SECOND DIVISION.
.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
136397
November 11, 2003
-versus-
ALBERTO DAGAMI,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This case was certified
and elevated to this Court by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section
13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court[1]
after it had reviewed the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Palo, Leyte, which convicted the
accused-appellant of rape. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court
with modification, increasing the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua
and the amount of indemnity.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The antecedents are
as follows:
On the basis of a criminal
complaint[3]
of the victim Visitacion Locañas, an Information for rape was
filed
against appellant, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or
about the 31st day of October, 1991, in the Municipality of Palo,
Province
of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused ALBERTO DAGAMI did, then, and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, intimidation and threat
have
carnal knowledge with VISITACION LOCAÑAS, against her will and
consent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ACTS CONTRARY TO
LAW.[4]
The appellant pleaded
not
guilty to the charge. Trial forthwith ensued. The Case for the
Prosecution[5]
Thirty-six-year-old
Visitacion Locañas and her three children lived in a farm
located
at Barangay Castilla, Palo, Leyte.[6]
Her husband, Fortunato Locañas, was serving sentence at the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,[7]
for the killing of a certain Hinlo, Jr.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the early morning
of October 31, 1991, while Visitacion and her children were sleeping in
the sala of their house, she was awakened by a noise in the kitchen.[9]
Curious, she lifted the mosquito net to check what it was.[10]
She was shocked when she saw the appellant from the kitchen's doorway,
bearing down upon her.[11]
With the aid of a kerosene lamp that was lighted in the kitchen's table,[12]
she recognized the appellant, who also happened to be a neighbor. He
pointed
a short firearm at Visitacion and warned her not to shout or else she
would
be killed. Terrified, she raised her hands.[13]
The appellant thereupon grabbed her hand and pulled her towards the
kitchen
floor.[14]
Visitacion fell prostrate to the ground, face down.[15]
The appellant grappled with her and turned her over.[16]
He then went astride her legs and straddled them.[17]
Visitacion resisted and struggled to free herself, but the appellant
poked
his gun against her abdomen and manhandled her.[18]
He then raised her duster up to her neck[19]
and stripped down her underwear.[20]
The appellant proceeded to fondle her vagina[21]
and to take off his shorts.[22]
With the gun pressed against her chest,[23]
Visitacion could not cry out.[24]
The appellant then mounted her, pinning both her arms on the floor.[25]
He inserted his penis into her vagina,[26]
and made push-and-pull movements while inside her.[27]
Satiated, the appellant stood up, and at gun-point, warned Visitacion
not
to divulge the incident to anyone, otherwise he would kill her.[28]
Thereupon, the appellant jumped out of the window and disappeared.[29]
Visitacion, trembling and in a daze, could not do anything but cry.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the afternoon of
the same day, Visitacion, went to her father at Sitio David, Barangay
San
Agustin, Palo, Leyte, and revealed her ordeal at the hands of the
appellant.[31]
The following day, accompanied by her father, she reported the incident
to Barangay Captain Roberto Dagami, the appellant's brother, who told
them
to lodge their complaint with the police authorities.[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 2, 1991,
Visitacion submitted herself to a medical examination at the Tacloban
City
Medical Center. She was examined separately by Dr. Giovanni Zilmar of
the
Surgery Department, and Dr. Isabelita M. Alo of the OB-GYNE Department.[33]
On November 6, 1991, the attending physicians issued a Medico-Legal
Report
which stated that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
FINDINGS
- Contusion,
1 cm.
right forearm middle 3rd anterior aspect.
- Abrasions
anterior
chest wall right.
- Abrasions,
left anterior
axillary line.
OB-GYNE
findings:
Pelvic
examination
findings:
- Normal
external genitalia.
- Parous
introitus
1. Abrasion 1
cm.
right labia minora at 7:00 o'clock position with erythema.
2. Abrasion 1
cm. left
labia minora at 5:00 o'clock position.
3. Abrasion,
0.5 cm.
fourchet with erythema.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4.
Lacerations, superficial,
1–2 mm. in length # 3 at para-uretheral orifice.
— Vagina
admits 2 finger
with ease.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Cervix —
pinkish with
eversion, small, firm, closed, non-tender.
Uterus — 6
cms from
S/Pchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Discharge —
Whitish,
scantychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Spermatozoa
examination
— No spermatozoa seen.
UCG exam —
Negative
for UCG.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x[34]
Dr. Alo recalled that
when
she examined Visitacion, she noticed a redness on the entrance of her
vagina.[35]
She opined that abrasions Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, above, sustained by
Visitacion
could have been caused by the rubbing or by the force and friction of a
sexual act.[36]
She explained that though there were no traces of spermatozoa in
Visitacion's
vagina, this does not negate rape since the same could had been
expelled
out or had simply died after 72 hours.[37]
Dr. Zilmar, elaborating
on his finding, declared that the contusion on the right forearm and
the
abrasions on the left anterior axillary line and right chest of
Visitacion
could have been caused by the forceful application of a blunt force
and/or
a struggle.[38]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 6, 1991,
Visitacion reported the incident to the police authorities.[39]
In the meantime, in
January 1992, Visitacion received a letter from her husband Fortunato
advising
her of his coming release from prison in April of that same year. Thus,
in March 1992, Visitacion left for Manila to fetch her husband.[40]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case for the
Appellant[41]
The appellant testified
that he was a next-door neighbor of Visitacion in Barangay Castilla,
Palo,
Leyte.[42]
He eked out a living as a farmer[43]
and doubled up as a Chief barangay tanod at night.[44]
He denied having raped Visitacion and vigorously claimed that they were
lovers.[45]
He began courting her in August of 1991 and being a convict's wife, won
her love effortlessly.[46]
The following month, they had sexual intercourse three times in her
house,
usually at around 11:00 p.m.[47]
The appellant said that as Chief barangay tanod, he had a convenient
excuse
to his wife for his nocturnal escapades.[48]
As his lover, he brought Visitacion palay during harvest season.[49]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 30, 1991,
at about 10:00 p.m., Visitacion summoned him to her house. Visitacion
showed
him a letter from Fortunato, informing her of his forthcoming release
from
prison in May 1992. She told him that she was carrying their love child.[50]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To the appellant's surprise,
his brother told him that Visitacion filed a criminal complaint against
him.[51]
He immediately went to Visitacion's house to straighten things out. The
appellant was accompanied by his mother. He confronted Visitacion but
elicited
no answer.[52]
He then told Visitacion's mother, Jovencia, of his illicit love affair
with her daughter and that the latter was pregnant. Jovencia got
furious
and started calling her daughter names.[53]
Unable to control herself, Jovencia went berserk and started beating up
Visitacion. The appellant explained that this particular event accounts
for the injuries of Visitacion as reflected in the medico-legal report.[54]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellant further
testified that Visitacion went to Manila to remove herself from the
prying
eyes and ears of her barriomates. There, months after or on June 29,
1992,
she gave birth to a baby boy at the Cogio Hospital.[55]
He was present when Visitacion delivered their child. The child was
thereafter
given up for adoption, and was adopted by Rizalina Estiller.[56]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellant asserted
that Visitacion merely fabricated the rape charge to save herself from
the shame and ignominy of having been impregnated by him, and,
likewise,
to escape the wrath of her ex-convict husband.[57]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Carolina Cobacha corroborated
the appellant's claim that the latter was Visitacion's paramour. She
testified
that despite being a neighbor and a kumadre of Visitacion, she came
forward
to shed light on the truth.[58]
She was a farmhand of Visitacion's mother who knew of the love affair
between
the appellant and Visitacion. In March 1991, she saw them twice in a
very
uncompromising situation.[59]
The first was during a harvest, when the appellant and Visitacion were
kissing and caressing each other inside a nipa hut located in the
rice-field.[60]
The other was when the appellant dropped by the house of Visitacion.
The
two kissed in her presence.[61]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Juanita Tayubong, 80
years old, testified that on October 31, 1991, at about 7:00 p.m., she
was at her porch when she heard Jovencia shouting at Visitacion at the
top of her voice and berating her about the illicit relationship.[62]
From Visitacion's window she witnessed Jovencia punch, scratch, and
pinch
Visitacion on different parts of her body.[63]
The incident attracted the attention of the neighbors who rushed to the
house of Visitacion.[64]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Adelina Ronquillo, 56
years old, is the maternal aunt of Visitacion and resided at Bonifacio
St., Bangkal, Makati City.[65]
She said that sometime in November 1991, Visitacion went to her place,
seeking financial help for her rape case.[66]
Initially, she obliged, but when she found out from Visitacion's
parents
and other relatives that the charge was but a sham, she stopped
extending
financial assistance.[67]
Thereafter, Visitacion returned home to Leyte. In January 1992,
Visitacion
again went back to Manila where she gave birth to a child on June 29,
1992
at the Antipolo Municipal Hospital. She said that the child was adopted
by Visitacion's sister, Riza.[68]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution then
recalled Visitacion to the witness stand as a rebuttal witness. She
testified
that after the release of her husband from prison, they left Barangay
Castilla,
Palo, Leyte and settled down at her husband's place at Moroboro, La
Paz,
Leyte.[69]
She indignantly denied that the appellant was her sweetheart and that
she
had consensual sexual relations with him.[70]
She said that she was neither impregnated by the appellant, nor had
given
birth to a child on June 29, 1992 sired by the appellant.[71]
Her youngest child was born on April 23, 1995 and its father was her
husband,
Fortunato.[72]
She averred that in June 1992, her Aunt Adelina approached her and
sought
the dropping of the case by offering money, which she flatly refused.[73]
According to Visitacion, her mother and her aunt Adelina were not in
speaking
terms, as the two were squabbling over some property left by her
maternal
grandmother.[74]
She further said that the nipa hut located at the rice-field being
alluded
to by Carolina as their love tryst was an open hut without any wall.[75]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On July 3, 1996, the
trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused ALBERTO DAGAMI,
alias Bebot, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the
consummated
offense of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the use of a deadly weapon, a handgun, and applying
the
pertinent provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, convicts him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pursuant to Art.
345
of the RPC, the accused is hereby condemned to: (1) indemnify the
offended
party, Visitacion Locañas, the sum of P30,000.00; & (2) to
acknowledge
and support the offspring resulting from the accused's illegal act
subject
of this indictment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.[76]
The appellant appealed
to the Court of Appeals.[77]
On October 26, 1998, the CA promulgated its decision[78]
affirming the decision of the trial court but with modifications. The
decretal
portion of the decision of the CA reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
the judgment convicting the accused-appellant Alberto Dagami is
AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATIONS that (a) the penalty of imprisonment to be
imposed
is reclusion perpetua; (b) that Alberto Dagami indemnify Visitacion
Locañas
in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); (c) that the order for
the recognition and support be deleted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering the
imposable
penalty and pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court,
instead
of entering judgment, this case is certified to the honorable Supreme
Court
for review. Let the entire records be accordingly elevated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[79]
The appellate court
found
no cogent reason to disturb the judgment of the trial court, but ruled
that the trial court erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
because
the law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable by
reclusion
perpetua. Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single
indivisible
penalty which, under Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, must be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Thus, the CA
increased the penalty meted to the appellant from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua, and likewise increased his civil liability from
P30,000.00
to P50,000.00. It deleted the order of the trial court on the matter of
acknowledgment and support of the offspring for being incongruous.[80]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellant assails
the decision of the trial court contending that it erred in:
I.
CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
DESPITE
THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II. CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE EVIDENCE TO
THE
CONTRARY THAT THEY WERE LOVERS;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III. CONDEMNING
THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO RECOGNIZE THE OFFSPRING RESULTING FROM ACCUSED'S
ILLEGAL
ACT SUBJECT OF THIS INDICTMENT; and,chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV. DENYING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND/OR RE-TRIAL.[81]
The appellant asserts
that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
stresses
that the trial court should have given due weight and credence to the
testimonies
of defense witnesses who were all not actuated with improper motives in
testifying in his favor, instead of believing the uncorroborated
testimony
of Visitacion, which is full of inconsistencies and contradictions.[82]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellant contends
that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of force and
intimidation
beyond a shadow of doubt. He argues that if there was any resistance at
all from Visitacion, it was only perfunctory and superficial. He added
that she failed to resist to the last ounce of her strength, the
attempts
of the appellant to rape her.[83]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The argument is bereft
of merit. In People v. Fraga,[84]
we held:
The test is
whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the
mind
of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of
the
accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be
futile,
offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault.
It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or
sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if
the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because
of
genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the
law
does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.[85]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
the
appellant was armed with a handgun and threatened to kill Visitacion if
she resisted. This notwithstanding, she still struggled with all her
might
to ward him off, but to no avail. During her testimony, Visitacion
clearly
described how the appellant suddenly grabbed her, forcibly pulled her
to
the kitchen and ravished her, and afterwards threatened to kill her if
she told others what he had done to her. She testified, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
PROSECUTOR
DAGANDAN:
Q In the early
morning
of October 31, 1991, do you recall where you were?
A Yes, ma'am, I
was
in our house.
Q Do you recall
what
you were doing at that time?
A We were sleeping.
Q Do you recall if
there
was any unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q What was that?
A I heard a noise
in
our kitchen.[86]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So, when you
heard
the noise, what did you do?
A I got up and
verified
what was happening.[87]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q Since you said
that
you tried to verify the noise, were you, in fact, able to verify?
A No, ma'am,
because
when I was near the door Alberto Dagami was there already at the door.
Q What door of
your
house?
A Door to the
kitchen.[88]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q You said that it
was
early morning, how were you able to identify the accused (Alberto
Dagami)
since you said it was early in the morning?
A We have a
kerosene
lamp which was lighted.[89]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q Will you
describe
again the accused as you saw him?
A As I was raising
the
edge of the mosquito net because I want to go out to verify the noise
in
the kitchen, Alberto Dagami was already at the door and he said "you
shout
now or else you will die.[90]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q What was his
position
when he said those words?
A He was pointing
his
gun towards me.[91]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So, what was
your
reaction as the accused had uttered those words?
A I was shocked
and
afraid. I said, why is this gun pointed at me.
Q So what did the
accused
do after saying those words?
A He grabbed my
hand.
Q Towards where?
A Towards the
kitchen.
Q So, what
happened
at the kitchen?
A I fell down.
Q What was your
position
when you fall (sic) down?
A I was as if in a
crawling
position.[92]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q What did he do?
A Because I fell
down,
face downward, he held my hand and turned my body facing upward.[93]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So, what did the
accused
do after that?
A He sat down on
my
knees.
Q In what manner?
Will
you demonstrate?
A He was sitting
on
my knees straddling.[94]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q What happened
after
that?
A He raised my
dress
because I was wearing a duster at that time.
Q Up to what
portion
of your body was your dress raised?
A Up to the upper
portion
of my chest, up to my neck.
Q After that, what
did
he do?
A He held and
massage
my vagina.[95]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So, what else
happened?
A I tried to
struggle,
and then he pointed his gun towards my abdomen and I could not do
anything.
(I would
like
to manifest that when the witness testified, she was shaky and crying)
Q Was he
successful
with your struggle?
A No, ma'am.
Q Why not?
A Because he was
sitting
on my legs and pointing his gun towards me.[96]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So, what
happened
after that?
A He took off my
panty.
Q With what hand?
A With his left
hand.
Q How about the
right
hand?
A The right hand
was
used in holding the gun and it was always pointed at me.
Q In what part of
your
body was the gun pointed?
A Towards my chest.[97]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So what did you
do
next?
A He pulled out
his
shorts and placed himself on top of myself, face downward.
Q What did he do
with
that position?
A He raped me.
Q How did you come
to
know that he raped you?
A He raped me and
sexually
molested me.
Q How did you come
to
know that he raped you?
A He inserted his
penis
inside my vagina.
Q Did you feel
anything?
A He was doing
"push
and pull."
Q How did you feel
at
that particular time?
A I was afraid.
Q For how long a
time
did the accused place himself on top of you?
A It did not take
a
long time.
Q What did you do
when
he was on top of you?
A I tried to
struggle.
While he was on top of me having that "push and pull" movement, I had
my
legs stretched.
Q For what purpose?
A So that he
cannot
be successful in what he wanted to do.
Q Did you make an
outlet
or did you shout?
A No, ma'am.
Q Why not?
A Because I was
afraid.[98]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q So, after the
accused
made that "push and pull" movement, what else happened?
A After he
sexually
abused me, he got up.
Q And after that
what
happened next?
A. He said, "If
you
will tell somebody, I will kill you."
Q Do you recall
where
was the gun (sic)?
A He was holding
the
gun with his right hand. When he said that "if you will tell somebody,
I will kill you," he was holding that gun it was pointed to me.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q So, what did the
accused
do?
A He jumped off
from
the window of the kitchen.
Q How about you?
A When he jumped
out,
I got up.[99]
The contusion on
Visitacion's
forearm, the abrasions on her chest and other parts of her body, and
the
redness of her genitalia are eloquent physical evidence of the force
employed
by the appellant in defiling her. In a rape case, the physical evidence
showing use of force speaks louder than words.[100]
And as disclosed by the records, Visitacion constantly cried during her
testimony.[101]
Her tears add poignancy to verity born out of human nature and
experience.[102]
The case for the prosecution
is not enfeebled by the testimony of Juanita Tayubong and the failure
of
the prosecution to present Visitacion's mother Jovencia; and to adduce
in evidence Fortunato's letter to Visitacion of his impending release
from
the national penitentiary; nor by the failure of Dr. Giovanni Zilmar
and
Dr. Isabelita M. Alo to pinpoint the exact time when Visitacion
sustained
her injuries.[103]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The matter of deciding
who to present as a witness for the prosecution is not for the
appellant
or the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the
prosecutor.
Besides, the testimony of Juanita is belied by the findings of Dr. Alo
that the redness and abrasions on Visitacion's genitalia were caused by
the rubbing or by the force and friction of a sexual act.[104]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Assuming that Visitacion's
mother is a vital witness, her non-presentation was the appellant's own
undoing. There was nothing that could have prevented the appellant from
presenting the said witness in order to discredit the testimonies of
Visitacion
and the other witnesses of the prosecution. Case law has it that the
presumption
of suppressed evidence does not apply when the same is equally
accessible
to the defense.[105]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to the appellant's
claim, Dr. Alo categorically declared when she testified that the
incident,
per her interview of Visitacion, occurred on October 31, 1991, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
PROS.
DAGANDAN:
Q On this
Medico-Legal
Report when did the incident happen?
R The incident
occurred
on October 31, 1991 at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning.[106]
Besides, it is of no
moment
that Dr. Zilmar failed to give the exact time when Visitacion suffered
the contusions and abrasions. Medical findings or proof of injuries,
virginity,
or an allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the
crime
are not essential in a prosecution for rape.[107]
In any event, even a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable
to the successful prosecution of rape.[108]
Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential
to conviction.[109]
Even without a medical report, the rape victim's credible testimony,
standing
alone, is sufficient basis for conviction.[110]
It was not unnatural
for Visitacion to report the incident to her father the following day
despite
the appellant's threat that she would be killed if she divulged to
others
what he had done to her. She must have been overwhelmed by cascades of
fear when he pointed his gun at her and threatened to kill her if she
resisted.
However, she regained the courage and equanimity the next day and
decided
to reveal her misfortune to her father.[111]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court has repeatedly
held that the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of
emotional
and psychological stress (such as during rape) are unpredictable, and
different
people react differently. There is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or
traumatic experience — some may shout, some may faint, and some may be
shocked into insensibility.[112]
As this Court has pointed out, the conduct of a woman immediately
following
the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish
the
truth or falsity of her claim. In the case at bar, if Visitacion had
not
been forced and intimidated into submitting to the lustful designs of
the
appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would have been to
conceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immediately as
rape,
for otherwise, her conduct would constitute adultery.[113]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Equally incredible is
the appellant's claim that he was the paramour of Visitacion and that
she
charged him with rape because she needed a scapegoat for her pregnancy,
in anticipation of the possible retribution by her ex-convict husband
should
the latter discover their relationship.[114]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In People v. Manalo,[115]
this Court said that the sweetheart defense is a much-abused defense
that
rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its
patience.
Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be
supported
by convincing proof.[116]
Since the appellant admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the
complainant
several times,[117]
he bears the burden of proving his defense by clear and convincing
evidence.[118]
The appellant failed to discharge his burden. Visitacion adamantly
denied
that the appellant was her sweetheart.[119]
Although the appellant presented witnesses to support his claim, the
corroborating
testimonies were neither credible nor convincing. Incredible was the
story
of Carolina Cobacha that in March 1991, she saw the appellant and
Visitacion
twice in very uncompromising situations. The testimony is even
inconsistent
with the appellant's testimony. By the appellant's account, he began
courting
Visitacion only in August 1991,[120]
and had sexual intercourse with her the following month. Also, the nipa
hut, where Carolina allegedly saw the appellant and Visitacion kiss
each
other, is located in the rice-field. Visitacion must have been so
morally
depraved as to allow herself to be seen in the arms of a man not her
husband,
in a conspicuous place, in a very rural community where everyone
practically
knew each other. The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact
that
in rural areas in this country, women by custom and tradition act with
circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that
their reputation remains untainted.[121]
As to Adelina Ronquillo, her testimony, with respect to the love affair
of her niece and the appellant, is hearsay. She testified that she
learned
of the illicit affair from Visitacion's parents and other relatives.[122]
When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the
same
is without any evidentiary weight, being patently hearsay. Moreover, it
has been shown that Adelina Ronquillo was a biased witness. She never
denied
that she sought from Visitacion the dropping of the charge against the
appellant by offering money, which offer was flatly rejected by
Visitacion.
Hardly can her corroborative statements be accepted as gospel truth.
Juanita
Tayubong's testimony is, likewise, as unreliable, as she merely
overheard
the alleged illicit relationship of Visitacion with another man from
Jovencia.[123]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree with the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the sweetheart story was a mere
concoction
of the appellant in order to exculpate himself from his criminal
liability.
In People v. Venerable,[124]
we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused-appellant was
unavailing
and self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and
the like, to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim.
Hence,
the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the
theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is
necessary,
such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. If the appellant were really
the paramour of Visitacion, she would not have gone to the extent of
charging
the appellant with rape which inevitably exposed her to the humiliation
of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she
would
not have implicated a person, who was allegedly her lover, as the
perpetrator
of an abominable crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship
to public shame and ridicule, not to mention the ire of an ex-convict
husband
and the smoldering contempt of her children were it not the truth.[125]
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but
must
also be credible in itself such as one that the common experience and
observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[126]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the appellant and the private complainant were indeed
sweethearts
as he claims, this fact alone would not extricate him from his
predicament.
The mere assertion of a love relationship would not necessarily rule
out
the use of force to consummate the crime.[127]
It must be stressed that in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.[128]
Visitacion, even if she was indeed the appellant's lover, cannot be
forced
to have sex against her will.[129]
Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a loved one,
worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a
license
for lust.[130]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellant's imputation
of ill motive on the part of the private complaint hardly persuades us.
In the afternoon after the rape, Visitacion told her father of the rape
incident. The day after, she went to the barangay captain to report the
same. Later, she submitted herself to medical examination and went to
the
police station to report the rape incident. She lodged a criminal
complaint
for rape against accused-appellant before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Palo, Leyte. This sequence of events after the rape indicates that
indeed,
Visitacion was deeply wronged and aggrieved, otherwise she would not
have
instituted this case at all. As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza,[131]
a married woman with a husband and three daughters would not publicly
admit
that she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth.
Similarly,
it defies reason in this case why a mother of four would concoct a
story
of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and publicly
disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were other
than
to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her.
Pertinently, it stands to reason that Visitacion would not bring
herself,
her family and her husband to embarrassment, to public scrutiny and
being
the talk of the community unless what she had testified that she was
raped
is true.[132]
It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason
or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely
against
an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony
is
worthy of full faith and credit.[133]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In rape cases, the accused
may be convicted on the sole basis of the victim's testimony, provided
it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature
and
normal course of things.[134]
Indeed, even the testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to support a
conviction, especially when the testimony enjoys the badges of
sincerity
and veracity.[135]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The time-honored rule
is that the trial court's factual findings[136]
and assessment of credibility of witnesses,[137]
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great
weight and are even conclusive and binding on this Court, barring
arbitrariness
and oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses is a matter that peculiarly falls within the province of
the
trial court as it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor
and behavior of the witnesses at the time of their testimony.[138]
Similarly, assigning value and weight to the testimonies of witnesses
is
also within its jurisdiction.[139]
Thus, the trial court's evaluation and assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses should be given weight by this Court, especially because
it had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, the
appellant
has failed to provide a substantial argument to warrant a departure
from
this rule, nor has he pointed to a matter of weight or substance that
had
been overlooked by the trial and appellate court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the trial, the
special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon (handgun) and
the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven. Nonetheless, these
aggravating
circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because the
same
were not alleged in the Information. Sections 8[140]
and 9[141]
of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now provide that
aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information; otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused
even
if proven during the trial. Being favorable to the appellant, this
rule,
as amended, should be applied retroactively to this case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although the aggravating
circumstances in question cannot be appreciated for the purpose of
fixing
a heavier penalty in this case, they can, however, be considered as
basis
for an award of exemplary damages. Evidence proving these circumstances
forms part of the actual commission of the crime and justifies an award
of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code even when the
said aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the information.[142]
Furthermore, the appellate
court correctly increased the amount of civil indemnity, from P30,000
to
P50,000, in accordance with the recent ruling of this Court.[143]
The Court of Appeals,
however, erred in not awarding moral damages and exemplary damages in
favor
of the victim. In line with recent jurisprudence and in recognition of
the victim's injury as being inherently concomitant with and
necessarily
resulting from the crime of rape, an additional P50,000 should be
awarded
to the victim as moral damages.[144]
As discussed above and pursuant to People v. Catubig,[145]
an award of P25,000 as exemplary damages is also proper.cralaw:red
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION
that, in addition to the amount of P50,000 awarded as civil indemnity,
accused appellant Alberto Dagami is ORDERED to pay complainant
Visitacion
Locañas the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as
exemplary
damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Sec. 13. Quorum of the court. — x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whenever a Criminal Cases Division should be of the opinion that the
penalty
of death or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the said
Division
after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render
judgment
imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the
circumstances
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case
and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Penned by Judge Mateo M. Leanda.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Records, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id., at 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Visitacion
Locañas,
Dr. Giovani Zilmar, and Dr. Ma. Isabelita M. Alo.
[6]
TSN, 30 August 1993, p. 2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id., at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
TSN, 16 December 1996, p. 15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Id. at 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id. at 6–7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Id. at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Id. at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id. at 9 and 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Id. at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id. at 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Id. at 34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Id. at 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Id. at 13–14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Id. at 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Id. at 14–15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Records, p. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
TSN, 6 September 1993, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
TSN, 21 October 1993, pp. 6–9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
TSN, 30 August 1993, p. 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
Id. at 16–17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
The appellant testified in his behalf. He also presented three
witnesses,
namely, Carolina Cobacha, Adelina Ronquillo, and Juanita Tayubong.
[42]
TSN, 14 December 1995, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
Id. at 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Id. at 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Id. at 6–7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
Id. at 9–10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
Id. at 13–14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
Id. at 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
Id. at 12 and 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
Id. at 10–11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
TSN, 15 January 1996, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
TSN, 14 December 1995, p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[58]
TSN, 16 April 1996, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[59]
Id. at 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[60]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[61]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[62]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[63]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[64]
Id. at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[65]
Id. at 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[66]
Id. at 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[67]
Id. at 4–5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[68]
Id. at 7–9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[69]
TSN, 1 July 1996, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[70]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[71]
Id. at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[72]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[73]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[74]
Id. at 9–10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[75]
Id. at 20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[76]
Records, p. 200.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[77]
Id. at 214.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[78]
Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, with Associate Justices
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Godardo A. Jacinto concurring.
[79]
CA Decision, pp. 8–9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[80]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[81]
CA Rollo, pp. 37–38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[82]
Id. at 43–44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[83]
Id. at 41–42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[84]
330 SCRA 669 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[85]
Id. at 689–690.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[86]
TSN, 30 August 1993, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[87]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[88]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[89]
Id. at 6.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[90]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[91]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[92]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[93]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[94]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[95]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[96]
Id. at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[97]
Id. at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[98]
Id. at 11–12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[99]
Id. at 12–13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[100]
People v. Obar, Jr., 253 SCRA 288 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[101]
TSN, 30 August 1993, p. 10; TSN, 1 July 1996, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[102]
People vs. Sagun, 303 SCRA 382 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[103]
Id. at 44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[104]
People vs. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA 1 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[105]
People vs. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 (1981).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[106]
TSN, 6 September 1993, p. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[107]
People v. Docena, 322 SCRA 820 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[108]
People v. Licanda, 331 SCRA 357 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[109]
People v. Baltazar, 329 SCRA 378 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[110]
People v. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[111]
CA Rollo, pp. 40–41.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[112]
People v. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[113]
People v. Bayron, 313 SCRA 727 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[114]
Id. at 38–39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[115]
G.R. No. 143704, March 28, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[116]
People v. Monfero, 308 SCRA 396 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[117]
TSN, 14 December 1995, pp. 6–7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[118]
People v. Bayani, 262 SCRA 660 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[119]
TSN, 1 July 1996, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[120]
TSN, 14 December 1995, p. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[121]
People v. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[122]
TSN, 24 May 1996, pp. 4–5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[123]
TSN, 17 April 1996, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[124]
290 SCRA 15 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[125]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[126]
Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[127]
People v. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[128]
People v. Igat, 291 SCRA 100 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[129]
People v. Jimenez, 302 SCRA 607 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[130]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[131]
292 SCRA 168 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[132]
People v. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[133]
People v. Abrecinoz, 281 SCRA 59 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[134]
People v. Bayona, 327 SCRA 190 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[135]
People v. Alagon, 325 SCRA 297 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[136]
People v. Nuestro, 240 SCRA 221 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[137]
People v. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[138]
People v. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[139]
People v. Torres, 247 SCRA 212 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[140]
140. Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the
acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing
it.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[141]
141. Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions
complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well
as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce
judgment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[142]
People v. Duhorom, G.R. No. 146276, November 21, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[143]
People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[144]
People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[145]
363 SCRA 621 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |