SECOND DIVISION
CRESENCIANO
DUREMDES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
138256
November 12, 2003
-versus-
AGUSTIN DUREMDES,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This is a Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended, of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 34700 affirming with
modification
the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City in Civil Case No.
16091
for recovery of possession, ownership and damages, and the Resolution[3]
of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Antecedents
Shirley Duremdes was
the owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1786, Pcadm-478-D
covered
by Tax Declaration No. 14-033-0039. The parcel of land was located in
Barangay
Tupaz, Carles, Iloilo and had an area of 50,000 square meters.
Cresenciano
Duremdes and Hortencia Bataga, Shirley's parents, and the latter's
brother
Nelson Duremdes administered the property while Shirley was working
abroad
as a nurse. When she came back to the Philippines for a brief respite,
she asked her parents and her brother to vacate the property because
she
had decided to sell it. Her parents and her brother refused. On May 24,
1984, Shirley sought the help of the Group Commander of the Civil
Relations
Group of the Office of the Civil Affairs of the Philippine Constabulary
(PACLAP), Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for the eviction of her kins to no
avail.[4]
Nevertheless, Shirley agreed to sell the property to her father's
brother,
her uncle Agustin Duremdes. On May 31, 1989, Shirley executed a deed of
conditional sale over the property in favor of Agustin for P40,000.
Shirley
acknowledged receipt of the said amount, and again asked her parents
and
brother to vacate the property. The latter adamantly refused.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the meantime, Shirley
again left for the United States of America to work as a nurse.
Cresenciano
still refused to vacate the property despite Agustin's demands for him
to do so. Agustin then sought the assistance of the Presidential
Assistance
Committee, again, to no avail. Agustin also sought the assistance of
the
barangay captain. This time, Cresenciano alleged that the property was
not in his possession but was occupied by an agricultural tenant,
Herminio
Tara, who also happened to be his brother-in-law. Agustin investigated
the matter and discovered that Herminio had been a tenant of
Cresenciano
since February 3, 1979. This was later confirmed by a certification
from
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.[5]
Cresenciano's property was contiguous to the parcel of land Agustin had
bought from Shirley.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 10, 1984,
Agustin filed a Complaint[6]
for recovery of possession, ownership and damages before the RTC of
Iloilo
City, Branch 38, against Cresenciano and Nelson Duremdes. He alleged
that
the defendants, who were only administrators of the subject property[7]
while the previous owner (Shirley) was employed in the United States,
refused
to turn over the possession of the lot, for which reason he suffered
damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their answer with
counterclaim, the defendants denied that they were the administrators
of
the land, and that they were the possessors of the same. They alleged
that
it was Nelson Duremdes who took care of the property in behalf of
Shirley,
and that the present possessor was Herminio Tara, who claimed to be a
tenant
of the aforesaid property. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff
knew
that Herminio was in possession of the property. In fact, prior to the
filing of the case, they had a conference regarding this controversy
before
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Balasan, Iloilo. The defendants also
claimed that the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff had no
factual
and legal basis, and thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The plaintiff filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Despite the defendants'
opposition,
the trial court granted the motion of the plaintiff and rendered a
Decision
dated February 11, 1985. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring
the plaintiff as owner of the land in question;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. Ordering the
defendants
to vacate the land and deliver immediately possession of the same to
the
plaintiff;
3. Ordering the
defendants
to deliver to the plaintiff the produce of the land since September 21,
1984, or its value to be computed according to prevailing market price
until fully paid;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. Ordering the
defendants
to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus
5. Costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6. The counterclaim
is dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The defendants
thereafter
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,[9]
which rendered judgment reversing the decision of the trial court and
remanding
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[10]
According to the appellate court:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is true
that the defendants-appellants admitted plaintiff's ownership over
subject
parcel of land. However, they have likewise denied being in possession
of said lot. A question necessarily arises as to whether or not
defendants-appellants
are really in possession of the land in question or it is possessed by
one Herminio Tara who is allegedly a tenant thereof. Certainly, these
questions
need to be ventilated and determined in a proper trial where parties
can
present their respective evidence. Judgment on the pleadings, even on
this
score alone, would surely place defendants-appellants in a quandary
because
they will be ordered to turn over possession of the land which they
deny
being in possession of in the first place. This, plus other issues
postulated
by the defendants-appellants in their Opposition to the Motion for
Judgment
on the Pleadings, certainly pose genuine issues which require the
proper
determination of the court for a more substantive resolution of the
instant
case.[11]
Dolores Duremdes,
the
plaintiff's wife, thereafter filed a Motion for Substitution[12]
alleging that her husband, Agustin Duremdes, was now physically
incapacitated
due to a stroke. The court granted the motion. She thereafter filed a
motion
to admit an amended complaint where she reiterated the following
prayer:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed of the
Honorable
Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and condemns the defendants:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. To
turn
over possession and cultivation of the parcel of land described in
paragraph
3 of the complaint to the plaintiff and to declare plaintiff to be the
rightful owner of the said lot;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. To pay the
sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to compensate for the loss of produce
of the land and the deprivation and enjoyment of the rights of the
plaintiff;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. To condemn
the defendants
to pay incidental expenses of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00);
4. To condemn
defendants
to pay the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (10,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
5. To pay
moral damages
in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Plaintiff
prays for
such other relief and/or remedy as maybe just and equitable under the
premises.[13]
The motion was granted.[14]
After trial on the merits of the case, the court a quo rendered a
decision[15]
dated February 27, 1991 ordering the defendants to vacate the land and
to pay damages to the plaintiff, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is rendered ordering the defendants
(and/or
any person acting for and on their behalf) (1) to deliver to the
plaintiff
the 3-hectare riceland portion of subject Lot No. 1786, Pcadm-478-D;
(2)
to pay plaintiff jointly and severally, 12 cavans of palay annually,
starting
from the year 1984, representing the produce of the 3-hectare riceland
portion, until said portion is delivered to plaintiff; and (3) to pay
plaintiff
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Defendants'
counterclaim
is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.[16]
According to the trial
court, the main issue to be resolved was whether or not the defendants
were in actual possession of the land in question. It found that the
claim
of the defendant Cresenciano, that the actual possessor of the land was
Herminio Tara, was part of a scheme to deprive the plaintiff of his
right
to possess the land. The court went on to explain that if the
defendants
could prove that the land was actually possessed by a tenant, then the
latter could not be so dispossessed under the Land Reform Law. This
would
thereby achieve the defendant's objective of retaining the land in his
possession. The trial court also made the following findings:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Taken
together
with the other circumstances surrounding this case, the fact that
Shirley
Amantillo went to the PACLAP to complain that her father, defendant
Cresenciano
Duremdes, refused to deliver the possession of the land which she had
already
sold to plaintiff has significant weight and consideration in favor of
the latter. If defendant Cresenciano Duremdes in not in actual
possession
of the land, his daughter should not have complained against him for
his
refusal to deliver to plaintiff the possession thereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is a veiled
conspiracy
between defendant Cresenciano Duremdes and his brother-in-law, Herminio
Tara, which became all the more prominent and apparent when the DAR
issued
a certification that the said Herminio Tara is a registered tenant in a
landholding owned by defendant Cresenciano Duremdes (Exh. "E").
Moreover,
on cross-examination, defendant Cresenciano Duremdes confirmed that he
is the Cresenciano Duremdes who is the owner of the land wherein
Herminio
Tara is a registered tenant (TSN, hearing of March 23, 1990, p. 7).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The opening of an
account
with the Rural Bank of Balasan (Iloilo) Inc. by Herminio Tara in the
name
of Agustin Duremdes was merely a part of the scheme and machination
resorted
to by the former in a veiled conspiracy with defendants to make it
appear
that Herminio Tara has been in actual possession of the land in
question
and that plaintiff refused to receive the rentals from his alleged
tenant,
Herminio Tara.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The defendants filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied.[18] The Case On Appeal
The defendants again
elevated to the Court of Appeals[19]
for the resolution of the following issues:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A) Who
actually
are in possession of the property consisting of about two (2) hectares
subject matter of this litigation;
B) Since Herminio
Tara
admitted having been in actual possession of the property under
litigation,
and the share of the landowner Agustin Duremdes over the produce is
being
deposited with the Rural Bank of Balasan, should defendants be ordered
to deliver the possession of the said land in favor of the plaintiffs;[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to the
defendants-appellants,
the appellee was unable to possess the entire area of the subject lot
because
a portion of about two hectares was in the possession of Herminio Tara.
In fact, a violent confrontation even ensued between appellee Agustin
and
Herminio when Agustin tried to take possession of the land, and
Herminio
suffered physical injuries when the incident occurred. The appellants
also
pointed out that despite all this, the appellee failed to implead
Herminio
as party-defendant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It was also contended
that when Shirley Duremdes complained to the PACLAP[21]
against her father, she had not yet sold the property to the plaintiff.
Her letter to the PACLAP was dated March 24, 1984 while the sale took
place
on March 31, 1984.[22]
Aside from claiming that no meeting or conference ever transpired
between
Shirley Duremdes and the appellants before the PACLAP, the appellants
also
pointed out that the letter-complaint filed with the said office was
against
Cresenciano and Noel Duremdes, and not against Nelson Duremdes. Nelson
Duremdes was not one of the defendants in the case. Because no member
of
the PACLAP testified regarding the letter, it practically had no
probative
value; the trial court thus gravely erred when it considered the said
letter
in ruling for the defendants. Furthermore, the lower court ignored
Dolores'
admission when she testified on direct and cross-examination that it
was
Noel Duremdes who was in possession of the land, and Herminio Tara's
declaration
that he was its present possessor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's ruling with modification in its Decision dated
August 31, 1998. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from with respect to Cresenciano Duremdes is
AFFIRMED
with the modification that the complaint against defendant-appellant
Nelson
Duremdes in Civil Case No. 16091 is hereby DISMISSED.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to the
appellate
court, the following circumstances indicate that Herminio was
Cresenciano's
tenant and, as such, was the present possessor of the subject property:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. In its
reply
to the letter-query of Agustin's counsel, the Agrarian Reform Team No.
189 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform informed that "per records
of this office, Mr. Herminio Tara is a registered tenant in the
landholding
owned by Mr. Cresenciano Duremdes situated in Brgy. Bolo, Carles,
Iloilo."
(Exhibit "E")chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. The said letter
further
disputes Cresenciano's allegation relating to Herminio's status as
Agustin's
tenant.
3. The aforecited
letter-reply
vis-à-vis the certification of the Office of the Municipal
Assessor
(Exhibit "16") dated November 29, 1989 stating that Cresenciano does
not
own a property adjacent to Agustin's land clearly indicates that the
land
leased by Cresenciano and Noel to Herminio was Agustin's land.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. Agustin and
Herminio's
alleged "violent" confrontation took place on or before March 23, 1984
(Exh. 1) when the former found Herminio working on the subject land. At
that time, the property was still owned by Shirley and administered by
Noel Duremdes ("Noel"), son of Cresenciano.
5. The Notices of
harvest
dated October 20, 1986, October 12, 1987 and September 5, 1988
(Exhibits
"6", "7" and "8", respectively) are irrelevant and immaterial as they
cover
periods after the fact or filing of the complaint in the court a quo.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6. The passbook
purportedly
showing bank deposits of Agustin's share in the harvest was opened only
on October 1, 1984 after the institution of the instant case.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, the court also
found that except for the certificate to file complaint issued by the
Barangay
Lupong Tagapamayapa, nothing in the documents and testimonies on record
implicated appellant Nelson Duremdes although a certain "Noel," a sort
of Cresenciano, was mentioned on several occasions, he was not a party
in the instant case. Hence, the court dismissed the case with regards
to
appellant Nelson Duremdes.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Issues
According to the petitioner,
the appellate court's decision clearly indicates its finding that
Herminio
Tara was working and leasing the land owned by the respondent, and that
the former was working as an agricultural tenant on the subject land
before
ownership thereof passed to the respondent from Shirley Duremdes. Thus,
Herminio Tara remained and should remain as such agricultural tenant
over
the subject land even if its ownership had already changed. The
petitioner
further contends that it is immaterial whose agricultural tenant
Herminio
Tara is. He also asserts that because a tenancy relationship is
involved,
jurisdiction over the case rests with the Department of Agrarian Reform
and Adjudication Board (DARAB).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner asserts
that, as the records of the case will show, he consistently raised the
issue of the tenancy of Herminio Tara in the lower court, and later in
the appellate court. He insists that the matter involving jurisdiction
can still be raised before the Court because the CA, through its
decision,
brought the issue to the fore. The petitioner prays that the decision
of
the CA be set aside for lack of jurisdiction as the subject real
property
is occupied and possessed by a duly registered agricultural tenant, who
was not even impleaded as a party in the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In her Comment, the
respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that
the petition for review was filed out of time. The period within which
to file the petition for review expired on May 9, 1999; the petitioner
filed the instant petition only after the lapse of 65 days therefrom.
Thus,
according to the respondent, it is clear from the facts and the records
of the case that the petition for review was filed beyond the period
allowed
by the Court, and that the same was filed merely for purposes of delay
and to subvert the ends of justice.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The issues thus presented
for the Court's resolution in the case at bar involve both procedural
and
factual matters:
(1) whether
or not the petition was filed out of time as to warrant its dismissal;
and
(2) whether or not
the
DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant case, and if so, whether it can
still exercise its jurisdiction, in view of an allegation of the
existence
of a tenancy agreement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's
Ruling
A perusal of the records
of the case indicates that the present petition for review on
certiorari
was indeed, filed out of time. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration
of the CA Decision dated August 31, 1998 on September 24, 1998. The CA
denied the motion in its Resolution dated March 10, 1999. Counsel for
the
petitioner was served with a copy of the CA Resolution denying the
motion
on March 24, 1999, and thereafter filed on April 8, 1999 a motion for
extension
of forty-five (45) days within which to file a petition for review.[26]
The Court granted the motion in its Resolution dated June 16, 1999, but
gave the petitioner only thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
reglementary
period within which to file the petition for review on certiorari, with
a warning that no further extension would be given.[27]
The petitioner thus had thirty (30) days from April 8, 1999 to file the
petition for review, or until May 9, 1999. The petition was filed only
on July 8, 1999.[28]
On this ground alone, the dismissal of the petition is inevitable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although it has been
said time and again that litigation is not a game of technicalities,
that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure
so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved,[29]
this does not mean that procedural rules may altogether be disregarded.
Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for
persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant
to
a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on
the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his
failure
to abide by the rules.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the instant case,
the respondent apologized to the Court and admitted his faux pas. In
his
reply, he offered the following reasons for non-compliance with the
rules:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) due to
the busy schedule and other pending legal work, counsel for the
petitioner
was erroneously of the impression that the period granted by the Court
was to start upon the receipt of the Court's resolution which granted
the
thirty-day extension; chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) the services
of
the said counsel were hired only when the present petition became
necessary;
and
(3) the said
misconception
was "done in good faith."
This Court cannot
countenance
such flimsy and tux-worm excuses. Counsel for the petitioner, as a
member
of the bar, is presumed to know the law, particularly the rules of
procedure.
He cannot feign ignorance of the said rules. If we were to allow such
lapses
to go unnoticed, the administration of justice would be derailed;
incompetent,
irresponsible lawyers would soon permeate the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner asserts
that the issue in the present petition "is such that the case needs to
be resolved on the merits and should not be dismissed on a mere
technicality."
The petitioner questions the finding of the Court of Appeals, that no
tenancy
agreement existed between the respondent and Herminio Tara. This is,
however,
a factual issue which is beyond the purview of this Court to act upon
and
resolve. The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by
the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the
trial
court and appellate court were correct in regarding them superior
credit.[31]
The issue being raised by the petitioner does not involve a question of
law, but a question of fact, not cognizable by this Court in a petition
for review under Rule 45.[32]
It is a well-settled
rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are accorded the highest degree of respect,
and
generally will not be disturbed on appeal.[33]
Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court.[34]
In Spouses Tansipek v. Philippine Bank of Communications,[35]
we had the occasion to enumerate the exceptions to the rule, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
(1) When the
conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) when the
inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3) where there is
a grave abuse of discretion;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(5) when the findings
of fact are conflicting;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(6) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(7) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(8) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the
findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The instant
case does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.chanrobles virtual law library
Neither can the petitioner
find solace in the allegation that the jurisdiction in the instant case
properly falls with the DARAB because of the existence of a tenancy
agreement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First. For the
DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy
relationship
between the parties.[37]
In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is
essential
to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1) That the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2) that the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3) that there is
consent
between the parties to the relationship;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4) that the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
5) that there is
personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[38]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Second. The
trial
court found that no such tenancy agreement existed between the
respondent
and Herminio Tara, and that such allegation was a mere ploy to prevent
the respondent from exercising dominion and ownership over the subject
property. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find no cogent
reason to reverse such finding.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Third. The petitioner
is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction. The petitioner
actively
participated in all stages of the instant case, setting up a
counterclaim
and asking for affirmative relief in his answer.[39]
He failed, however, to question the court's jurisdiction over the suit.
After relying on the jurisdiction of the regular courts, he cannot be
permitted
to turn around and question it. It is not right for a party who has
affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure
an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction.[40]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the
Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs against the petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate Justice
Salome A. Montoya and then CA Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Roger B. Patricio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Exhibit "H."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Exhibit "E."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Records, pp. 1–4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Annex "D," Records, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 05807, promulgated on January 21, 1988; id.
at 42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Penned by Associate Justice Oscar R. Victoriano with Associate Justices
Ricardo P. Tensuan and Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. concurring.
[11]
Records, p. 45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 53.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id. at 57-58.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Id. at 62.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id. at 223-229.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at 229.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id. at 228.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Id. at 245.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 34700.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Annex "B," Records, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
CA Rollo, p. 40.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Id. at 125.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id. at 123-124.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Rollo, p. 75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 44-45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Id. at 22.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Cleofe Norris v. Hon. Jose J. Parentela, Jr., G.R. No. 143216, February
27, 2003.
[30]
Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, G.R. No. 141116, February 17, 2003, citing
Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 305
(Emphasis
supplied.).
[31]
Chan Sui Bi v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 364 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 146397, July 1, 2003.
[33]
Lagman v. People, 371 SCRA 686 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Pua v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 233 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
372 SCRA 456 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Id. at 460-461.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 308 SCRA 167 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Laguna Estates Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 29
(2000).
[39]
Centeno v. Centeno, 343 SCRA 153 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
Celendro v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 835 (1999), citing Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29 (1968).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |