FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
148810
November 18, 2003
-versus-
HEVER PAULINO Y
BIYAYA,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is an appeal
from the Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 34, in Criminal
Case
No. 12720 finding appellant Hever Paulino y Biyaya guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum
of P50,000.00.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For the death of the
Leonarda Paulino, appellant was charged with murder in an Information
that
reads:
That on 18
August 1996 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Tubod,
Tamao,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery
and evident premeditation and without regard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of her sex did then and there willfully,
feloniously
and unlawfully attack, assault and stone one Leonarda Paulino with a
large
rock thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal injury at her head which
caused her death soon thereafter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO ART.
248
of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
When arraigned,
appellant
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter trial on the merits ensued.
The facts of the case
are as follows:
On August 18, 1996,
at about 5:00 p.m., the victim and her daughters, Joy and Mylene, were
at their house when appellant passed by and asked for water to drink.
Since
he was the nephew of the victim, appellant was welcomed into the house
and was given a glass of water by Mylene. He stayed at their porch
while
Mylene left for the house of her grandmother, Vivenciana Cantero,
approximately
40 meters away. Moments later, the victim advised appellant to go home
as his father might be looking for him. Appellant left the house angry
at the victim for telling him to leave. Then as the victim and Joy
walked
towards the house of Vivenciana Cantero to fetch Mylene, Joy saw
appellant,
who was only about[2]
meters behind them, throw a rock at them hitting the head of the
victim.
The victim slumped to the ground with her face down while appellant ran
away. Vivenciana heard the cries of Joy for help, and rushed to the
scene.
Her husband, Timoteo Cantero and Leonila Onayan, Joy's aunt, helped
Vivenciana
bring the victim to Bindoy District Hospital where she was treated. She
was then transferred to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital later
that
night. The victim died the following day.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Fe Herrera, a resident
physician of Bindoy District Hospital, testified that the victim was
unconscious
when she was brought by the relatives to the hospital. The victim
sustained
two lacerated wounds, one on the left temporal region, about three
centimeters
long and the other one on the right parietal region, about six
centimeters
long. She referred the victim to the Negros Oriental Provincial
Hospital
for further treatment.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Virgilio de Guzman,
the government physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital who
attended to the victim, testified that the injuries sustained by the
victim
were fatal and no amount of surgical intervention could have saved her.
The victim died on August 19, 1996 at 8:30 a.m. due to cardio-pulmonary
arrest secondary to uncal herniation secondary to severe traumatic
injury.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his part, appellant
admits that he threw a stone at the victim but claims that he did so in
self-defense. According to him, in the afternoon of August 18, 1996, he
passed by the house of the victim and asked for water to drink. After
Mylene
Paulino gave him a glass of water, he asked her if she already had a
boyfriend.
Mylene did not reply but kicked him instead. She then went into the
kitchen.
Suddenly, the victim came out of the kitchen holding a scythe in her
hand
and shouted at him, "I will kill you! I will chop you finely with the
use
of this scythe!" Appellant ran away and the victim chased him. When the
victim was about 3 meters away from him, he picked a stone and threw it
at her to defend himself. After that, he ran towards their house. He
did
not see whether the victim was hit or not. That same night, he told his
father what happened. The following morning, he went to the house of
policeman
Remegio Torres to surrender. He was accompanied to the police station
of
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, where he was investigated and detained.[6]
After trial, the court
a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
accused HEVER PAULINO is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, and the Court hereby
imposes
upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accused is
likewise
directed to indemnify the heirs of victim Leonarda Paulino the amount
of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).
In line with
Section
5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
accused
Hever Paulino is hereby ordered to be immediately detained at the New
Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. The accused is, however,
hereby
given full credit for the entire period of his preventive detention,
provided
that he has submitted himself to and observed the rules and regulations
imposed by the detention center.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No pronouncement
as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this appeal,
based
on the following assignment of errors:
I.chanrobles virtual law library
THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II.chanrobles virtual law library
THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
INTERPOSED
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III.chanrobles virtual law library
ON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TREACHERY.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant's claim of
self-defense
is unavailing.
Settled is the rule
in criminal cases that the prosecution has the onus probandi in
establishing
the guilt of the accused.[9]
However, where the accused admits commission of the crime but invokes
self-defense,
the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies
on the prosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to
the
accused to prove the elements of his defense.[10]
It then becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own
evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, for even if
the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted
the killing.[11]
Hence, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his
conviction
must ensue as a matter of consequence.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
By invoking self-defense,
appellant must prove:
(a)
unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b) reasonable
necessity
of the means employed to repel or prevent it; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c) lack of
sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although all the three
elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of
unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has
been
proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete
or
incomplete. In other words in self-defense, unlawful aggression is a
primordial
element.[14]
The question whether
appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. 15
In
convicting appellant, the trial court succinctly held that:
In the case
at bar, the court is not persuaded to believe the assertion of accused
Hever Paulino that he acted in self-defense when he threw a big stone
at
the head of victim Leonarda Paulino, which led to her death. As
admitted
by the accused on the witness stand, he had no previous quarrel or
misunderstanding
with victim Leonarda Paulino, nor with eyewitness Joy Paulino, or with
any members of their family. There is no reason, therefore, why
Leonarda
would chase him with a scythe. There is also no reason at all why Joy
Paulino
would impute to the accused the heinous crime of Murder, if he did not
commit the crime as charged. This is especially so, taking into account
the fact that the accused, the victim and the eyewitness are relatives.
Leonarda is the wife of the uncle of the accused, while Joy is the
first
cousin of the accused. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no
showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated
by any improper motive, the presumption is that they are not so
actuated
and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. Mere
relationship
of a witness to the victim does not impair her credibility as to render
her testimony unworthy of credence where no improper motive can be
ascribed
to her for so testifying. The assertion of the accused that the victim
chased him with a scythe is unworthy of belief as it is unnatural,
coupled
by the fact that it runs counter to the credible and straightforward
testimony
of eyewitness Joy Paulino x x x. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
The fact that
victim
Leonarda Paulino advised the accused, who is the nephew of her husband,
to go home because he has his own house and his father might be looking
for him, does not constitute an unlawful aggression in contemplation of
law. The victim simply showed concern for the accused and his father.[16]
(Citations
omitted.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We have consistently
held
that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters
best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having
observed
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment
on
the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate
courts. The trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the
lower
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which,
if
properly considered, would alter the results of the case.[17]
No such fact or circumstance obtains in the case at bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant failed to
prove with satisfactory and convincing evidence that the victim was
guilty
of unlawful aggression. Self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained
where it is not only uncorroborated by competent evidence but is
seriously
doubtful. Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense, which
is so easy to concoct but very difficult to verify.[18]
Appellant's invocation of self-defense therefore deserves scant
consideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant next argues
that if he were to be held criminally liable, it should only be for
homicide.
According to him, treachery was not alleged in the Information with
specificity
as to qualify the killing to murder. He cites as bases for his argument
the cases of People v. Alba[19]
and People v. Manlansing,[20]
wherein the Court disregarded the qualifying circumstance of treachery
for the reason that it failed to specify treachery as a circumstance
qualifying
the killing to murder. In said cases, treachery was considered only a
generic
aggravating circumstance; thus, the crime committed was only homicide
and
not murder.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not agree.cralaw:red
In the subsequent case
of People v. Aquino,[21]
the Court clarified its ruling in the cases of Alba and Manlansing by
holding
that:
The Court
has
repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by
descriptive
words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by to properly qualify an
offense. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Section 9, Rule
110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the —
"x x
x
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know
x x x the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances
x x x."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, even the
attendant
circumstance itself, which is the essential element that raises the
crime
to a higher category, need not be stated in the language of the law.
With
more reason, the words "aggravating/qualifying circumstances" as used
in
the law need not appear in the Information, especially since these
words
are merely descriptive of the attendant circumstances and do not
constitute
an essential clement of the crime. These words are also not necessary
in
informing the accused that he is charged of a qualified crime. What
properly
informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is the specific
allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the
crime
to a higher category.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The rules require
the
qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged in the Information
in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be
properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
purpose
is to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent
surprises
during the trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Section 8 of Rule
110
requires that the Information shall "state the designation of the
offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances." (Emphasis
supplied.). Section 8 merely requires the Information to specify
the
circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the words
"qualifying"
or "qualified by" to refer to the circumstances which raise the
category
of an offense. It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or
"qualified
by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation
of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising
the
crime to a higher category.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
We therefore
reiterate
that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information
allege,
specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law
to
qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the
words
"aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by" to be
considered
as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances
be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges
against
him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding
surprises
during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the
Information
the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and
succeeds
in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to
impose
the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in
proper cases.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at
bar,
the Information clearly passes the test as it specified treachery as an
attending circumstance in the commission of the crime. The allegation,
although not preceded by the words "aggravating/qualifying,"
"qualifying,"
or "qualified by," is sufficient to apprise appellant of the charge
against
him as to enable him to prepare fully his defense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court
correctly
found the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the
instant
case. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence
of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim
without
the slightest provocation on his part.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar, it
was established that the victim had no reason to expect that she will
be
assaulted by appellant. She and her daughter Joy were just walking
towards
the house of Vivenciana to fetch her other daughter Mylene. The
unexpected
and sudden attack on Leonarda constitutes treachery because said
assault
rendered her unable and unprepared to defend herself. Appellant's act
of
throwing a stone at the victim from behind shows that he deliberately
adopted
a mode of attack that would deprive the victim of an opportunity to
defend
herself. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, we agree with appellant that the
same
should be considered in his favor. The evidence shows that appellant
surrendered
to a person in authority a day after the incident. This fact was not
contested
by the prosecution. Notwithstanding this, the presence of voluntary
surrender
as a mitigating circumstance will not affect the penalty to be imposed
upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended,
the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of
the
same code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of
two
indivisible penalties and the crime is attended by a mitigating
circumstance
and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.[23]
Consequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed
by
the trial court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the trial court
correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the
heirs
of the victim. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the
accused
without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder
or
homicide.[24]
Likewise, the trial court was correct in not awarding actual, moral and
exemplary damages because the prosecution failed to present competent
evidence
to prove the same. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss.[25]
Further, in murder cases, moral damages cannot be granted in the
absence
of proof therefor[26]
and exemplary damages without any aggravating circumstance.[27]
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City,
Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 12720 finding appellant Hever Paulino y
Biyaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay
the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is
AFFIRMED
in toto. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs de officio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban,
Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Rollo, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
TSN, June 11, 1997, pp. 3–14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
TSN, July 4, 1997, pp. 3–6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
TSN, September 8, 1998, pp. 9–11; Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit D (Death
Certificate).
[6]
TSN, February 2, 2000, pp. 3–9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, pp. 31–32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Rollo, p. 61.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
People v. Quijano, Sr., G.R. Nos. 144523–26, 10 June 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
People v. Annibong, G.R. No. 139879, 8 May 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
People v. Cueto, G.R. No. 147764, 16 January 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
People v. Gallego, G.R. No. 127489, 11 July 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
People v. Castillano, G.R. No. 139412, 2 April 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
People v. Rabanal, G.R. No. 146687, 22 August 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
People v. Suyum, G.R. No. 137518, 6 March 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Rollo, Decision, p. 83.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
People v. Federico, G.R. No. 146956, 25 July 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
People v. Ansus, G.R. No. 149784, 14 July 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
G.R. No. 130523, 29 January 2002, 375 SCRA 70, 78–79.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
G.R. Nos. 131736-37, 11 March 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
G.R. Nos. 144340-42, 6 August 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
People v. Aguilos, G.R. No. 121828, 27 June 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
People v. Delada, G.R. No. 137406, 26 March 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 140762, 10 September 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
People v. Olermo, G.R. No. 127848, 17 July 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, 10 September 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Art. 2230, New Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |