FIRST DIVISION
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT
AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
145804
February 6, 2003
-versus-
MARJORIE NAVIDAD,
HEIRS OF THE LATE NICANOR NAVIDAD
AND PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY,
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
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VITUG,
J.: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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The case before the
Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in
CA-G.R.
CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor
Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of
11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City,
exonerating
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account
of the death of Nicanor Navidad.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 14 October 1993,
about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced
to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered
the
first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment
that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed
instantaneously.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 08 December 1994,
the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with
her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit),
and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a
counterclaim
against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent.
Prudent,
in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence
in the selection and supervision of its security guards.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The LRTA and Roman presented
their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence,
filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin
was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision; it adjudged:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay
jointly
and severally the plaintiffs the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a) 1) Actual damages
of P44,830.00;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
d) Costs of suit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The complaint against
defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The compulsory counterclaim
of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Prudent appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated
its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for
the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman
jointly
and severally liable thusly:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, the assailed
judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any
liability
for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman
and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death
and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs-appellees,
the following amounts:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a) P44,830.00
as actual damages;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
b)
P50,000.00
as nominal damages;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
c)
P50,000.00
as moral damages;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
d)
P50,000.00
as indemnity for the death of the deceased; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
e)
P20,000.00
as and for attorney’s fees."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellate court
ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded
the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when
the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after
paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting
Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to
link
the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad
failed
to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence
merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having
been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the
time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their
failure
to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application
of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellate court
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10
October 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their present recourse,
petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court;
viz:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE
TRIAL
COURTchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE
OF
LRTA."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners would contend
that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings
of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping
conclusion
that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was
not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon
Navidad,
which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger
that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that
the appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of an
employer-employee
relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself
had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents, supporting
the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of
carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT
station
and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the
rights
and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court
had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in
failing
to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Law and jurisprudence
dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and
for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.[4]
The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death
of
or injury to its passengers, provides:
“Article 1755. A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Article 1756. In case
of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and
1755."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 1759. Common
carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation
of the orders of the common carriers.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"This liability of the
common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Article 1763. A common
carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers,
if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission."
The law requires common
carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.[5]
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so
obligates
it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers
are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.[6]
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees
or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7]
In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or been negligent, and[8]
by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to
still
establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees
and
the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9]
In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident
occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have
failed
to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10]
an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The foundation of LRTA’s
liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge
of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose
to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Should Prudent be made
likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under
the provisions of Article 2176[12]cralaw
and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13]cralaw
of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability
is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
established,
the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption
juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families
in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is
primary
and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision
of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such
a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the
common
carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand,
be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be
breached
by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194[14]cralaw
of the Civil Code can well apply.[15]cralaw
In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort
is that which breaches the contract.[16]cralaw
Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said
to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Regrettably for LRT,
as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad,
this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad),
for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not
been
duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There being, similarly,
no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable
act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to
say,
the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a
juridical
relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable
only
for his own fault or negligence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The award of nominal
damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated
or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18]
It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory
damages.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only
in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner
Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p. 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Rollo, pp. 46-47.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, pp. 18-19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Arada vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 624.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 575.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Article 1763, Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Gatchalian vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126; Yobido vs. Court of Appeals, 281
SCRA
1; Landingin vs. Pangasinan Transportation Co., 33 SCRA 284.
[9]
Mercado vs. Lira, 3 SCRA 124.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Article 1756, Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Vda. De Abeto vs. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 30 July 1982.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Guardians
are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who
are under their authority and live in their company.
The
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The
State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent,
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the
task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176
shall be applicable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.
The
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father
of a family to prevent damage.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict is solidary.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Air France vs. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
PSBA vs. CA, 205 SCRA 729.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Manila Railroad vs. Compania
Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Article 2221, Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Medina, et al. vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil. 506.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |