SECOND DIVISION.
.
HERMOGENA G.
ENGRESO
WITH SPOUSE
JOSE ENGRESO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
148727
April 9, 2003
-versus-
NESTORIA DE LA
CRUZ
AND HERMINIO
DE LA CRUZ,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,
J.:
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
affirming the Decision of the court a quo[2]
which declared private respondent Nestoria de la Cruz the lawful owner
of one-half (½) of Lot No. 10561 and of the
residential/commercial
building standing thereon.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sometime in 1993
private
respondent Nestoria de la Cruz instituted an action for declaration of
ownership, possession and damages against petitioner spouses Hermogena
and Jose Engreso.[3]
In her complaint, Nestoria alleged that in 1979 she purchased from her
sister Hermogena one-half (½) of an unregistered property
located
in Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, designated as Lot No. 10561,
containing
an area of 112.5 square meters, more or less, as specified and
delineated
in the deed of sale.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nestoria further
averred
that their deceased father Romeo Gajelloma had constructed a
residential/commercial
building on their adjoining properties such that a part of the
structure
stood on her property and the remaining half on Hermogena’s land.
During his lifetime, Romeo lived in the building and leased a portion
thereof
to third parties. After Romeo’s death petitioner spouses
deprived
her of her rights over the purchased property as well as the building
thereon.
Private respondent Nestoria also complained that her sister Hermogena
mortgaged
Lot No. 10561 with all its improvements in favor of the Rural Bank of
Zamboanguita,
Negros Oriental, without her knowledge and consent. In support of
her complaint Nestoria presented in evidence a notarized Deed of Sale
dated
20 January 1979 attesting to the fact that in consideration of
P3,000.00
Hermogena sold to her an identified portion of the disputed
property.
Private respondent prayed that she be declared owner of one-half
(½)
portion of Lot No. 10561 as well as the building thereon, and that
petitioner
spouses be ordered to render an accounting of the rentals derived from
the lease of the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner spouses moved
to dismiss the complaint arguing that private respondent failed to
allege
whether earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In its Order dated
20 May 1993 the trial court denied the motion; instead, it ordered
Nestoria
to amend her complaint to indicate whether efforts towards a compromise
had been undertaken.[4]
Forthwith, private respondent filed an amended complaint stating that
petitioner
spouses
had rebuffed all attempts towards an amicable resolution of their
dispute.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In due time, the trial
court rendered its decision declaring private respondent Nestoria de la
Cruz owner of a portion of the disputed parcel of land, which was
designated
as Lot No. 10561-A, as well as one-half (½) of the
residential/commercial
building standing thereon. The trial court ordered petitioner Hermogena
Engreso to deliver to private respondent possession of Lot No. 10561-A
and one-half (½) of the building thereon as well as one-half
(½)
of the rentals derived from the lease of the property beginning
February
1993. In support of its decision the trial court
ratiocinated
that a recital in a public document celebrated with all the legal
formalities
under the safeguard of a notarial certificate constituted evidence
against
the parties and a high degree of proof would be necessary to overcome
the
legal presumption that such recital was true. The trial court
ruled
that the biased and interested testimony of petitioner Hermogena could
not overcome the evidentiary force of the 20 January 1979 Deed of Sale
which was ratified before a notary public, Atty. Luz Teves, who even
testified
in favor of the authenticity and genuineness of the document.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner spouses
went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari insisting
that
it was error for the trial court not to have dismissed the complaint
and
to have declared valid the "falsified deed of sale." The Court of
Appeals
dismissed the appeal and held that the trial court could validly order
the plaintiff to amend the complaint to conform with the requirements
set
forth in Art. 222 of the New Civil Code for as long as the amendment
did
not actually confer jurisdiction on the court in which the action was
filed.
The appellate court likewise upheld the findings of facts made by the
trial
court rationalizing that the latter was in a better position to analyze
and assess the probative value of the evidence adduced during
trial.
Hence, this petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The principle
is
well-established
that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an
appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of The Rules of Court, only questions of
law
may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function
of
trial courts the findings of which on these matters are received with
respect
and are, as a rule, binding on this Court unless it is shown that they
are grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures.[5]
In the present case, whether the Deed of Sale dated 20 January 1979 is
authentic and genuine, and whether petitioner spouses are bound to
deliver
the property object of the sale to private respondent are essentially
factual
issues and, after a prudent study of the contentions of both sides, we
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court which
have been affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, under the law
on sales the vendor is bound to transfer ownership of and deliver the
thing
object of the sale to the vendee.[6]
In the present case, although the sale was made through a public
document
and hence equivalent to delivery of the thing sold, petitioner
Hermogena
vehemently denied the fact of the sale and interposed her objection to
private respondent’s enjoyment of the property. As such, fiction
must yield to reality and petitioner’s obligation to deliver the sold
portion
of Lot No. 10561, or Lot No. 10561-A, to private respondent remains.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, we take
exception
to the order of the courts a quo directing petitioner spouses to
deliver
to private respondent Nestoria de la Cruz one-half (½) of the
building
standing on Lot No. 10561. Although Nestoria is indeed the sole
owner
of a specified portion of the disputed parcel of land she only co-owns
the structure standing thereon.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is a basic principle
in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually
partitioned,
all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate
share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to
demand
a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common
because
until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only
by an ideal portion.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As such, the only
effect
of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from
a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right
to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate
part of the property.[8]
Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half
(½) of the building in favor of private respondent.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At this instance, it
must be noted that the building subject of this controversy was built
not
by the contending parties but by their father Romeo Gallejoma who died
years prior to this controversy. Following the rules on
succession
and in the absence of proof that the estate of Romeo had been
judicially
or extrajudicially partitioned all his surviving heirs have a right
over
the building having succeeded him from the moment of his
death.
Although Leon Gallejoma, brother of Nestoria and Hermogena, admitted
that
the building was given by their deceased father to his squabbling
sisters,[9]
such testimony should not prejudice and bind the other heirs who have
not
relinquished their rights over the aforesaid building.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, petitioner Hermogena’s
encumbrance of Lot No. 10561 and the building thereon in favor of the
Rural
Bank of Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, affects only her share in the
property
but not that of private respondent or that of the other heirs who were
not parties to the mortgage. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the sole
MODIFICATION
that petitioner Hermogena Engreso and private respondent Nestoria de la
Cruz are declared co-owners of the residential/commercial building
standing
on Lots Nos. 10561 and 10561-A and they may exercise jointly the right
of dominion over the aforesaid structure until they effect its
partition
and until their respective portions are properly
determined.
This is without prejudice to the rights of the other heirs of Romeo
Gajelloma,
if any, to demand their share in the building. No costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Quisumbing, and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
no part. Concurred in CA decision.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred
in
by Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Hilarion L.
Aquino,
prom. 25 June 2001; Rollo, pp. 19-28.
[2]
Decision penned by Judge Enrique C. Garovillo, RTC-Br. 30, Dumaguete
City;
CA Rollo, pp. 51-62.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Also referred to as "Hermogena and Jose Ingreso" in the records.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, p. 34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
The Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, 353 Phil.
591
(1998).
[6]
Civil Code, art. 1495.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Villanueva v. Florendo, G.R. No. 33158, 17 October 1985,
139
SCRA 329.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines,
170 (1994).
[9]
TSN, 22 July 1994, pp. 13-14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |