SECOND DIVISION.
.
SPOUSES ARTURO
AND
NICETA SERRANO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
133883
December 10, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
AND HEIRS OF EMILIO S. GELI,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 45573 setting aside the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-24790
with motion of herein petitioners, Spouses Arturo and Niceta Serrano,
for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Antecedents
The Spouses Serrano
were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed
thereon
located at Road 4, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 80384, and a parcel of land located in
Caloocan
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15191. The couple
mortgaged
the said properties in favor of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) as security for a loan of P50,000. By June 1969, the couple was
able to pay only the amount of P18,000. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 23, 1969, the
Spouses Serrano, as vendors, and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as
vendees,
executed a deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage
over
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house thereon for
the
price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the amount of P38,000 in
partial
payment of the property, the balance of P32,000 to be paid by them to
the
GSIS for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses Geli
thereafter
took possession of the property. In the meantime, Evelyn Geli died
intestate
and was survived by her husband Emilio Geli and their children.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, Emilio Geli
and his children failed to settle the amount of P32,000 to the GSIS.
The
latter forthwith filed a complaint against Emilio Geli and his children
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the rescission of the
deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage. The
defendants
therein alleged, by way of special defense, that the plaintiffs Spouses
Serrano failed to furnish them with a detailed statement of the account
due from the GSIS, thus accounting for their failure to remit the
balance
of the loan to the GSIS. On September 6, 1984, the trial court rendered
judgment ordering the rescission of the said deed, the decretal portion
of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered: a) ordering the rescission of the Deed of
Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, dated June 23, 1969; b)
ordering
defendant Emilio S. Geli and all persons claiming under him, including
the other defendants Oswaldo, Eugenia, Marilyn, Cristopher and Ray, all
surnamed Geli, to vacate the house and lot located at No. 110 A-1, Road
4, Project 6, Quezon City, and to turn over the peaceful possession of
the premises to plaintiffs Arturo Serrano and Niceta M. Serrano; c)
ordering
defendant Emilio S. Geli to pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,000.00 a
month
representing reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the
premises
starting June 23, 1969 up to the time the defendant Geli and all other
persons claiming under them including the other defendants, shall have
completely vacated the property, deducting therefrom the sum of
P38,000.00
paid by defendant Geli to plaintiffs as part of the aforesaid
compensation;
and, d) ordering defendant Emilio S. Geli to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000.00 representing exemplary damages. Costs against defendant
Emilio
S. Geli.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Emilio Geli and his
children appealed the decision to the CA on October 19, 1984. During
the
pendency of the appeal, the GSIS foreclosed the real estate mortgage
over
the property for non-payment of the P50,000 loan secured by the said
property.
At the sale on public auction, the GSIS was the highest bidder. A
certificate
of sale over the property was thereby issued by the sheriff in its
favor
on August 30, 1986. On October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, Emilio
Geli
paid the redemption price of P67,701.84[4]
to the GSIS. Official Receipts Nos. 905401 and 901685 for the said
amount
with the notation "for the account of Arturo Serrano" were issued.
Accordingly,
on February 22, 1988, the GSIS executed a certificate of redemption[5]
and turned over to Emilio Geli the owner's copy of TCT No. 80384 in the
names of the Spouses Serrano. Emilio Geli did not inform the Spouses
Serrano
and the CA that he had paid the redemption price to the
GSIS. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 8, 1991,
the CA dismissed the appeal of Emilio Geli and his children on the
ground
that the appellants failed to pay the requisite docket fees despite
notices
from the appellate court. No motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution
was filed. Thus, the said dismissal of the appeal became final and
executory.
The Court of Appeals forthwith issued an Entry of Judgment on February
27, 1991.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After the remand of
the records, the Spouses Serrano filed with the RTC on January 14, 1994
a motion for the execution of the trial court's September 6, 1984
Decision.
On February 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order granting the
motion
and forthwith issued a writ of execution. The writ, however, was not
implemented
as the Spouses Serrano were then in the United States. On August 1,
1995,
the trial court issued an alias writ of execution on motion of the
plaintiffs.
This, too, was not implemented, because of the defendants' change of
address.
On May 9, 1996, the trial court issued an order granting the motion of
the plaintiffs for a second alias writ of execution. On September 6,
1996,
the defendants filed a motion to quash the same claiming, for the first
time, that defendant Emilio Geli had already redeemed the subject
property
in 1988 from the GSIS. According to the defendants, this constituted a
supervening event that would make the execution of the trial court's
decision
unjust and inequitable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 19, 1997, the
trial court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion of the
defendants.
It noted that the payment by defendant Emilio Geli of the redemption
price
to the GSIS took place before the CA dismissed the appeal and before
the
decision of the RTC became final and executory; hence, it did not
constitute
a supervening event warranting a quashal of the writ of execution. The
trial court cited the ruling of this Court in Lim v. Jabalde.[6]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 18, 1997,
the trial court issued an order granting the motion for the issuance of
another alias writ of execution filed by the Spouses Serrano, to wit:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Motion
to Quash Writ of Execution, filed by defendants having been earlier
denied
and, it being explicit under the New Rules of Civil Procedure (1997)
that
no appeals may be taken from orders of execution, instead of giving due
course to the appeal interposed by defendant, the court resolves to
grant
the motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 26, 1997,
the trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution.[8]
Conformably with said writ, the sheriff served a Sheriff's Notice to
Vacate[9]
on the defendants. In the meantime, Emilio Geli died intestate and was
survived by his children.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 10, 1997,
the heirs of Emilio Geli filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition praying for the nullification of the May
19, 1997 and September 18, 1997 Orders of the trial court. They alleged
inter alia that when their father Emilio Geli paid the redemption price
to the GSIS on October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, their appeal of
the
September 6, 1984 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-24790 before
the CA was still pending resolution. Consequently, under the terms of
the
deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage which was still
subsisting
at that time, they were ipso facto subrogated to the rights of the
Spouses
Serrano as mortgagors of the property; hence, they became the owners of
the property and were entitled to the possession thereof. The
petitioners
therein further posited that since they acquired ownership of the
property
before the CA dismissed their appeal and before the September 6, 1984
Decision
of the RTC became final and executory, the execution of the decision
against
them was unjust and unfair. They then prayed for the following relief:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the order of public
respondent Judge, dated 18 September 1997 and the Notice to Vacate
issued
by public respondent Sheriff, dated 26 September 1997 be set aside.
Likewise,
to declare execution of judgment in Civil Case No. Q-24790 to have been
rendered impossible, as execution hereof would result to injustice. In
the meantime to obviate irreversible damage on the part of petitioners,
a writ of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION be granted after due hearing, ORDERING
public respondent Judge and public respondent Sheriff to desist or
refrain
from implementing the September 18, 1997 order.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Other remedies
available
in law and equity are likewise prayed for.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 5, 1998,
the appellate court issued an order restraining the implementation of
the
alias writ of execution and the notice to vacate issued by the trial
court.[11]
On May 12, 1998, the CA rendered the assailed decision in favor of the
heirs of Emilio Geli, the decretal portion of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the writ
of certiorari issued. The respondent court is hereby PERPETUALLY
ENJOINED
from issuing any order or writ which would disturb the petitioners in
their
lawful ownership and possession of the property subject matter of the
instant
case.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellate court
ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the redemption price for the property
to the GSIS in 1987 while his appeal was pending in the CA, the said
redemption
was a supervening event which rendered the enforcement of the writ of
execution
issued by the trial court against them unjust and inequitable.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Spouses Serrano
filed the instant petition and assigned to the CA the following errors:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I
THE COURT A QUO
COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN
IT PERMANENTLY ENJOINED THE TRIAL COURT FROM DISTURBING THE RESPONDENTS
IN THEIR 'LAWFUL OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION' OF THE SAID PROPERTY, IT
BEING
CLEAR THAT THEIR REDEMPTION WAS EFFECTED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER
ARTURO V. SERRANO.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
THE COURT A QUO
COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN
IT HELD THAT THE REDEMPTION CONSTITUTED A SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH
CHANGE
THE RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THUS RENDERING EXECUTION INEQUITABLE
UNDER
THE PREMISES.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners contend
that the payment of the redemption price made by Emilio Geli in 1987
during
the pendency of the appeal in the CA was ineffective because,
subsequently,
when the respondents' appeal was dismissed by the CA, the summary
decision
of the RTC declaring the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption
of mortgage rescinded had become final and executory. The deed of
absolute
sale with partial assumption of mortgage executed by the petitioners
and
the Spouses Geli had ceased to exist with its rescission as decreed by
the RTC. According to the petitioners, the payment of the redemption
price
was conditioned upon the perfection and outcome of the appeal. Since
the
appeal of the respondents was dismissed by their failure to pay the
requisite
docket fees, they must suffer the consequences thereof. The petitioners
assert that the redemption of a property is a right belonging to the
mortgagor-debtor,
and since the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage
had been rescinded by final judgment of the RTC, Emilio Geli was no
longer
a mortgagor or the successor-in-interest of the mortgagors; hence, he
could
not redeem the property on behalf of the mortgagors without the
latter's
knowledge and consent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For their part, the
respondents echo the ruling of the CA that although the issuance by the
trial court of a writ of execution is ministerial upon the finality of
its decision, the same is subject to the onset of a supervening event
which
may, as in this case, render the same unwarranted, unjust and
inequitable.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondents contend
that the petitioners lost their ownership over the property when they
failed
to redeem the property within one year from the sale thereof at public
auction
to the GSIS. Although the GSIS executed a Certificate of Redemption in
favor of Emilio Geli on February 22, 1988, the deed was, in fact, a
deed
of conveyance because, by then, the one-year period to redeem the
property
had already lapsed and the GSIS in the meantime had become the owner of
the property. Thus, the Spouses Geli acquired ownership thereof when
they
purchased the same from the GSIS in 1988 for P67,701.84. The GSIS in
effect
sold the property to Emilio Geli and did not merely allow him to redeem
it. Departing from their submission before the CA, the respondents now
posit that their claim of ownership over the subject property was after
all not anchored on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, as it
had been admittedly rescinded by virtue of the finality of the trial
court's
September 6, 1984 Decision. Their claim of ownership rests on the fact
that they had acquired the property from the GSIS, the purchaser at
public
auction. As owners of the property, they cannot now be evicted
therefrom.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find the petition
to be meritorious.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Generally, the execution
upon a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the
prevailing
party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to
enforce
its own judgment once it becomes final and executory. It may happen,
however,
that new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a judgment
had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new
matters
had developed after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed
judgment
had become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of and
could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the
appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that time. In the first
situation,
any attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an executory
decision
must fail. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the only
remedy
left for material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. There is no other prerequisite mode of
thwarting the execution of the judgment on equitable grounds predicated
on facts occurring before the finality of judgment.[14]
In the second situation, the execution may be stayed, notwithstanding
the
affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court.[15]
It is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances
must
either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and
settled
or create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the
parties
therein which would render execution of a final judgment unjust,
impossible
or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.[16]
The interested party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution
issued
by the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and further supervening facts.[17]
Evidence may be adduced by the parties on such supervening facts or
circumstances.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, the payment
by Emilio Geli of the amount of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November
3,
1987 to the GSIS for the account of the petitioners was made while the
appeal of the private respondents from the summary judgment of the RTC
was pending. The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become final
and
executory. It behooved the said respondents to prosecute their appeal
and
file their brief, where they should have invoked the payment of the
redemption
price as a ground for the reversal of the trial court's summary
judgment
in their favor. The respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the
payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners. Worse, the
respondents
did not pay the requisite docket fees for their appeal, which resulted
in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any motion for
the reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing their
appeal.
In sum, the respondents allowed the decision of the trial court to
become
final and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the summary
judgment
of the trial court can no longer be frustrated by the respondents'
payment,
through Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in 1987.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Irrefragably, the Spouses
Geli, as vendees-mortgagors under the deed of absolute sale with
partial
assumption of mortgage, would have been subrogated to the rights and
obligations
of the petitioners under the said deed, including the right to redeem
the
property from the GSIS.[19]
However, the CA dismissed their appeal for failure to pay the requisite
docket fees, and such dismissal became final and executory. Hence, the
summary judgment of the trial court declaring the deed of absolute sale
with partial assumption of mortgage rescinded had also become final and
executory.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Generally, the rule
is that to rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to
abrogate
and undo it from the beginning; that is, not merely to release the
parties
from further obligations to each other in respect to the subject of the
contract, but to annul the contract and restore the parties to the
relative
positions which they would have occupied if no such contract had ever
been
made. Rescission necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract and
a refusal of the moving party to be further bound by it.[20]
With the rescission of the deed of sale, etc., the rights of Emilio
Geli
under the said deed to redeem the property had been extinguished. The
petitioners
cannot even be compelled to subrogate the respondents to their rights
under
the real estate mortgage over the property which the petitioners
executed
in favor of the GSIS since the payment of the P67,701.84 redemption
price
was made without the knowledge of the petitioners.[21]
The respondents, however, are entitled to be reimbursed by the
petitioners
to the extent that the latter were benefited.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither did the respondents
acquire title to the property under the certificate of redemption
executed
by the GSIS on February 10, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First. In the certificate
of redemption, the mortgagor-debtor in whose favor the certificate was
executed was the petitioner Arturo Serrano and not Emilio Geli and/or
the
respondents:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
NOW, THEREFORE, for
and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the sum of
SIXTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ONE & 84/100 (P67,701.84) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, herein paid by EMILIO S. GELI, of legal age, married,
Filipino,
with residence and postal address at 110 A-1, Road 4, Project 6, Quezon
City, do hereby resell, retransfer and reconvey by way of Certificate
of
Redemption in favor of ARTURO V. SERRANO, the above-described parcel/s
of land, together with the building/s and improvements existing
thereon.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN WITNESS
WHEREOF,
the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM has caused this instrument to
be
executed by its Director, Atty. Roque M. Fernando, Jr., at the City of
Manila, Philippines, this _____ day of _____, 19_.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM
Mortgagee-Purchaser
By: (Sgd.)
ROQUE
M. FERNANDO, JR.
in his
capacity
as Director[23]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Second. Case law has
it that the one-year period within which the mortgagor-debtor or his
successor-in-interest
may redeem the property should be counted from the time the certificate
of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds.[24]
Upon the lapse of the one-year period, the right to redeem becomes
functus
officio on the date of its expiry.[25]
The rule on redemption is actually liberally construed in favor of the
original owner of the property. The purpose of the law is to aid rather
than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of redemption.[26]
Before the lapse of the one-year period, the mortgagor-debtor remains
the
owner of the property. The right acquired by the purchaser at public
auction
is merely inchoate until the period of redemption has expired without
the
right being exercised by the redemptioner.[27]
Such right becomes absolute only after the expiration of the redemption
period without the right of redemption having been exercised.[28]
The purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to consolidation of
title
and to the possession of the property.[29]
Where redemption is seasonably exercised by the mortgagor-debtor, what
is actually effected is not the recovery of ownership of his land,
which
ownership he never lost, but the elimination from his title thereto of
the lien created by the registration of a mortgage thereon.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon the expiry of the
redemption period without the mortgagor-debtor being able to redeem the
property, the purchaser can no longer be compelled to allow the former
to redeem the property or to resell the property; and if he agrees to
sell
the property, it may be for a price higher than that for which he
purchased
the property at public auction.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, there
is no showing in the records that the sheriff's certificate of sale in
favor of the GSIS had been registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and if so, when it was in fact registered in the
said
office. It cannot thus be argued that when Emilio Geli remitted the
amount
of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in full payment of the account of the
petitioners,
the one-year period to redeem the property had by then lapsed. Hence,
the
petitioners remained the owners of the property. The GSIS never
acquired
title over the property and could not have conveyed and transferred
ownership
over the same when it executed the certificate of redemption to and in
the name of the petitioner Arturo Serrano. As the Latin maxim goes:
NEMO
DAT QUOD NON HABET
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We are not convinced
by the ratiocination of the respondents that the enforcement of the
summary
decision of the trial court and the alias writ of execution against
them
is unjust and unreasonable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Spouses Geli and
the respondents, as heirs and successors-in-interest of the said
spouses,
were obliged under the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of
mortgage to pay to the GSIS the balance of the petitioners' account.
The
Spouses Geli reneged on their undertaking. The petitioners were
impelled
to secure the services of counsel and sue the Spouses Geli with the RTC
for the rescission of the said deed with damages. The respondent
spouses
nevertheless remained adamant and refused to pay the petitioners'
account
with the GSIS which impelled the latter to foreclose the real estate
mortgage
and sell the property at public auction. Emilio Geli and the
respondents
did not inform the CA and the petitioners that Emilio Geli had paid the
amount of P67,701.84 for the account of the petitioners. The
respondents
even allowed their appeal to be dismissed by the CA, and the dismissal
to become final and executory. The petitioners were impelled to spend
money
for their counsel and for sheriff's fees for the implementation of the
writ of execution and the alias writ of execution issued by the trial
court.
In the meantime, the respondents remained in possession of the property
from 1969, when the said deed of absolute sale with partial assumption
of mortgage was executed, up to the present, or for a period of 34
years
without paying a single centavo. For the Court to allow the respondents
to benefit from their own wrong would run counter to the maxim: Ex Dolo
Malo Non Oritur Actio (No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his
own wrongdoing).[32]
Equity is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory
law
or judicial rules of procedure.[33]
We reiterate our ruling that:
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Justice is
done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be
a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration
(meaning
compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must
fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or
sympathy.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The choice between
what
is legally just and what is morally just, when these two options do not
coincide, is explained by Justice Moreland in Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil.
769, 788 where he said:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Courts
operate
not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but
because
he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things,
make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by
them
— indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the
law
intervene and restore. There must be in addition, a violation of law,
the
commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong before the
courts
are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it." (Rural Bank
of Parañaque, Inc. v. Remolado, 62051, March 18, 1985) (135 SCRA
409, 412).[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum then, the
respondents,
as heirs of Emilio Geli, are obliged to vacate the subject property.
However,
since the petitioners were benefited to the extent of P67,701.84 which
was the total amount paid by Emilio Geli to the GSIS as redemption
price
for the foreclosed property, the petitioners are obliged to refund the
said amount to the respondents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated May 12, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45573 is SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The petitioners Spouses Serrano are obliged to refund to the
respondents, as heirs of Emilio S. Geli, the amount of P67,701.84 to be
deducted from the amount due to the petitioners under the September 6,
1984 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No.
Q-24790.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez
and Tinga, JJ., concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices
Ricardo
P. Galvez and Martin S. Villarama, Jr. concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Jaime M. Lantin who was appointed Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 43.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id. at 71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 69–70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
172 SCRA 211 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, p. 54.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Annex "D," Petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Annex "F," Petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Rollo, p. 65.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
CA Rollo, p. 41.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 64.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Rollo, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Concurring opinion of Chief Justice Andres N. Narvasa in Baclayon v.
Court
of Appeals, 182 SCRA 761 (1990); Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400
(1982);
Ago v. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 81 (1966).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Lee v. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624 (1928).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
See Seavan Carrier, Inc. v. GTI Sportswear Corporation, 137 SCRA 580
(1985).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
See Limpin, Jr. v. IAC, 147 SCRA 516 (1987).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
De la Costa v. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686 (1939).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Litonjua v. L & R Corporation, 320 SCRA 405 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Wae v. Zynda, 278 Northwestern Reports, 66 (1935), citing 1 Black on
Rescission
and Cancellation, 81.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Article 1237, New Civil Code. — Whoever pays on behalf of the debtor
without
the knowledge or against the will of the latter, cannot compel the
creditor
to subrogate him in his rights, such as those arising from a mortgage,
guaranty, or penalty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Article 1236, New Civil Code. — The creditor is not bound to accept
payment
or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment
of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whoever
pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except
that
if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he
can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Rollo, p. 69.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 359 SCRA 480 (2001);
People v. Narido, 316 SCRA 131 (1999); Bernardez v. Reyes, 201 SCRA 648
(1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Urbano v. GSIS, 367 SCRA 672 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Ysmael v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 215 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Medida v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 886 (1992).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Heirs of Blancaflor v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 796 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Tarnate v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 254 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Medida v. Court of Appeals, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Urbano v. GSIS, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 36 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Pilipinas Hino, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 355 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Manzanilla v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 207 (1990).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |
