SECOND DIVISION.
.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
138266
April 30, 2003
-versus-
PEDRO CABRERA,
JR.,
ALIAS "ONYONG"AND
DANILO CABRERA,
ALIAS "TOTI" (AT LARGE),
Accused,
/PEDRO CABRERA,
JR., ALIAS "ONYONG,"
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
This is an appeal from
the Decision[1]
dated January 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch
9, in Criminal Case No. 34, 985-95, finding appellant Pedro Cabrera,
Jr.,
alias "Onyong" guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua.
Appellant’s co-accused, Danilo Cabrera, alias "Toti," remains at large.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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The amended information,[2]
dated August 21, 1995, charged appellant and his co-accused as follows:
The
undersigned
accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Murder under Article
248
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about
November
22, 1992, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring,
confederating
and helping one another, with treachery, armed with a bladed weapon and
with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted
and stabbed one Leopoldo Alvarado thereby inflicting upon the latter
stabbed
wounds which caused his death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to law.
To this amended
information,
only appellant Pedro Cabrera, Jr., was arraigned. Assisted by
counsel,
he pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution adduced
evidence consisting of the testimonies of Shirley Aguilus,[3]
Benedicto Aguilus, Dr. Danilo Ledesma, and SPO3 Josefa F. Crodua, as
well
as several documents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Shirley Aguilus testified
that on November 22, 1992, she decided to pay her father a visit at
1055
C. Arellano Street, Davao City.[4]
She was with her boyfriend, Leopoldo Alvarado. On their way coming from
her work, she observed that there was a gathering in the nearby house
of
appellant’s mother because it was the first death anniversary of
Conrado
Cabrera, a brother of appellant. Appellant and another brother,
the
co-accused Danilo Cabrera, were there in the celebration. The
Cabreras
lived only a house away from the Aguilus’ residence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At nine o’clock that
evening, after Shirley Aguilus and her boyfriend Leopoldo Alvarado had
dinner and watched TV, they left her father’s house to return to where
she was staying with a sister in Buhangin, Davao City. But as they were
passing the Cabreras’ house, Shirley saw the appellant and his
co-accused
standing at the front gate. Shirley and Leopoldo were crossing the
junction
of Jacinto and Quirino Streets, walking side by side, arm in arm, when
appellant suddenly came from behind and stabbed Leopoldo.
Shocked,
Shirley cried, "Bakit n’yo kami ginaganito wala kaming kasalanan sa
inyo?"
Leopoldo retreated to the Central Bank Bulding area where, according to
Shirley, he was stabbed anew in the stomach by co-accused Danilo
Cabrera.
Thereafter, Shirley said she saw appellant and his co-accused leave
together
toward a gasoline station. Two male bystanders helped her bring the
wounded
Leopoldo to the San Pedro Hospital where Leopoldo was pronounced dead
on
arrival.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to Shirley
she had her father, Benedicto Aguilus, notified by telephone and
together
from the San Pedro Hospital they went to the San Pedro Police Station
to
have the stabbing incident blottered. Asked who did the stabbing, she
replied,
"our neighbors." She identified the assailants as the Cabrera brothers,
whom she only knew by their nicknames. She was told by the police
officer
on duty to come back the following day to provide the real names of the
culprits. She did not return at that time as she was then eight and a
half
months pregnant with Leopoldo’s lovechild, and she was afraid of the
accused
who were known "hawod" in their place.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When asked, she could
not offer a possible reason why appellant and his brother stabbed and
killed
Leopoldo. But she said that it could have been a case of mistaken
identity, the accused mistaking Leopoldo for a certain "Muki"[7]
who appears to be their enemy. Muki apparently had features similar to
Leopoldo’s. As it later surfaced in appellant’s own testimony,
Pedro
Cabrera, Jr., admitted that a certain Muki Yparraguire was the suspect
in the killing of appellant’s other brother a year earlier.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, according to
the witness Shirley Aguilus, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte assured
her
of his assistance early in 1995, so she came forward to execute an
affidavit
which led to the prosecution of the accused.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Shirley’s father, Benedicto
Aguilus, corroborated the testimony of his daughter. He testified that
around 15 to 20 minutes after Shirley and Leopoldo left his residence
at
1055 C. Arellano St., a certain Romeo Tambio, a janitor at the Emmanuel
Baptist Church, came to inform him that Shirley called from the
hospital
and had requested Benedicto to come over. Forthwith, he went to the San
Pedro Hospital and saw her daughter crying. She told him that Leopoldo
was stabbed by the brothers "Onyong" and "Toti" Cabrera. Thus,
witness
Benedicto Aguilus and his daughter Shirley went to the San Pedro Police
Station to report the incident.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Witness Dr. Danilo Ledesma,
a medical officer, also testified. According to him, he conducted
the autopsy on the victim. As stated in his necropsy report,[11]
he testified that the victim sustained three (3) stab wounds. In the
death
certificate[12]
of Leopoldo Alvarado, Dr. Ledesma indicated the cause of death as
"hemorrhage,
severe, secondary to stab wound of the chest."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, SPO3 Josefa
F. Crodua testified on the due execution of the report in the police
blotter,
showing the events on the night of November 22, 1992. The blotter
was presented in evidence as Exhibit C.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For the defense, appellant
Pedro A. Cabrera, Jr., his brothers, Ruben and Leonardo A. Cabrera, and
Ricarte P. Alaton testified and presented documentary evidence, marked
as Exhibits 1-11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant invoked the
defense of denial and alibi. He testified that he did not kill the
victim
and that he did not know the person named Leopoldo Alvarado, who died
of
stab wounds on November 22, 1992. He denied knowing their
neighbor,
Shirley Aguilus. According to appellant, from 1989 to April of
1995,
he was in Manila employed as a helper in the business of his brother,
earning
P1,000.00 a month. On November 22, 1992, the day of the alleged
murder,
he was at work, doing his job. As proof of his employment, he
presented
his brother, Ruben Cabrera, to corroborate his testimony.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to witness
Ruben Cabrera, he has a business firm in Quezon City, engaged in the
buy
and sell of home decors, carpets, furnitures, jars, paintings, and
other
objects. He said that sometime in 1989, he hired his brother
Pedro
Cabrera, Jr., as "kargador." When asked on cross-examination, he failed
to show any record of appellant’s employment. According to the
witness,
as employer he had no listing of his employees but he could memorize
their
faces. He added that on November 22, 1992, he was with appellant
making deliveries.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Defense witness Ricarte
P. Alaton testified that appellant could not have been the assailant of
Leopoldo Alvarado because on November 22, 1992, appellant was in
Manila.
Witness Alaton said he even had a drinking spree with appellant at the
Headquarters of the National Equifrilibricum, a religious organization
of which he is a member.[14]
To substantiate his claim he offered in exhibit his Equifrilibricum
World
Religion membership card.[15]
It turned out, however, that he was the brother-in-law of Renato
Cabrera,
also a brother of the appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Another brother of appellant,
namely Leonardo A. Cabrera, was presented on the witness stand.
He
stated that the appellant was one of fifteen siblings.[16]
But one of their brothers, Conrado Cabrera, died on November 22, 1991,
and a sister died on December 21, 1992.[17]
He corrected Ruben Cabrera’s testimony as to these dates.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court disbelieved
the defense but gave credence to the testimony of eyewitness Shirley
Aguilus
and other witnesses for the prosecution.cralaw:red
Accordingly, the court
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE,
finding the accused PEDRO CABRERA, JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery, as defined in Art. 248
of
the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to suffer the accessory penalties attendant thereto
and to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo Alvarado in the amount of
P50,000.00.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
His immediate
confinement
at the National Penitentiary is hereby ordered.
The case against
DANILO
CABRERA alias Toti, the other accused, is hereby held in abeyance and
archived
until he is brought to the jurisdiction of this Court. Issue alias
warrant
for his arrest.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Aggrieved, appellant
comes
to this Court assigning as lone error the failure of the trial court to
acquit him,[19]
in this wise: THE LOWER COURT
ERRED
IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[20]
The resolution of this
appeal hinges on the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses,
particularly
the eyewitness. Appellant seeks to discredit the testimony of the
prosecution’s eyewitness, Shirley Aguilus. He points out that
contradictions
in the latter’s testimony cannot be appreciated as mere mistakes, but
constitute
deliberate falsehood, thus impairing her credibility as a witness and
the
weight of her testimony. Specifically, appellant claims that
Shirley’s
statement on the night of the incident as borne in the police blotter
contradicts
her testimony on the witness stand four years later as regards the
identity
of the malefactor.[21]
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On record are the
pertinent
contents of the police blotter, to wit:
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2145H For
record
MOC informed this Office thru telephone ICOW stabbed victim rushed to
San
Pedro Hospital; In this connection, PO3 Ballenas and PO3 Jackaria with
members of Wagon Bravo led by Pacumbaba left this station to verify.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2210H Returned re-
Peace officers mentioned in the immediate preceding Item 2145H item
returned
this office with info that stabbing incident Nov 22,
1992
transpired at the vicinity of Central Bank, along Jacinto Stabbing
Incident.
The victim identified as one LEOPOLDO ALVARADO Y FERNANDEZ, 25 years
old,
married, AC Jeep Driver, native of Bansalan,chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davao del Sur, presently
resident of Care of Montajes - Ext., Davao City
Art and sign, along
San Roque St., Bajada, Davao City, who sustained two stabbed wounds in
the left and right breast and left arm. Initial investigation
dsclosed
that victim together with his wife one SHIRLEY ALVARADO were walking
along
aforementioned place when the unidentified suspects without any
apparent
reason nor provocation followed them and stabbed the victim
twice.
Victim was rushed to San Pedro Hospital for treatment. However,
he
was declared dead on arrival by attending physician. That suspect
after the incident hurriedly boarded Alpa PU Minica color white and
fled
to unknown direction. While at this office the wife of the victim
averred that she can identify the suspect if seen again. Case Ref
to HAS.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to appellant,
the statements made by Shirley Aguilus appearing in the police blotter
immediately after the stabbing incident are admissible as part of the
res
gestae.[23]
He contends that the phraseology "she can identify suspect if seen
again"
presents a factual impression that Shirley Aguilus never knew of the
identity
of the assailants at the time of the stabbing; and that her testimony
later,
identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is a mere concoction
raising
doubt as to the truth of her testimony.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For the appellee, the
Office of the Solicitor General argues that appellant’s logic is faulty
and his contention bereft of merit; hence, his conviction should be
sustained.
According to the OSG, in her testimony Shirley positively identified
appellant
as one of the assailants on the night of November 22, 1992.[24]
The fact that Shirley did not give the full names of the assailants to
the desk officer as directed does not detract from her credibility
since
she had given their nicknames as her neighbors, says the OSG.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the outset, it should
be noted that during trial, appellant’s defense vigorously interposed
denial
and alibi. After trial, however, his defense changed tack and began to
attack the credibility of the prosecution’s eyewitness.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To impeach the credibility
of eyewitness Shirley Aguilus, appellant makes it appear that the
statements
made by Shirley as borne by the police blotter are inconsistent with
her
statements on the witness stand. Appellant contends also that the
omission
by Shirley to identify assailants is part of the res gestae, and it
should
have been afforded evidentiary weight by the trial court to show the
inconsistency
of her statements.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Such reliance on the
rule on res gestae, however, is misplaced. As already explained by this
Court in an earlier case, "the rule on res gestae applies when the
declarant
himself did not testify provided that the testimony of the witness who
heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that
the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood;
and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances."[25]
Since Shirley Aguilus herself testified, there is absolutely no need
for
the application of the rule on res gestae. Besides, an appreciable
amount
of time had elapsed from the time of the alleged killing and the making
of the statements at the police station, which brings the case beyond
the
application of the res gestae rule.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As found by the trial
court:
Entries in the police
blotter about the suspects being "unidentified" will not help the cause
of the accused. It does not mean that Shirley Aguilus failed to
identify
the accused when she reported to the police. She was categorical in her
testimony that she did identify the accused not by their names but by
their
nicknames. It could be that the Desk Officer simply did not consider
the
nicknames a sufficient identification of the accused and so wrote
"unidentified"
in the police blotter because the accused were not identified by their
proper names. Besides, even granting in arguendo that Shirley failed to
identify the accused to the police when she reported the incident, her
failure to do so will not impair her credibility.[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Citing People v. Divina,[28]
the trial court continued -
The rule is well established
that the failure to reveal or disclose at once the identity of the
accused
does not necessarily affect much less impair, the credibility of the
witness.
The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a
criminal
case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations
due to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially declared not
to affect credibility.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Further, it is well
settled that entries in the police blotter should not be given undue
significance
or probative value as they are not evidence of the truth of their
contents
but merely of the fact that they were recorded.[29]
Hence, they do not constitute conclusive proof.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As aptly stated in People
v. Casinillo:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant’s reliance
on the police blotter deserves nothing more than the scantest
consideration.
In the first place, "[t]he entry in the police blotter is not
necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes
from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestion or inquiries,
without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion
of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to
the subject.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to appellant,
Shirley’s failure to seek police assistance for the immediate arrest of
the assailants, and the fact that two years had elapsed before she was
able to execute a sworn statement impaired her credibility as a
witness.
This matter, however, was adequately explained by the
prosecution.
Reluctance to get involved in a criminal investigation is not an
unnatural
reaction of some individuals, especially when there is fear of
reprisal.
Such initial reluctance is insufficient to affect credibility.[32]
Moreover, the eyewitness had given reasons why she did not return to
the
police station: she was in the last stages of her pregnancy, and she
feared
the Cabreras who are notorious troublemakers in their neighborhood.[33]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant makes much
about the alleged inconsistency in Shirley’s police statement that the
suspects hurriedly boarded a white-colored Alpha PU minica and fled to
an unknown direction, and her testimony in open court that assailants
left
towards a gasoline station. Such perceived contradiction refers only to
a minor matter that does not touch upon the elements of the crime
committed.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to
minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration,
their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, appellant faults
the prosecution for failing to present other witnesses who could
identify
the malefactors. It is settled, however, that in the absence of
any
evidence to show that the witness was actuated by any improper motive,
her identification of the accused as the assailant should be given full
faith and credit.[35]
Moreover, the testimony of a single eyewitness, if positive and
credible,
is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge for murder.[36]
Thus, it was not incumbent on the prosecution to comply with the wish
of
the defense to present more witnesses when one eyewitness would
suffice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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In sum, we find that
the trial court did not err in its reliance principally upon the
testimony
of the lone eyewitness for the conviction of appellant.
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We go now to the
determination
of appellant’s criminal liability. The weapon used by appellant and his
co-accused, and the location of the wound which is in the chest, a
vital
part of the body, unmistakably show the intent to kill Leopoldo.[37]
The prosecution evidence clearly and convincingly shows a coordinated
assault
on the victim, with appellant performing a specific role in the
execution
of the crime. The duo were together at the gate of their house when
Shirley
Aguilus and the victim passed by. One after another, they attacked the
victim with a bladed weapon, with appellant stabbing the victim twice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Concerning treachery,
the prosecution has shown that there was that swift and unexpected
attack
of an unarmed victim, which is the essence of treachery.[38]
The victim was defenseless and unarmed as he was then promenading with
his pregnant girlfriend, clueless of the danger that lies ahead. Thus
the
twin requirements for the existence of treachery under Art. 14 (16) of
the Revised Penal Code[39]
had been adequately proven: (1) the means of execution employed gave
the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[40]
Accordingly, the killing of Leopoldo Alvarado constitutes murder. Under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code prior to its amendment by Republic
Act
7659 or the Death Penalty Law, the crime of murder is punishable by
reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. In the absence of any
mitigating
or generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in
its
medium period, or reclusion perpetua.[41]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to damages, the trial
court awarded to the heirs of the victim, Leopoldo Alvarado, the amount
of P50,000 as civil indemnity pursuant to current jurisprudence.
However, in addition to the death indemnity, moral damages for the
amount
of P50,000 must be awarded to the heirs of the victim,[42]
as well as P20,000 for temperate damages,[43]
in consonance with case law. Temperate or moderate damages are
allowed
because, while some pecuniary loss has been suffered, from the nature
of
the case its amount cannot be proved with certainty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 9, in
Criminal
Case No. 34, 985-95 dated January 5, 1999, convicting appellant Pedro
Cabrera,
Jr., of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. He is also ordered to pay the
heirs
of the deceased, Leopoldo Alvarado, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as temperate damages. Costs de
oficio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 21-36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id. at 9-10. The original information was amended to reflect the true
date
of the commission of the offense from November 22, 1994 to November 22,
1992 (Records, p. 55).
[3]
Sometimes Aguilos in some parts of the records.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
TSN, 3 April 1996, pp. 3-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Also spelled as "Moki" in some parts of the records.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Rollo, p. 24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, 3 April 1996, p. 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
TSN, 23 October 1996, pp. 66-69; 80.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Records, p. 260.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 261.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
TSN, 30 April 1997, pp. 114-115, 118.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
TSN, 14 August 1997, pp. 128-129.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Records, p. 270.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
TSN, 18 June 1998, pp. 137-138.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id. at 136.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Rollo, pp. 89-90.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Id. at 57.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id. at 66-67.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Records, p. 262. Stress supplied.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Rollo, p. 62.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id. at 102.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
People v. Oposculo, Jr., G.R. No. 124572, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA
167,
176.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
People v. Mansueto, G.R. No. 135196, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 715, 731.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
G.R. Nos. 93808-09, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 209, 219.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 132123, 23 November 2000, 345 SCRA
642,
651.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
People v. Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, 17 February 2000, 325 SCRA 725,
736;
People v. Geral, G.R. No. 122283, 15 June 2000, 333 SCRA 453, 460.
[31]
G.R. No. 97441, 11 September 1992, 213 SCRA 777, 790.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
People v. Torres, Jr., G.R. No. 138046, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 526,
535.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
TSN, 3 April 1996, p. 11; TSN, 17 April 1996, p. 35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
People v. Bato, G.R. No. 134939, 16 February 2000, 325 SCRA 671, 677.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 125518, 20 July 1998, 292 SCRA 663, 676.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
People v. Villanueva, G.R. Nos. 115555-59, 22 January 1998, 284 SCRA
501,
509; People v. Geral, supra, at 459.
[37]
See People v. Balderas, G.R. No. 106582, 31 July 1997, 276 SCRA 470.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
See People v. Padlan, G.R. No. 111263, 21 May 1998, 290 SCRA 388.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
16.
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, without risk to
himself
arising from the defense, which the offended party might make.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
People v. Abriol, 17 October 2001, G.R. No. 123137, 367 SCRA 327,
350-351.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
People v. Malazarte, G.R. No. 108179, 6 September 1996, 261 SCRA 482,
492.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
People v. Diolata, G.R. No. 144933, 3 July 2002, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
People v. Abriol, supra, note 40 at 357.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |
