THIRD DIVISION
BASILIO RIVERA,
TOMAS
RIVERA,CORNELIO
RIVERA
AND LADISLAO RIVERA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
141863
June 26, 2003
-versus-
THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS,
AND
SPOUSES DANILO
DEATO AND DIVINA LEGASPI,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
CORONA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a Petition
for Review of the Resolution[1]
dated October 8, 1999 of the Court of Appeals[2]
denying petitioners’ Motion for New Trial on the ground that the
document
sought to be introduced is not a newly discovered evidence.
The facts of the case
follow.cralaw:red
On December 28, 1993,
petitioners Basiliso Rivera, Tomas Rivera, Cornelio Rivera and Ladislao
Rivera filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Branch
75, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4275-V-93 for quieting of
title
and ownership with cancellation of title against respondent spouses
Danilo
and Divina Deato.cralaw:red
In their complaint,
petitioners claimed ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription
over
Lot 7 of the Malinta Estate, situated in the province of Bulacan.cralaw:red
On the other hand, respondent
spouses claimed that the said lot was bought as patrimonial property by
Calixto Bautista from the Republic of the Philippines. When
Calixto
died, his daughter, Beatriz Bautista, inherited the same. Upon
the
death of Beatriz, her heirs had the said lot titled in their name
and
thereafter sold it to herein respondent Danilo Beata.
Accordingly,
TCT No. V-24759 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela,
Metro
Manila, in favor of the respondent spouses.cralaw:red
Respondent spouses contend
that petitioners are the agricultural tenants of Lot 7 of the
Malinta
Estate whom they agreed to pay disturbance compensation just to vacate
the property. Later on, however, petitioners changed their mind
and
decided to sue respondents, claiming ownership over the said property.cralaw:red
On April 28, 1995, the
trial court rendered a decision[3]
in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered the plaintiffs’ claim having been established by
the
quantum of evidence which is preponderance of evidence, judgment is
hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs BASILISO RIVERA, TOMAS RIVERA, CORNELIO
RIVERA and LADISLAO RIVERA and against defendants-spouses Danilo Deato
and Divina Legaspi and thus declare:
(1) the
plaintiffs
as the rightful owners of lot 7 of the Malinta Estate;chanrobles virtual law library
(2) the titles
and tax
declarations issued to the defendants-spouses and their
predecessors-in-interest
commencing from Beatriz Bernabe as null and void and the cancellation
of
the same by the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and a new
title be issue (sic) to herein plaintiffs;chanrobles virtual law library
(3) the
defendants to
pay the plaintiffs the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos by was
of attorney’s fees and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) PESOS by way of
moral damages.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[4]
Respondent spouses
filed
a motion for reconsideration. After petitioners filed their comment,
the
trial court reversed its earlier judgment and ruled in favor of
respondent
spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and finding the instant Motion for Reconsideration
to be in Order, another Order/Decision is hereby entered as follows:
viz-
(1)
ORDERING, this Court’s Decision dated April 28 1995, as vacated or is
hereby
set-aside, and a new one is hereby entered as follows: viz -
(a)
Declaring
the defendants as the true and lawful owners of that parcel of land
situated
at Bignay, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, presently covered by or embraced
in
TCT no. V- 24759 of the Registry of Deeds for Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
with an area of 44,300 square meters, more or less;
(b) Declaring
defendants’
present title over subject property, TCT V-24759 of the Registry of
Deeds
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, as valid, legal and subsisting; and -chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Declaring
plaintiffs
and all persons claiming rights under them, to respect the title of the
defendants over subject property, and ordering said plaintiffs and all
persons claiming rights under them, to peacefully surrender possession
of subject landholding to defendants.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in a decision[6]
dated April 20, 1999. On May 14, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration
to which respondent spouses filed their comment. On July 1, 1999, Atty.
Bienvenido M. Tagorio, for and in behalf of petitioners, filed a motion
to enter appearance together with a motion for leave to file and admit
motion for new trial. The respondent spouses filed their comment
thereto
which elicited a reply from the petitioners. On October 8, 1999, the
appellate
court issued the assailed resolution, to wit:
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x.
After a judicious
consideration
of the Appellant’s motions, (a) Appellants’ ‘Motion to Withdraw Motion
for Reconsideration’ is granted and their ‘Motion for Reconsideration’
is deemed withdrawn. Anent Appellants’ ‘Motion for Leave to file Motion
for New Trial,’ the same is granted. Acting on the ‘motion to admit
motion
for new trial,’ the same is hereby denied. The document sought to
introduced
(sic) by the Appellants (a) is not a newly-discovered evidence; (b)
contrary
to and eschews Appellants’ theory in the Court a quo and in this Court.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners then filed
the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil
Procedure raising a lone assignment of error: I
WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR (SIC) IN CONCLUDING THAT THE GROUND
RAISED
BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR APPLICATION FOR NEW TRIAL IS BASED ON NEWLY
DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR INCOMPETENCE OF THEIR
PREVIOUS
COUNSEL TO PRESENT IN EVIDENCE THE ASSIGNMENT OF SALES CERTIFICATE NO.
668 DATED MAY 26, 1909 BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.[8]
After respondent spouses
filed their comment and supplemental comment with leave of court,
petitioners
filed a reply. On January 5, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for leave
to file supplemental petition with entry of appearance of Atty. Jose
Reyes,
another collaborating counsel for petitioners. Attached to the motion
was
petitioners’ supplemental petition. On February 12, 2001, this
Court
issued a resolution[9]
granting the motion and noting the supplemental petition which posits
two
additional assignments of errors, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO ADMIT MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’ TITLE TO THE LOT IN QUESTION DESPITE
THE
PATENT ERRORS THEREIN.[10]
Petitioners filed the
present petition to question the resolution of the appellate court
denying
their motion for new trial. They allege that the appellate court
erroneously ruled that their motion for new trial was premised on newly
discovered evidence when in fact the basis of their contention was the
excusable negligence committed by their previous counsel, Atty. Braulio
Darum. They argue that Section 1, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
considers excusable negligence as one of the grounds for new trial.
According
to petitioners, their previous counsel committed gross negligence in
failing
to present in evidence Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 668 dated
May
25, 1909 which is material to establishing their right of ownership
over
the subject lot. They contend that said document belonged to their
grandmother
and served as their title over the subject parcel of land. They allege
that during the trial of the case, their former counsel, Atty. Darum,
deliberately
disregarded said document in favor of his own erroneous theory of the
case
— that their title to the land was based on prescription. Darum
overlooked
the fact that the said mode of acquiring ownership cannot prevail over
titled property as in the case at bar. Branding Atty. Darum’s action as
gross negligence, petitioners invoke the ruling of this Court in
Legarda
vs. Court of Appeals[11]
rendered on March 18, 1991 where we held that losing the case because
of
the gross negligence of counsel was tantamount to depriving the client
of the latter’s property without due process of law.cralaw:red
We deny the petition.cralaw:red
The instant petition
for review seeking a reversal of the resolution denying petitioners’
motion
for new trial is an erroneous remedy. Section 1, Rule 41 of the
1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Section 1. Subject
of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.cralaw:red
No appeal may be taken
from:
(a) An order denying
a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
In all the above instances
where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
(Emphasis supplied.)chanrobles virtual law library
In Oro vs. Judge Diaz,[12]
we held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of
due
process. Rather, it is a procedural remedy of statutory origin
and,
as such, may be availed only in the manner prescribed by the provisions
of law authorizing its exercise. We thus cannot confer on
petitioners
a right that the Rules of Court does not give and in fact even
prohibits.cralaw:red
Interlocutory orders,
like a resolution denying a motion for new trial, cannot be the subject
of an appeal. What must be appealed is the judgment which
completely
disposes of the case. Petitioners should have joined the denial of said
motion as an additional assignment of error in a petition for review of
the judgment that finally and completely disposed of the case.[13]
Clearly, the assailed resolution in the case at bar is a non-appealable
order. Petitioners cannot by right seek a reversal of such order
without
formally disputing the decision on the merits.cralaw:red
According to petitioners,
the prohibition in Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does
not
apply in the present case because said rule is only applicable to a
judgment
or final order of the Regional Trial Court and not to a final order or
resolution issued by the Court of Appeals. We disagree.cralaw:red
It must be emphasized
that Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
crafted
by this Court to codify the long-established jurisprudence prohibiting
an appeal from an interlocutory order such as an order denying a motion
for new trial. Inasmuch as a petition for review is similar to an
ordinary
appeal of a decision of the Regional Trial Court in that both are modes
of appeal, the prohibition against appeals from interlocutory orders
applies
to petitions for review as well. The common objective of the
prohibition,
that is, to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, applies
to
both modes of appeal.[14]
Thus, whether issued by a trial court or an appellate court,
interlocutory
orders cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment
that
completely or finally disposes of the case. The only alternative remedy
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.chanrobles virtual law library
Assuming arguendo that
petitioners are allowed to appeal said resolution, we find no excusable
negligence to merit the grant of a new trial. Petitioners consider as
gross
negligence their previous counsel’s failure to present Assignment of
Sales
Certificate No. 668 dated May 25, 1909 issued in favor of their
grandmother,
and his erroneous reliance on the theory that petitioners owned the
subject
lot by virtue of acquisitive prescription. However, as a general rule,
the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his
case and he cannot therefore complain that the result of the litigation
might have been otherwise had his counsel proceeded differently.
It has been held time and again that blunders and mistakes made in the
conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for
new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for
re-opening
cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel
could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium
on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a
view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.[15]
The 1991 Legarda Decision[16]
invoked by petitioners does not buttress their cause because it was
already
reversed by our Resolution[17]
dated October 16, 1997. We held in said Resolution that the final
judgments
being disputed in the case could no longer be nullified despite the
gross
negligence of Legarda’s counsel. First, nullifying the subject
decisions
would unjustly deprive the innocent purchasers for value of the
property
subject of the case which they acquired after the finality of said
decisions.
It would violate the right to due process of the innocent purchasers
for
value who were neither impleaded nor given an opportunity to file their
answer. Apart from this, the Torrens system made their title
conclusive
and indefeasible. Second, Legarda was given the opportunity to
defend
her interests in due course and thus could not be said to have been
denied
due process of law. The order of default, the execution sale and
the decision on her petition to annul judgment were all done without
any
irregularity. She was even partly at fault; she was
constructively
notified of the auction sales that were duly published but she failed
to
attend the proceedings to redeem her property. We also held that
"(i)f she may be said to be ‘innocent’ because she was ignorant of the
acts of negligence of her counsel, with more reason are the respondents
truly ‘innocent.’ As between two parties who may lose due to the
negligence
or incompetence of the counsel of one, the party who was responsible
for
making it happen should suffer the consequences."chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar,
the acts of Atty. Darum could not even qualify as gross negligence.
Petitioners
were duly represented by and heard through Atty. Darum, petitioners’
previous
counsel, who filed the necessary pleadings and actively participated in
the trial. Although he advocated an erroneous legal position, the
effects
thereof, which did not amount to a deprivation of their right to be
heard,
must bind petitioners. The question is not whether petitioners
succeeded
in defending their interests, but whether petitioners had the
opportunity
to present their side.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. (now Associate Justice
of
this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Quirino Abad-Santos
and Mariano Umali; Rollo, p.20.
[2]
Sixth Division.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Penned by Judge Jaime Bautista.
[4]
Rollo, p. 112.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Rollo, p. 129.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 119-141.
[7]
Rollo, p. 20.
[8]
Rollo, p. 14.
[9]
Rollo, p. 143.
[10]
Rollo, p. 89.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
195 SCRA 418 [1991].chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Sta. Ana vs. Sta. Ana, 28 Phil. 65, 67 [1914].chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Pagtakhan vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 SCRA 455 [1971], citing
the former Section 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court; People vs. Doriques, 24
SCRA 167 [1968]; Ramos vs. Ardant Trading Corporation, 23 SCRA 947
[1968];
Sy vs. Dalman, 22 SCRA 834 [1968]; Chuatoco vs. Aragon, 22 SCRA 346
[1968];
People vs. Macandog, 7 SCRA 195 [1963]; Bautista vs. De la Cruz, 9 SCRA
725 [1963]; Harrison Foundry & Machinery vs. Harrison Foundry
Workers
Association, 8 SCRA 430 [1963]; Phil. Refining Co., Inc. vs. Ponce, 99
Phil. 269 [1956]; PLDT Employees Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers
Union,
97 Phil. 424 [1955]; Sitchon vs. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil.
397 [1948].chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 135330, August 31, 2000; U.S. vs.
Umali,
15 Phil. 33 [1910].chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
The facts of the case showed that the counsel defaulted in filing an
answer
to the complaint; the consequence was an order of default. And when
judgment
was rendered against his client, he allowed the same to become final
and
executory. Morever, he did nothing to prevent the public auction sale
of
the subject property and issuance of a certificate of sale in favor of
the opposing party. Although he subsequently filed a petition to annul
the judgment, he nevertheless allowed the adverse judgment of the
appellate
court to lapse.
[17]
280 SCRA 642 [1997].chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Villa Rhecar Bus vs. de la Cruz, 157 SCRA 13 [1988]. |