EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 137407
January 28, 2003 - versus -
WILLERIE
AVENDAÑO,
Accused-Appellant. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
D E C I S I O N
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryredQUISUMBING,
J.: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On automatic review
is the decision[1]
dated January 29, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental
Mindoro, Branch 46, in Criminal Case No. R-4227. Appellant
Willerie
Avendaño was found guilty of murder and accordingly sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts of this case,
culled from the records, are as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In an information dated
August 18, 1997, Willerie Avendaño was charged with two counts
of
murder allegedly committed as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about the
29th day of July, 1997 at night time (sic) in Purok Bagong Silang,
Barangay
Aguas, Municipality of Rizal, Province of Occidental Mindoro,
Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
then armed with a jungle knife, with intent to kill, with treachery,
did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault
and
stab with the said weapon Remedios Castillo and Melvin Castillo
inflicting
upon the victims serious wounds which caused their untimely death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon arraignment, the
accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The principal witness
for the prosecutionwas
JEFFRE CASTILLO, an eight-year-old son of the victim Remedios Castillo
and brother of the victim Melvin Castillo. In his testimony, he
stated
that his parents were named Remedios and Boyet; that they were six
children
in the family, namely, Michael, Dikong, Ape, Manolito, the victim
Melvin
and himself; and that he was a Grade I pupil
at the Aguas Elementary School. He testified that he knows appellant,
having known him for about three or four years before the incident of
July
29, 1997. On said date, at around 6:00 P.M., ;he saw appellant in
their house, looking for his plow and asking if he knew who got it, to
which he replied that he did not. While appellant was in their
house,his
mother was upstairs and his Kuya Melvin was also inside
the house.
His father and the rest of his brothers and sisters were in Cabanatuan
City. He recalled that appellant was then wearing a green t-shirt
and shorts, the color of which he could not remember.[3]
Thereafter, appellant left. After dinner, he, his mother and
brother
went to sleep. Before theycralawslept,
he recalled they had a pangmagdamagancralawor
overnight lamp which was turned on.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That night, according
to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He was suddenly awakened
when he heard a commotion (kalambugan). However, by the time he
woke
up, the room was very dark because the lamp was already turned
off.
He heard his mother shout, "Dikong, tulungan mo kami." When he
heard
the kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept their
pillows
and tried to hide. Then, there was silence. Then he heard
somebody
going downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the lamp, while Jeffre
stayed
where he was. He then heard the person downstairs going up again.[4]
He saw through his blanket that the person had come up: "Naaninag ko po
sa kumot yung tao."[5]
That was when he distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, "Kuya Willie,
tama
na, tama na!" That was just before Melvin was killed.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Jeffre recalled that
someone coughed and he recognized the cough as that of his Kuya
Willie.
He recognized it because he had heard a similar cough on several
occasions
in the past when appellant frequented their house. He remained
where
he was until appellant left.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Jeffre said he fell
asleep and was awakened only the following morning by persistent
knocking
on their door. He opened the door to find his Ate Annie (Juliana
Castillo), Ate Norma (Roldan) and Ate Ann (Roldan) looking for his
mother.
He then told his Ate Annie that Willerie Avendaño killed both
his
mother Remedios and his Kuya Melvin. He remembered that
thereafter,
their relatives as well as some policemen arrived.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Jeffre recounted that
he was brought to the police station where his sworn statement was
taken
and he signed it in the presence of Mayor Bartolome Miranda of Rizal
town.[8]
He said he was accompanied by his Lola Nena who read to him what was
written
in the statement because he did not know how to read. He said no
one coached him to answer the way he did, particularly to the question:
"Sino ang taong umubo na yon?" His answer was: "Hindi ko po nakita pero
kilala ko ang boses niya na si Kuya Willie."[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the course of his
testimony, Jeffre was shown a green t-shirt and a pair of shorts which
he recognized as those appellant wore the night of July 29, 1997, when
appellant went to their house earlier in the evening.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On cross-examination,
Jeffre said his father talked to him about the case four times, and
that
before coming to court, several of his relatives also talked to him
about
the case and told him to point to appellant as the person who killed
his
mother and brother.[11]
The child further testified that on the night his brother and mother
were
killed, he heard his Kuya Willie cough four times - three times
downstairs
and once upstairs, after which he again pointed to appellant as the
culprit
behind the deaths of his mother and brother.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Witnesses JULIANA
CASTILLO[13]
and VIRGILIO CASTILLO[14]
testified that they were neighbors and relatives of the victims.
They lived in a compound in Brgy. Aguas, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro
where
the houses of three brothers were built: the house of Ramon Castillo,
Juliana’s
husband; the house of Virgilio Castillo, who was still single and lived
alone; and the house of Benedicto Castillo, his wife Remedios, and
their
children.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to witnesses,
appellant was the adopted son (or palaki) of an aunt of the Castillo
brothers.
Appellant had four children. His wife lived in San Roque I,
Occidental
Mindoro, and seldom visited him.[15]
He owned and worked on a seven-hectare farm adjacent to the lot where
the
witnesses and the victims lived. He frequented the neighborhood
while
he bought food and supplies from the store of Juliana.[16]
He spoke with Virgilio at times, although Virgilio said that they were
not close because Virgilio was not used to having a barkada.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Both witnesses claimed
that when appellant was working on his farm, he frequented the house of
Remedios, dropping by almost three times a day, especially when the
victim’s
husband was not around. He sometimes had coffee or left some of
his
farm implements there. They claimed that appellant had spent a
night
there. Juliana further testified that on two occasions prior to
the
incident,[18]
the victim Remedios confided to her that she was angry at appellant
because
he was courting her. Witness Juliana added she already suspected
that fact even before Remedios confided in her, but she did not tell
appellant’s
wife because the wife might not believe her.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Juliana recalled that
at about 7:00 P.M. on July 29, 1997, appellant arrived at her store and
bought a cigarette. After that he invited Virgilio, who was then
having dinner, for a drink. The latter declined.[20]
She recalled that on that night, she and her children slept at around
8:30
P.M. She did not recall hearing any noise coming from Remedios’
house
because it was raining heavily then and she was also listening to the
radio.[21]
The next day, at about 7:00 A.M., her neighbor Norma Roldan and her
daughter,
Ann, arrived and asked her to accompany them to Remedios, to ask the
latter
for their wages for planting palay. Remedios was their kabisilya
at that time. They knocked for about 30 minutes, calling
"Nanie".
Jeffre then opened the door and told them that his mother and brother
were
both dead and that the killer was his Kuya Willie.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his testimony,[23]
Virgilio Castillo stated that, at approximately 7:00cra
to 7:10 P.M. of July 29, 1997, while he was seated in the terrace of
Juliana
Castillo’s house, he saw appellant with a lighted cigarette enter the
kitchen
door of the victims’ house.
At that time, he saw Remedios washing clothes in the poso (water pump),
about six arms-length from her house where her two sons were.
Appellant
inquired where his plowwas.
After about three minutes,he
left. Virgilio recalled that appellant returned at about the same
time he went out of Juliana’s house. Appellant followed and
invited
him to "go around". According to Virgilio, he declined because he
was tired. He could not recall where appellant went after.
He remembered appellant wore a green t-shirt with the words "Landbank"
printed in front and back, and a pair of dark green shorts. When
shown a green t-shirt and short pants (marked as Exhibit [Ccra]),
witness identified the clothesas
those worn by appellant the night of July 29, 1997. He said he
learned
of Remedios and Melvin’s death the following morning. He said he
did not hear anything the previous night as it was raining hard and
because
a cement wall separated his house from that of Remedios.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The fourth witness
for the prosecution was SPO2 ESTEBAN MARIANO DIMALALUAN,[24]Chief
of the Police Relations Section and Chief Investigator assigned
at
the Rizal Police Station. He testified that on July 30, 1997, his
office received a radio report of an incident in Sitio Bagong Silang,
Barangay
Aguas, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro. Upon arrival at the scene he
and
three other policemen found the bodies of Remedios and Melvin Castillo,soaked
in blood. They bore numerous stab wounds. The room where
the
bodies were found measuredabout
three meters by four meters. After they took pictures of the
bodies,
and after further inspection, he noticed fresh footprints with mud on
the
toilet bowl and on the wall made of light materials. He also took
pictures of the footprints but the negatives got exposed prematurely.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the course of his
investigation, said SPO2 Dimalaluan, he met eight-year-old Jeffre
Castillo,
who had survived the carnage. The boy told him that he heard his
mother shout "Dikong, tulungan mo kami" and also his brother shouting
"Kuya
Willie," and "Tulungan nyo kami, hindi na po ako uulit."
According
to Jeffre, the last time he saw appellant in their house was before
nighttime
of the day of the crime.[25]
Dimalaluan added that Juliana and Virgilio also saw appellant then.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Later, according to
Dimalaluan, they went to the house of appellant 150 meters away from
the
crime scene. There they found appellant who had just taken a
bath.
They asked him what he wore the day of the incident, and appellant
pointed
to the clothes he was wearing. Doubting appellant, Dimalaluan
went
inside the house. In the bathroom, a green t-shirt with
"Landbank"
print and dark short pants, newly washed and still wet, were hanging
from
the clothesline. He said he noticed dark stains on them.
These
were brought to the police station. During Dimalaluan’s testimony
he marked the stains found on the clothes.[26]
These, however, were not subjected to laboratory examination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant voluntarily
went with the police to the police station, according to
Dimalaluan.
While detained, appellant made an oral admission that he killed the
victims
and that he used a knife, said the police officer. Hence, on July
31, 1997, Dimalaluan accompanied appellant back to his house, where
appellant
got from the cabinet a hunting knife with scabbard and then handed it
over
to him.[27]
According to Dimalaluan, appellant’s admission was not reduced into
writing[28]
because when appellant made the admission, he was not assisted by a
lawyer.
The knife was likewise not subjected to any laboratory examination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The last prosecution
witness, DR. MICHAEL C. JIMENEZ,[29]
Municipal Health Officer of Rizal, testified that he conducted the
autopsy
on the bodies of the victims. He issued their respective death
certificates.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant WILLERIE
AVENDAÑO[31]
was presented by the defense as its sole witness. He denied
committing
the crimes and interposed an alibi. He said the deceased Remedios
and he had no disagreements.[32]
He did admit that in the late afternoon of July 29, 1997, he bought
cigarettes
from Juliana’s store and there saw Virgilio Castillo. He denied
he
invited him for a drink.[33]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to appellant,
he learned of the stabbing incident the following day, July 30, 1997,
at
about 8:00 A.M. He then went to the place where the victims were
killed.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thereafter he went
back home. A few moments later five policemen, headed by SPO2
Dimalaluan,
arrived. They asked him to accompany them to Remedios’
house.
After taking them there, he returned home to cook. He later went
back to Remedios’ house and SPO2 Dimalaluan no longer allowed him to go
home. Accompanied by policemen, he was allowed to go home only to
lock the door of his house. There, they took one t-shirt and a
pair
of shorts. Thereafter, he was brought to the Rizal police station
and detained.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to appellant,
he was told to admit to the killings but he refused, saying he did not
do it. He did not give a written statement while under
detention.
The following day, July 31, 1997, the policemen brought him back to his
house using a service jeep. They took a knife from his house and
before they left, took a photograph of him pointing to the knife.
He did not protest or say anything at the time because he was afraid.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the witness stand,
he admitted ownership of the t-shirt and short pants taken from his
house
but denied having worn them in the afternoon of July 29, 1997. He
averred he did not wash them and said that these were hanging for
sometime
when the police found them. Later, however, he said he hanged
said
clothes on July 29, 1997.[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 29, 1999,
the RTC convicted appellant as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, and in the
light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the
accused
Willerie (Willy) Avendaño is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the
crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised
Penal Code, and Section 6 of Republic Act Number 7659, otherwise
referred
to as the Death Penalty Law, and is hereby sentenced to DEATH.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The accused is ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victims Remedios Hilario Castillo and
Melvin
Hilario Castillo in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.000)
for
each victim, and to furthermore pay said heirs the amount of ONE
HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for each victim as and for moral damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Provincial Warden
is hereby directed to cause the immediate transfer of the accused from
the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro to the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant, in his brief, assigns the following errors for our
consideration:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I.
THAT
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF
JEFFRE (sic) CASTILLO WHO IS ONLY EIGHT YEARS OLD.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II. THAT THE
HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
JEFFRE
CASTILLO WHO PLAYS IN THE COURTROOM AND UNMINDFUL OF THE TRIAL AND WHO
DOES NOW (sic) UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF AN OATH.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III. THAT THE
HONORABLE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JEFFRE
CASTILLO
WHO WAS COACHED BY THE FATHER AND MANY RELATIVES.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV. THAT THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE
OFFICER THAT ACCUSED ADMITTED THE OFFENSE VERBALLY TO HIM.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
V. THAT THE
LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE ACCUSED WAS
ARRESTED
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND PUT TO JAIL UP TO THE PRESENT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VI. THAT THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE CONFISCATED T-SHIRT AND
SHORT
PANTS WHICH THE PROSECUTION CLAIMED TO HAVE BLOOD STAINS WITHOUT
LABORATORY
EXAMINATION.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VII. THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF THE CHILD IS CONTRARY TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR, EXPERIENCE,
OBSERVATION
AND NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS.[37]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From the foregoing,
the main issue for resolution is whether the prosecution’s evidence
suffices
to convict appellant of murder beyond reasonable doubt, and impose on
him
the death penalty. We must, for this purpose, inquire (1) whether
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses are credible; (2) whether the
arrest and the confinement of appellant are legal; and (3) whether the
T-shirt and short pants taken from appellant are admissible in
evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant assails the
credibility of the prosecution’s witness, Jeffre Castillo.
According
to appellant, the boy is only a playful eight-year-old who couldnot
possibly understand the value of an oath. Appellant pointsout
that during Jeffre’s testimony, the defense counsel called the
attention
of the court that Jeffre was playing witha
rubber band while testifying and appeared to be inattentive to the
questions
propounded to him.[38]
Moreover,appellant
states that Jeffre did not understand his oath because he
did not even know his birthday, did not know how to read and write even
in Tagalog, and did not know where he was born.[39]
According to the appellant, based on these observations, Jeffre’s
credibility
is questionable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In previous cases,
the Court has held that a witness is not incompetent to give testimony
simply because he or she is of tender age. The requirements of a
child’s competence as a witness are: (1) capacity of observation;
(2) capacity of recollection; and (3) capacity of communication.[40]
It is the degree of a child’s intelligence that determines the child’s
competence as a witness. If the witness is sufficiently mature to
receive correct impressions by his senses, to recollect and narrate
intelligently,
and to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth, he is competent[41]
to testify. A minor’s testimony will suffice to convict a person
accused of a crime so long as it is credible.[42]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The determination of
a child’s intellectual preparedness to be a witness rests primarily
with
the trial judge, who assesses the child’s manners, his apparent
possession
or lack of intelligence, as well as his understanding of the
obligations
of an oath. These abstract matters cannot be photographed into
the
record. The judgment of the trial judge will not be disturbed on
review, unless from that which is preserved, it is clear that it was
erroneous.[43]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
the trial court found that despite Jeffre’s age, his testimony was
delivered
in a firm, candid, and straightforward manner and that his demeanor
while
at the witness stand was credible.[44]
On this point, we see no reason to depart from the evaluation by the
trial
judge, who had the advantage of directly observing the witness’
deportment
and manner of testifying, as well as having certain potent aids in
understanding
and weighing the testimony of the witness.[45]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the alleged
inconsistencies in Jeffre’s testimony were only on minor details and
trivial
matters that serve to strengthen rather than destroy Jeffre’s
credibility.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant avers that
Jeffre’s father and relatives coached him on what to say and that his
testimony
and identification of appellant appeared rehearsed. He points out
that Jeffre’s father was allowed to sit near him while he was
testifying.
He also places emphasis on the admission made by Jeffre in open court[46]
that on several occasions, including the night before he was to
testify,
his father and relatives talked to him about the case and taught him
what
to say and who to point to as the culprit. These, according to
appellant,
strip the testimony of the child of any shred of credibility.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The records of this
case, however, do not support appellant’s claim. As found by the
trial court, Jeffre’s testimony was delivered in a firm, candid, and
straightforward
manner. There is no showing that Jeffre wavered from the basic
facts
of his testimony, even when he was subjected to rigorous
cross-examination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
If we are to believe
the defense’s assertion that the child was coached before he testified,
wouldn’t his coaches also teach him to vehemently deny that such wasthe
fact? Being a child of tender age, Jeffre naturally
needed guidance to face the ordeal ofcratestifying
before the court on a matter as gruesome as the death of hisown
mother and brother. His spontaneous admission that his elders
talked
to him beforehand did not diminish, but rather bolstered, his
truthfulness.
With regard to the proximity of his father to him while he was
testifying,
the records bear out that the defense had the opportunity to manifest
itscralawobjection.
Such proximity was duly noted by the trial court yet upon its own
judgment
allowed it, with the observation that any improper behavior would be
readily
observed by the judge as he was close enough to do so.[47]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When it comes to the
issue of credibility, this Court ordinarily defers to the assessment
and
evaluation given by the trial court, for only the trial judge has the
unique
opportunity to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witness’ deportment on the witness stand while testifying, an
opportunity
denied to the appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages of
the records of the case.[48]
Only when such assessment is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some significant fact or circumstance will the appellate court depart
from
the trial court’s factual conclusions.[49]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The records reveal
that the trial court duly noted the objections, closely observed the
proceedings,
and propounded its own questions to satisfy itself of the accuracy of
the
witness’ testimony. We find no reason to disturb the factual
findings
of the trial court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Jeffre’s credibility
is also being assailed on the ground that his testimony, particularly
his
reaction to what transpired in his presence, was contrary to human
behavior,
experience, observation and the natural course of things.
Appellant
alleges that the natural reaction of a child his age is to be afraid
and
either shout for his mother or brother or hide, or else run away
outside
the house. This Court observes that was exactly how this child
witness
reacted. He was afraid and realized something was definitely
wrong,
which then prompted him to inch his way to a place where he felt safer
and out of harm’s way. He hid where he could not be found, in the
dark but safe area for pillows, and escaped the bloody carnage that
took
her mother’s and his brother’s lives.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We have long recognized
that different people react differently to a given situation and there
is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with
a strange, startling or frightful experience.[50]
Witnessing a crime is one novel experience that elicits different
reactions
from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn.[51]
This is especially true if the assailant is physically near.[52]
Moreover, it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have
undergone
traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances
from mature persons.[53]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant questions
the child’s testimony with respect to his recognition of the coughing
made
by the assailant as that of appellant himself. Appellant contends
this is unbelievable, and that any identification made in this manner
is
subject to mistakes.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In People vs. Reyes,[54]
however, the Court held that once a person has gained familiarity with
another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a
considerable
distance. The sound of a person’s voice is an acceptable
means
of identification where it is established that the witness and the
accused
knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.[55]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, Jeffre
has known appellant for about three to four years. The latter
lived
in the same barangay and his farm was right beside the house where the
witness lived. They were in close contact with each other,especially
since appellant often came to the house of the Castillos. Such
day-to-day
familiarity and close proximity lend credence to the child’s testimony
that he would indeed recognize the distinctive
cough of appellant. The child testified that on that fateful
night,
the assailant coughed not only once but a total of four times.
Taking
into account all the other circumstances of thiscase,
this Court is convinced that Jeffre’s identification of appellant’s
coughing
is credible.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When there is no
evidence
to indicate that the witness against the accused has been actuated by
any
improper motive, and absent any compelling reason to conclude
otherwise,
the testimony given by a witness is ordinarily accorded full faith and
credit.[56]
As a whole, we find the prosecution’s witnesses and their testimonies
credible.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With regard to the
legality of the arrest and confinement of appellant, it was shown that
upon arraignment, appellant voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty"
without first questioning the legality of his arrest. By so
pleading,
he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing
any defect in his arrest. Such act amounted to a waiver of the
right
to question any irregularity in his arrest.[57]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It was error on the
part of the trial court, however, to give probative value to the
alleged
verbal admission made by appellant to SPO2 Dimalaluan. The
alleged
admission was not reduced into writing. It was obtained in
violation
of appellant’s right under custodial investigation.[58]
As regards the items of clothing as well as the knife found in and
taken
from the house of appellant, a search warrant should have been obtained
as required under Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.[59]
Failing thus, the exclusionary rule applies. Hence neither the
knife
with scabbard nor the T-shirt with shorts ought to be allowed in
evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant denies the
commission of the crime and interposes the alibi that he was in his
house
on the night of July 29, 1996. For alibi to stand, it must be
shown
that not only was appellant somewhere else when the crime was committed
but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Appellant failed
in this regard. His house was only about 150 to 200 meters from
the
house of Remedios; it was not impossible for him to have been at the
scene
of the crime.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Alibi is inherently
weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested
witnesses.
Since appellant is unable to substantiate his alibi with the testimony
of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence
undeserving
of any weight in law.[60]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum, we find
appellant’s
defense of denial and alibi unavailing. Given the testimonial
evidence
for the prosecution which we find credible, we entertain no doubt as to
his criminal liability for the death of Remedios and Melvin
Castillo.
The only remaining question is whether these killings were attended by
qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The qualifying
circumstance
of treachery was found present by the trial court, resulting in
appellant’s
conviction for two counts of murder. Under the Revised Penal
Code,
there is treachery "when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make."[61]
For treachery to exist, two conditions must be found: (1) that at the
time
of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2)
the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form
of
attack employed by him.[62]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, we find
no adequate proof of treachery. Evidence on record does not show
that appellant consciously and purposely adopted means and methods to
ensure
the commission of the crime without any risk to himself. Thus,
absent
treachery or any circumstance that would otherwise qualify an offense
to
murder, the crime committed is only homicide. Hence, appellant
should
only be held for two counts of homicide, not double murder.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial courtappreciated
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, and unlawful
entry.
Of the three, however, only nighttime was properly alleged in the
information.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December
1,
2000, requires that every complaint or information should state not
only
the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.[63]
This rule may be given retroactive effect
in the light of the settled doctrine that statutes regulating the
procedure
of the court will be construed as applicable toactions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Proceduralcralaws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[64]
Hence,crafollowing
this new rule, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling
and unlawful entry, since they were not alleged in the information.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to nighttime, this
circumstance is considered aggravating only when (1) it was especially
sought by the offender; or (2) the offender took advantage of it; or
(3)
it facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s
immunity
from identification or capture.[65]
In this case, the prosecution did not adduce evidence that the
appellant
deliberately sought the cover of the night to commit the offense.
The mere fact that the killing was committed at night would not suffice
to sustain nocturnity for, by, and of itself.[66]
Aggravating circumstances must be established with the same quantum of
proof as fully as the crime itself, and any doubt as to their existence
must be resolved in favor of appellant.[67]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At this juncture, we
note the observation of the trial court that only one criminal
information
was filed for the two deaths, in violation of Rule 110, Section 13[68]
of the Rules of Court which mandates that one information for each
crime
should be filed, except in cases for which the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses. This observation, however,
should
not stop the court from imposing a penalty for each crime committed in
the light of appellant’s failure to object to the defect in the
information.
As held in People vs. Ramon:[69]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Regrettably for the
accused-appellant, however, he has failed to timely question the above
defect, and he may thus be deemed to have waived his objection to the
multiplicity
of charges. In People vs. Conte, this Court has ruled:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Sections 1 and
3(e) of Rule 117, theappellant,
before entering his plea, should have moved to quash the complaintfor
being duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to have
waived the defect. Hence, pursuant
to Section 3 of Rule 120, the court could convict him of as many
offenses
as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and
every
one of them. (Citations omitted)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating
circumstances, the appropriate penalty therefore is reclusion temporal
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
appellant’s
sentence for each homicide should be an indeterminate penalty of eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, on the award
of damages. For each count of homicide, the award of P50,000 as
civil
indemnity for the death of the victim,is
in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[70]
Given the facts of this case, where mother and son perished in a
shocking
carnage from numerous wounds inflicted by the malefactor, the amount of
P50,000 as moral damages for the death of each victim should also be
awarded.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,cralawin
Criminal Case No. R-4227, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant WILLERIE
AVENDAÑO is found GUILTY of two counts of homicide. Foreach
count, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is
sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of
prision
mayor,as
minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal,
as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Appellant
is also ordered to pay the heirs of each victim the amount of
P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and another sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
together
with the costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chan
robles virtual law library
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna,
JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 15-45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id. at 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
TSN, September 23, 1997, pp. 3-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id. at 12-15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 15; TSN, October 21, 1997, p.12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Supra, note 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
TSN, September 23, 1997, pp. 13-19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 19-21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, October 21, 1997, pp. 16-18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
TSN, September 23, 1997, pp. 7, 8, 22-24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
TSN, October 21, 1997, pp. 6-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
TSN, September 22, 1997, pp. 2-36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 2-34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Supra note 13 at 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Supra, note 14 at 21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Specifically the dates July 27 & 28, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
TSN, September 22, 1997, pp. 34-35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Id. at 18-19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id. at 30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Id. at 6-9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 5-11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
TSN, November 26, 1997, pp. 3-59.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Id. at 11-17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 18-23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Id. at 23-24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Id. at 57.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
TSN, January 7, 1998, pp. 2-20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Records, pp. 52-53.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
TSN, October 2, 1998, pp. 2-31.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Id. at 19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Id. at 7-12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Id. at 21-23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Id. at 64-75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
TSN, September 23, 1997, p. 16; TSN, October 21, 1997, p. 8.
[39]
Id. at 2-3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 130507, 311 SCRA 547, 559 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
People vs. Pearson, 126 IIl App. 2d 166, 261 N.E.2d 519.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
People vs. Tumaru, G.R. Nos. 95751-52, 319 SCRA 515, 527 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, 254 SCRA 18, 32-33 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Rollo, p. 42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
See People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 122746, 302 SCRA 380, 398 (1999),
citing
People vs. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 110107, 240 SCRA 624, 635 (1995) and
People
vs. Malunes, G.R. No. 114692, 247 SCRA 317, 324 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
TSN, October 21, 1997, pp. 6-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Id. at 3-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
People vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 137379-81, 341 SCRA 502, 509 (2000),
citing
People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 130205, 335 SCRA 100, 111-112 (2000) and
People vs. Babera, G.R. No. 130609, 332 SCRA 257, 266 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
People vs. Garcia, supra at pp. 509-510, citing People vs. De Guzman,
G.R.
No. 124368, 333 SCRA 269, 279-280 (2000) and People vs. Balgos, G.R.
No.
126115, 323 SCRA 372, 380 (2000).
[50]
People vs. Palma, G.R. Nos. 130206-08, 308 SCRA 466, 481 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 120642, 309 SCRA 622, 634 (1999); People vs.
Taclan, G.R. No. 123109, 308 SCRA 368, 381-382 (1999); People vs.
Palma,
supra; People vs. Carullo, G.R. Nos. 129289-90, 311 SCRA 680, 690-691
(1999);
People vs. Quilang, G.R. Nos. 123265-66, 312 SCRA 314, 327 (1999);
People
vs. Sevilla, G.R. No. 126199, 320 SCRA 107, 114 (1999).
[52]
People vs. Alquizalas, G.R. No. 128386, 305 SCRA 367, 374 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
People vs. Villanos, G.R. No. 126648, 337 SCRA 78, 85 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
Supra, note 51 at 634-635.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
People vs. Gayomma, G.R. No. 128129, 315 SCRA 639, 646 (1999); People
vs.
Preciados, G.R. No. 122934, 349 SCRA 1, 16 (2001), citing People vs.
Avillano,
G.R. No. 111567, 269 SCRA 553, 561 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
People vs. Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, 325 SCRA 725, 737-738 (2000);
People
vs. Galido, G.R. No. 128883, 326 SCRA 187, 194 (2000); People vs.
Platilla,
G.R. No. 126123, 304 SCRA 339, 351-352 (1999), citing People vs.
Agunias,
G.R. No. 121993, 279 SCRA 52, 65 (1997).
[57]
People vs. Lagarto, G.R. Nos. 118828 & 119371, 326 SCRA 693, 749
(2000).
[58]
See Art. III, Section 12 (1), 1987 Constitution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEC. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
[59]
See Article III, Section 3 (2), 1987 Constitution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEC. 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[60]
See People vs. Galido, supra, note 56 at 195-196.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[61]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[62]
People vs. Dacibar, supra, note 56 at 744.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[63]
Rule 110, Section 8 states in pertinent part: Designation of the
offense.
- The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there
is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section
or subsection of the statute punishing it.
[64]
Ocampo vs. CA, G.R. No. 79060, 180 SCRA 27, 33 (1989); Alday vs.
Camilon,
G.R. No. L-60316, 120 SCRA 521, 523 (1983); People vs. Sumilang, 77
Phil.
764, 765-766 (1946).
[65]
People vs. De la Cruz, G.R. Nos. 109619-23, 291 SCRA 164, 185 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[66]
People vs. Belo, G.R. No. 109148, 299 SCRA 654, 666-667 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[67]
People vs. Cayago, G.R. No. 128827, 312 SCRA 623, 637-638 (1999), cited
in People vs. Cabug, G.R. No. 123149, March 27, 2001, p.28.
[68]
SEC. 13. Duplicity of Offenses. - A complaint or information must
charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment
for
various offenses.
[69]
320 SCRA 775, 783 (1999); People vs. Lucena, G.R. No. 137281, 356 SCRA
90, 105-106.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[70]
Id. at 107-108; People vs. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, 302 SCRA 690, 706
(1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |