EN BANC
FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 133250
May 6, 2003
-versus-
PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY
AND AMARI
COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I respectfully submit that
the plea of the private respondent AMARI for a prospective application
of our Decision of July 26, 2002 deserves serious attention. From the
mosaic
of facts, it appears that private respondent is a Philippine
corporation
whose capital structure includes a heavy mix of public investment and
foreign
equity. It further appears that respondent AMARI did not conclude its
Amended
Joint Venture Agreement (AJVA) with the government, thru the public
respondent
Public Estates Authority (PEA) without exercising the due diligence
required
by law. Private respondent AMARI claims and the records support it,
that
its AJVA passed the proverbial eye of the needle before it was approved
by the Chief Executive of the country.
The submission of private
respondent AMARI that it believed in good faith that its AJVA does not
suffer from any legal infirmity should not be dismissed with a cavalier
attitude. First, respondent AMARI contends that it relied on the
unbroken
opinions of the Department of Justice allowing the entity that
undertook
the reclamation project to be paid with part of the reclaimed lands. It
calls our attention to DOJ Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, given
under the 1935 Constitution, and rendered by no less than the eminent
Chief
Justice Jose Abad Santos, then the Secretary of Justice, to the effect
that “reclaimed land belong to the entity or person constructing the
work
for the reclamation of the land,” viz:chanrobles virtual law library
“Section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain
in
the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the
basic
classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of
July
1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of
the
Constitution of the Philippines, the term “Agricultural public lands”
had,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public land laws. The
Supreme
Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government,
10 Phil. 175, held that the phrase ‘agricultural public lands’ means
those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber or mineral
lands.
This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many
subsequent
cases (Montano vs. Ins. Gov’t., 12 Phil. 572) by prescribing distinct
rules
as to their disposition. Lands added to the shore by accretion belong
to
the State while lands reclaimed belong to the entity or person
constructing
the work for the reclamation of the land.”
The advent of the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions does not appear to have changed the opinion
of the DOJ.[1]
Secondly, respondent AMARI avers that Congress has consistently enacted
laws allowing portions of reclaimed lands to be paid to whoever
undertook
the work. These laws passed under the 1935 Constitution are, among
others,
the following:
“(i) Rep.
Act
No. 161 (1947) which authorizes the City of Bacolod to undertake
reclamation
and own the reclaimed lands;
(ii) Rep. Act No.
287
(1948) which authorizes the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar to
undertake
reclamation and own the reclaimed lands;
(iii) Rep. Act No.
1132
(1954) which also authorizes the City of Bacolod to lease out or sell
reclaimed
lands;chanrobles virtual law library
(iv) Rep. Act No.
3857
(1964), as amended by Rep. Act No. 4654 (1966), which authorizes Cebu
to
reclaim lands and own the reclaimed lands;
(v) Rep. Act No.
4663
(1966) which authorizes the Cagayan De Oro Port Authority to undertake
reclamation and own the reclaimed lands;
(vi) Rep. Act No.
4776
(1966) which provides for the authority of Tacloban City to undertake
reclamation
and to lease, sell or barter such reclaimed land;
(vii) Rep. Act No.
4850
(1966) which authorizes the Laguna Lake Development Authority to
undertake
reclamation and to own such reclaimed land;
(viii) Rep. Act
No.
5412 (1968) which authorizes General Santos City to undertake
reclamation
and to own such reclaimed land;
(ix) Rep. Act No.
5518
(1969) which authorizes the city of Oroquieta to undertake reclamation
and to own such reclaimed land;
(x) Rep. Act No.
5519
(1969) which authorizes the City of Mandaue to undertake reclamation
and
to own such reclaimed land;
(xi) Rep. Act No.
5798
(1969) which authorizes the City of Dumaguete to undertake reclamation
and to own such reclaimed land;
(xii) Rep. Act No.
5956
(1969) [An Act Making the Municipality of Dapa, Province of Surigao Del
Norte, a Sub-Port of Entry, and Authorizing the Appropriation of the
Necessary
Funds for the Operation of a Customs Service Therein] which authorizes
the City to undertake reclamation and to own such reclaimed land.”chanrobles virtual law library
The same kind of laws
was
passed by Congress under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Respondent
AMARI
cites, among others, the following laws:
“(i) Exec.
Order No. 1086 (1986) [Tondo Foreshore Area], as amended by
Proclamation
No. 39 (1992), which provides that reclaimed lands shall be owned by
the
National Housing Authority;
(ii) Rep. Act No.
6957
(1990) [Build-Operate-Transfer Law] which provides that in case of
reclamation,
the repayment scheme may consist of a grant of a portion of the
reclaimed
land;
(iii) Rep. Act No.
7160
(1992) [Bases Conversion Development Authority] which authorizes the
BCDA
to reclaim lands and to own the reclaimed lands;
(iv) Rep. Act No.
7621
(1992) [Cebu Port Authority] which authorizes the Cebu Port Authority
to
reclaim lands and to own the reclaimed lands.”
Republic Act No. 6957,
enacted in 1990, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law
(BOT Law), as amended by R.A. No. 7718, is of great significance to the
case at bar. The Senate deliberations on the law clearly show that in
case
of reclamation undertakings, the repayment scheme may consist of the
grant
of a portion of the reclaimed land. I quote the pertinent
deliberations,
viz:[2]
“x
x x
The President Pro Tempore.
We are still in the period of interpellations.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Mr.
President.chanrobles virtual law library
The President Pro Tempore.
Senator Gonzales is recognized.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Mr.
President, may I be permitted to ask a few questions from the
distinguished
Sponsor.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President.cralaw:red
The President Pro Tempore.
Please proceed.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Mr.
President, Section 6 provides for the repayment scheme. It provides
here
that for the financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of any
infrastructure project undertaken pursuant to the provisions of this
Act,
the contractor shall be entitled to a reasonable return of his
investment,
operating and maintenance costs in accordance with the bid proposal of
the contractor as accepted by the concerned contracting infrastructure
agency or local government unit and incorporated in the contract terms
and conditions. This repayment scheme is to be effected by authorizing
the contractor to charge and collect reasonable tolls, fees and rentals
for the use of the project facilities, etcetera. May I know,
distinguished
colleague, whether this repayment scheme is exclusive, in the sense
that
the repayment here would always consist in authorizing the contractor
to
charge and collect reasonable tools, fees, or rentals for the use of
the
project facilities?
Senator Ziga.
Exclusive to the?
Senator Gonzales. Exclusive
in the sense that no other repayment scheme may be pursued or adopted?
Senator Ziga.
Yes, Mr. President.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales.
If it be so, Mr. President, I notice that, among others, the project
that
can be the subject of the build-operate-and-transfer scheme are land
reclamations.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga.
That is correct, Mr. President.chanrobles virtual law library
Senator Gonzales. Now,
in land reclamation, does the distinguished Gentleman expect that the
one
or the builder or contractor who effects or undertakes the reclamation
project will be merely repaid or will be required to recoup his
investments,
plus profits, and otherwise, by imposing tolls. That is not the usual
arrangement
as far as land reclamation is concerned.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President. “Tolls” here are concentrated more on horizontal
constructions,
such as roads and bridges.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Yes,
Mr. President, but undoubtedly, the priority projects here would be
land
reclamation. In land reclamation, the usual arrangement is that
there
should be a certain percentage of the reclaimed area that would be
under
the ownership of the Government. On the other hand, a certain
percentage
of the land area reclaimed would go to the contractor or the reclaiming
entity.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. If
as the Gentleman now say that Section 6, which is the repayment scheme,
is exclusive, then that would not be allowable and we cannot effect
land
reclamation.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President. I believe that there is a little bit of difference that
probably
this concept, that the Gentleman put into light here by the reclamation
project, could be met under the build-and-transfer scheme only.chanrobles virtual law library
Senator Gonzales. Yes,
Mr. President, the build-and-transfer scheme, but there is no question
that they are already covered, either by the build-operate-and-transfer
scheme and build-and-transfer scheme. The question is repayment. How
will
the contractor be able to recoup his investments, plus reasonable
returns
of whatever amount that he had invested for the purpose?
I think, the distinguished
Gentleman is agreeable that the imposition of tolls, fees, and rentals
would not be appropriate.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. In reclamation.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Yes,
Mr. President.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President. I believe that there is a space for improvement on these
reclamation
projects.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. So,
we can provide for another scheme of repayment outside of the repayment
scheme as provided for in Section 6 of the bill now.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Now,
would a foreign entity, probably, wholly owned by foreigners, be
authorized
to engage in land reclamation?
Senator Ziga. In the
earlier interpellation, we have stated that the issue of the sharing of
60:40 is one of the acceptable points of amendment. I believe that, in
this bill, we are still covered by that ratio. As of now, this bill
intends
that it can only allow contractor or developers, whether they be
private
corporations, but with the requirements of the Constitution as to
foreign
participation.chanrobles virtual law library
Senator Gonzales. Yes,
Mr. President. Because, in Section 2, paragraph a provides:
… any private individual,
partnership, corporation or firm desiring to undertake the construction
and operation of any of the infrastructure facilities mentioned in
Section
3 of this Act. The private individual contractor/developer must be a
Filipino
citizen. For a corporation, partnership or firm, 75 percent of the
capital
must be owned by the citizens of the Philippines in accordance with
Letter
of Instructions No. 630.cralaw:red
My problem here is in
land reclamation, Mr. President. Normally, the arrangement here is that
a certain percentage goes to the Government, and a certain percentage
of
the reclaimed land would go to the developer or the contractor. Now,
would
the distinguished Gentleman require a 75:25 percent ratio as far as the
ownership of stocks are concerned, while the Constitution allows a
60:40
ratio as far as ownership of the land is concerned?
Senator Ziga: Mr. President,
we have stated that the requirements of the Constitution would be
adhered
to.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. I
see. So it would be sufficient that an entity, a corporation, or a
partnership
that undertakes a land reclamation project be owned on the basis of the
60:40 ratio between Filipino citizens and foreigners.cralaw:red
Senator Ziga. Yes, that
is correct, Mr. President.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. All
of these would require undoubtedly amendments in this bill. Would the
distinguished
Gentleman be willing to, at least, consider these amendments at the
opportune
time?
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr.
President.chanrobles virtual law library
Senator Gonzales. Thank
you, Mr. President.”
On the basis of his
interpellations, Senator Gonzales then introduced the following
amendment
which was accepted by Senator Ziga and approved by the Senate, viz:[3]
“GONZALES AMENDMENT
Senator Gonzales. Mr.
President, between lines 8 and 9, I am proposing a new paragraph which
would read as follows:
IN CASE OF LAND RECLAMATION
OR THE BUILDING OF INDUSTRIAL ESTATES, THE REPAYMENT SCHEME MAY CONSIST
OF THE GRANT OF A PORTION OR PERCENTAGE OF THE RECLAIMED LAND OR
INDUSTRIAL
ESTATE BUILT SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE
OWNERSHIP OF LANDS.’chanrobles virtual law library
Because, Mr. President,
the repayment scheme includes all of these - payment of tolls, fees,
rentals,
and charges. But in case of land reclamation, that is not the ordinary
arrangement. Usually, the compensation there takes the form of a
portion
or a percentage of the reclaimed land. And I would apply it all, as far
as the building of industrial estates is concerned. Of course, we have
to respect the constitutional provision that only Filipino citizens or
corporations-at least, 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by
citizens
of the Philippines-may acquire or own lands.cralaw:red
The President. What
is the pleasure of the Sponsor?
Senator Ziga. Accepted,
Mr. President.cralaw:red
Mr. President. Is there
any objection? Any comment? (Silence) Hearing none, the same is
approved.cralaw:red
Senator Gonzales. Thank
you, Mr. President.”
Section 6 of R.A. No.
6957 (BOT Law), as amended, thus provides:
“Section 6.
Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance
of any infrastructure project undertaken through the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer
arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent shall be repaid by authorizing it to charge
and collect reasonable tolls, fees, and rentals for the use of the
project
facility not exceeding those incorporated in the contract and, where
applicable,
the proponent may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the
revenue
of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited
to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject
to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of
land.”
The Rules and
Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 6957 (BOT Law), as amended, likewise provide:
“Sec. 12.13
Repayment Schemechanrobles virtual law library
x x x
“Where applicable,
the
proponent may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue
of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited
to the grant of commercial development rights or the grant of a portion
or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional
requirement
that only Filipino citizens or in the case of corporations only those
with
at least 60% Filipino equity will be allowed to own land.”
But this is not all.
Respondent
AMARI points to P.D. No. 1085, the charter of the respondent PEA, which
conveyed to it the reclaimed lands within the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) including the lands subject of the
case
at bar and which authorized respondent PEA to dispose of said lands.
Pursuant
to existing laws, rules, and regulations, it appears that respondent
PEA
has the discretion to pay the entity reclaiming the lands a portion or
percentage of said lands. P.D. No. 1085 pertinently provides:
“WHEREAS,
the
National Government acting through the Department of Public Highways is
presently undertaking pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(m) of
Republic
Act No. 5137, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 3-A, the
reclamation
of a portion of the foreshore and offshore areas of the Manila Bay from
the Cultural Center of the Philippines passing through Pasay City,
Parañaque,
Las Piñas, Zapote, Bacoor up to Cavite City;
"WHEREAS, in the
implementation
of the above-cited laws bidding was held for the reclamation works and
the corresponding contract awarded to the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines;chanrobles virtual law library
"WHEREAS, it is in
the
public interest to convert the land reclaimed into a modern city and
develop
it into a governmental, commercial, residential and recreational
complex
and this is better accomplished through a distinct entity organized for
the purpose;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I
FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order the following:
"The land
reclaimed
in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the
contract
for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction
and
Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973
and/or
any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby
transferred,
conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public
Estates Authority established pursuant to P.D. No. 1084; Provided,
however,
That the rights and interest of the Construction and Development
Corporation
of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be
recognized
and respected.
"Henceforth, the
Public
Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways)
arising
from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of
the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines.chanrobles virtual law library
"In consideration
of
the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority
shall
issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding
shares
of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock
shall
be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
"The Secretary of
Public
Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall
execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines,
as
may be necessary to implement the above.
"Special land
patent/patents
shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the
Public
Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the
contractor
or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or
to
be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the
basis
of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the
corresponding
certificates of title.”
Former President
Corazon
C. Aquino also implemented P.D. No. 1085 by issuing Special Patent No.
3517 ceding absolute rights over the said properties to respondent PEA,
which rights include the determination whether to use parts of the
reclaimed
lands as compensation to the contractor, viz:
“TO ALL TO
WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME,
"GREETINGS:
"WHEREAS, under
Presidential
Decree No. 1085 dated February 4, 1977 the ownership and administration
of certain reclaimed lands have been transferred, conveyed and assigned
to the Public Estates Authority, a government entity created by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 1084 dated February 4, 1977, subject to the
terms and conditions imposed in said Presidential Decree No. 1085;
"WHEREAS, pursuant
to
said decree the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) of the Public Estates Authority
consist
of a total area of 1,915,894 square meters surveyed under Plans
RL-13-000002
to RL-13-000005 situated in the Municipality of Parañaque;
"NOW, THEREFORE,
KNOW
YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in
conformity
with the provisions thereof and of Presidential Decree No. 1085,
supplemented
by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and
conveyed
unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land
containing
a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred
ninety-four (1,9 15,894) square meters; the technical descriptions of
which
are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof;chanrobles virtual law library
"TO HAVE AND TO
HOLD
the said tracts of land, with appurtenances thereunto of right
belonging
unto the Public Estates Authority, subject to private ‘rights, if any
there
be, and to the condition that the said land shall be used only for the
purposes authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1085;
"IN TESTIMONY
WHEREOF,
and by authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of
the Philippines, hereby caused these letters to be made patent and the
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be hereunto affixed.”
Respondent AMARI
further
claims that the administration of former President Fidel V. Ramos
upheld
the legality of the original JVA. On the other hand, it alleges that
the
amended JVA was the subject of prior exhaustive study and approval by
the
Office of the General Corporate Counsel, and the Government Corporate
Monitoring
and Coordinating Committee composed of the Executive Secretary of
Finance,
Secretary of Budget and Management, Secretary of Trade and Industry,
the
NEDA Director-General, the head of the Presidential Management Staff,
the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Office of the
President.[4]
The amended JVA was executed on March 30, 1999 and approved on May 28,
1999 under the administration of former President Joseph E. Estrada.[5]
In sum, the records
give color to the claim of respondent AMARI that it should not be
blamed
when it consummated the JVA and AJVA with its co-respondent PEA. It
relied
on our laws enacted under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and
their
interpretations by the executive departments spanning the governments
of
former Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada, all favorable to the said
JVA and AJVA. Finding no legal impediments to these contracts, it
claims
to have invested some P9 billion on the reclamation project.cralaw:red
Should this P9 billion
investment just come to naught? The answer, rooted in the concept of
fundamental
fairness and anchored on equity, is in the negative. Undoubtedly, our
Decision
of July 26, 2002 is one of first impression as the ponente himself
described
it. As one of first impression, it is not unexpected that it will cause
serious unsettling effects on property rights which could have already
assumed the color of vested rights. Our case law is no stranger to
these
situations. It has consistently held that new doctrines should only
apply
prospectively to avoid inequity and social injustice. Thus in Co vs.
Court
of Appeals, et al,[6]
this Court, thru Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, held:
“The
principle
of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied
in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961, (sic) 2 SCRA 682 (June
30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the
Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment
of
loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of
the act; Lagardo v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962),
ruling
that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior
courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
retroactive
effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64
SCRA
18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90,
amending
Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v.
Que Po Lay, 94 SCRA 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of
violating
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when the alleged violation
occurred
before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v.
CA, 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27
decreeing
the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No.
316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farm holdings,
pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No.
27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389
which
removed ‘personal cultivation’ as a ground for the ejectment of a
tenant
cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory
statement
for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal
of
the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded
retroactive
effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should
have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177
SCRA
294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).chanrobles virtual law library
The prospectivity
principle
has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to
wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, October 12, 1981, 108
SCRA
142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer;
Sanchez
v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the
Commission
on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no
retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was
ruled
that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective
effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose
temporary
appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity
has also been applied to judicial decisions which, ‘although in
themselves
not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, (this being)
the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial
decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system.’
So did this Court hold,
for example, in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
‘It will be
noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander
in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us
in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision
in People v. Mapa, reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967.
The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on
the
basis of our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero in
Mapa?
Decisions
of
this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of
the
New Civil Code, ‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.’ The
interpretation
upon a law was originally passed, since this Court’s construction
merely
established the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities
is a restatement of the legal maxim ‘legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet’
- the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has
the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was
part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time
appellant
was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the
Mapa
case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted
on the faith thereof. This is specially true in the construction
and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishability
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.’chanrobles virtual law library
So, too, did the Court
rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of
Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97998), January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515,
527-528:
‘We sustain
the petitioner’s position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was
mortgaged
to DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977,
and
then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
"At that time, the
prevailing
jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that
enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and
respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code ‘judicial decisions applying or
interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the
Philippines.’ But while our decisions form part of the law of the land,
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides
that
‘laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided.’
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit,
the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity
is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually
divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract
and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061
(sic)]).
"The same
consideration
underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating
new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply
to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.’
"A compelling
rationalization
of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth
in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist v. Baxter States
Bank,
308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative
necessity
to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its
nullification,
as an operative fact negating acceptance of “a principle of absolute
retroactive
invalidity.”chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, in this Court’s
decision
in Tañada v. Tuvera, promulgated on April 24, 1985 - which
declared
‘that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been
published, shall have no force and effect,’ and as regards which
declaration
some members of the Court appeared ‘quite apprehensive about the
possible
unsettling effect (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on
the validity of those presidential decrees’ - the Court said:
The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic
and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter
States Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
‘The courts
below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shellby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566.
It is quite clear,
however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed
to have become vested, of status, or prior determinations deemed to
have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.’
Much earlier, in De
Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 -concerning the effects of the
invalidation
of “Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued
Executive
Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending
the
enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations
payable
by war sufferers,” and which had been “explicitly held in Rutter v.
Esteban
(93 Phil. 68 [1953]) (to be) in 1953 unreasonable, and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer” - the Court made substantially
the same observations, to wit:
‘The decision now on
appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for
that
matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering
from
the infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor
can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the
fundamental
law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes
a mere scrap of paper. It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary
to its terms cannot survive.cralaw:red
Such a view has support
in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of
nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience
and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their
positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation
regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive
act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence
as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness
that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid,
a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition
of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.chanrobles virtual law library
In the language of an
American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute,
prior
to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, -
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular
conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States
Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with
approval
in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the
decision
in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more
recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the
Court
in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).’
Again, treating of the
effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military
Commission
No. 34, - declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the
martial
law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and
incarceration of numerous persons - this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190
SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
‘In the interest of
justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be
applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or
not
yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no
retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or
acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the
promulgation
of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed
by
the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the
State
shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the
accused,
should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered
based on the violation of he constitutional rights of the accused, and
not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the
accused
should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.cralaw:red
The trial of thousands
of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions
during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created
under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored.
The
belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity
of
those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which
now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus
did
this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533,
where
the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a
municipality
by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished.’chanrobles virtual law library
It would seem, then,
that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition
that
the Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA
160
(1987) - i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance
of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 - should not
be
given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the
Minister
of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg.
22.”
Despite the stream of
similar decisions, the majority holds that it would have been
sympathetic
to the plea for a prospective application of our Decision “x x x if the
prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the amended
JVA
was that a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the
public
domain and the Decision annulled the law or reversed the doctrine.”[7]
It explains that “under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations
were
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. But since the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private corporations were banned
from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain.
The
1987 Constitution continued this constitutional prohibition.”[8]
I beg to disagree. We
should put section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution in its proper
perspective.
It provides:
“All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the
measure and limit of the grant.” (Emphasis supplied)chanrobles virtual law library
With due respect, the
plea
for prospectivity is based on the ground that our Decision is novel not
because it bars private corporations like respondent AMARI from
acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease but because for
the
first time we held, among others, that joint venture agreements cannot
allow entities undertaking reclamation of lands to be paid with
portions
of the reclaimed lands. This is the first case where we are
interpreting
that portion of section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states
that “x x x the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production,
joint venture, or production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years and
under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.” Indisputably,
this
part of section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is new as it is
neither in the 1973 or 1935 Constitutions. Undoubtedly too, our
Decision
goes against the grain of understanding of the said provision on the
part
of the Executive and Legislative Departments of our government. The
disquieting
effects of our Decision interpreting said provision in a different
light
cannot be gainsaid.
The majority concedes
that in Benzonan,[9]
we held that the sale or transfer of the land involved in said case may
no longer be invalidated because of “weighty considerations of equity
and
social justice.”[10]
Nonetheless, the majority holds that there are “special circumstances
that
disqualify AMARI from invoking equity principles,” viz:[11]
“There are, moreover,
special circumstances that disqualify Amari from invoking equity
principles.
Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the
Amended
JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on
April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to
acquire
the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two
Senate
Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee
Report No. 560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized
investigation
into PEA’s sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom
Islands
are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the
Amended
JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the
annulment
of the Amended JVA.cralaw:red
Amari has also not paid
to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the
Freedom
Islands. Amari states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.00 out of
the P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon in the
Amended
JVA. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the
reclamation
of the 592. 15 hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA,
or to have started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the
Freedom
Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical
improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the
subject
of the Amended JVA. And yet Amari claims that it had already spent a
“whopping
P9,876,108,638.00 as its total development cost as of June 30, 2002.
Amari
does not explain how it spent the rest of the P9,876,108,638.00 total
project
cost after paying PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari cannot claim to
be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.”
Again, with due respect,
I beg to disagree. The alleged facts and factors cited by the majority
do not provide sufficient basis to condemn respondent AMARI of bad
faith.
First, the petition at bar was filed before the amended JVA was
consummated.
As alleged by the petitioner, he filed the petition to:[12]
“x x x
5.1
Compel respondent to make public all documents, facts and data related
to or in connection with the ongoing RENEGOTIATIONS between respondents
PEA and AMARI, and
5.2
Enjoin respondents from privately entering into perfecting and/or
executing
any new agreement with AMARI.”chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner invoked section
7, Article III of the Constitution which recognizes the right of people
to information on matters of public concern and section 28, Article II
of the Constitution which provides that the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public
interest. In fine, the amended JVA was yet inexistent at the time the
petition
at bar was filed and could not provide a basis for a finding of bad
faith
on the part of respondent AMARI. Secondly, Senate Committee Report No.
560 also pertains to the original JVA. Precisely because of the report,
former President Ramos issued Presidential Order No. 365 which
established
a presidential legal task force to study the legality of the original
JVA.
The legal task force did not reach the same conclusions as the Senate.
In any event, the original JVA was renegotiated and was approved by
former
President Estrada on May 28, 1999 following intensive review by the
Office
of the General Corporate Counsel and the Government Corporate
Monitoring
and Coordinating Committee which, as aforestated, is composed of the
Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Budget and
Management,
the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the NEDA Director General, the
Head
of the Presidential Management Staff and the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral
ng Pilipinas and the Office of the President. To be sure, the value of
Senate Report No. 560 is not as proof of good or bad faith of any party
but as a study in aid of legislation. As a legislative body, the Senate
does not determine adjudicative facts. Thirdly, the allegation that
respondent
AMARI has not complied with its obligation to PEA is a matter that
cannot
be resolved in the case at bar. If at all it can be raised, it is
PEA that should raise it in a proper action for breach of contract or
specific
performance. This Court is not a ‘trier of facts and it cannot resolve
these allegations that respondent AMARI violated its contract with PEA.
The majority cannot condemn respondent AMARI of acting in bad faith on
the basis of patently inadmissible evidence without running afoul of
the
rudimentary requirements of due process. At the very least, the
majority
should hear respondent AMARI on the issue of its alleged bad faith
before
condemning it to certain bankruptcy.cralaw:red
This is not all. There
is another dimension of unfairness and inequity suffered by respondent
AMARI as a consequence of our Decision under reconsideration. It cannot
be denied that respondent AMARI spent substantial amount of money (the
claim is P9 billion), fulfilling its obligation under the AJVA, i.e.,
provide
the financial, technical, logistical, manpower, personnel and
managerial
requirements of the project. Our Decision is silent as a sphinx whether
these expenses should be reimbursed. Respondent AMARI may not be paid
with
reclaimed lands, but it can be remunerated in some other ways such as
in
cash. Our omission to order that respondent AMARI be paid commensurate
to its expenses does not sit well with our decision in Republic of the
Philippines vs. CA and Republic Estate Corporation, et al.[13]
where we held:
“x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Although Pasay
City
and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area
within
the subject reclamation project, it appearing that something
compensable
was accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law and
hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even the
government
shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another, we
believe,
and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said
actual
work done and dredge-fill’ poured in.”
Needless to state, the
government will be unjustly enriched if it will not be made to
compensate
the respondent AMARI for the expenses it incurred in reclaiming the
lands
subject of the case at bar.
We should strive for
consistency for rights and duties should be resolved with reasonable
predictability
and cannot be adjudged by the luck of a lottery. Just a month ago
or on March 20, 2003 this Court en banc resolved a motion for
reconsideration
in Land Bank vs. Arlene de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 143275. In this case,
we resolved unanimously to give a prospective effect to our Decision
which
denied LBP’s petition for review. Written by our esteemed colleague,
Mr.
Justice Corona, our resolution held:
“Be that as
it may, we deem it necessary to clarify our Decision’s application to
and
effect on LBP’s pending cases filed as ordinary appeals before the
Court
of Appeals. It must first be stressed that the instant case poses a
novel
issue; our Decision herein will be a landmark ruling on the proper way
to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Before this case
reached
us, LBP had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of
Special
Agrarian Courts considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of
Sections
60 and 61 of RA 6657."chanrobles virtual law library
More importantly, the
Court
of Appeals has rendered conflicting decisions on this precise issue. On
the strength of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Feliciano
Buenaventura,
penned by Associate Justice Salvador Valdez, Jr. of the Court of
Appeals,
certain decisions of the appellate court held that an ordinary appeal
is
the proper mode. On the other hand, a decision of the same court,
penned
by Associate Justice Romeo Brawner and subject of the instant review,
held
that the proper mode of appeal is a petition for review. In another
case,
the Court of Appeals also entertained an appeal by the DAR filed as a
petition
for review.
On account of the absence
of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding
the
proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as
the
conflicting decisions of (the) Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be
blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation
and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken
belief
that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions
of Special Agrarian Courts.cralaw:red
Hence, in the light
of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the
prospective application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A
prospective
application of our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair
play
but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules of procedure
shall
not impair substantive rights.cralaw:red
In accordance with our
constitutional power to review rules of procedure of special courts,
our
Decision in the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure,
specifically,
a rule on the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution,
rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
In determining whether a rule of procedure affects substantive rights,
the test is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto, which provides that:chanrobles virtual law library
‘In
determining
whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure
of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive
right,
the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and
for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction
of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural.
If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified
as a substantive matter, but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.’
"We hold that our
Decision,
declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments
of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects
substantive
rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will
prejudice
LBP’s right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals
will
be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the
substantial
merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending
case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who
acted
in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.”chanrobles virtual law library
Our Decision under
reconsideration
has a far reaching effect on persons and entities similarly situated as
the respondent AMARI. Since time immemorial, we have allowed private
corporations
to reclaim lands in partnership with government. On the basis of
age-old
laws and opinions of the executive, they entered into contracts with
government
similar to the contracts in the case at bar and they invested huge sums
of money to help develop our economy. Local banks and even
international
lending institutions have lent their financial facilities to support
these
reclamation projects which government could not undertake by itself in
view of its scant resources. For them to lose their invaluable property
rights when they relied in good faith on these unbroken stream of laws
of congress passed pursuant to our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
and
executive interpretations is a disquieting prospect. We cannot invite
investors
and then decapitate them without due process of law.
I vote to give prospective
application to our Decision of July 26, 2002.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Private respondent cites DOJ Opinion No. 100 dated July 13, 1994
rendered
by then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, holding:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x
x x Water is a natural resource, the development, exploitation or
utilization
of which is reserved for citizens of the Philippines, or corporations
or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens
(Opinion No. 243, Secretary Of Justice, s. 1989).
x
x x The appropriation of waters is the acquisition of rights over the
use
of waters or the taking or divesting of waters from natural source in
the
manner and for any purpose allowed by law (Art. 9, id.).
It
may be observed, however, that while the Water Code imposes a
nationality
requirement for the grant of water permits, the same refers to the
privilege
“to appropriate and use water.” We have consistently interpreted this
to
mean the extraction of water directly from its natural source. However,
once removed therefrom, they cease to be part of the natural resources
of the country and are subject of ordinary commerce and they can be
acquired
by foreigners (Sec. of Justice Opn. No. 55, s. 1939; No. 173, s. 1984;
No. 243, s. 1989).chanrobles virtual law library
[2]
CP-Senate, TSP, 8 February 1990, 12th Congress, Regular Session, S.B.
No.
1285 pp. 9-12.
[3]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, p. 16.
[5]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
227 SCRA 444, 448-455 (1993).
[7]
Resolution, p. 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Op cit.
[10]
Resolution, p. 8.
[11]
Id., p. 9.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Petition, p. 5.
[13]
299 SCRA 199 (1998). |
