THIRD DIVISION.
.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
141631
April 4, 2003
-versus-
FERDINAND
FRANCISCO,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:
This is an appeal from
the decision[1]
dated May 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch
31, finding herein appellant, Ferdinand Francisco, guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P50,000 and attorney’s fees in
the amount of P10,000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Based on a criminal
complaint filed by private complainant Rose Francisco (Rose, for
brevity), appellant was charged on May 11, 1995 with the crime of rape
in an information that read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The undersigned Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, on the basis of the sworn criminal complaint
filed
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Agoo Branch, Agoo, La
Union,
by the offended party Rose Ollero-Francisco assisted by Laureano
Francisco
which criminal complaint is hereby made as an integral part hereof,
accuses
FERDINAND FRANCISCO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about the
month of May 1994, in the Municipality of Pugo, Province of La Union,
Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused,
with lewd design, did then and there, by means of force and
intimidation
and against the will and consent of the aforenamed offended woman ROSE
OLLERO-FRANCISCO, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic)
carnal
knowledge of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to law.[2]
During appellant’s arraignment
on July 17, 1995, he pleaded not guilty.cralaw:red
Appellant filed a petition
for bail on the ground that the evidence against him was not strong.
After
conducting a hearing, the trial court issued a resolution[3]
dated January 21, 1998 denying the petition for bail.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The evidence of the
prosecution shows that, at the time of the rape, Rose was a 27-year-old
mother of four. Inasmuch as she did not even finish Grade 1, she
does not know how to read and write.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the morning of May
7, 1994, Rose was gathering baguio beans in her garden in the mountain
of Cagaling, Palina, La Union, together with her 7-year-old son whom
she
left to sleep in a bamboo bed. She claimed that appellant came from
behind,
suddenly grabbed her with his left hand and punched her in the abdomen
with his right hand rendering her unconscious.[5]
Upon regaining consciousness, she noticed that she was no longer
wearing
her pants and panty. The appellant was seated beside her. She felt pain
in her buttocks and thighs, and noticed that her vagina was wet and
slippery
due to the white substance oozing from her buttocks. Appellant
threatened
to kill her and her entire family if she revealed the incident to her
husband.[6]
The appellant then left. When she and her son were on their way home,
she
noticed that blood was flowing down her thighs. She realized that she
was
suffering a miscarriage since she was then pregnant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rose told Laureano Francisco,
her husband, only about the miscarriage but not about the rape because
of the threats made by appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the early morning
of November 2, 1994, Rose was awakened from her sleep by someone
outside
the house trying to open the door. Laureano saw and recognized the
intruder
as herein appellant. When Laureano shouted at appellant, the
latter
hurriedly left. Rose cried and asked for help while Laureano started
shouting
outside. When Laureano saw Rose crying, she narrated to him the rape
that
occurred on May 7, 1994. Her husband cried after hearing her story.[7]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That same day, Rose
and Laureano went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for
brevity)
to report the crime.[8]
She executed a sworn statement and, the next day, subjected herself to
a medical examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore.[9]
During her medical examination, Dr. Llavore asked her why she reported
the rape incident only after six months from its commission. She
replied
that she was afraid of the death threats made by appellant.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rose testified that
she suffered mental anguish due to this incident.cralaw:red
For his defense, appellant
denied the charges, invoked that he and Rose were lovers and tried to
discredit
her testimony by pointing out the delay in, and her ill-motives for,
filing
the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant testified
that Rose is his cousin-in-law, Laureano being his first cousin. He
denied
raping her on May 7, 1994.[11]
Instead, he claimed that he began a secret love affair with her
sometime
in April, 1994 when she went to his house to ask him to testify in a
criminal
case involving the murder of her father. In exchange for this favor,
Rose
offered to have sexual intercourse with appellant. Appellant refused
but,
just the same, she still desired to make love to him. Appellant acceded
and they had sexual intercourse in his house.[12]
They again had sexual intercourse at the Pugo Cemetery at about 11:00
a.m.
also in April, 1994.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the barangay
elections on May 9, 1994, or two days after the alleged rape incident,
Rose and Laureano went to appellant’s house to invite the latter to be
an official watcher of Laureano who was then campaigning for the
position
of barangay kagawad. Appellant agreed. In the morning of election day,
appellant went to Precinct 16, Barrio Palina, Pugo, La Union, and acted
as the official watcher of Laureano. Rose even brought him food for
lunch.[14]
To support his claim, appellant presented the minutes of the voting and
counting of votes which showed his handwritten name and his designation
as the watcher of Laureano. Although Araceli Suyat (Acting Election
Registrar)
and Yolanda Queral (Chairman of Precinct 16, Barrio Palina, Pugo, La
Union)
testified on the authenticity of the document, they told the court that
they did not know appellant personally.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lorna Francisco, the
appellant’s wife, corroborated her husband’s testimony. She also went
to
the polling place, voted and gave appellant his lunch.[16]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pablito Francisco,
the father of appellant, testified that, after the election, Rose and
Laureano
went to the house he (Pablito) was renting. They asked Pablito to let
their
son live with him considering that his house was near Pugo Catholic
School,
the school where their son was studying. Her son stayed with
appellant’s
father from June up to November, 1994. During that short period of
time,
Rose visited her son and brought him food once a week. During her
visits,
Pablito did not notice anything unusual in her. In one instance even,
Rose,
appellant and Lorna Francisco (appellant’s wife) met by chance at his
house
where they cooked and ate together.[17]
Lorna Francisco corroborated Pablito’s testimony and added that, prior
to the filing of the case, their relationship with private complainant
went along fine.[18]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In response to the
allegation that he attempted to surreptitiously enter Rose’s house,
appellant
testified that, on November 1, 1994, Rose told him to go to her house
the
next morning as Laureano would not be around. At about 7:00 or 8:00
a.m.
on November 2, 1994, appellant went to Rose’s house but when he saw
Laureano
at the gate, he went away.[19]
It was only on November 2, 1994 that the charge of rape was filed
because
it was only on that day that Laureano found out about their
extra-marital
affair. According to appellant, Rose herself revealed their illicit
relationship
to her husband.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After the defense offered
its evidence, the prosecution again presented Rose to rebut the
testimonies
of the defense witnesses. She denied all the details of appellant’s
testimony,
specially his claim that they were maintaining an illicit love affair.
She denied engaging in consensual sexual relations with appellant. She
denied ever going to appellant’s house to convince him to testify in
the
criminal case involving her father’s murder by offering sexual
intercourse
in return. Crying, she explained that she would not stoop so low as to
sacrifice her and her family’s honor despite their poverty.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rose belied the testimonies
of the defense witnesses that she went with her husband to convince
appellant
to be her husband’s election watcher. She further testified that
she never brought appellant food on election day considering that she
was
at home still bleeding as a result of the miscarriage; that she never
went
to Pablito’s residence to bring food to her son; and that she never
cooked
and ate lunch with Lorna Francisco and appellant in Pablito’s
residence.
She clarified that it was her younger brother and her husband who
brought
food to her son in Pablito’s house every Sunday afternoon. She never
went
there because she was afraid of appellant.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 7, 1999, the
trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crime of
rape.
The dispositive portion of the decision read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, this Court
finds accused FERDINAND FRANCISCO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape and is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is also
ordered to pay damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00)
to Rose Ollero Francisco as indemnity and to pay the attorney’s fees of
the Private Prosecutor in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS.
(P10,000.00).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[23]
In finding appellant
guilty of the crime of rape, the trial court relied heavily on the
credibility
of Rose’s testimony and held that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Judge of this Court
believed her. Her answers to questions were straightforward. In sum,
her
story was unswerving and plain. The Judge of this Court was looking for
something in her that would give her away if she was just acting her
part
but there was none. When she cried and wiped away the tears, the
Defense
Counsel derided the tears as crocodile’s tears. The Court does not
agree.
They were real tears. The could only well in someone’s eyes by a
chemistry
that is hard to explain but all the same they came out because of
genuine
emotions, a finding and a conclusion that can only be made by someone
who
had been in the battlefield called courtroom for 20 years.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The other points raised
by the Defense that the rape charge was a concoction what with the
asseverations
by the Defense that accused was a watcher of private complainant’s
husband
on May 9, 1994 when said husband ran for punong barangay, that private
complainant’s son, Raul, was lodged at accused’s father’s place when
said
son was studying in the town, that private complainant brought food for
the watchers which included accused during the election day for punong
barangay on May 1, 1994 et cetera are considered by this Court as
peripheral
defenses that do not necessarily rule out the commission of rape
precisely
because of fear.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
If this rape was
untrue,
Rose Ollero Francisco could have easily hid this incident for anyway
the
accused is a relative of her husband. This incident could have been
easily
patched up by the elders so as to eschew public embarrassment but still
she chose to pursue this case and consequently, as the Supreme Court
said
in the case of People v. Borce, G.R. No. 124131, April 22, 1998, opened
"herself and her family to public scrutiny and embarrassment, let alone
send an innocent man possibly to the gallows for no strong reason at
all".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Also, the theory of
the accused that this rape case was filed or initiated sometime
in
November 1994 because the accused did not want to be a witness for the
prosecution in the case of People v. Nalica, et. al. has no foundation
because by that time in November 1994, two persons emerged to be
witnesses
for the prosecution, who in fact executed their Sworn Statements on May
10, 1994. They were Hipolito Saoyao and Marcelino Viloria. This Court
was
the court that tried the case of murder wherein private complainant’s
father
was murdered in 1984, but which case was filed only in 1994 when two
persons,
after (10) years, emerged to testify.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
xxx
xxx
xxx
Hence, this appeal on
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT FEARED FOR HER LIFE, HUSBAND (SIC) AND
OTHER MEMBERS OF HER FAMILY (SIC) IN REPORTING THE INCIDENT TO ANY
MEMBERS
OF HER FAMILY, BARANGAY OFFICERS AND OTHER POLICE AUTHORITIES FOR A
PERIOD
OF SIX MONTHS (FROM MAY 7, 1994 TO NOVEMBER 2, 1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED.[24]
We affirm appellant’s
conviction.cralaw:red
Appellant’s defense
is anchored to impugning the credibility of private complainant by
invoking
"the sweetheart theory." It is supported by a general denial of the
accusation
that he raped Rose on May 7, 1994.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant capitalizes
on the fact that private complainant allowed six months from May 7,
1994
(the date of the rape) to elapse before she filed the complaint. We
have
ruled that delay in making a criminal accusation does not impair the
credibility
of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.[25]
Appellant maintains that Rose did not give a satisfactory explanation
for
the delay in the filing of the criminal complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to Rose, she
did not immediately file the case because she was afraid of appellant’s
threats. Appellant, however, questioned the existence of fear by
pointing
out the following circumstances: (1) although appellant lived 3
kilometers
away from Rose’s house, she did not report the crime to the police
authorities
or to the barangay officials; (2) she also failed to disclose the rape
incident to her mother and siblings despite the fact that they were
neighbors
and they often conversed with each other; and (3) she frequently
visited
her son who resided in the house of appellant’s father and, at one
time,
even dined with appellant and his wife.cralaw:red
The issue raised in
the first assignment of error questions the credibility of Rose and the
appreciation of facts by the trial court. Well-entrenched is the rule
that
the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed
on appeal. This is so because the trial court had the advantage of
observing
the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood,
such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of
a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the
forthright
tone of a ready reply; of the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame,
the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant
or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.[26]
In the case at bar,
the trial court ruled that private complainant sufficiently proved fear
to explain the delay in the filing of the complaint for rape. The trial
court found her answers to the questions as straightforward, unswerving
and plain without any indication that she was fabricating a story.
Also,
the trial court took note of the fact that the victim cried. In
refuting
appellant’s claim that her tears were feigned, the trial court held
that
"they (complainant’s tears) could only well in someone’s eyes by a
chemistry
that is hard to explain but all the same they came out because of
genuine
emotions, a finding and a conclusion that can only be made by someone
who
had been in the battlefield called courtroom for 20 years."[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We adopt the trial court’s
findings of fact and assessment of Rose’s credibility. Appellant’s
claim
that the victim could have taken advantage of countless opportunities
to
report the rape incident to her family, the police or barangay
officials
(but did not) does not, by itself, negate the presence of fear.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is
sufficient that the victim is intimidated by the fear that, if she does
not yield to the bestial demands of the appellant, something will
happen
to her at that moment, or even after, as when she is threatened with
death
if she reports the incident.[28]
In the instant case, Rose explained in detail the fear which compelled
her to keep quiet about the crime for six months. She was afraid that
appellant
would harm not only her, but also her husband, her mother and siblings.
To quote from the records, she testified as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
R E - D
I R E C T
ATTY. RIVERA:
Q. You said
that you did not narrate the alleged rape that was made against
yourself
by the accused in this case, (sic) you said that you were afraid, why
are
(sic) you afraid?
A.
The reasons why I’m afraid to tell to anyone, sir, because, first,
about
my miscarriage and the second is that he threated (sic) me to
kill
us (sic) including my family, sir.cralaw:red
Q. Who treated
(sic) you?
A.
Ferdinand Francisco, sir.cralaw:red
Q. If Ferdinand
Francisco is here, will you kindly point at him?
A.
(The witness is going down from the witness stand and point [sic] to
the
accused Ferdinand Francisco).cralaw:red
ATTY. RIVERA:
That would be all for the witness.cralaw:red
COURT:
Re-cross.cralaw:red
ATTY. RODRIGO:
Yes, Your Honor.cralaw:red
R E - C
R O S S
ATTY. RODRIGO:
Q. You testified
a while ago that the accused (sic) residence in relation to your house
is approximately 3 kilometers, (sic) my point is, now, while you were
in
conversation with any of your relative (sic) you still fear (sic)
Ferdinand
Francisco who was not present within the premises while you were
talking
with your brother?
A.
I’m afraid to tell that anybody (sic) because every morning my husband
is (sic) always going to the field and maybe he might met (sic) this
Ferdinand
Francisco that’s why he might do something to him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q. What
about your mother, does she also go to the field everyday that is why
you
were afraid to narrate what happened. (sic)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ATTY. RIVERA:
We will object to that,
Your Honor.cralaw:red
COURT:
OVERRULED. WITNESS
MAY ANSWER.cralaw:red
A.
Also in another field, sir.cralaw:red
ATTY. RODRIGO:
Q. Where
is that field or bangkag located?
A.
At the same barrio, sir.cralaw:red
Q. Will
you tell us on point of kilometer or meters how far is that bangkag to
the house of the accused?
A.
Around 3 kilometers because he just (sic) the neighbor where she is
working,
sir.cralaw:red
Q. What
about your sister, were you afraid for her life also that is why you
did
not narrate what happened to you on May 7, 1994?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A.
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q. The same
is through (sic) with your brother you were afraid for the life of your
brother, is that correct?
A.
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q. If you
are afraid to (sic) the accused why did you immediately remove your son
from the house of the parents of.cralaw:red
ATTY. RIVERA:
That is already not.cralaw:red
COURT:
Alright, that is not
allowed anymore.[29]
(Underscoring
supplied)
Thus, Rose was worried
about the possible confrontation between her husband and appellant who
both went to work everyday in the same place. Likewise, she feared that
appellant might harm her mother, considering that the field where her
mother
worked was located in the same barrio where appellant resided.
Her
fears were real and justified.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, Rose, is
illiterate.[30]
People of ordinary intelligence can normally act rationally and not let
their emotions interfere with their perception of the best course of
action
in a particular situation. However, in the case at bar, private
complainant’s
intellectual shortcomings and fear deprived her of the better judgment
of reporting the incident to the proper authorities or her own family.
Private complainant took appellant’s threats very seriously and found
it
better to momentarily sacrifice the vindication of her honor than risk
harm and reprisal against her and her loved ones. Indeed, there is no
standard
form of behavior that can be expected of rape victims after they have
been
defiled because people react differently to emotional stress. This
experience
is relative and may be dealt with in many ways by the victim depending
on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with
any
modicum of doubt.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant points out
the inconsistency between the victim’s earlier testimony that, after
the
rape incident, she was always accompanied by her husband, and her
subsequent
testimony that she used to go alone to Pablito’s house to fetch her son
or bring food to him. We view this discrepancy as a minor matter that
did
not weaken private complainant’s testimony. It did not delve into the
rape
incident itself. It also did not disprove fear during the time that
private
complainant remained silent. It hardly mattered whether or not private
complainant went to Pablito’s house after the rape for the reason that
said house was not the appellant’s. In fact, appellant lived in the
mountain,
far from his father’s house. Private complainant was afraid of
appellant,
not Pablito.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant also tried
to impugn the credibility of private complainant by presenting the
election
officers who purportedly attested to his presence in the precinct
during
the barangay elections of May 9, 1994, contrary to her claim that
appellant
was not a watcher of her husband. We disagree. First, Rose never denied
appellant’s presence as a watcher in the polling place. In fact, she
was
not competent to testify on the matter because she did not go to the
polling
place on election day to see for herself who were the persons who acted
as watchers for her husband. When asked whether she was aware of
the fact that appellant served as a watcher, private complainant
replied
that she only knew of two persons who acted as watchers - her husband’s
sister and sister-in-law. But she also testified that when her husband
arrived after the elections, he told her that appellant also worked as
his watcher.[32]
Second, the election officers did not personally know appellant and
therefore
could not have categorically confirmed his presence in the polling
place.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aside from failing to
cast doubt on private complainant’s credibility, appellant could not
prove
his "sweetheart defense." No one corroborated this self-serving
assertion.
No independent evidence such as love letters, mementos or pictures was
ever presented to prove his alleged relationship with private
complainant.
As we have consistently ruled, the affirmative defense of love affair
needs
to be supported by substantial evidence other than the bare assertions
of appellant.[33]
In People vs. Cepeda,[34]
where the private complainant and the appellant were also both married,
this Court held that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
If accused-appellant
were really the paramour of private complainant, she would not have
gone
to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably exposed
her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her
womanhood.
Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is allegedly her
lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open
their
illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention the
ire
of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were
it not the truth.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Evidence to be believed
must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in
itself such as one that the common experience and observation of
mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has taken
judicial
cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by
custom
and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great
caution
is observed so that their reputation remains untainted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since it was duly proven
that appellant committed the crime of rape by means of force against
Rose,
we affirm the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on him
pursuant
to Article 335[35]
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In addition to the trial
court’s award of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and attorney’s
fees
amounting to P10,000, we award to the victim the amount of P50,000 as
moral
damages. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 are automatically
granted in rape cases without need of proof for it is assumed that the
victim suffered moral injury entitling her to such an award.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, finding
appellant
Ferdinand Francisco GUILTY of the crime of rape and sentencing him to
suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000, is
hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that moral damages of P50,000 shall
also
be awarded to the victim, Rose Ollero-Francisco.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Clifton U. Ganay; Rollo, pp. 356-372.
[2]
Id., p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id., pp. 202-203.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
TSN, June 3, 1996, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1995, p. 13.
[5]
TSN, August 21, 1995, pp. 1-4, 20-21.
[6]
Id., pp. 4-5, 12, 22-23, 30.
[7]
Id., pp. 9-11; TSN, March 15, 1999, pp. 7-9.
[8]
TSN, August 21, 1995, pp. 6-7.
[9]
Id., pp. 9-11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
TSN, March 15, 1999, p. 27.
[11]
TSN, February 14, 1997, p. 4.
[12]
Id., pp. 5-10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id., pp. 17-18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
TSN, February 12, 1999, pp. 3-8.
[15]
TSN, October 28, 1998, pp. 4-7; TSN, November 16, 1998, pp. 1-5,7, 10.
[16]
TSN, January 25, 1999, pp. 1-12.
[17]
TSN, January 15, 1999, pp. 2-11.
[18]
TSN, January 25, 1999, p. 12.
[19]
TSN, February 14, 1997, p. 14.
[20]
Id., pp. 12-13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
TSN, March 12, 1999, pp. 3-7.
[22]
Id., pp. 7-14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Rollo, pp. 16-17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id., pp. 79-80.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
People vs. Tanail, 323 SCRA 667, 675 [2000]; People vs. Narido,
316
SCRA 131 [1999].
[26]
People vs. Bertulfo, G.R. No. 143790, May 7, 2002; People vs.
Abella,
339 SCRA 129, 144-145 [2000].
[27]
Rollo, p. 37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
People vs. de los Santos, G.R. No. 137968, November 6, 2001;
People
vs. Geromo, 321 SCRA 355, 364 [1999].
[29]
TSN, January 8, 1999, pp. 11-14.
[30]
TSN, November 13, 1995, pp. 12-13.
[31]
People vs. Lomerio, 326 SCRA 530, 549-550 [2000]; People vs. Tahop, 315
SCRA 465, 473 [1999].
[32]
TSN, March 15, 1999, p. 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
People vs. Cepeda, 324 SCRA 290, 297-298 [2000].
[34]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
(1)
By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason
or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years
of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
[36]
People vs. Supnad, G.R. Nos. 133791-94. August 8, 2001; People
vs.
Alba, 302 SCRA 811 [1999].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |