EN BANC
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
146803
January 14, 2004
-versus-
CLEMENTINO LOU Y
GALINDO ALIAS "JUNIOR,"
Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
VITUG,
J.:
On appeal to the Court
is the decision, dated 09 November 2000, in Criminal Case No. 3635 of
the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,[1]
of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, finding appellant Clementino Lou y
Galindo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the commission of the crime of rape
"defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by
R.A. No. 7659, Section 11 thereof." The trial court imposed upon
appellant
the death penalty and the payment of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
by way of civil indemnity to the victim.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The accusatory information
read:
"That on April 22, 1996
at about 12:00 o’clock midnight in the premises and vicinity
particularly
at the house of the victim located at Bayugan 3, Rosario, Agusan del
Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named
accused with the use of his superior strength, with intent of lewd
design,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with force and
intimidation, succeed in having sexual intercourse with his
stepdaughter
ELGIE S. BULAQUEÑA, a girl who was then fifteen (15) years old,
and a woman of good reputation, against her will and consent to the
damage
and prejudice of the said victim which damage consists of actual,
compensatory
and moral damages."[2]
At his arraignment,
appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pled not guilty to the
charge.cralaw:red
The prosecution presented
its evidence tending to prove that –
At midnight of 22 April
1996, Elgie S. Bulaqueña was already asleep in their house in
Purok
8, Balite, Sinug-ang, Bayugan III, Rosario, Agusan del Sur, when she
was
awakened by appellant. He lifted her skirt, removed her panty, and
tried
to insert his penis into her vagina but initially failed as she made
"some
movements." Although he finally succeeded in inserting his penis into
her
vagina, the penetration, however, was not completely achieved. Elgie
cried,
but, afraid of his threat to kill her, Elgie remained in the room and
did
not tell her mother, Judith Bulaqueña, about what had
transpired.
Instead, she asked the help of her uncle who, thereupon, accompanied
her
to the police station. The police had Elgie medically examined at the
rural
health center.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Rebecca R. Aquino
examined Elgie on 24 April 1996, and prepared a medico-legal report.
She
found Elgie to have had "completely healed lacerations" at the 3 and 8
o’clock hymenal positions but that there were no abrasions, hematoma
and
contusions. Dr. Aquino explained that the laceration could have been
caused
by sexual intercourse, "medical instrumentation," the "passage of
clotted
blood thru menstruation," or "severe physical exertion."
On 25 April 1996, Elgie,
assisted by her mother Judith, filed a complaint for rape, on three
counts,
against appellant, one committed "on or about 3:00 o’clock day time of
1995," the second "on February 7, 1996 [at] 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon"
and the third on "April 22, 1996 [at] 12:00 o’clock night time right in
the residence of the victim particularly at Balite, Purok 8, Bayugan 3,
Rosario, Agusan del Sur."[3]
(Still, for unexplained reasons, the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan
del
Sur filed the information, hereinbefore quoted, charging only one crime
of rape, i.e., that which was averred to have been committed at
midnight
on 22 April 1996).cralaw:red
Appellant testified
in his defense. He claimed that Judith, Elgie’s mother, was his
common-law
wife from 1991 to 1996. Judith thereafter lived with another man. On 22
April 1996, appellant said he was at home with his two children by
Judith
and two other persons, Marlon Ayaton and Rosendo Barrios, who were then
working for him. Appellant denied having sexually molested Elgie on the
evening of 22 April 1996. The "truth," he claimed, was that, at about
ten
o’clock that night, he mauled Elgie after seeing her in bed with Marlon
and Rosendo. Days later, policemen invited him to the police station
and
put him in jail. He was told that Elgie had accused him of raping her
three
times.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court saw
the case for the prosecution; it found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape for which it meted the death penalty.cralaw:red
In this automatic review
of the case, appellant, through counsel, would contend that –
"I.
"THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED
IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME
OF RAPE.
"II.
"EVEN ASSUMING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS TRULY GUILTY OF HAVING RAPED THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT,
NONETHELESS, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON HIM THE SUPREME
PENALTY
OF DEATH."[4]
In reviewing rape cases,
the Court is so guided, as usual, by these principles: That -chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x x x First, the prosecution
has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt
or
that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces
conviction.
Second, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts,
especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to
great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Third, the disposition of
rape cases are governed by the following guidelines: (1) an accusation
for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme
caution, and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence
of the defense."[5]
The crime of rape can
be committed by, among other ways, "having carnal knowledge of a woman"
with the use of force or intimidation.[6]
Intimidation is subjective, and it is addressed to the mind of the
person
against whom it is employed at the time and occasion of the crime.
While
there is no hard and fast rule to test its presence,[7]
one accepted norm, nevertheless, is whether the intimidation produces a
reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she were to resist or
were not to yield to the desires of the malefactor, the threat would be
carried out.[8]
The victim was still
young when she began to live with her mother and appellant, her
mother’s
common-law husband, whom she recognized to be a "stepfather." The
relationship
between appellant and the victim was far from ideal. Appellant
repeatedly
maltreated the girl, a fact that he himself admitted. The threat of
another
round of abuse proved all too real that midnight of 22 April 1996, when
appellant verbalized his intention to harm her upon entering her room.
It was not unnatural that the young girl would be cowed by appellant.
The
victim testified:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Q What happened while
you were sleeping in your house?
"A While I was sleeping
I was awakened, sir.cralaw:red
"Q What happened?
"A He got inside the
room and said `Do not tell. If you will tell I will kill you,’ sir.cralaw:red
"Q And what did he do
to you if any?
"A He lifted my skirt
and removed my panty and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.cralaw:red
"Q What did you do when
he inserted his penis to your vagina?
"A I kept on crying,
sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Q And after that what
happened if any?
"A After that he went
out and my mother arrived, sir.cralaw:red
"Q What did you do after
your mother arrived in your house?
"A I still remained
inside the room and I did not tell my mother because if I told her he
would
kill me, sir."[9]
Contrary to the claim
of appellant, the victim’s submission to his lust was not free from
struggle.
She did resist the sexual advances.cralaw:red
"Q You said that accused
inserted his penis in your vagina, can you tell us how deep was the
penetration?
"A At first it did not
insert because I made some movements, Your Honor.cralaw:red
"Q My question is how
deep was it penetrated?
"A The penis did not
penetrate completely, Your Honor.cralaw:red
"Q It penetrated but
not completely is that what you mean?
"A Yes, Your Honor."[10]
The medical report that
there have been "healed lacerations" found in the 3 and 8 o’clock
hymenal
positions would not refute the existence of rape. Proof of entry of the
male organ within the labia of the pudendum is sufficient.[11]
The full penetration of the victim’s sex organ is not required to
consummate
the crime of rape. Neither is proof of hymenal laceration an element of
rape.[12]
In People v. Madronio,[13]
the Court has said that the "presence of an old healed laceration on
[the
victim’s] hymen does not negate the commission of rape," and that a
"freshly
broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime." Moreover, a
medico-legal
report is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, it being
merely corroborative in nature.[14]
In this case, the medical report also reflects the fact that the victim
has had "[n]o abrasions, hematoma and contusions" in "the vulva or in
other
parts of the body," that belie appellant’s claim that he only "mauled"
the victim with his bare hands, instead of sexually abusing her, that
night
of 22 April 1996.cralaw:red
Appellant assails the
credibility of the victim at the witness stand. Like before, this Court
must defer to the assessment and evaluation given by the trial court on
this issue.[15]
It is the trial court that would be in such unique a position as to be
able to observe the deportment of the witness while testifying.[16]
There is here no cogent reason to overturn the judgment of the trial
court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is claimed that the
victim’s motive in filing the rape charge has only been to exact
vengeance
and to get rid of appellant. The Court has consistently disregarded
this
kind of assertion as being too trite to merit consideration. In one
case,
the allegation that the rape victim has just wanted to "get rid" of an
accused due to the maltreatment which she and her mother have suffered
in his hands has been held by the Court to be "too unnatural to merit
faith
and credit."16 Truly, as has so often been said, neither the victim nor
a mother would expose the family to shame and scandal if the charge
were
merely impelled by a motive other than to exact justice.[17]
Appellant argues that
the victim’s getting married soon after her supposed horrendous ordeal
is uncharacteristic of a rape victim. Appellant apparently fits the
fact
of her marriage into his own desperate mold of defense. He fails to
consider
the fact that different people react differently to given situations
and
that there is no known standard form of human behavioral response when
confronted particularly with a frightful experience.[18]
In any case, her subsequent marriage is of no moment; indeed, it could
have even strengthened her determination to pursue her complaint to its
just conclusion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 27 September 2001,
Elgie, after consulting with her mother, executed and filed with this
Court
an affidavit of desistance. An affidavit of desistance is not looked
upon
with favor on appeal following a conviction, let alone as being the
sole
consideration for the reversal of that conviction. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with retraction or desistance, create
doubts on the veracity of the testimony given by witnesses during the
trial.[19]
The records do not here cast such doubts. A rape victim, who testifies
in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and
remains
consistent, is a credible witness.[20]
The victim in this case has remained steadfast in her testimony despite
a rigid cross-examination made by the defense. The spontaneous
emotional
breakdowns suffered by the victim occasioned by the forced recollection
of the sexual violation she has experienced from the hands of appellant
somehow would add to her credibility.[21]
There is merit, however,
in the contention that the death penalty should not be imposed upon
appellant.cralaw:red
As so amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 335. When and
how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
"1. By using force or
intimidation;
"x x
x
x x x x x x
"The crime of rape shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.cralaw:red
"x x
x
x x x x x x
"The death penalty shall
also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following
attendant circumstances:
"1. When the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim."
Circumstances that would
warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape are
in
the nature of special qualifying circumstances that require to be both
alleged with certainty in the information and proven at the trial.[22]
The information averred
that the victim was fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission
of the crime. On the witness stand, the victim claimed to be 16 years
old,
but no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, was presented. It
was
the defense counsel who asked her on cross-examination if she had a
birth
certificate to prove her age. Even while the victim had testified to
the
existence of a birth certificate in the possession of her mother, the
prosecution,
however, failed to pursue the matter and ignored the disclosure. The
information
alleged the victim to be the "stepdaughter"[23]
of appellant, but the evidence adduced showed that the victim’s mother
and appellant had only lived together for a while as just common-law
husband
and wife.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The crime committed
by appellant is simple rape for which the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is prescribed. The trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity of
P50,000.00
but it has overlooked the prevailing rule that, in rape cases, moral
damages
should similarly be awarded.[24]
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant
Clementino
Lou y Galindo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime
of simple rape for which he shall suffer the penalty, not of death, but
of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay to the
victim
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages in addition to the
civil
indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) already decreed by the
trial
court. Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Presided by Judge Evangeline S. Yuipco-Bayana.
[2]
Records, p. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Exhibit C; see also Exhibit B.
[4]
Rollo, p. 29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
People v. Aguinaldo, 375 Phil. 295, 308 (1999), citing People v.
Burgos,
345 Phil. 205, 213-214 (1997).
[6]
Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
[7]
People v. Rapisora, G.R. No. 138086, 25 January 2001, 350 SCRA 299, 307.
[8]
People v. Loyola, G.R. No. 126026, 06 February 2001, 351 SCRA 263, 268,
citing People v. Fraga, 386 Phil. 884 (2000).
[9]
TSN, 03 June 1998, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Ibid., at p. 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
People v. Joya, G.R. No. 79090, 01 October 1993, 227 SCRA 9, 22-23.
[12]
People v. De Taza, G.R. Nos. 136286-89, 11 September 2003; People v.
Tampos,
G.R. No. 142740, 06 August 2003; People v. Dogaojo, G.R. Nos.
137834-40,
03 December 2001, 371 SCRA 321, 334-335; People v. Ayo, 365 Phil. 88,
102
(1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
G.R. No. 137587 and No. 138329, 29 July 2003.
[14]
People v. Lasola, 376 Phil. 349, 360 (1999).
[15]
People v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 141881, 21 November 2001, 370 SCRA 142,
146-147.
[16]
People v. Lasola, Ibid., pp. 358-359.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
People v. Zaballero, 340 Phil. 731, 743 (1997).
[18]
People v. Sta. Ana, 353 Phil. 388, 408-409 (1998).
[19]
People v. Montejo, G.R. No. 133475, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 210, 223.
[20]
People v. Vedra, G.R. No. 108615, 09 October 2000, 342 SCRA 317, 324,
citing
People v. Perez, 357 Phil. 17 (1998).
[21]
People v. Ramos, 371 Phil. 66, 77 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
See People v. Ferolino, G.R. Nos. 131730-31, 05 April 2000, 329 SCRA
719,
734-735.
[23]
A stepdaughter is the daughter of one’s spouse by a previous marriage,
or the daughter of one of the spouses by a previous marriage. (People
v.
Brigildo, 380 Phil. 610, 629 (2000).
[24]
People v. Toquero, G.R. No. 127650, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 69, 75. |