THIRD DIVISION
SOLEDAD
CHANLIONGCO
RAMOS, FRANCISCO D. CHANLIONGCO,ADELBERTO D.
CHANLIONGCO, ARMANDO D. CHANLIONGCOAND FLORENCIO D.
CHANLIONGCO,
Petitioners, |
G.R.
No.
144294
March 11, 2003
-versus-
TERESITA
D. RAMOS,
SPOUSES TERESITA AND EDMUNDO S. MUYOT,SPOUSES VEDASTA
AND FLORENCIO M. DATO, LORETO MUYOT,SPOUSES TERESITA
AND ELMER SOLIS, LICERIA TORRES,SPOUSES CORAZON
AND VICENTE MACATUNGAL,SPOUSES PRECILLA
AND CRISOSTOMO MUYOT,
AND SPOUSES CARIDAD
AND SALVADOR PINGOL,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Well-settled is the rule
that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. The only exceptions
to this rule are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the
so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3)
void
judgments.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 31,
2000 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29507 which denied
petitioners'
Motion to Set Aside the CA Decision[3]
dated September 28, 1995. The assailed Resolution disposed as
follows:
"Finding the opposition
of [respondents] to be well-taken, the [Court hereby DENIES the
Motion]."[4]
The Facts
Petitioners are children
of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr., who was the co-owner of a
parcel
of land known as Lot No. 2-G of Subdivision Plan SWO No. 7308.
Situated
in Tondo, Manila, it was co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and his
brothers
Mario and Antonio. By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
executed
by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza
had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days in September
1986.
Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity
of the sale, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5]
a Complaint[6]
for interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims.cralaw:red
The RTC upheld the sale
insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned. It ruled that
Adoracion
had no authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners, because the
Special Power of Attorney had been executed in favor only of her
mother,
Narcisa.cralaw:red
On appeal, the CA modified
the ruling of the RTC. It held that while there was no Special
Power
of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless valid,
because
she had been authorized by her mother to be the latter's
sub-agent.
There was thus no need to execute another special power of attorney in
her favor as sub-agent. This CA Decision was not appealed, became
final and was entered in favor of respondents on August 8, 1996.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On April 10, 1999, petitioners
filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision. They
contended
that they had not been served a copy of either the Complaint or the
summons.
Neither had they been impleaded as parties to the case in the
RTC.
As it was, they argued, the CA Decision should be set aside because it
adversely affected their respective shares in the property without due
process.cralaw:red
In denying the Motion
of petitioners, the CA cited the grounds raised in respondents'
Opposition:
(a) the Motion was not allowed as a remedy under the 1997 Rules of
Civil
Procedure; (b) the Decision sought to be set aside had long become
final
and executory; (c) the movants did not have any legal standing; and (d)
the Motion was purely dilatory and without merit.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issue
In their Memorandum,
petitioners raise this sole issue for the Court's consideration:
"x x x [W]hether the
Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' Motion and allowing its
Decision dated September 25, 1995 to take its course, inspite of its
knowledge
that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioners
and passing petitioners property in favor of respondents, hence without
due process of law."[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.cralaw:red
Main Issue:
Entitlement to
Summons
It is well settled that
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable.
A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law;[11]
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest
court in the land.[12]
The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical
errors,
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and (3) void judgments.[13]
To determine whether the CA Decision of September 28, 1995 is void, the
failure to implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be
addressed.[14]
To be able to rule on
this point, the Court needs to determine whether the action is in
personam,
in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of summons
differ
depending on the nature of the action.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An action in personam
is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in
rem
is directed against the thing itself instead of the person;[15]
while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object
is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding
lien
or obligation.[16]
The Complaint filed
by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the
ownership of the real property in question.[17]
Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to
settle
the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the
property.
Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not
directed against the personal liability of any particular person.
It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or
possession
of real property.[18]
As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered
co-owners:
Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by
their
respective estates.cralaw:red
Clearly, petitioners
were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an
inchoate
interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in
court
with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the
latter
was represented by an executor or administrator.[19]
Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case,
inasmuch
as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made parties.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, at the
time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court were still in
effect.
Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3,[20]
an executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the
party
for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended.[21]
The present rule,[22]
however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose
benefit the action is brought. Under the former Rules, an
executor
or administrator is allowed to either sue or be sued alone in that
capacity.
In the present case, it was the estate of petitioners' father Paulino
Chanliongco,
as represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included
as defendant[23]
and served summons.[24]
As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as
defendants.
Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served summons.cralaw:red
Petitioner Florencio
D. Chanliongco, on the other hand, was impleaded in the Complaint, but
not served summons. However, the service of summons upon the
estate
of his deceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for and
on
behalf of all the beneficiaries and the heirs of Paulino Chanliongco,
including
Florencio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We also note that the
counsel of petitioners, Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr., is a partner of
the
law firm that represented the estate of the deceased father.
Hence,
it can reasonably be expected that the service upon the law firm was
sufficient
notice to all the beneficiaries of the estate, including Petitioner
Florencio
D. Chanliongco.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against
petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-10.
[2]
Id., p. 111. Former Special Fourth Division. Written by
Justice
Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Justice Godardo A. Jacinto
(acting
Division chairman) and Justice Eloy R. Bello Jr. (member).
[3]
Id., pp. 32-51. Fourth Division. Written by Justice Ruben T.
Reyes,
concurred in by Justice Gloria C. Paras (Division chairman) and Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (member, now a justice of the Supreme Court).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Assailed Resolution, p. 1; rollo, p. 111; correction in bracket
supplied
to avoid a dangling participial phrase.
[5]
Manila, Branch 35. Presided by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 52-82.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
CA rollo, p. 134.
[8]
CA rollo, pp. 334-348.
[9]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on April 10, 2001, upon the
Court's receipt of respondents' Memorandum signed by Atty. Venancio B.
Padilla. Petitioners' Memorandum, filed on February 6, 2001, was
signed by Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 149-150.
[11]
Salva v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 632, March 11, 1999; Nacuray v.
National
Labor Relations Commission, 270 SCRA 9, March 18, 1997; Korean Airlines
Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 599, August 23, 1995; Lim v.
Jabalde,
172 SCRA 211, April 17, 1989.chan
robles virtual law
[12]
Nuñal v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 26, April 6, 1993; Manning
International
Corporation v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 155, March 13, 1991.
[13]
Nacuray v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra; Nuñal v.
Court of Appeals, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
More properly, petitioners should have lodged in the CA a Petition (not
a mere motion) for Annulment of Judgment grounded on lack of
jurisdiction.
Brushing aside this procedural defect for the nonce, in the interest of
substantial justice we have decided to take a quick look at the claimed
lack of due process. Such claim goes into the very essence of
jurisdiction.
[15]
Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, September 25, 1998;
Dial Corporation v. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737, May 31, 1988.
[16]
Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, supra; Brown v. Brown, 3 SCRA
451,
October 31, 1961.
[17]
Respondents' Complaint, p. 5; rollo, p. 56.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 564,
October
16, 1989.
[19]
Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561, May 4, 1942.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
"SEC. 3. Representative Parties. A trustee of an express
trust,
a guardian, executor or administrator, or a party authorized by
statute,
may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the
action
is presented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the
proceedings,
order such beneficiary to be made a party. An agent acting in his
own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be
sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things
belonging to the principal."
[21]
Papa v. A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc., 284 SCRA 643, January 23, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
§3, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Respondents' Complaint, p. 5; rollo, p. 56.
[24]
Sheriff's Return, p. 1; rollo, p. 87. |