FIRST DIVISION
ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
144412
November 18, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALSAND
POTENCIANO
L.
GALANIDA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is
a Petition for Review[1]
assailing the Decision[2]
of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision[3]
of 18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the
National
Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98. The
NLRC
modified the Decision dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter Dominador
A. Almirante ("Labor Arbiter") in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94
holding
that Allied Banking Corporation ("Allied Bank") illegally dismissed
Potenciano
L. Galanida ("Galanida"). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay,
backwages,
moral and exemplary damages, and other amounts totaling P1,264,933.33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Antecedent Facts
For a background of
this case, we quote in part from the Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Private
respondent
Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation
on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant
manager
in 1991. His appointment was covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action"
which provides as one of the conditions of employment the provision on
petitioner's right to transfer employees:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"REGULAR
APPOINTMENT:
x x x It is understood that the
bank
reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other departments or
branches
of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining
smooth
and uninterrupted service to the public."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private respondent was
promoted several times and was transferred to several branches as
follows:
"a)
January,
1978 to March, 1982 — Tagbilaran City Branchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"b) April, 1982 to
May, 1984 — Lapulapu City Branchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"c) June, 1984
—
Mandaue City Branchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"d) July, 1984 to
April,
1986 — Tagbilaran City Branchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"e) May, 1986 to May,
1987 — Dumaguete City Branchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"f) June, 1987 to
August,
1987 — Carbon Branch, Cebu Citychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"g) September, 1987
to Sept. 1989 — Lapulapu City Branch, Cebuchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"h) October, 1989 to
Sept. 1992 — Carbon Branch, Cebu Citychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"i) October 1992 to
Sept. 1994 — Jakosalem Regional Branch, Cebu City: (Rollo, p. 47)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Effecting a
rotation/movement
of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent
as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned
outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for seven years
already.
Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred to Bacolod
City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental
obligations,
expenses, and the anguish that would result if he is away from his
family.
He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive
dismissal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Subsequently, petitioner
bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report
to
the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private respondent
refused.
In a letter dated 13 June 1994, petitioner warned and required of
private
respondent as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"There is
no
discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among the officers mentioned,
only you have refused the new assignment citing difficulty of working
away
from your family as if the other officers concerned do not suffer the
same
predicament. To exempt you from the officer transfer would result in
favoritism
in your favor and discrimination as against the other officers
concerned.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In furtherance of
maintaining
a smooth and uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance
with
the Bank's order of priority of rotating its accountants' places of
assignments,
you are well aware that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu
form
ore than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994, reassigned to
Iligan
City Branch and then to Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994.
Hence,
your objection on the ground of your length of service is without
merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x x
"As discussed,
your
refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment
to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII
of
the Bank's Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure which provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'XII
Transfer
and Reassignment
Refusal to follow
instruction
concerning transfers and reassignments.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First and
subsequent
offenses-
The penalty may
range
from suspension to dismissal as determined by management. The employee
shall be required to comply with the order of transfer and
reassignment,
if the penalty is not termination of employment.'chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In view of the
foregoing,
please explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt hereof why
no disciplinary action should be meted against you for your having
refused
to follow instructions concerning the foregoing transfer and
reassignment."
x x x.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 16 June 1994,
Galanida
replied that "(w)hether the bank's penalty for my refusal be Suspension
or Dismissal x x x it will all the
more establish and fortify my complaint now pending at NLRC, RAB 7."[5]
In the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with discrimination and
favoritism
in ordering his transfer, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x x What I cannot decipher now under the headship of
Mr. Olveda is management's discriminatory act of transferring only the
long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of
management
prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to
accommodate
some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with
management.
How can the bank ever justify the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new
officer
who had experienced being assigned outside of Cebu for more than a year
only to Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check and balance, is
management
implying that Melinda Co can better carry out such function over Mr.
Larry
Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced accountant or any of the
Metro
Cebu accountants for that matter? Isn't this act of management an
obvious
display of favoritism? x x x.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 5 October 1994,
Galanida
received an inter-office communication[7]
("Memo") dated[8]
September 1994 from Allied Bank's Vice-President for Personnel, Mr.
Leonso
C. Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his
services
effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal were:
(1)
Galanida's continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu
City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial
of his application for additional vacation leave. The salient portion
of
the Memo reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Therefore,
your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and
reassignment
to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without any justifiable
reason
and constituted violations of Article XII of the Bank's EDPP
x
x x.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In view of the
foregoing,
please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective
September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are
entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative
Penalties,
page 6 of the Bank's EDPP which provides as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"04.
Dismissal.
Dismissal is a
permanent
separation for cause x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Notice of
termination
shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the
confirmation
of the President or his authorized representative as officer/employee
who
is terminated for cause shall not be eligible to receive any benefit
arising
from her/his employment with the Bank or to termination pay."
It is understood that
the
termination of your service shall be without prejudice to whatever
legal
remedies which the Bank may have already undertaken and/or will
undertake
against you.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis
supplied.)[8]
The Ruling of the
Labor Arbiter
After several hearings,
the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management
prerogative
in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran
branches.
In ruling that Galanida's refusal to transfer did not amount to
insubordination,
the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Court's decision in Dosch v. NLRC,[9]
thus:
As a
general
rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an
employer's exclusive right and the prerogative of management (Abbott
Laboratories
vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The exercise of this
right,
is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut
Dosch
vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
"While it
may
be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an
employer's
exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such right is not
absolute.
The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is
limited by the paramount police power x x
x
for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual
but impressed with public interest x x x. And neither
capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each other.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Refusal
to
obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where
employee
cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from
the
family."[10]
(Emphasis
supplied by the Labor Arbiter.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Labor Arbiter
reasoned
that Galanida's transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because
Galanida
would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel.
On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to
show
any business urgency that would justify the transfer.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Labor Arbiter also
gave credence to Galanida's claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special
treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately left
out Ms. Co's name from the list of accountants transferred to Cebu as
contained
in Allied Bank's letter dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor
Olveda,
Allied Bank's Vice President for Operations Accounting, testified that
the bank transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch within the
first
half of 1994.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Still, the Labor Arbiter
declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not entirely free
from blame. Since another bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor
Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The
dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision of 23 December 1997 provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent
Allied
Banking Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of
Three
Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P324,000.00) representing the
following
awards:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a)
Separation
pay for P272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus
for
1994 — P16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay
for
1994 — P16,000.00;
d) Refund of
contribution
to Provident Fund — P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[11] The Ruling
of
the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC
likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause.
The NLRC agreed that the transfer order was unreasonable and
unjustified,
considering the family considerations mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC
characterized
the transfer as a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches
were
smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the
bank
wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant
accountant
in the Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since
Allied Bank did not transfer several junior accountants in Cebu. The
NLRC
also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment by assigning
her
to Cebu even though she had worked for the bank for less than two
years.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The NLRC ruled that
Galanida's termination was illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC
stated
that Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared that
Allied
Bank failed to send a termination notice, as required by law for a
valid
termination. The Memo merely stated that Allied Bank would issue a
notice
of termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The NLRC concluded that
Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair
labor
practice as the dismissal undermined Galanida's right to security of
tenure
and equal protection of the laws. On these grounds, the NLRC
promulgated
its Decision of 18 September 1998, the relevant portion of which states:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this
particular
case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer advantageous to
both parties to order reinstatement of the complainant x
x
x. For lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994 quarter
bonus.
Likewise, no attorney's fees is awarded as counsels for
complainant-appellee
are from the City Prosecutor's Office of Cebu.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 23, 1997
is
hereby MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay and granting
in addition thereto backwages, moral and exemplary damages. The
respondent-appellant,
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein
complainant-appellee,
POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a)
P336,000.00
— representing separation pay
b)
P833,600.00
— representing backwages
c)
P5,333.23
— representing proportional 1994 13th month pay
d)
P20,000.00
— representing refund of Provident Fund
Contribution
e)
P50,000.00
— representing moral damages
f)
P20,000.00
— representing exemplary damages
==
========
P1,264,933.33
— TOTAL AWARD
All other claims are
dismissed
for lack of basis. The other respondents are dropped for lack of
sufficient
basis that they acted in excess of their corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Allied Bank filed a
motion
for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24
December
1998.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dissatisfied, Allied
Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and
Resolution
of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,[14]
the Court of Appeals held that Galanida's refusal to comply with the
transfer
orders did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that
the
transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran
branches
was effectively a demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank
did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no
hearing
and no notice of termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank
would
issue a notice of termination but there was no such notice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision
of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[15]
Allied Bank filed a
motion
for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution
of 8 August 2000.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 26 April 2001, Allied
Bank appealed the appellate court's decision and resolution to the
Supreme
Court. Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court:
(1) issue a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction ex parte
to restrain the implementation or execution of the questioned Decision
and Resolution;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) declare
Galanida's
termination as valid and legal;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3) set aside the
Court
of Appeals' Decision and Resolution;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(4) make permanent
the restraining order or preliminary injunction;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(5) order Galanida
to pay the costs; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(6) order other
equitable
reliefs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the
following issues:
1. WHETHER
UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONER'S EXERCISE
OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S
VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE PENALTY
OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER
THE
FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. WHETHER UNDER
THE
FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT
RECOVER
ANY MONETARY AWARD.[17]
In sum, Allied Bank
argues
that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative.
Allied Bank contends that Galanida's continued refusal to obey the
transfer
orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a
just cause for termination under the Labor Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, Galanida
defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for
Galanida
filed with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again
misquoted
the Court's ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x x His (Galanida's) refusal to transfer falls well
within
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al., 123
SCRA
296 (1983) quoted as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Refusal to obey
a transfer
order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason
for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family."[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Ruling
of
the Court
The petition is partly
meritorious.cralaw:red
Preliminary Matter:
Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme Court
The memorandum prepared
by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
both misquoted the Supreme Court's ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court
held
in Dosch:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We cannot
agree
to Northwest's submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience
and
insubordination which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece
of
evidence on which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is
petitioner's letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein
petitioner
acknowledged receipt of the former's memorandum dated August 18, 1975,
appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the
same time regretted "that at this time for personal reasons and reasons
of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines"
and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position,
saying:
"I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my position of
Manager-Philippines
until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer
required
by Northwest Airlines." From this evidence, We cannot discern even the
slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part
of petitioner.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The phrase "refusal to
obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where
employee
cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the
family"
does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanida's counsel
lifted
the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus
of
Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The syllabus of cases
in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or
resolutions
is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Court's decision.
The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his
understanding
of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience
of
lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the court's
Decision.[20]
A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully
considered
text in the Decision of the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch,
but
substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA
syllabus,
which they even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote
from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We
admonish
them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright
attempt
to mislead the parties and the courts taking cognizance of this case.
Rule
10.02, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a Decision for authority. It is
the
duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of
the Supreme Court accurately.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whether Galanida
was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight
and even finality to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
particularly
when they affirm the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts. However,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) when
the
findings are grounded on speculation, surmise and conjecture;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) when the
inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3) when there is
grave,
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(4) when the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(5) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the
case
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(6) when the judgment
of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or
when
it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered,
will justify a different conclusion;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(7) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(8) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[22]
After a scrutiny of the
records, we find that some of these exceptions obtain in the present
case.
The rule is that the
transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the
employer's
prerogatives.[23]
The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for
valid
reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the
transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the
employee's
salary, benefits and other privileges.[24]
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that
the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the
displaced
employee.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The constant transfer
of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities from
one
branch to another is a standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more
than a hundred branches throughout the country.[26]
Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control. It also enables
bank
employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual promotion. The
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Other Financial Intermediaries,[27]
requires the rotation of these personnel. The Manual directs that the
"duties
of personnel, handling cash, securities and bookkeeping records should
be rotated" and that such rotation "should be irregular, unannounced
and
long enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or
manipulations."[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Galanida was well aware
of Allied Bank's policy of periodically transferring personnel to
different
branches. As the Court of Appeals found, assignment to the different
branches
of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanida's employment. Galanida
consented
to this condition when he signed the Notice of Personnel Action.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The evidence on record
contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida
and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer. Allied Bank's letter
of 13 June 1994[30]
showed that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from various
branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other branches.
Allied
Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter explained that
Galanida
was second in line for assignment outside Cebu because he had been in
Cebu
for seven years already. The person first in line, Assistant Manager
Roberto
Isla, who had been in Cebu for more than ten years, had already
transferred
to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the other
transferees
joined Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his allegations of
widespread
discrimination and favoritism.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards Ms. Co, Galanida's
letter of 16 June 1994 itself showed that her assignment to Cebu was
not
in any way related to Galanida's transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to
replace
a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer has the
prerogative,
based on its assessment of the employees' qualifications and
competence,
to rotate them in the various areas of its business operations to
ascertain
where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither was Galanida's
transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence
showing that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other
privileges. Instead, Allied Bank's letter of 13 June 1994 assured
Galanida
that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the
transfer
would involve the same rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda
explained
this further in the affidavit he submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
19. There
is
no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainant's salary,
benefits
and other privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch officers is
premised
on the role/functions that they will assume in the management and
operations
of the branch, as shown below:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(a) The
Branch
Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for the proper
discharge
of the functions of the accounting section of the branch, review of
documentation/proper
accounting and control of transaction. As such, the accounting
functions
in the branch can be assumed by any of the following officers with the
rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/Acctg.; Senior Asst.
Manager/Acctg.;
Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
20. The
transfer/assignment
of branch officer from one branch, to another branch/office is lateral
in nature and carries with it the same position/rank, salary, benefits
and other privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the officer to
assume
the functions relative to his job and NOT the position/rank of the
officer
to be replaced.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is also no basis
for the funding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in
dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations
of
"the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization"[32]
and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor
Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no
evidence
that Galanida took part in forming a union, or even that a union
existed
in Allied Bank.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This leaves the issue
of whether Galanida could validly refuse the transfer orders on the
ground
of parental obligations, additional expenses, and the anguish he would
suffer if assigned away from his family.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court has ruled
on this issue before. In the case of Homeowners Savings and Loan
Association,
Inc. v. NLRC,[33]
we held:
The
acceptability
of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an illicit or
underhanded purpose — i.e., to defeat an employee's right to
self-organization,
to rid himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an employee for
union activities — cannot be upheld is self-evident and cannot be
gainsaid.
The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or
underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to
the
transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or
hardship
that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer. What
then?
This was the very same
situation we faced in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana.
In
that case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio
City
Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to the company's branch
office at Laoag City. In refusing the transfer, the employee averred
that
she had established Baguio City as her permanent residence and that
such
transfer will involve additional expenses on her part, plus the fact
that
an assignment to a far place will be a big sacrifice for her as she
will
be kept away from her family which might adversely affect her
efficiency.
In ruling for the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city
to another within the country as valid as long as there is no bad faith
on the part of the employer. We held then:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Certainly
the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes
his
employer's decision to transfer him to another work place, there being
no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is
the employee's wishes that should be made to prevail."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Galanida, through
counsel,
invokes the Court's ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.[34]
Dosch, however, is not applicable to the present case. Helmut Dosch
refused
a transfer consequential to a promotion. We upheld the refusal because
no law compels an employee to accept a promotion, and because the
position
Dosch was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time.[35]
This left as the only basis for the charge of insubordination a letter
from Dosch in which the Court found "not even the slightest hint of
defiance,
much less x x x insubordination."[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the transfer
of an employee to an overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be
likened
to a transfer from one city to another within the country,[37]
which is the situation in the present case. The distance from Cebu City
to Bacolod City or from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed
the
distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila,
which the Court considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v. Laplana.[38]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The refusal to obey
a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful
order
of an employer.[39]
Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers
for
rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until
and
unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent
authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril.[40]
For Galanida's continued refusal to obey Allied Bank's transfer orders,
we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance
with
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.[41]
Galanida is thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whether
Galanida's
dismissal violated the requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal
must comply with Section 2(d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code ("Omnibus Rules"), which provides:
For
termination
of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
Code:
(i) A
written
notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of
termination,
and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(ii) A hearing
or conference
during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if
he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present
his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(iii) A written
notice
of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The first written
notice
was embodied in Allied Bank's letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice
required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the requirement of
a hearing this Court has held that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard.[42]
An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters, in
which Galanida's wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutor's Office,
assisted
him, gave Galanida an opportunity to respond to the charges against him.cralaw:red
The remaining issue
is whether the Memo dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes
the written notice of termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In
finding
that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Bank's
rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that, "Notice of termination
shall
be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of
the President or his authorized representative."[43]
The appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any
notice
of termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the heading "Transfer and
Reassignment,"
was not the termination notice required by law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not agree.chanrobles virtual law library
Even a cursory reading
of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied
Bank's decision to dismiss him. The statement, "please be informed that
the Bank has terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and
considered
whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to] as
forfeited
x x x"[44]
is plainly worded and needs no interpretation. The Memo also discussed
the findings of the Investigation Committee that served as grounds for
Galanida's dismissal, The Memo referred to Galanida's "open defiance
and
refusal" to transfer first to the Bacolod City branch and then to the
Tagbilaran
City branch. The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to report
for
work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation
leave.[45]
The Memo also refuted Galanida's charges of discrimination and
demotion,
and concluded that he had violated Article XII of the bank's Employee
Discipline
Policy and Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Memo, although captioned
"Transfer and Reassignment," did not preclude it from being a notice of
termination. The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is
characterized
not by the title given to it but by its body and contents.[46]
Moreover, it appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a
notice
of termination. We quote, from the Memorandum for Private
Respondent-Appellee,
as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
proceedings
may be capsulized as follows:
1. On March 13,
1994
47 Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration
Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A copy of the Complaint
is attached to the Petition as Annex "H";chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
5. On September 8,
1994,
Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of Termination. A copy of said
letter is attached to the Petition as Annex "N";
6. Private
Respondent-Appellee
filed an Amended/Supplemental Complaint wherein he alleged illegal
dismissal.
A copy of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to the
Petition
as Annex "O"; x x x.[48]
(Emphasis
supplied.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Memorandum for
Private
Respondent-Appellee refers to the Memo as a "Letter of Termination."
Further,
Galanida amended his complaint for constructive dismissal[49]
to one for illegal dismissal[50]
after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo
to
mean that Allied Bank had terminated his services.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Memo complied with
Allied Bank's internal rules which required the bank's President or his
authorized representative to confirm the notice of termination. The
bank's
Vice-President for Personnel, as the head of the department that
handles
the movement of personnel within Allied Bank, can certainly represent
the
bank president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nevertheless, we agree
that the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the Memo stated
that
Allied Bank terminated Galanida's services as of 1 September 1994, the
Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only
received
a copy of the Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the
supposed
date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of termination
must be served on the employees.[51]
Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he
had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Bank's decision
to
dismiss him. Galanida's dismissal could only take effect on 5 October
1994,
upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason, Galanida is entitled to
backwages for the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under the circumstances,
we also find an award of P10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts
award
nominal damages to recognize or vindicate the right of a person that
another
has violated.[52]
The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied Bank's
decision
to dismiss him. Allied Bank should have exercised more care in issuing
the notice of termination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Decision
of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451
upholding
the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No.
V-000180-98
is AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1) The
awards
of separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are hereby
deleted
for lack of basis;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2) Reducing the
award
of backwages to cover only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October
1994; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3) Awarding
nominal
damages to private respondent for P10,000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This case is REMANDED
to
the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from
receipt
of this Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits,
due to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was
ineffectual
from 1 September 1994 until 4 October 1994.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Labor Arbiter Dominador
A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more
careful
in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and
concurred
in by Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera and Elvi John S. Asuncion,
Seventh Division.
[3]
Penned by Presiding Commissioner Irenea E. Ceniza, concurred in by
Commissioners
Bernabe S. Batuhan and Amorito V. Cañete, Fourth Division.
[4]
Rollo, p. 82.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Ibid., p. 123.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Ibid., p. 156.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
208 Phil. 259 (1983).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
CA Rollo, p. 67.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
CA Rollo, p. 46.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Ibid., p. 64.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Supra, see note 9. The Court of Appeals cited Dosch v. NLRC accurately.
[15]
Rollo, p. 82.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Ibid., p. 100.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Ibid., p. 45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Rollo, p. 475. Emphasis supplied by counsel.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Supra, see note 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 780
(1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-Natu v. Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd., No. L-25291, 30 January 1971, 37 SCRA 244.
[22]
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 261 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
OSS Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 382 Phil. 35 (2000);
Abbott Laboratories Inc. v. NLRC, No. L-76959, 12 October 1987, 154
SCRA
713.
[24]
Castillo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 605 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Petitioner's Memorandum, rollo, p. 438; Affidavit of Vice-President
Regidor
M. Olveda, rollo, p. 200.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 100–104.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Section 1168.8 of the Manual states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a. The duties of personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping
records
should be rotated.
b. Rotation assignment should be irregular, unannounced and long enough
to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations.
x x
x
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
CA Rollo, pp. 80–81.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Rollo, p. 116. Portions of this letter were also quoted in the Court of
Appeals' Decision.
[31]
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, 373 Phil. 520 (1999) citing
Philippine
Japan Active Carbon Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83239, 8 March 1989, 171
SCRA
164.
[32]
Article 247 of the Labor Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
G.R. No. 97067, 26 September 1996, 262 SCRA 406.
[34]
Supra, see note 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Ibid.chan
robles
virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[36]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
PT&T v. Laplana, G.R. No. 76645, 23 July 1991, 199 SCRA 485.
[38]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97067,
26 September 1996, 262 SCRA 406.
[40]
Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel v. NLRC, 366 Phil. 313 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
41. ART. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an
employment
for any of the following causes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
x x x
[42]
Gabisay v. NLRC, 366 Phil. 593 (1999) citing Tan v. NLRC, 359 Phil. 499
(1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
Rollo, p. 156.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Ibid. The relevant portion of the Memo states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a manifestation of your open defiance and refusal to follow
instruction
concerning your transfer, you filed several applications for vacation
leaves
the latest of which was that dated May 31, 1994 which was approved for
an unextendible (sic) period of six (6) days or until June 10, 1994 due
to exigency of the service. So far management had approved a total of
more
than fifteen (15) days which you have availed for [the] current
year
x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
Dosch v. NLRC, supra, see note 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
The complaint indicates that it was filed on 13 May 1994, not on 13
March
1994.
[48]
Supra, see note 17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Rollo, p. 114.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
Ibid., p. 164.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
Sec. 2(d)(iii), Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.
Quoted earlier.
[52]
Civil Code, Art. 2221.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |