EN BANC
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 133250
May 6, 2003
-versus-
PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY
AND AMARI
COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
R E S O L U T I O
N
CARPIO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For resolution of the Court
are the following Motions: (1) Motion to Inhibit and for
Re-Deliberation
filed by respondent Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation ("Amari"
for brevity) on September 13, 2002; (2) Motion to Set Case for
Hearing
on Oral Argument filed by Amari on August 20, 2002; (3) Motion
for
Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Amari
on July 26, 2002 and August 20, 2002, respectively; (4) Motion for
Reconsideration
and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Public
Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) on July 26, 2002 and August 8,
2002,
respectively; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification
filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General on July 25, 2002.
Petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez filed on November 13, 2002 his Consolidated
Opposition
to the main and supplemental motions for reconsideration.
To recall, the Court’s
decision of July 9, 2002 ("decision" for brevity) on the instant case
states
in its summary:
We can now summarize
our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.cralaw:red
2. The 592.15
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources
of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.
The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify
as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural
resources the government can alienate. In their present state,
the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce
of man.cralaw:red
3. Since the Amended
JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary
to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.cralaw:red
4. Since the Amended
JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government
can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and
further
declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer
of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be
void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public
domain.chanrobles virtual law library
Clearly, the Amended
JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or
purpose
is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men,"
are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must
perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares
the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.chanrobles virtual law library
Amari seeks the inhibition
of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ponente of the Decision, on the ground
that
Justice Carpio, before his appointment to the Court, wrote in his
Manila
Times column of July 1, 1997, "I have always maintained that the law
requires
the public bidding of reclamation projects." Justice Carpio, then
a private law practitioner, also stated in the same column, "The
Amari-PEA
reclamation contract is legally flawed because it was not bid out by
the
PEA." Amari claims that because of these statements Justice
Carpio
should inhibit himself "on the grounds of bias and prejudgment" and
that
the instant case should be "re-deliberated" after being assigned to a
new
ponente.chanrobles virtual law library
The motion to inhibit
Justice Carpio must be denied for three reasons. First, the
motion
to inhibit came after Justice Carpio had already rendered his opinion
on
the merits of the case. The rule is that a motion to inhibit must
be denied if filed after a member of the Court had already given an
opinion
on the merits of the case,[1]
the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate
upon
the action of the Court x x x (only to) raise
an
objection of this sort after a Decision has been rendered."
Second,
as can be readily gleaned from the summary of the Decision quoted
above,
the absence of public bidding is not one of the ratio decidendi of the
Decision which is anchored on violation of specific provisions of the
Constitution.
The absence of public bidding was not raised as an issue by the
parties.
The absence of public bidding was mentioned in the Decision only to
complete
the discussion on the law affecting reclamation contracts for the
guidance
of public officials. At any rate, the Office of the Solicitor
General
in its Motion for Reconsideration concedes that the absence of public
bidding
in the disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered the Amended JVA null
and void.[2]
Third, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a
case just because they have written legal articles on the law involved
in the case. As stated by the Court in Republic v. Cocofed,[3]
-
The mere fact that,
as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has written on the coconut levy
will
not disqualify him, in the same manner that jurists will not be
disqualified
just because they may have given their opinions as textbook writers on
the question involved in a case.chanrobles virtual law library
Besides, the subject
and title of the column in question was "The CCP reclamation project"
and
the column referred to the Amari-PEA contract only in passing in one
sentence.cralaw:red
Amari’s motion to set
the case for oral argument must also be denied since the pleadings of
the
parties have discussed exhaustively the issues involved in the case.cralaw:red
The motions for reconsideration
reiterate mainly the arguments already discussed in the Decision.
We shall consider in this Resolution only the new arguments raised by
respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
In its Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration, Amari argues that the Decision should be
made
to apply prospectively, not retroactively to cover the Amended
JVA.
Amari argues that the existence of a statute or executive order prior
to
its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences
are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB,[4]
thus:
x
x x. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration
of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been
in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience
and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their
positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation
regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive
act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence
as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness
that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid,
a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition
of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of
an
American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute,
prior
to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, - with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official." This language has
been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the
decision
in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. x
x
x.chanrobles virtual law library
x
x x
x
x x That before the decision they were not
constitutionally
infirm was admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to
yield
assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute
or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative
fact
to which legal consequences are attached.
Amari now claims
that "assuming arguendo that Presidential Decree Nos. 1084 and 1085,
and
Executive Order Nos. 525 and 654 are inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution,
the limitation imposed by the Decision on these decrees and executive
orders
should only be applied prospectively from the finality of the Decision."
Amari likewise asserts
that a new doctrine of the Court cannot operate retroactively if it
impairs
vested rights. Amari maintains that the new doctrine embodied in
the Decision cannot apply retroactively on those who relied on the old
doctrine in good faith, citing Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals,[5]
thus:
At that time, the prevailing
jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that
enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and
respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land,
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides
that
"laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided."
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit,
the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity
is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually
divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract
and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1961]).cralaw:red
The same consideration
underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating
new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]
"x x x when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.cralaw:red
There may be special
cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will
warrant
a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of
statutory
law as it applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the
present
petitions, however, we find no such equitable considerations. Not only
did the private respondent apply for free agricultural land when he did
not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble
purposes
behind the law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the
property
purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979
and
which, because of improvements and the appreciating value of land must
be worth more than that amount now.cralaw:red
The buyers in good faith
from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when
they
purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago.
Under
the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed
lot
given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise
his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case
of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already
become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive
application of the Belisario ruling.chanrobles virtual law library
Amari’s reliance on
De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases would
apply if the prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of
the
Amended JVA was that a private corporation could acquire alienable
lands
of the public domain, and the Decision annulled the law or reversed
this
doctrine. Obviously, this is not the case here.cralaw:red
Under the 1935 Constitution,
private corporations were allowed to acquire alienable lands of the
public
domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
private
corporations were banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands
of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this
constitutional
prohibition. The prevailing law before, during and after the
signing
of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold, except by
lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not
annulled or in any way changed the law on this matter. The
Decision,
whether made retroactive or not, does not change the law since the
Decision
merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the effectivity of the
1973
Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is
invalidated
by a decision of the Court, has no application to the instant case.cralaw:red
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan
is inapplicable because it refers to a doctrine of the Court that is
overruled
by a subsequent decision which adopts a new doctrine. In the
instant
case, there is no previous doctrine that is overruled by the
Decision.
Since the case of Manila Electric Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome,[6]
decided on June 29, 1982, the Court has applied consistently the
constitutional
provision that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
alienable
lands of the public domain. The Court reiterated this in numerous
cases, and the only dispute in the application of this constitutional
provision
is whether the land in question had already become private property
before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.[7]
If the land was already private land before the 1973 Constitution
because
the corporation had possessed it openly, continuously, exclusively and
adversely for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
then
the corporation could apply for judicial confirmation of its imperfect
title. But if the land remained public land upon the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution, then the corporation could never hold, except by
lease,
such public land. Indisputably, the Decision does not overrule
any
previous doctrine of the Court.cralaw:red
The prevailing doctrine
before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the
public
domain. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision
annulled
the Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of
Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the
commerce
of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on
Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decision merely reiterates, and does not
overrule,
any existing judicial doctrine.cralaw:red
Even on the characterization
of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the Decision does not
overrule
existing law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine
in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been
part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No.
1654
on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
statutory
law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be
sold
to private corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined
and expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public domain.cralaw:red
There are, of course,
decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of the law
or Constitution, hold that the sale or transfer of the land may no
longer
be invalidated because of "weighty considerations of equity and social
justice."[8]
The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be superfluous if the
purpose of the statutory or constitutional ban has been achieved.
But none of these cases apply to Amari.cralaw:red
Thus, the Court has
ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien
who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first
transfer
is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen.[9]
Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires
Philippine
citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the
constitutional
ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved.[10]
In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the
buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a
qualified
party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. In the
instant
case, however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom Islands, or any
portion
of it, to any qualified party. In fact, Amari admits that title
to
the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
The Court has also ruled
consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no longer be
questioned
under the principle of res judicata, provided the requisites for res
judicata
are present.[12]
Under this principle, the courts and the parties are bound by a prior
final
decision, otherwise there will be no end to litigation. As the Court
declared
in Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals,[13]
"once a judgement has become final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed
no matter how erroneous it may be." In the instant case, there is
no prior final decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.cralaw:red
There are, moreover,
special circumstances that disqualify Amari from invoking equity
principles.
Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the
Amended
JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on
April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to
acquire
the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this
petition,
two Senate Committees[14]
had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No.
560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized investigation
into PEA’s sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom
Islands
are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the
Amended
JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the
annulment
of the Amended JVA.cralaw:red
Amari has also not paid
to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the
Freedom
Islands. Amari states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.00[15]
out of the P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon in
the
Amended JVA. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even
initiated
the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas covered in
the
Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent
infrastructure
on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to
have
introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation
project
that is the subject of the Amended JVA. And yet Amari claims that
it had already spent a "whopping P9,876,108,638.00" as its total
development
cost as of June 30, 2002.[16]
Amari does not explain how it spent the rest of the P9,876,108,638.00
total
project cost after paying PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari
cannot
claim to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.chanrobles virtual law library
In its Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration, PEA claims that it is "similarly situated"
as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A.
No.
7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and
other military reservations. PEA’s comparison is incorrect.
The Decision states as follows:
As the central implementing
agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority
to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government
agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain.
The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands,
in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable
lands,
does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public
domain.
Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands
become private lands. In the hands of the government agency
tasked
and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the
public
domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.cralaw:red
PEA is the central implementing
agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. PEA
took
the place of Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"
for
brevity) as the government agency charged with leasing or selling all
reclaimed
lands of the public domain. In the hands of PEA, which took over
the leasing and selling functions of DENR, reclaimed foreshore lands
are
public lands in the same manner that these same lands would have been
public
lands in the hands of DENR. BCDA is an entirely different
government
entity. BCDA is authorized by law to sell specific government
lands
that have long been declared by presidential proclamations as military
reservations for use by the different services of the armed forces
under
the Department of National Defense. BCDA’s mandate is specific
and
limited in area, while PEA’s mandate is general and national.
BCDA
holds government lands that have been granted to end-user government
entities
- the military services of the armed forces. In contrast, under
Executive
Order No. 525, PEA holds the reclaimed public lands, not as an end-user
entity, but as the government agency "primarily responsible for
integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government."chanrobles virtual law library
In Laurel v. Garcia,[17]
cited in the Decision, the Court ruled that land devoted to public use
by the Department of Foreign Affairs, when no longer needed for public
use, may be declared patrimonial property for sale to private parties
provided
there is a law authorizing such act. Well-settled is the doctrine
that public land granted to an end-user government agency for a
specific
public use may subsequently be withdrawn by Congress from public use
and
declared patrimonial property to be sold to private parties. R.A.
No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that declares specific military
reservations
no longer needed for defense or military purposes and reclassifies such
lands as patrimonial property for sale to private parties.cralaw:red
Government owned lands,
as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties,
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.
Thus,
the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120
are patrimonial property[19]
which even private corporations can acquire by purchase.
Likewise,
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred
to
a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial
property in the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once
converted
to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal
corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations.chanrobles virtual law library
We reiterate what we
stated in the Decision is the rationale for treating PEA in the same
manner
as DENR with respect to reclaimed foreshore lands, thus:
To allow vast areas
of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA,
and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still
to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably
the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos,
now numbering over 80 million strong.cralaw:red
This scheme, if allowed,
can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain
since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This
will
open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds,
if not thousands, of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under
the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands.
This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never
before
seen in this country - creating the very evil that the constitutional
ban
was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear
direction
of constitutional development in this country. The 1935
Constitution
allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of
public lands. The 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations
from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has
unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, the Office
of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that the cost of reclaiming
deeply
submerged areas is "enormous" and "it would be difficult for PEA to
accomplish
such project without the participation of private corporations."[19]
The Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in
reclamation
projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands.
What
the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate,
is for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public
domain.
There is no prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of
private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at
public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
They
can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus
acquired becomes private land.cralaw:red
Despite the nullity
of the Amended JVA, Amari is not precluded from recovering from PEA in
the proper proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may
have
incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to its declaration of
nullity.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, finding the
Motions for Reconsideration to be without merit, the same are hereby
DENIED
with FINALITY. The Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and
the Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument are likewise DENIED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria- Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo,
J., please see separate
opinion, concurring and dissenting.
Puno,
J., please see separate
opinion.
Ynares-Santiago,
J., please see
dissenting opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., please see
dissenting opinion.
Corona, J., I dissent.
Azcuna, J., I take
no part.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Limpin, Jr. v. IAC, 161 SCRA 83 (1988); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
368 (1949).
[2]
Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 3.
[3]
En Banc Resolution of February 26, 2002.
[4]
38 SCRA 429 (1971).
[5]
205 SCRA 515 (1992).
[6]
114 SCRA 799 (1982).chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Republic v. CA and Iglesia ni Cristo, and Republic v. Cendaña
and
Iglesia ni Cristo, 119 SCRA 449 (1982); Republic v. Villanueva and
Iglesia
ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875 (1982); Director of Lands v. Lood, 124
SCRA
460 (1983); Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 128 SCRA 44 (1984); Director
of Lands v. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., 141 SCRA 21
(1986); Director of Lands v. IAC and Acme Plywood & Veneer
Inc.,
146 SCRA 509 (1986); Republic v. IAC and Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lucena,
168 SCRA 165 (1988); Natividad v. CA, 202 SCRA 493 (1991); Villaflor v.
CA and Nasipit Lumber Co., 280 SCRA 297 (1997). In Ayog v. Cusi,
Jr., 118 SCRA 492 (1982), the Court did not apply the constitutional
ban
in the 1973 Constitution because the applicant corporation,
Biñan
Development Co., Inc., had fully complied with all its obligations and
even paid the full purchase price before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution,
although the sales patent was issued after the 1973 Constitution took
effect.
[8]
Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, note 5.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446
(1988);
Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547 (1982); Godinez v. Pak
Luen, 120 SCRA 223 (1983); Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap &
Sons, 96 Phil. 447 (1955).chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Lee v. Republic, G.R. No. 128195, October 3, 2001; Yap v. Maravillas,
121
SCRA 244 (1983); De Castro v. Teng, 129 SCRA 85 (1984).
[11]
Amari’s Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002;
Firestone
Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522 (1999); Herrera v. Canlas,
310
SCRA 318 (1999); People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Mencias,
20 SCRA 1031 (1967); Galvez v. Tuason, 10 SCRA 344 (1964).
[13]
302 SCRA 331 (1999).chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and
Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations.
[15]
Amari’s Motion for Reconsideration, p. 49.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Ibid., p. 50.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
187 SCRA 797 (1990); See also Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil.
335
(1960); Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
(1975).
[18]
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920); Jacinto v. Director of
Lands,
49 Phil. 853 (1926); Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962); De la Cruz v.
De la Cruz, 130 SCRA 666 (1984).
[19]
OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 22-24; PEA’s Supplement to Motion
for Reconsideration, p.12. |