PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
EN BANC
Pleaseclick
here to read full text of the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary |
Main
Decision |
Bellosillo,
J.,
see separate opinion, concurring. |
Puno,
J., see dissenting opinion. |
Vitug,
J.,
see separate (dissenting) opinion. |
Quisumbing,
J.,
in the result, concur with J. Bellosillo’s opinion. |
Ynares-Santiago,
J.,
join the dissent, of J. Puno and J. Gutierrez. |
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J.,
dissent, please see dissenting opinion. | PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUÑO,
STATE PROSECUTORS
PETER L. ONG AND RUBEN A. ZACARIAS;
2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN
AND CITY PROSECUTOR
OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
149453
April 1, 2003 - versus -
PANFILO M. LACSON,
Respondent. R E S O L U T I O
N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.
.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before the Court is the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration[1]
of the Resolution[2]
dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual
issues
relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules
of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the
said court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and
his
co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and
killing
of eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal
of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16
years
old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas,
Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old,[3]
Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine
Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and
Alex
Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine
Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The
respondent
opposed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court ruled in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express
consent
of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal
when
he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that
although
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be
given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether
the
requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court
was
thus directed to resolve the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) whether the provisional
dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2)
whether
it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3)
whether
the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is
any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period;
(5) whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases
of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether
there
were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three
(3)
other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent
Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court further held
that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined
whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the
various
offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new
rule.
According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the
two-year
bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to
comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule
fixes
a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting
cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded
from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases
beyond
the two-year bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In support of their
Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in
said
rule should not be applied retroactively.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court shall resolve
the issues seriatim.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I.
SECTION 8, RULE 117
OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.cralaw:red
The petitioners aver
that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because
the essential requirements for its application were not present when
Judge
Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing
with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent
did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr.,
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent
allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during
the
hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases,
or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the
heirs
of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal
of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the
petitioners,
the respondent’s express consent to the provisional dismissal of the
cases
and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondent’s
motion
and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners further
submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the RTC to
determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22,
1999
hearing on the respondent’s motion for judicial determination of the
existence
of probable cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that
only
the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of
hearing
on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private
prosecutor
Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the
private
complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their
contention
that Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of
desistance
and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondent, on the
other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge
Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the
provisional
dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed
separate
but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should
the
trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest
against them.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondent further
asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors,
were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He
contends
that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during
the
March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause because criminal actions are always
prosecuted
in the name of the People, and the private complainants merely
prosecute
the civil aspect thereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court has reviewed
the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 8, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 8. Provisional
dismissal. - A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.cralaw:red
The provisional dismissal
of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Having invoked said
rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court
of
Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential
requisites
of the first paragraph thereof, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1.
the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both
the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the
case;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2.
the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal
of the case;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3.
the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4.
the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The foregoing requirements
are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement
of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal
case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or
for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although the second
paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having
been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal
shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal
on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution[6]
without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor
cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with
a copy of the order of dismissal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Express consent to a
provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It
is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication
to supply its meaning.[7]
Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts
to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the
case.[8]
The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a
provisional
dismissal of the case[9]
or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal[10]
does not amount to express consent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A motion of the accused
for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional
dismissal.[11]
If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods
provided
in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is
provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his
objection,
the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled
even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy[12]
or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The case may be revived
by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information
or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an
offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new
preliminary
investigation.[14]
However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal
case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may
have
recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be
available
and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation[15]
must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information
is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if
aside
from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new
criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under
a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused
is
upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The
accused
must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence.
After all, "the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in
ambush;
the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice
to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice."[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, the respondent
has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph
of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal
Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did
not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for
judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17]
among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a
personal
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned
before
the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein
that
until after the trial court shall have personally determined the
presence
of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the
respondent
and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by
the
trial court. He then prayed therein that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1)
a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
Article
III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for
this
purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the
private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2)
warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if
issued,
recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Other equitable reliefs
are also prayed for.[18]
The respondent did not
pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact,
in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An examination of the
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination
of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other
co-accused
in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray
for the dismissal of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs
prayed
for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial determination of
probable
cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2)
that
warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued,
recalled
in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be
said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the
consent
of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto
attached
and made integral part hereof as Annex "A"[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the hearing in
the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through counsel,
categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not
file
any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a
provisional
dismissal thereof, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE SALONGA:chanrobles virtual law library
And it is your stand
that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
It was in (sic) that
the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was
simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of
arrest
issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of
their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits,
made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in
probable
cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did
not justify proceeding to trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE SALONGA:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
And it is expressly
provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed
except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.cralaw:red
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
That is correct, Your
Honor.cralaw:red
JUSTICE SALONGA:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
And with notice to
the offended party.cralaw:red
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
That is correct, Your
Honor.cralaw:red
JUSTICE SALONGA:chanrobles virtual law library
Was there an express
conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
There was none, Your
Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement,
which
would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other
matters,
including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice
in
criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very
careful
on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the
accused
to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the
implications
of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede
bang
pumirma ka?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE ROSARIO:chanrobles virtual law library
You were present during
the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
Yes, Your Honor.cralaw:red
JUSTICE ROSARIO:chanrobles virtual law library
You represented the
petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
That is correct, Your
Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge
Agnir,
who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of
provisional
dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional
dismissal
of the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE GUERRERO:chanrobles virtual law library
Now, you filed a motion,
the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of
probable
cause?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
Yes, Your Honor.cralaw:red
JUSTICE GUERRERO:chanrobles virtual law library
Did you make any alternative
prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should
the
Court do?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
That the arrest warrants
only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked.
In
fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my
prayer
before the Court, it said: “Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that
(1)
a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
Article
III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants
and
their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the
warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued,
recalled
in the meantime until resolution of this incident.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE GUERRERO:chanrobles virtual law library
There is no general
prayer for any further relief?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
There is but it simply
says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE GUERRERO:chanrobles virtual law library
Don’t you surmise Judge
Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for
just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the
net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being
issued
without dismissing the case?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
Yes, Your Honor.
I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is
we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to
sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE GUERRERO:chanrobles virtual law library
If you did not agree
to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for
reconsideration
of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:chanrobles virtual law library
I did not, Your Honor,
because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been
arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was
concerned.
So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me,
and
therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the
boat
or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice
the
interest of my client.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
JUSTICE GUERRERO:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in
lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent
declared in no uncertain terms that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Soon thereafter, the
SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan
without
jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC
RTC. Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81.
Petitioner
and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable
cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be
issued.
He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to
respondent
OSG’s claim.[21]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondent’s
admissions
made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are
binding
and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating
his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such
admissions.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To apply the new rule
in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or
make
exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly
included
therein. This the Court cannot and should not do.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court also agrees
with the petitioners’ contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of
the
hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three
days
before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court.
It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests,
the
new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of
the
victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the
provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private
prosecutor,
if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must
relay
the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them
to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the
hearing.
The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the
motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory.
Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim
the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion
on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution
and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case
thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent
release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and
kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or
loss
of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the
rights
of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused
by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the
consequent
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
even if the respondent’s motion for a determination of probable cause
and
examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion
for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689,
however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to
the
hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed
that
the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for
hearing
on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although
the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records
do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of
the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them,
including
those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of
Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24]
There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor
notified
the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on
March
22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private
prosecutor,[25]
he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims,
namely,
Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon,
Carmelita
Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26]
executed their respective affidavits of desistance.[27]
There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero,
Jr.,
and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the
heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was
any
attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or
the
private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the
respondent’s
motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr.
dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their
right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to protect their
interests
either in the trial court or in the appellate court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since the conditions
sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the
time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117
of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus
revive
or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations
for multiple murder against the respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II.cralaw:red
THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION
8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE
APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners contend
that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to
a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent’s
motion
before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the
resolution
of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in
Section
8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
applied
prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply
the
time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent
and
his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process,
and
unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State’s substantive right to
prosecute
the accused for multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to
file
the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the
new
rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor
of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689
within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took
effect
on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months
within
which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period
for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily
reduced.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and
the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that
the
State had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning
that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a
retroactive
application of the new rule.[28]
Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May
28
2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his part, the
respondent
asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules
of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no
substantive
right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the
criminal
cases in question since ‘the State’s witnesses were ready, willing and
able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on
these
cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to
do
so.’[29]
According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or
substantive,
may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.[30]
He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999
and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity
for
the State to fairly indict him.[31]
In any event, the State is given the right under the Court’s assailed
Resolution
to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102
to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondent insists
that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
does
not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice
of
the State because the prohibition against the revival of the cases
within
the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a legal concept
distinct
from the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally dismissed
case
within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he
claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do
not
modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised
Penal
Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule
117 because a complaint or information has already been filed against
the
accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period
under
Article 90.[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court agrees with
the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender
by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute
at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to
acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should
not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
explode
only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the
accused
have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.[33]
The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are
essential
elements of the offenses covered.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand,
the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special
procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the
time-bar
an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that
the
lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The time-bar under
the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised
Penal Code, a substantive law.[36]
It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal
case
against the accused after the Information had been filed but
subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused.
Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed,
albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the
case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto
permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or
another crime necessarily included therein.[37]
He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in
any
new indictments.[38]
The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year
periods
provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.[39]
By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the
accused
because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the
prescriptive
periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.[40]
But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the
statute
of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the
effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of
Illinois
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"This, in effect,
enacts
that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the
state
to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be
punished.to
be deprived of his liberty..shall cease. Its terms not only
strike
down the right of action which the state had acquired by the offense,
but
also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the offender’s
title
to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than
statutes
barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only
the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right
which
such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy
would
invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the
state has against the offender.the right to punish, as the only
liability
which the offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this
liability are at an end. "[41]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court agrees with
the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the
steps
by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42]
this Court held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact
that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not
preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable.
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has
no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist
on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal,
of any other than the existing rules of procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It further ruled
therein
that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so
would
work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or
impair
the independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision in
Cipriano
v. City of Houma,[43]
the United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the
court
would produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively,
there is ample basis for avoiding "the injustice of hardship" by a
holding
of nonretroactivity.[44]
A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which
will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and
injurious consequences.[45]
This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which
produces
absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation
could be avoided.[46]
Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be
construed
in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied.
In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose.[47]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Remedial legislation,
or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement
the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be
applied
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as
the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the
retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought
to
be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and
of criminal laws in particular.[48]
In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49]
the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining
whether
a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective
or prospective effect:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"(a) the purpose to
be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, the Court
agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new
rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the new rule in
question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed
with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the
offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests
and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal
cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It
took
into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused
to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable
period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent
of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar
fixed
by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly
short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.[50]
The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of
the time-bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The new rule was
conceptualized
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court
en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice
system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by
eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing
criminal
cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
either
with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite
period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
times
when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes
beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the
indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice
of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors
and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is almost a
universal
experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in
his
favor,[52]
especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction.
He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases
have
been known to expire.[53]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The inordinate delay
in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity
of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability
of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost.
Memories
of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time
makes
proof of any fact more difficult.[54]
The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another
crime.
The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the
revival
thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other side of
the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate
a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at
any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
accused
for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a
normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety.
He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with
the presumption of innocence.[55]
He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the
passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend
himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice
system.[56]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The time-bar under
the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of
the
State and the accused; not for the accused only.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court agrees with
the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the
two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor
received
his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal
cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule.
Instead
of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases,
the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus,
Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March
29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the
Court
applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one
year
and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal
cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the
new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively,
the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance
with
the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent
injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive,
injurious,
and wrongful results in the administration of justice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The period from April
1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of
the
two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect
at
the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the
time-bar.
It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the
criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not
reviving
them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United
States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v.
People:[57]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We should not indulge
in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and,
therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their
rights.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The two-year period
fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused.
It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application
of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused.
For
to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and
adversely
affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To require the State
to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the
revival
of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused
before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State
is
obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took
effect.
This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a
period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1,
2000
to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid
justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of
the
new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
Supreme
Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts,[58]
"the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true." In Dimatulac v.
Villon,[59]
this Court emphasized that the judge’s action must not impair the
substantial
rights of the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to
due process of law. This Court further said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, for justice
to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended
parties
which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a
verdict
of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal
is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended
and
the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then
must
be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the
State
and offended party, on the other.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, the eleven
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed
with
the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year
period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum, this Court finds
the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE.
The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent with the
Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is
DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112
with deliberate dispatch.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No pronouncements as
to costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and
Azcuna,
JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, J.,
see separate opinion, concurring.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., please
see dissenting opinion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Vitug, J., see
separate (dissenting) opinion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Quisumbing, J.,
in the result, concur with J. Bellosillo’s opinion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ynares-Santiago, J.,
join the dissent, of J. Puno and J. Gutierrez.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J.,
dissent, please see dissenting opinion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Carpio, J.,
no part. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1203-1228.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id. at 1183-1200.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
NBI Report, pp. 309 and 311.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1237-1267.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 9th Revised Edition, p.
442;
People v. Bellosillo, 9 SCRA 835 (1963).
[6]
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
People v. Hon. Vergara, 221 SCRA 561 (1993).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
People v. Hinaut, 105 Phil. 303 (1959).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Pendatum v. Aragon, 93 Phil. 798 (1953); Caes v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989).
[10]
People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Baesa v. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, 37 SCRA 437 (1971).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Rule 117, Section 3(i) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Benes v. United States of America, 276 F.2d 99 (1960).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Sy v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 335 (1982); Lava v. Gonzales, 11 SCRA
650 (1964); Bandiala v. CFI of Misamis Occidental, 35 SCRA 237 (1970);
Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 (1971); Teehankee v. Madayag, 207 SCRA
134 (1992).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when
required.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should
be held for trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Except
as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is
required
to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. (Section 1,
Rule 112, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure).
[16]
Bandiala v. Court, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
232 SCRA 192 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
RTC Records, Vol. 10, p. 232.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
CA Rollo, p. 355.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
TSN, CA-G.R. SP No. 65034, July 31, 2001, pp. 13-18 (emphasis ours).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
CA Rollo, p. 378 (emphasis by respondent).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Vari v. Food Fair Stores, 13 A.L.R.3d 844 (1964).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Victims
Address (per Medico Legal Report)
Manuel
Montero
Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Rolando
Siplon
Miputak, Dipolog City
Sherwin
Abalora
Miputak, Dipolog City
Ray
Abalora
Miputak, Dipolog City
Joel
Amora
Osmina St., Dipolog City
Jevy
Redillas
Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Welbor
Elcamel
Bgy. Barra, Dipolog City
Carlito
Alap-ap
Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Pacifico
Montero,
Jr.
Bo. Tinago, Palumpon, Leyte
Meleubren
Sorronda
Miputak, Dipolog City
Alex
Neri
No address
(Unidentified
Male inchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Medico
Legal Report)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
RTC Records, Vol. IX, p. 9.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[26]
Rufino Siplon did not affix his signature on the Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.
[27]
Affiants
Address (per Affidavit of Desistance)
Myra
Abalora
UST Abono Estaca, Dipolog City
(Mother
of Sherwin Abalorachanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
and
Ray Abalora)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Leonora
Amora
Bgy. Sentral, Dipolog City
(Mother
of Joel Amora)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nenita
Alap-ap
338 Sagin St. cor. Amaga St., Poblacio Santa,
(Wife
of Carlito
Alap-ap)
Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Imelda
Montero
Poblacion Norte, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
(Wife
of Manuel Montero)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Carmelita
Elcamel
Upper Dicayas, Dipolog City
(Wife
of Welbor Elcamel)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Margarita
Redillas
Bgy. Poblacion South, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
(Mother
of Jevy Redillas)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 1205-1214.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Id. at 1240.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Id. at 1241-1247.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Id. at 1250-1251.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 223, p. 574; United States v.
Eliopoulos,
45 F. Supp. 777 (1942).
[34]
People v. Allen, 118 P.2d 927, 47 C.A.2d. 735.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Carpenter v. Cox, 182 So. 813 (1939).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
ART. 90. Prescription of crime. Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua
or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes
punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Those
punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with
the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall
prescribe
in five years.
The
crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six
months.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Light
offenses prescribe in two months.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When
the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall
be
made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first,
second, and third paragraph of this article.
[37]
People v. Allen, 14 NE2d 397; State v. Crawford, 98 SE 615.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Republic v. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579 (1971).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
State of Kansas v. Ransom, 39 ALR 4th 892.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
22 C.J.S., supra. at 575, citing People v. Di Franco, 184 N.Y.S.2d, p.
974, 17 Misc.2d 177.
[41]
People v. Ross, 156 N.E. 303 (1927).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002, p. 13.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[43]
395 U.S. 701 (1969).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Ursua v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 147 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
City and County of Denver v. Holmes, 400 P.2d 1 (1965).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Linkletter v. Victor Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
393 U.S. 630 (1968).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
Glen Livestock Company v. Colwell, 185 U.S. 54 (1902).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
United States v. Mann, 201 F. Supp. 208 (1968); Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S.
514 (1972).
[52]
United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (1963).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
United States v. Mann, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
Dickey v. State of Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
[55]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
Barker v. Winggo, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
351 U.S. 12 (1956).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[58]
291 U.S. 97 (1933).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[59]
297 SCRA 679 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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