Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
143643
June 27, 2003
-versus-
SPOUSES JOSE C.
CAMPOS, JR.chanrobles virtual law libraryAND
MA. CLARA
LOPEZ-CAMPOS,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review of the Decision[1]
dated June 16, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54265.
The assailed decision affirmed in toto the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98, which
ordered
petitioner National Power Corporation to pay, among others, actual,
moral
and nominal damages in the total amount of P1,980,000 to respondents
Spouses
Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Ma. Clara A. Lopez-Campos.
The petition at bar
stemmed from the following antecedents:
On February 2, 1996,
the respondents filed with the court a quo an action for sum of money
and
damages against the petitioner. In their complaint, the
respondents
alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo.
San
Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite, consisting of 66,819 square meters
("subject property") covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-957323. Sometime in the middle of 1970, Dr. Paulo C. Campos,
who
was then the President of the Cavite Electric Cooperative and brother
of
respondent Jose C. Campos, Jr., verbally requested the respondents to
grant
the petitioner a right-of-way over a portion of the subject
property.
Wooden electrical posts and transmission lines were to be installed for
the electrification of Puerto Azul. The respondents acceded to
this
request upon the condition that the said installation would only be
temporary
in nature. The petitioner assured the respondents that the
arrangement
would be temporary and that the wooden electric posts would be
relocated
as soon as permanent posts and transmission lines shall have been
installed.
Contrary to the verbal agreement of the parties, however, the
petitioner
continued to use the subject property for its wooden electrical posts
and
transmission lines without compensating the respondents therefor.[3]chanrobles virtual law library
The complaint likewise
alleged that some time in 1994, the petitioner’s agents trespassed on
the
subject property and conducted engineering surveys thereon. The
respondents’
caretaker asked these agents to leave the property. Thereafter,
in
1995, a certain "Mr. Raz," who claimed to be the petitioner’s agent,
went
to the office of respondent Jose C. Campos, Jr., then Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, and requested permission from the latter to enter
the subject property and conduct a survey in connection with the
petitioner’s
plan to erect an all-steel transmission line tower on a 24-square meter
area inside the subject property. Respondent Jose Campos, Jr.,
refused
to grant the permission and expressed his preference to talk to the
Chief
of the Calaca Sub-station or the head of the petitioner’s Quezon City
office.
The respondents did not hear from "Mr. Raz" or any one from the
petitioner’s
office since then. Sometime in July or August of 1995, the
petitioner’s
agents again trespassed on the subject property, presenting to the
respondents’
caretaker a letter of authority purportedly written by respondent Jose
C. Campos, Jr. When the caretaker demanded that the letter be
given
to him for verification with respondent Jose C. Campos, Jr. himself,
the
petitioner’s agents refused to do so. Consequently, the caretaker
ordered the agents to leave the subject property.[4]
The complaint further
alleged that on December 12, 1995, the petitioner instituted an
expropriation
case involving the subject property before the RTC of Imus, Cavite,
Branch
22. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1174-95. The
petitioner
alleged in its complaint therein that the subject property was selected
"in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least
private
injury" and that it (petitioner) had tried to negotiate with the
respondents
for the acquisition of the right-of-way easement on the subject
property
but that the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.[5]
The respondents maintained
that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegations, there were other more
suitable
or appropriate sites for the petitioner’s all-steel transmission lines
and that the petitioner chose the subject property in a whimsical and
capricious
manner. The respondents averred that the proposed right-of-way
was
not the least injurious to them as the system design prepared by the
petitioner
could be further revised to avoid having to traverse the subject
property.
The respondents vigorously denied negotiating with the petitioner in
connection
with the latter’s acquisition of a right-of-way on the subject property.[6]chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, the complaint
alleged that unaware of the petitioner’s intention to expropriate a
portion
of the subject property, the respondents sold the same to Solar
Resources,
Inc. As a consequence, the respondents stand to lose a
substantial
amount of money derived from the proceeds of the sale of the subject
property
should the buyer (Solar Resources, Inc.) decide to annul the sale
because
of the contemplated expropriation of the subject property.[7]
The complaint a quo
thus prayed that the petitioner be adjudged liable to pay the
respondents,
among others, actual, nominal and moral damages:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court
award the plaintiffs:
a.
Actual damages for the use of defendants’ property since middle 1970’s,
including legal interest thereon, as may be established during the
trial;
b.
P1,000,000.00 as nominal damages;chanrobles virtual law library
c.
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;chanrobles virtual law library
d.
Lost business opportunity as may be established during the trial;chanrobles virtual law library
e.
P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees;chanrobles virtual law library
f.
Costs of suit.
Plaintiffs pray for
other,
further and different reliefs as may be just and equitable under the
premises.[8]
Upon receipt of the
summons and complaint, the petitioner moved for additional time to file
its responsive pleading. However, instead of filing an answer to
the complaint, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that
the action had prescribed and that there was another action pending
between
the same parties for the same cause (litis pendencia). The
respondents
opposed said motion. On May 2, 1996, the RTC issued an order
denying
the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.cralaw:red
The petitioner then
moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. The respondents
opposed the same and moved to declare the petitioner in default on the
ground that its motion for reconsideration did not have the required
notice
of hearing; hence, it did not toll the running of the reglementary
period
to file an answer.cralaw:red
On July 15, 1996, the
RTC issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Subsequently, on July 24, 1996, it issued another order granting the
respondents’
motion and declared the petitioner in default for its failure to file
an
answer. The petitioner filed a motion to set aside the order of default
but the same was denied by the RTC.cralaw:red
The petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41782, assailing the
May
2, 1996, July 15, 1996 and July 24, 1996 Orders issued by the RTC as
having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion and to enjoin it from
proceeding
with the case. On February 13, 1996, the CA dismissed the
petition
for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction filed by the
petitioner
in CA-G.R. SP No. 41782.cralaw:red
In the meantime, the
respondents adduced their evidence ex parte in the RTC. As
synthesized
by the trial court, the respondents adduced evidence, thus:
From the evidence thus
far submitted, it appears that the plaintiffs spouses, both of whom
professional
of high standing in society, are the absolute owners of a certain
parcel
of land situated in Bo. San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
consisting
of 66,819 square meters, more or less, covered and embraced in TCT No.
T-95732. Sometime in the mid-1970, Dr. Paulo C. Campos, brother
of
Justice Jose Campos, Jr., then President of the Cavite Electric
Cooperative,
approached the latter and confided to him the desire of the National
Power
Corporation to be allowed to install temporary wooden electric posts on
the portion of his wife’s property in order that the high-tension
transmission
line coming from Kaliraya passing thru that part of Cavite can be
continued
to the direction of Puerto Azul.cralaw:red
Having heard the plea
of his brother and the fact that National Power Corporation was under
pressure
because at the time that Puerto Azul was being developed there was no
electricity
nor was there electrical lines towards that place and acting on the
belief
that the installation of wooden electric posts would be temporary in
nature,
plaintiffs gave oral permission for the NPC personnel to enter the said
parcel of land. Dr. Paulo C. Campos, assured him that it was just
a temporary measure to meet the emergency need of the Puerto Azul and
that
the wooden electric posts will be relocated when a permanent posts and
transmission lines shall have been installed. Pursuant to their
understanding,
the National Power Corporation installed wooden posts across a portion
of plaintiffs’ property occupying a total area of about 2,000 square
meters
more or less. To date, defendant NPC has been using the
plaintiffs’
property for its wooden electrical posts and transmission lines; that
the
latter has estimated that the aggregate rental (which they peg at the
conservative
rate of P1.00 per square meter) of the 2,000 square meters for
twenty-four
(24) years period, would amount to the aggregate sum of P480,000.00.chanrobles virtual law library
From the time National
Power Corporation installed those temporary wooden posts, no notice was
ever served upon the plaintiffs of their intention to relocate the same
or to install permanent transmission line on the property. Also,
there was no personal contact between them. However, in late
1994,
plaintiffs’ overseer found a group of persons of the defendant NPC
conducting
survey inside the said property, and were asked to leave the premises
upon
being discovered that they have no authority to do so from the owners
thereof.
Subsequently thereafter, or sometime in 1995, a person by the name of
Mr.
Paz, bearing a letter from Calaca Regional Office, went to see Justice
Jose C. Campos, Jr. in his office, informing the latter that he was
authorized
by the National Power Corporation to acquire private lands. In
the
same breath, Mr. Paz requested his permission to let NPC men enter the
subject property and to conduct a survey in connection with its plan to
erect an all steel transmission line tower on a 24 square meter area
inside
plaintiffs’ property, but same was denied. Justice Campos,
however,
expressed his preference to talk instead to the Chief of the Calaca
Sub-station
or the Head of the NPC, Quezon City office. Since then, nothing
however
transpired.cralaw:red
Sometime in July or
August 1995, plaintiffs learned that defendant’s agents again entered
the
subject property. This time, they have presented to the caretaker
a letter of authority supposedly from Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr.
And, when prodded to see the letter for verification, defendant’s
agents
refused to do so. So, they were ordered out of the
vicinity.
Plaintiffs stressed that defendant’s repeated intrusions into their
property
without their expressed knowledge and consent had impugned on their
constitutional
right to protection over their property.cralaw:red
Later, on December 12,
1995, plaintiffs received copy of summons and complaint in Civil Case
No.
1174-95 filed by the defendant before the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 22, Imus, Cavite for the expropriation of 5,320
square meters of plaintiffs’ above-described property to be used as
right-of-way
for the all-steel transmission line tower of the
Calaca-Dasmariñas
230 KV T/L Project. But what had caused plaintiffs’ discomfiture
is the allegation in said complaint stating that the "parcel of land
sought
to be expropriated has not been applied to nor expropriated for any
public
use and is selected by plaintiff in a manner compatible with the
greatest
good and the least private injury" and that defendant "had negotiated
with
(plaintiffs) for the acquisition of the right-of-way easement over the
portion of the same for the public purpose as above-stated at a price
prescribed
by law, but failed to reach an agreement with them notwithstanding the
repeated negotiations between the parties".cralaw:red
Plaintiffs’ assert that
at no instance was there a negotiation between them and the NPC or its
representative. The alleged "talk" initiated by Mr. Paz with
Justice
Campos, Jr. just ended in the latter’s remonstrance and in prevailing
upon
the former of his preference to discuss the matter with a more
responsible
officer of the National Power Corporation, such as the Chief of the
Calaca
Sub-Station or the Head of NPC’s Office in Quezon City. But
plaintiffs’
plea just fell on the deaf ear. The next thing they know was
Civil
Case No. Q-1174-95 already filed in court. A party to a case
shall
not do falsehood nor shall mislead or misrepresent the contents of its
pleading. That gross misrepresentation had been made by the
National
Power Corporation in their said pleading is irrefutable.chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiffs-spouses Campos
declared that there are other areas more suitable or appropriate that
can
be utilized as alternative sites for the all-steel transmission line
tower.
Just a few meters from the planned right-of-way is an abandoned road
occupied
by squatters; it is a government property and the possession of which
the
NPC need not compensate. The latter had not exercised judiciously
in the proper selection of the property to be appropriated.
Evidently,
NPC’s choice was whimsical and capricious. Such arbitrary
selection
of plaintiffs’ property despite the availability of another property in
a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least private
injury, constitutes an impermissible encroachment of plaintiffs’
proprietary
rights and their right to due process and equal protection.cralaw:red
Concededly, NPC’s intention
is to expropriate a portion of plaintiffs’ property. This
limitation
on the right of ownership is the paramount right of the National Power
Corporation granted by law. But before a person can be deprived
of
his property through the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
requisites
of law must strictly be complied with. (Endencia vs. Lualhati, 9
Phil. 177) No person shall be deprived of his property except by
competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just
compensation. Should this requirement be not first complied with,
the courts shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner in
his
possession. (Art. 433, Civil Code of the Philippines)chanrobles virtual law library
Records disclose that
in breach of such verbal promise, defendant NPC had not withdrawn the
wooden
electrical posts and transmission lines; said wooden electrical posts
and
transmission lines still occupy a portion of plaintiffs’ property; that
the NPC had benefited from them for a long period of time already, sans
compensation to the owners thereof.cralaw:red
Without first complying
with the primordial requisites appurtenant to the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, defendant NPC again boldly intruded into plaintiffs’
property by conducting engineering surveys with the end in view of
expropriating
5,320 square meters thereof to be used as right-of-way for the
all-steel
transmission line tower of the Calaca-Dasmariñas 230 KV T/L
Project.
Such acts constitute a deprivation of one’s property for public use
without
due compensation. It would therefore seem that the expropriation
had indeed departed from its own purpose and turns out to be an
instrument
to repudiate compliance with obligation legally and validly contracted.[9]chanrobles virtual law library
On September 26, 1996,
the RTC rendered a decision finding the petitioner liable for damages
to
the respondents. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing consideration, justment [sic] is hereby
rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs, condemning the defendant to pay -
(a) Actual
damages
of P480,000.00 for the use of plaintiff’s property;
(b) One
Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;chanrobles virtual law library
(c ) Five Hundred
Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as nominal damages;chanrobles virtual law library
(d) One
Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as attorney’s fees; andchanrobles virtual law library
(e) Costs of
suit
in the amount of P11,239.00.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The petitioner appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals which on June 16, 1990 rendered a
decision affirming the ruling of the RTC.
Essentially, the CA
held that the respondents’ claim for compensation and damages had not
prescribed
because Section 3(i) of the petitioner’s Charter, Republic Act No.
6395,
as amended, is not applicable to the case. The CA likewise gave
scant
consideration to the petitioner’s claim that the respondents’ complaint
should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia. According
to
the CA, the complaint a quo was the more appropriate action considering
that the venue for the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 1174-95) was
initially improperly laid. The petitioner filed the expropriation
proceedings with the RTC in Imus, Cavite, when the subject property is
located in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Moreover, the parties in
the
two actions are not the same since the respondents were no longer
included
as defendants in the petitioner’s amended complaint in the
expropriation
case (Civil Case No. 1174-95) but were already replaced by Solar
Resources,
Inc., the buyer of the subject property, as defendant therein.cralaw:red
The CA likewise found
the damages awarded by the RTC in favor of the respondents just and
reasonable
under the circumstances obtaining in the case.cralaw:red
The petitioner now comes
to this Court seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed
decision.
The petitioner alleges as follows:
I
The Court of Appeals
grievously erred and labored under a gross misapprehension of fact in
finding
that the Complaint below should not be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
II
The Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the award of nominal and moral damages, attorney’s
fees
and costs of litigation.[11]
Citing Article 620 of
the Civil Code, the petitioner contends that it had already acquired
the
easement of right-of-way over the portion of the subject property by
prescription,
the said easement having been allegedly continuous and apparent for a
period
of about twenty-three (23) years, i.e., from about the middle of 1970
to
the early part of 1994. The petitioner further invokes Section
3(i)
of its Charter in asserting that the respondents already waived their
right
to institute any action for compensation and/or damages concerning the
acquisition of the easement of right-of-way in the subject
property.
Accordingly, the petitioner concludes that the award of damages in
favor
of the respondents is not warranted.chanrobles virtual law library
The petition is bereft
of merit.cralaw:red
The petitioner’s claim
that, under Article 620 of the Civil Code, it had already acquired by
prescription
the easement of right-of-way over that portion of the subject property
where its wooden electric posts and transmission lines were erected is
untenable. Article 620 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art.
620.
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a
title
or by prescription of ten years.chanrobles virtual law library
Prescription as a mode
of acquisition requires the existence of the following: (1) capacity to
acquire by prescription; (2) a thing capable of acquisition by
prescription;
(3) possession of the thing under certain conditions; and (4) lapse of
time provided by law.[12]
Acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary, in which case the
possession
must be in good faith and with just title,[13]
or extraordinary, in which case there is neither good faith nor just
title.
In either case, there has to be possession which must be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.[14]
As a corollary, Article 1119 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art.
1119.
Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere
tolerance
of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession.
In this case, the
records
clearly reveal that the petitioner’s possession of that portion of the
subject property where it erected the wooden posts and transmission
lines
was merely upon the tolerance of the respondents. Accordingly,
this
permissive use by the petitioner of that portion of the subject
property,
no matter how long continued, will not create an easement of
right-of-way
by prescription. The case of Cuaycong vs. Benedicto[15]
is particularly instructive. In that case, the plaintiffs for
more
than twenty years made use of the road that passed through the hacienda
owned by the defendants, being the only road that connected the
plaintiff’s
hacienda to the public road. The defendants closed the road in
question
and refused the use of the same unless a toll was paid. The
plaintiffs
therein brought an action to enjoin the defendants from interfering
with
the use of the road. In support of their action, the plaintiffs
presented
evidence tending to show that they have acquired the right-of-way
through
the road by prescription. This Court rejected the contention,
holding
as follows:
Had it been shown that
the road had been maintained at the public expense, with the
acquiescence
of the owners of the estates crossed by it, this would indicate such
adverse
possession by the government as in course of time would ripen into
title
or warrant the presumption of a grant or of a dedication. But in
this case there is no such evidence, and the claims of plaintiffs,
whether
regarded as members of the public asserting a right to use the road as
such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of
another must be regarded as resting upon the mere fact of user.cralaw:red
If the owner of a tract
of land, to accommodate his neighbors or the public in general, permits
them to cross his property, it is reasonable to suppose that it is not
his intention, in so doing, to divest himself of the ownership of the
land
so used, or to establish an easement upon it, and that the persons to
whom
such permission, tacit or express, is granted, do not regard their
privilege
of use as being based upon anything more than the mere tolerance of the
owner. Clearly, such permissive use is in its inception based
upon
an essentially revocable license. If the use continues for a long
period of time, no change being made in the relations of the parties by
any express or implied agreement, does the owner of the property
affected
lose his right of revocation? Or, putting the same question in
another
form, does the mere permissive use ripen into title by prescription?chanrobles virtual law library
It is a fundamental
principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of
real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a
possessory
character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, which are or
due
to his license (Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This principle
is
applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as
a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem. In the
case
of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu-Tibo (2 Phil. Rep., 24, 38), the Court said:
The
provision
of article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are
merely
tolerated produce no effect with respect to possession is applicable as
much to the prescription of real rights as to the prescription of the
fee,
it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as
does
the appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental
basis of prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is
possible,
not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere
tolerance
produce no effect with respect to possession, as that article provides,
in conformity with article 444 of the same Code, it is evident that
they
can produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition
be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds in one and the
other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the
legal
sense of the word. (Citations omitted)
Possession, under the
Civil
Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
possession
under claim of title (en concepto de dueño), or to use the
common
law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of
possessory
character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are
clearly not en concepto de dueño, and such possessory acts, no
matter
how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.[16]
Following the foregoing
disquisition, the petitioner’s claim that it had acquired the easement
of right-of-way by prescription must perforce fail. As intimated
above, possession is the fundamental basis of prescription, whether
ordinary
or extraordinary. The petitioner never acquired the requisite
possession
in this case. Its use of that portion of the subject property
where
it erected the wooden poles and transmission lines was due merely to
the
tacit license and tolerance of the respondents. As such, it
cannot
be made the basis of the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way by
prescription.chanrobles virtual law library
Neither can the petitioner
invoke Section 3(i) of its Charter (Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended) to
put
up the defense of prescription against the respondents. The said
provision reads in part:
Sec. 3(i). The
Corporation or its representatives may also enter upon private property
in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or purposes,
including
the construction of transmission lines thereon; Provided, that
the
owner of such private property shall be paid the just compensation
therefor
in accordance with the provisions hereinafter provided; Provided,
further,
that any action by any person claiming compensation and/or damages
shall
be filed within five years after the right-of-way, transmission lines,
substations, plants or other facilities shall have been
established:
Provided, finally, that after the said period no suit shall be brought
to question the said right-of-way, transmission lines, substations,
plants
or other facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or damages
involved;
Two requisites must
be complied before the above provision of law may be invoked:
1. The petitioner entered
upon the private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of
its
businesses or purposes; and
2.The owner of the private
property shall be paid the just compensation therefor.cralaw:red
As correctly asserted
by the respondents, Section 3(i) of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended,
presupposes
that the petitioner had already taken the property through a negotiated
sale or the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and not where, as
in this case, the petitioner was merely temporarily allowed to erect
wooden
electrical posts and transmission lines on the subject property.
Significantly, the provision uses the term "just compensation,"
implying
that the power of eminent domain must first be exercised by the
petitioner
in accordance with Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides
that "no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation."chanrobles virtual law library
This Court’s ruling
in Lopez vs. Auditor General[17]
is likewise in point:
The petitioner brought
this case to this Court on the sole issue of prescription. He
cites
Alfonso vs. Pasay City in which a lot owner was allowed to bring an
action
to recover compensation for the value of his land, which the Government
had taken for road purposes, despite the lapse of thirty years
(1924-1954).
On the other hand, the respondents base their defense of prescription
on
Jaen vs. Agregado which held an action for compensation for land taken
in building a road barred by prescription because it was brought after
more than ten years (i.e., thirty three years, from 1920 to
1953).
They argue that the ruling in Alfonso cannot be applied to this case
because,
unlike Alfonso who made repeated demands for compensation within ten
years,
thereby interrupting the running of the period of prescription, the
petitioner
here filed his claim only in 1959.cralaw:red
It is true that in Alfonso
vs. Pasay City this Court made the statement that "registered lands are
not subject to prescription and that on grounds of equity, the
government
should pay for private property which it appropriates though for the
benefit
of the public, regardless of the passing of time." But the
rationale
in that case is that where private property is taken by the Government
for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation
or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe. This is the point that has been
overlooked
by both parties.cralaw:red
On the other hand, where
private property is acquired by the Government and all that remains is
the payment of the price, the owner’s action to collect the price must
be brought within ten years otherwise it would be barred by the statue
of limitations.[18]chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the five-year
period provided under Section 3(i) of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended,
within
which all claims for compensation and/or damages may be allowed against
the petitioner should be reckoned from the time that it acquired title
over the private property on which the right-of-way is sought to be
established.
Prior thereto, the claims for compensation and/or damages do not
prescribe.
In this case, the findings of the CA is apropos:
Undeniably, NPC never
acquired title over the property over which its wooden electrical posts
and transmission lines were erected. It never filed expropriation
proceedings against such property. Neither did it negotiate for
the
sale of the same. It was merely allowed to temporarily enter into
the premises. As NPC’s entry was gained through permission, it
had
no intention to acquire ownership either by voluntary purchase or by
the
exercise of eminent domain.[19]
The petitioner instituted
the expropriation proceedings only on December 12, 1995.
Indisputably,
the petitioner never acquired title to that portion of the subject
property
where it erected the wooden electrical posts and transmission
lines.
Until such time, the five-year prescriptive period within which the
respondents’
right to file an action to claim for compensation and/or damages for
the
petitioner’s use of their property does not even commence to run.
The CA thus correctly ruled that Section 3(i) of Rep. Act No. 6395, as
amended, finds no application in this case and that the respondents’
action
against the petitioner has not prescribed.cralaw:red
With respect to the
damages awarded in favor of the respondents, the petitioner avers, thus:
The Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the award of nominal and moral damages, attorney’s
fees
and costs of litigation.cralaw:red
It follows from Section
31(c) of R.A. 6395 that the award moral and nominal damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs are baseless. The right to claim them
has
likewise prescribed.[20]
With our ruling that
the claims of the respondents had not prescribed, the petitioner’s
contention
that the respondents are not entitled to moral and nominal damages and
attorney’s fees must fail. In affixing the award for moral and
nominal
damages and attorney’s fees, the CA ratiocinated:chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the
fourth assignment of error, this Court is not persuaded to reverse much
less modify the court a quo’s findings.cralaw:red
An award of moral damages
would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there
must
be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained
by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission
factually
established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
is
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4)
fourth,
the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article
2219 of the Civil Code.cralaw:red
NPC made it appear that
it negotiated with the appellees when no actual negotiations took
place.
This allegation seriously affected the on-going sale of the property to
Solar Resources, Inc. as appellees seemed to have sold the property
knowing
fully well that a portion thereof was being expropriated. Such an
act falls well within Article 21 of the Civil Code. NPC’s
subterfuge
certainly besmirched the reputation and professional standing of
Justice
Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Professor Maria Clara A. Lopez-Campos, and
caused
them physical suffering, mental anguish, moral shock and wounded
feelings.chanrobles virtual law library
The records show that
Justice Campos’ career included, among other[s], being a Professor of
Law
at the University of the Philippines; Acting Chairman of the Board of
Transportation;
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, and
Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals. Such career reached its apex
when
he was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1992.
Justice Campos was a member of the Judicial and Bar Council when NPC
filed
its Civil Case No. 1174-95. Professor Maria Clara A. Lopez-Campos
is a noted authority in Corporate and Banking Laws and is a Professor
Emerita
of the University of the Philippines from 1981 to the present.
She
had taught more than three decades at the College of Law. Against
such backdrop, it does not take too much imagination to conclude that
the
oppressive and wanton manner in which NPC sought to exercise its
statutory
right of eminent domain warranted the grant of moral damages.cralaw:red
On the award of nominal
damages, such are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered
by him. As previously discussed, it does not brood well for a
government
entity such as NPC to disregard the tenets of private property
enshrined
in the Constitution. NPC not only intentionally trespassed on
appellees’
property and conducted engineering surveys thereon but also sought to
fool
the appellees’ caretaker by claiming that such entry was
authorized.
Moreover, NPC even justifies such trespass as falling under its right
to
expropriate the property. Under the circumstances, the award of
nominal
damages is sustained.cralaw:red
That NPC’s highhanded
exercise of its right of eminent domain constrained the appellees to
engage
the services of counsel is obvious. As testified upon, the
appellees
engaged their counsel for an agreed fee of P250,000.00. The trial
court substantially reduced this to P150,000.00. Inasmuch as such
services included not only the present action but also those for Civil
Case No. 1174-95 erroneously filed by NPC with the Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, and the Petition for Certiorari in CA-GR No. 41782,
this
Court finds such attorney’s fees to be reasonable and equitable.[21]
We agree with the CA.cralaw:red
The award of moral damages
in favor of the respondents is proper given the circumstances obtaining
in this case. As found by the CA:
NPC made it appear that
it negotiated with the appellees when no actual negotiation took
place.
This allegation seriously affected the on-going sale of the property to
Solar Resources, Inc. as appellees seemed to have sold the property
knowing
fully well that a portion thereof was being expropriated. Such an
act falls well within Article 21 of the Civil Code. NPC’s
subterfuge
certainly besmirched the reputation and professionally standing of
Justice
Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Professor Maria Clara A. Lopez-Campos, and
caused
them physical suffering, mental anguish, moral shock and wounded
feelings.chanrobles virtual law library
The records show that
Justice Campos’ career included, among other[s], being a
Professor
of Law at the University of the Philippines; Acting Chairman of the
Board
of Transportation; Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pasay
City, and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Such career
reached its apex when he was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court in 1992. Justice Campos was a member of the Judicial and
Bar
Council when NPC filed its Civil Case No. 1174-95. Professor
Maria
Clara A. Lopez-Campos is a noted authority in Corporate and Banking
Laws
and is a Professor Emerita of the University of the Philippines from
1981
to the present. She had taught more than three decades at the
College
of Law. Against such backdrop, it does not take too much
imagination
to conclude that the oppressive and wanton manner in which NPC sought
to
exercise its statutory right of eminent domain warranted the grant of
moral
damages.[22]
Further, nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered
by him.[23]
Similarly, the court may award nominal damages in every case where any
property right has been invaded.[24]
The petitioner, in blatant disregard of the respondents’ proprietary
right,
trespassed the subject property and conducted engineering surveys
thereon.
It even attempted to deceive the respondents’ caretaker by claiming
that
its agents were authorized by the respondents to enter the property
when
in fact, the respondents never gave such authority. Under the
circumstances,
the award of nominal damages is likewise warranted.cralaw:red
Finally, the award of
attorney’s fees as part of damages is deemed just and equitable
considering
that by the petitioner’s unjustified acts, the respondents were
obviously
compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interests
over
the subject property.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated June
16,
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54265 is AFFIRMED in
toto.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, Chairman, Twelfth
Division,
with Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Wenceslao I. Agnir,
Jr.
concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Justo M. Sultan.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Records, pp. 1-3.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Id. at 3-4.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 4-5.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 5-6.
[8]
Id. at 6-7.
[9]
Id. at 325-328.
[10]
Id. at 329.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 18-19.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines 14 (1985).
[13]
Article 1117, Civil Code.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Article 1118, Civil Code.
[15]
37 Phil. 783 (1918).
[16]
Id. at 792-793.
[17]
20 SCRA 655 (1967).chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Id. at 656-657. (Citations omitted).
[19]
Rollo, p. 32.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Id. at 21.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Id. at 39-40.
[22]
CA Decision, p. 15; Rollo, p. 39.
[23]
Article 2221, Civil Code.
[24]
Article 2222, Civil Code.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 326
(2001). |