SECOND DIVISION.
.
FRANCISCA L.
MARQUEZ
AND
GASPAR M.
MARQUEZ,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
143779
April 4, 2003
-versus-
SIMEON BALDOZ,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This petition for review
seeks to reverse the decision[1]
dated April 24, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55068,
affirming the orders in Civil Case No. 9-97, dated April 6, 1999 and
August
4, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Taal, Batangas City, Branch
86.
The trial court denied herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss in Civil
Case
No. 9-97, based on alleged prescription and failure to state a cause of
action, as well as their motion for reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts of this case
are culled from the records.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Simeon Baldoz
is the son of Spouses Dionisia Leonor and Aurelio Baldoz. They
died
intestate, leaving behind a parcel of land with an area of 33,675
square
meters in Halang, Taal, Batangas. The lot was purchased by them from
Emiliano
Baldoz on January 17, 1937, as evidenced by a deed of sale issued on
the
same date.[2]
The second paragraph of the deed of sale bears the following statement:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Said property is owned
in common by the herein vendor (Emiliano Baldoz) and by Gregorio Leonor
(father of petitioners) of Taal, Batangas.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On March 24, 1997, Simeon’s
co-heirs waived their rights over the lot in his favor by virtue of a
Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver of Rights.[4]
Later, however, Simeon discovered that Francisca Leonor and Candelaria
Orlina declared certain portions of the same land in their name, as
evidenced
by Tax Declaration Nos. 0056 to 0058.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Simeon made several
demands upon Francisca, Gaspar and Candelaria urging them to vacate the
premises and to surrender possession thereof, but his demands remained
unheeded. On September 3, 1997, Simeon filed Civil Case No. 9-97,
entitled
"Simeon Baldoz v. Spouses Francisca Leonor and Gaspar Marquez, and
Candelaria
Orlina," for accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title, with
preliminary
writ of injunction and damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 27, 1997,
Francisca, Gaspar and Candelaria filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground
of prescription and failure to state a cause of action. In an order
dated
April 6, 1999, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the
complaint has sufficiently alleged a cause of action. On the issue of
prescription,
the RTC stated that it involves evidentiary matters which should be
threshed
out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a
motion
to dismiss as the question has become a matter of proof.[6]
The motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC was likewise denied.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Seasonably, petitioners
Francisca and Gaspar Marquez filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court
of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for denying
their
motion to dismiss. On April 24, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Petitioners then moved to reconsider
the order of the Court of Appeals, but it was denied in a resolution
dated
June 20, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this petition for
review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA decision on two grounds:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLETELY
DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES AND MERELY BASED ITS RULING THAT
RESPONDENT’S RIGHT OF ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED ON THE ALLEGATIONS IN
THE
COMPLAINT IN CONTRAVENTION OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3, RULE 16 OF THE 1997
RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; ANDchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION DESPITE ITS FAILURE TO LIKEWISE CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD
AND TO RULE CATEGORICALLY ON THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION IN FLAGRANT
DISREGARD
OF THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3, RULE 16 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The issue in this petition
is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion as
well as a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s orders.
Resolution of this issue depends on whether the trial court had
violated
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 16, of the Rules of Court, in denying
petitioners’
motion to dismiss the complaint as well as their motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Sections 2 and 3
of Rule 16, the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Hearing of motion.
- At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their
arguments
on the questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact
involved
except those not available at that time. Should the case go to
trial,
the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part
of
the evidence of the party presenting the same.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEC. 3. Resolution of
motion. - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim,
deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.cralaw:red
The court shall not
defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
relied
upon is not indubitable. (Stress supplied)
In every case, the resolution
shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefore.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners insist that
the appellate court erred when it held that no grave abuse of
discretion
was committed by the trial court when it deferred the resolution of the
issue of prescription raised in their motion to dismiss. According to
petitioners,
deferring the resolution of this issue violates the abovecited
provisions
of the Rules which provide that the court must either grant, deny or
order
the amendment of the pleadings, but must not defer the resolution of
the
motion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering the submissions
of the parties on record, we find that the instant petition lacks
merit.
In its Order dated April 6, 1999, the trial court did not violate
Sections
2 and 3 of Rule 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First. Section 2 of
Rule 16 requires hearing in resolving the motion to dismiss. From
the records, it is clear that the trial judge conducted a hearing to
resolve
petitioners’ motion to dismiss. In compliance with this
requirement,
both testimonial and documentary evidence were submitted by the parties
to resolve the issues raised in the motion to dismiss. However, the
summary
hearing on the motion to dismiss did not persuade the trial court that
petitioners had proved the respondent’s claim had already prescribed.
Hence,
the trial court resolved to require a more in-depth and thorough
determination
of this issue, which could be done only in a full-blown trial of the
case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither was there a
circumvention of Section 3 of Rule 16. The trial court did not
defer
the resolution of the motion to dismiss; in fact, the motion was
expressly
denied. Said the Order dated April 6, 1999:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The above allegations
in the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action against the
defendants.
The complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving
the
existence of a cause of action at the outset, this will have to be done
at the trial on the merits of the case. In fact, the complaint is
not supposed to contain evidentiary matters. Rule 6, section 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must be limited to "a
concise
statement of the plaintiff’s cause of action." Consequently, the
motion to dismiss must be denied.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The above conclusion
finds support in the cases of Repubic Bank vs. Cuaderno, 19 SCRA 677;
Boncato
vs. Siasan, 138 SCRA 414 and Sumalinong vs. Doronio, 184 SCRA 187 where
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that so rigid is the norm
prescribed
that if the Court should doubt the truth of the facts averred, it must
not dismiss the complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear the
case on the merits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the issue of prescription
raised in the said motion, the Court finds the same evidentiary matters
which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and
cannot
be determined in a motion to dismiss as the question has become a
matter
of proof.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners palpably
misinterpreted the trial court’s Order, particularly in regard to the
matter
of prescription. It ruled that the prescription issue is "one involving
evidentiary matters which must be threshed out in a full-blown trial on
the merits and cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss as the
question
has become a matter of proof." Petitioners misconstrued the trial
court’s ruling as one tantamount to deferring the resolution of the
motion
to dismiss itself. This reading of the Order is flawed. By
denying the motion expressly, the Order resolved the motion to dismiss
as required by Section 3 of Rule 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It must be pointed that
under the new Rules, deferment of the resolution of the motion to
dismiss
is no longer permitted. The court must either grant the motion to
dismiss, deny it, or order the amendment of the pleadings. The purpose
for the above rule is to avoid and end the common practice of
perfunctorily
denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier
disposition
often creates difficulty on the part of the aggrieved party in taking
recourse
therefrom and likewise on the part of the higher court called upon to
resolve
the issue, usually on certiorari.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, what is prohibited
by the rules is the deferment until trial of the resolution of the
motion
to dismiss itself. Here, the trial court did not defer resolution of
the
motion itself but, in fact, categorically resolved to deny it based on
its finding that: (1) the complaint showed a sufficient cause of
action,
and (2) the pleadings did not ipso facto establish prescription.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As required by Section
3, Rule 16, the trial court’s Order also explains at length the basis
for
its finding that in his complaint, plaintiff has shown a sufficient
cause
of action. Corollary to its discussion on this issue, the trial court
also
touched on the issue on prescription with a pronouncement that such
issue
is better threshed after a full-blown trial on the merits. The
trial
court’s reasoning, in our view, sufficiently explained the reason for
dismissing
the motion to dismiss. It satisfactorily served the purpose behind the
new Rules of Court as earlier explained.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the trial
court’s ruling requiring a full-blown trial on the merits to resolve
the
issue of prescription, finds jurisprudential basis in our ruling in
National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) v. Court of Appeals,[10]
reiterating Francisco v. Robles.[11]
In the NIA case, we stated that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An allegation of prescription
can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint
on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This precedent finds
application in the present case. Nothing shows on the face of the
complaint filed by herein respondent as plaintiff in Civil Case No.
9-97
that the action already prescribed at the time it was filed. The
complaint
merely averred that Gregorio Leonor, father of herein petitioners, was
a tenant of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. As observed by
the Court of Appeals:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Notwithstanding the
jurisprudence which states that prescription may be effectively pleaded
in a motion to dismiss if the complaint shows on its face that the
action
had already prescribed at the time it was filed, We believe, however,
that
there is no sufficient and convincing showing that prescription as
regards
the subject property has set in already. The reason is simple:
the
court a quo noted on the face of the complaint in Civil Case No. 9-97
that
Gregorio Leonor, father of herein petitioners, was the tenant of the
parents
of private respondent over the subject property. Obviously,
perusing
the complaint with an allegation that the subject property was a
tenanted
property, the contention of petitioners in establishing an
uninterrupted
adverse possession for more than thirty (30) years seems
implausible.
Besides, possession is not a definitive proof of ownership, nor is
non-possession
inconsistent therewith.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Based on the pleadings,
the issue of prescription was not clearly established. On this
point,
it is but logical and proper for the trial court to deny petitioners’
motion
to dismiss and, additionally, to require a full-blown trial on the
issue
of prescription.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion, much less any
reversible
error, in affirming the Orders of the trial court.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals of April 24, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55068, and
its
resolution dated June 20, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against
the petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 33-36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
CA Rollo, pp. 43-44; Records, p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Records, p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
CA Rollo, pp. 43-44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 45-47.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
CA Rollo, p. 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, p. 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Rollo, p. 179. Stress supplied.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Pefianco v. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, 19 January 2000, 322 SCRA 439, 446.
[10]
G.R. No. 129169, 17 November 1999, 318 SCRA 255, 269.
[11]
94 Phil. 1035 (1954).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Supra, note 10 at 269.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Rollo, p. 35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |