claim
of ownership. It only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof of
respondent to support its claim of ownership over the disputed
property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent relies
solely
on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or
resolve
the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The
reconstitution
of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of
title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or
resolve
the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A
reconstituted
title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither may the rewards
of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an
iron-clad
dictum that prescription can never lie against the Gov't. Since
respondent
failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to
private
property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by
respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property
being
a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the
Government.
Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning
decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership.
Moreover,
the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State,
unless
therein expressly provided, is founded on "the great principle of
public
policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the
public
interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or
agents
to whose care they are confided."[16]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, the
declarations
in the Court's judgment that the subject property belongs to the
Government
is not an offshoot of a collateral attack on respondent's title. The
validity
of the reconstitution of title to the land in question was directly in
dispute, and the proceedings before the trial court was in the nature
of
a direct attack on the legality of respondent's title.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, our declaration
that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to
the
Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law
insofar
as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a Friar Land
and
both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the
patrimonial
property of the State or that it had become private property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN VIEW THEREOF, We
DENY with finality the separate motions for reconsideration of the
petitioners
and respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, Vitug, Carpio,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
concurs in the result.chan
robles virtual law library
Panganiban, J.,
took no part. Former party of a party's counsel.chan
robles virtual law library
Quisumbing, J.,
joins the dissent
of J. Tinga. chan
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Ynares-Santiago,
J.,
took no part.chan
robles virtual law library
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J.:
see separate opinion.
Corona, J.,
shares the dissent
of J. Tinga.chan
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Carpio-Morales, J.,
took no part. Concurred in the ponencia of the Court of Appeals.
Tinga,
J.: See dissenting opinion.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1099-1100.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Rollo, p. 1104.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Hanopol vs. Shoemart, Inc., G.R. No. 137774, October 4, 2002; Borlongan
vs. Madrideo, 323 SCRA 248, 255 (2000); Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
204 SCRA 160, 168 (1991); and, Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA
290, 301 (1990).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Otherwise known as "An Act Providing For The Administration And
Temporary
Leasing And Sale Of Certain Haciendas And Parcels Of Land, Commonly
Known
As Friar Lands, For The Purchase Of Which The Government Of The
Philippine
Islands Has Recently Contracted, Pursuant To The Provisions Of Sections
Sixty-Three, Sixty-Four And Sixty-Five Of An Act Of The Congress Of The
United States, Entitled "An Act Temporarily To Provide For The
Administration
Of The Affairs Of Civil Government In The Philippine Islands, And For
Other
Purposes," Approved On The First Day Of July, Nineteen Hundred And
Two".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
196 SCRA 630 (1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
323 SCRA 430, 442 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, pp. 1092-1097.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Barrera vs. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 312, 317 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., G.R. No. 146030, December 3,
2002; Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 645, 671 (1996); and,
Atilano
vs. Inclan, 45 Phil. 246, 252 (1923).
[10]
Palmares vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 422, 434 (1998); Inciong, Jr.
vs.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, 586 (1996); and, Cu vs. Court of
Appeals,
195 SCRA 647, 657 (1991).
[11]
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003; Heirs of Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of
Appeals, 362 SCRA 531, 547 (2001); Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 231
SCRA
498, 504 (1994); and, Pornellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration, 110
Phil.
986, 991 (1961).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Decision, Supreme Court, promulgated on January 31, 2002, p. 12; Rollo,
p. 1095.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284, 303 ("14), citing Associacion Cooperativa
de Credito Agricola de Miagao vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 281, 283.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Jacinto vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853 (1926).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Decision, pp. 16-17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Viña vs. Government of P.I., 65 Phil. 262, 265 (1938).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |
