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Republic of the
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
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| Pleaseclick here to read full text of the following: |
| Main Decision |
| Bellosillo, J., see separate opinion, concurring. |
| Puno, J., see dissenting opinion. |
| Vitug, J., see separate (dissenting) opinion. |
| Quisumbing, J., in the result, concur with J. Bellosillo’s opinion. |
| Ynares-Santiago, J., join the dissent, of J. Puno and J. Gutierrez. |
| Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., dissent, please see dissenting opinion. |
..
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUÑO,
STATE PROSECUTORS
PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS;
2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN
AND CITY PROSECUTOR
OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
149453
April 1, 2003
PANFILO M. LACSON,
Respondent.
SEPARATE OPINION, CONCURRING
BELLOSILLO, J.:
If we make a mistake,
we can only pray that their ghosts will not haunt us for the rest of
our
days......chan
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chan
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"Amen!" I say to the
clear and concise ponencia of our colleague, Mr. Justice Romeo J.
Callejo
Sr., who touched the issues head on and resolved them with the calm
deliberation
of a dedicated jurist. Let me just add a few more thoughts in the
effort
to reveal and rectify the hazards and uncertainties ordinarily
concealed
by the glib use of formal illogic.chan
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chan
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This case springs from
the brutal slaughter of suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
on 18 May 1995. Eleven (11) restless souls - who perished in a shroud
of
mystery - remain shackled for more than half a decade by the bondage of
popular apathy and neglect, and condemned to an ignominious fall by
their
infamy. Stigmatized and denounced, their demise must have been hailed
by
many as the triumph of retributive justice.chan
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chan
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x x x x Gifted with
the liberty they know not how to use; with a power and energy they know
not how to apply; with a life whose purpose and aim they comprehend
not;
they drag through their useless and convulsed existence. Byron destroys
them one after the other, as if he were the executioner of a sentence
decreed
in heaven. They fall unwept, like a withered leaf into the stream of
time
x x x x They die, as they have lived, alone; and a popular malediction
hovers round their solitary tombs.[1]
chan
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The dictates of
prudence
however would counsel us at this time to reserve judgment on their sins
and transgressions. The overriding consideration is the need to unveil
the truth, for truth alone is the veritable touchstone of justice. The
rights of the eleven (11) victims, as much as those of the respondent
and
his co-accused, deserve full recognition and protection. Only then can
we say that we are truly civilized - a breed apart from savages.chan
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But the manner by which the carnage of 18 May 1995 was carried out sparked a public indignation that prompted the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, Crimes and National Defense and Security to conduct a joint investigation on possible human rights violations involving police officers. The inquiry focused on the issue of whether the death of the eleven (11) victims was the result of a "rub-out" or summary killing, or a "shoot-out" or with exchange of gunfire, between the victims and the police considering that the principal antagonists were policemen and civilians. On 21 June 1995 the aforesaid Senate Committees, in Joint Committee Report No. 1021, found thus -chan robles virtual law library
There is no clarity as to whether the bodies were handcuffed or hogtied with ropes when they were killed. The evidence, however, establishes that those who died were defenseless and that except for Soronda, none of them fired a gun. The forensic report and testimonies of De los Santos and De la Cruz show that eleven (11) persons were killed in coldblood while in the custody of the law enforcers in the early morning of May 18 in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.chan robles virtual law library
concluded that the killings were done in cold blood and recommended the filing of the appropriate charges against the police officers.[2]chan robles virtual law library
Thereafter multiple murder charges were filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan against respondent and twenty-five (25) other police officers, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 23047-23057. On motion of the accused, the Ombudsman conducted a reinvestigation of the cases resulting in the filing of Amended Informations, this time charging respondent, among other officers, as a mere accessory after-the-fact. Arraignment followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty.chan robles virtual law library
Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan contending in the main that the highest ranking principal accused under the Amended Informations held the position of Chief Inspector with a salary below that for Grade 27, for which reason, jurisdiction properly belonged to the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan. The issue of jurisdiction eventually reached the Supreme Court, which ordered the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not because the highest ranking principal accused was receiving a salary below Grade 27 but because the Amended Informations did not show that the offenses charged were committed in relation to, or in the discharge of, official functions of the accused.chan robles virtual law library
The criminal cases were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, and raffled to RTC-Br. 81 then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. Respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions praying for a judicial determination of probable cause, to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest in the meantime, and to dismiss the cases should the court find no probable cause.chan robles virtual law library
During the hearing on the motions, the seven (7) or eight (8) victims’ next of kin executed affidavits of desistance while others recanted their affidavit-complaints. With this development, the trial court in its Resolution of 29 March 1999 dismissed the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial, holding that "there is no more evidence to show that the crime(s) have been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."[3]chan robles virtual law library
Two (2) years later,
or on 29 March 2001, Secretary Hernando B. Perez of the Department of
Justice
received a letter from PNP Director General Leandro R. Mendoza
indorsing
for preliminary investigation the sworn affidavits of two (2) new
witnesses
relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. Secretary Perez constituted
a panel of State Prosecutors to investigate the matter. The panel
issued
several subpoenas to all the accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, including respondent Lacson, requiring them to submit their
counter-affidavits and to appear at the preliminary conference.chan
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chan
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Consequently, on 28
May 2001, respondent and several of his co-accused filed a petition for
prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary
injunction with the RTC-Manila, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of
Justice
and the State Prosecutors from further conducting a preliminary
investigation.
The prohibition case was raffled to RTC-Br. 40, Manila, presided over
by
Judge Herminia V. Pasamba. The filing of this petition notwithstanding,
the Panel of State Prosecutors proceeded to issue a Resolution finding
probable cause to hold respondent and his co-accused for trial, for
eleven
(11) counts of murder. Accordingly, Informations were filed before the
RTC, Quezon City, and docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112.chan
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chan
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Deviating from the
normal procedure, the Executive Judge, Vice-Executive Judges and
Presiding
Judges of Quezon City dispensed with the customary raffle; instead,
assigned
the cases to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao of RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City,
presumably
as the successor of Judge Agnir in the same branch.
chan
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Meanwhile, in the
prohibition
case before RTC-Br. 40, Manila, Judge Pasamba denied the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order thus-
After a study, this
Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689
is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and
entered
plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct
consequence of the finding of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court that
no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioner herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with
the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective
since
the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try
the
cases.[4]chan
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Dissatisfied, respondent
elevated the case on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
which thereafter rendered the assailed Decision of 24 August 2001
granting
the petition, declaring null and void all the proceedings conducted by
the State Prosecutors, and ordering all the criminal Informations
dismissed
-
chan
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The present
controversy,
being one involving "provisional dismissal" and revival of criminal
cases,
falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under
Section
8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second
paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and
categorical
words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional
dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order
without
the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of
the
subject criminal cases x x x was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that
is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of
RTC-Quezon
City’s Resolution x x x x[5]
chan
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Hence, the present
recourse. The bone of contention, which crystallizes all the arguments
of the parties into a single point of inquiry, bears upon the nature
and
effects of a provisional dismissal which has become permanent after the
lapse of the periods provided in Sec. 8, Rule 117, 2000 Revised Rules
on
Criminal Procedure. For facility of reference, the controversial
provision
of Sec. 8 quoted hereunder -chan
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Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. - A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment x x x of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (Italics supplied) chan robles virtual law library
Assuming that Sec. 8, Rule 117, is available to respondent although it is my position that it is not, the question that should be asked is: Does the provisional dismissal of a criminal case which has become permanent under Sec. 8 effectively foreclose the right of the State to prosecute an accused? I have taken great pains analyzing the position of respondent; regretfully, I am unable to agree for my conscience shivers at its debilitating, crippling if not crushing, impact upon our criminal justice system.chan robles virtual law library
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Arts. 90 and 91 of The Revised Penal Code, which are quoted hereunder -chan robles virtual law library
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.chan robles virtual law library
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.chan robles virtual law library
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.chan robles virtual law library
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.chan robles virtual law library
Light offenses shall prescribe in two monthschan robles virtual law library
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.chan robles virtual law library
Art. 91. Computation
of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall
commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.chan
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The term of
prescription
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.chan
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Evidently, respondent’s concept of a provisional dismissal that has become permanent under Sec. 8, Rule 117, emasculates and renders illusory its very purpose. It effectively obliterates the different prescriptive periods under Art. 90, which are fixed on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed for the offense, and supplants it with a uniform period of one (1) year or two (2) years, as the case may be. It likewise substantially modifies the manner of computing the period of prescription in Art. 91 since the reckoning of the one (1) or two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 8 is constant and invariable, and without regard to the number of interruptions. Regardless of the number of times the case against an accused is provisionally dismissed, the prosecution would always have a full grace period of two (2) years within which to revive the case; much unlike Art. 91 wherein the period consumed prior to the filing of the complaint or information is tacked to the period consumed after the dismissal of the case for purposes of determining whether the crime has prescribed.chan robles virtual law library
Interestingly, a dividing
line is drawn in the application of Arts. 90 and 91 of The Revised
Penal
Code, and Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure,
obviously in an attempt to lend a delusive semblance of plausibility to
its construction of Sec. 8. It is posited that Art. 91 and Sec. 8
operate
on "different planes," so to speak, the vital distinction being that
Sec.
8, Rule 117, contemplates a situation where a case had already been
filed
and was provisionally dismissed.
chan
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I do not agree. Article
91 of The Revised Penal Code distinctly speaks of "prescription x x x
shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused
being convicted or acquitted, or unjustifiably stopped for any reason
not
imputable to him." It can readily be seen therefore that the concept of
a provisional dismissal is subsumed in Art. 91 since in a provisional
dismissal,
proceedings necessarily terminate without the accused being convicted
or
acquitted. Thus, to construe and apply Sec. 8 in the manner suggested
above
would undeniably result in a direct and irreconcilable conflict with
Art.
91.chan
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In a provisional dismissal, the prosecution, the defense and the offended party, in effect, enter into a tacit agreement for a temporary cessation of hostilities, i.e., to momentarily hold in abeyance the prosecution of the accused. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8 prescribes the requirements thereto: (a) consent of the accused, and (b) notice to the offended party. It must be remembered however that permanent dismissal of a case is but an offshoot of its previous provisional dismissal and the subsequent failure to revive within the time frames set forth in Sec. 8. But does the permanent dismissal of the case arising from a provisional dismissal affect the right of the State to prosecute within the periods provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Certainly not, for the prescriptive periods prescribed by law cannot be affected directly or indirectly by any agreement or consent of the parties, much less be held hostage to anyprocedural limitations. Verily, in matters of public crimes which have a direct bearing on public interest, no agreements or personal arrangements should be brought to bear upon the penal action.chan robles virtual law library
Courts cannot - by an act of judicial legislation - abridge, amend, alter, or nullify statutes. We do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to judicially reform or fashion legislation in accordance with our own notions of prudent public policy. Certainly, lest we are prepared to ride roughshod over this prerogative of Congress, we cannot interfere with the power of the legislature to surrender, as an act of grace, the right of the State to prosecute and to declare the offense no longer subject to prosecution after certain periods of time as expressed in the statute.chan robles virtual law library
Furthermore, the right of the State to prosecute criminals is a substantive, nay, inherent right. To unduly limit the exercise of such right for a short period of one (1) or two (2) years through the expedient of a procedural rule is unconstitutional, considering the limitation in our fundamental law on the rule-making power of this Court, that is, its rules must not "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights."[6]chan robles virtual law library
Another decisive factor which militates heavily against the foregoing thesis that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different planes," is the fact that the phrase "amounts to an acquittal," which appeared in the original draft of what is now Sec. 8, Rule 117, was judiciously rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved the final draft of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure -chan robles virtual law library
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You know that prior to the wordings at present of Sec. 8, Rule 117, there was a final committee draft that said and I quote: "the corresponding order shall state that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent and amount to an acquittal one year after the issuance without the case having been revived." What I am trying to point out is that, as originally worded, Section 8 expressly stated that the dismissal would amount to an acquittal. But the final wording eliminated the words "amount to an acquittal," isn’t it?chan robles virtual law library
ATTY. FORTUN: I would
not know that, Your Honor. I have not seen that revised (interrupted) x
x x x
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Well, that is true that those words were eliminated precisely because
we
wanted to avoid making invocation of that rule equivalent to an
acquittal.
All right, (interrupted) x x x x[7]chan
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chan
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Had the intention been
to confer on Sec. 8 the effect of acquittal, the Court should have
retained
the express provision to that effect in the final draft. Obviously, the
conspicuous absence therein of the phrase "amounts to an acquittal," or
its equivalent, forecloses a speculative approach to the meaning of
Sec.
8. Virtually crossed out, such clause cannot now be incised from the
original
draft and grafted into the approved draft of the revised rules, without
doing violence to its intent.
chan
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It must be stressed
that Sec. 8 is nothing more than a rule of procedure. As part of the
adjective
law, it is only a means to an end - an aid to substantive law - and
should
accordingly be interpreted and applied in that concept. It was never
meant
to modify the settled provisions of law on the matter of prescription
of
offenses; or to unduly curtail the right of the State to bring
offenders
before the bar of justice. These matters are best left to the wisdom
and
sound judgment of the legislature.
chan
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Section 8 is very
limited
in scope and application. Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Consultant,
Committee
on Revision of the Rules, in his Treatise on Historical Development and
Highlights of Amendments of Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rationale of
Amendments
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure), made the following
commentaries
on the import of the provision -chan
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There had been so many instances where the National Bureau of Investigation or other police agencies have refused to issue clearances for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to persons who have pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of their cases by the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such provisional dismissals, more often than not, had been done five or ten years ago. This causes prejudice to the persons concerned. Accordingly, a rule was provided that the provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.[8]chan robles virtual law library
Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely administrative or regulatory in character. The policy embodied therein is simply to grant the accused momentary relief from administrative restrictions occasioned by the filing of a criminal case against him. He is freed in the meantime of the dire consequences of his having been charged with a crime, and temporarily restored to his immunities as a citizen, solely for purposes of government clearances. Section 8 imports no intricate nor ornate legal signification that we need not discern from it a meaning that too far deviates from what it actually purports to convey.chan robles virtual law library
Indeed, were we to adhere to the thesis equating permanent dismissal with "finality" and "acquittal," we would be ascribing meaning to the provision which is not only at war with the demands of reason but also contrary to the clear intention of the rule. The disastrous effect of respondent’s interpretation of Sec. 8 upon our criminal justice system is not difficult to imagine. So construed, it would afford an accused, endowed with a fertile imagination and creativeness, a plethora of opportunities to rig his prosecution by silencing witnesses and suppressing evidence then letting the case hibernate for a much shorter period of one (1) or two (2) years. To be sure, our procedural laws could not have intended to sanction such a result. "A system of procedure," intoned Justice Cardozo, "is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of a clear necessity."[9]chan robles virtual law library
Respondent conjures up the ingenious hypothesis that although Sec. 8 of Rule 117 and the "double jeopardy" principle have different requisites, they are nonetheless cognate rules since Sec. 8 of Rule 117 affords the accused benefits analogous to that bestowed under the "double jeopardy" principle.[10] Implacable and unyielding is he in the position that a provisional dismissal that attains the character of permanency produces the effect of a sui generis acquittal. In this respect, according to him, Sec. 8 of Rule 117 is not in that Sec. 17 (Discharge of Accused to be State Witness) unique and Sec. 18 unique and Sec. 18 (Discharge of Accused Operates as Acquittal) of Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is also invested with the benefits of double jeopardy when it grants the accused state witness a discharge tantamount to an acquittal. In both instances, the absence of any or all of the essential requisites of double jeopardy does not preclude the discharge of the accused state witness or one whose case has attained permanent dismissal.chan robles virtual law library
It bears recalling that since Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence on double jeopardy was swept into the shores of Philippine constitutional and statutory history, our concept of double jeopardy has faithfully adhered to the pronouncements first made by Kepner v. United States[11] that "x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the second offense." The fundamental philosophy that underlies the finality of an acquittal is the recognition of the fact that the state with its infinite resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual and expose him to a state of perpetual anxiety and embarrassment as well as enhancing the possibility that although innocent, he may be found guilty.chan robles virtual law library
Presently, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit in its prescription of the requisites for the invocation of double jeopardy and the resultant effect thereon on acquittals. Section 7, Rule 117, states -chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.chan robles virtual law library
Ensconced in the foregoing procedural tenet are the imperatives for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.chan robles virtual law library
In contrast, provisional
dismissal under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 requires only the twin requirements
of consent of the accused and notice to the offended party. When a
criminal
case is provisionally dismissed upon the express application of the
defendant,
the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
because his action in having the case dismissed is a waiver of his
constitutional
prerogative of double jeopardy as he, in a manner of speaking, throws a
monkey wrench to the judicial process and prevents the court from
rendering
a judgment of conviction against him. Jurisprudence has emphatically
enunciated
that double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked where the case was
dismissed
with the express conformity of the accused. This much is given as one
of
the requisites of double jeopardy, i.e., where the accused is acquitted
or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. This assent by the accused to the
dismissal
is the operative act that precludes the effects of double jeopardy from
setting in, so that despite the permanency of the dismissal due to the
lapse of the periods set forth in Sec. 8 of Rule 117, the refiling of a
case under a new information does not trample upon this venerable
doctrine.
chan
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The permanence of the
dismissal should not be understood as the harbinger of final and
absolute
liberation of the accused from future prosecution. It merely augurs the
demise of the unrevived cases but it does not prevent the state from
exercising
the right to re-prosecute the accused within the prescriptive period
provided
in Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code. With more weighty reason can we
not
accommodate respondent in his plea to avail of the graces afforded by
the
doctrine since the records would show that he has yet to enter his plea
to the charges or that the trial on the merits has as yet to commence.chan
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Respondent also fires a shot in the dark when he suggests that there exists no marked difference between revival and refiling of a criminal case as in fact, according to him, the two (2) concepts are synonymous and interchangeable. A survey of jurisprudential antecedents reveal the distinction between the revival and refiling of a new information. The authorities are unanimous in their recognition of the fact that a provisionally dismissed case can be revived as it does not call for the operation of the rule on double jeopardy and that cases can also be refiled under a new complaint or information for the same offense.[12]chan robles virtual law library
While I agree however that the filing of Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 - 01-101112 is NOT a revival of the earlier dismissed cases, I wish to emphasize, lest I be misconstrued, that the "New Informations" in the subsequently refiled cases are new not because the respondent is charged thereunder as a co-principal, instead of as a mere accessory, or that the number of the accused has been increased from 26 to 34; rather, the new Informations which are the bases for the prosecution of the respondent again under the same offense, are new for the singular reason that they are separate and distinct from those in the previously dismissed cases. Simply stated, it is not of consequence whether the allegations in the two (2) sets of Informations are quintessentially identical or different in form and substance insofar as concerns the right of the state to prosecute the respondent anew after the provisional dismissal became permanent.chan robles virtual law library
A question may be asked: Suppose that the new information is a verbatim reproduction of the information in the permanently dismissed case, can we not now say that the newly filed case is a mere revival of the case previously dismissed? After all, stripped of semantic finery, their being identical would lead to the impression, although erroneous, that one is but a revival of the other. On the surface one may see no apparent difference between the two (2) sets of Informations, but a subtle yet significant functional distinction in fact exists. Once a case is permanently dismissed after the lapse of the prescriptive periods set forth in Sec. 8, the case is dead and, for all intents and purposes, beyond resuscitation. All the on-going proceedings and those still to be had, e.g., preliminary investigation, arraignment, trial, etc., shall cease and be terminated. In the event however that the accused is prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an identical information, the previously terminated proceedings will not be reactivated, the previous case having been set at rest; instead, new proceedings will be conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh. To my mind, the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 8, Rule 117 has in its favor the soundest policy considerations based no less on the fundamental objectives of procedural rules.chan robles virtual law library
Incidentally, I find
it particularly disturbing that the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 were dismissed by the trial judge without complying with
one of the requirements of the first paragraph of Sec. 8, i.e., the
dismissal
must be with notice to the offended party. There is nothing in the
records
which would show that all the offended parties were ever notified that
the cases against respondent and his co-accused would be dismissed.
Even
if we proceed on the assumption that the filing of affidavits of
desistance
by the offended parties may be considered a substantial equivalent of
notice,
still the dismissal appears to be procedurally infirm since only seven
(7) of the offended parties representing eight (8) of the eleven (11)
victims,
executed affidavits of desistance.[13]
No similar affidavits were submitted for the three (3) remaining
victims.[14]
Cannot the next of kin of these three (3) remaining victims, who were
not
even notified of the provisional dismissal of the cases, prosecute
those
responsible for killing them within the prescriptive period provided in
Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Are they now without any remedy in
law
if witnesses belatedly surface, they who cowered in fear at the time
because
of the positions of power held by those perceived to be responsible
therefor?
chan
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Significantly also,
I am at a loss as to why the Court of Appeals reckoned the two (2)-year
period from 29 March 1999 as the date of issuance of the resolution of
dismissal. When Sec. 8 speaks of "issuance" it should be construed not
with reference to the date as appearing in the resolution of dismissal
but on the date it was actually delivered to the proper person and
received
by him. Otherwise, how would the offended parties know that such
resolution
was issued as to reckon with the two (2)-year period after which the
provisional
dismissal would be considered permanent?chan
robles virtual law library
In the instant case, the records do not clearly identify who the offended parties are, or whether they were all notified of Judge Agnir's order of dismissal dated 29 March 1999 as they do not even appear to have been properly named. In the absence of such evidence, the reckoning point for computing the two (2)-year period under Sec. 8 becomes indeterminable. Assuming that Sec. 8 is available to respondent, to which we do not even agree, still respondent has failed to discharge his burden of proving that the two (2)-year period has indeed elapsed to make the provisional dismissal permanent.chan robles virtual law library
These circumstances cast a heavy pall of doubt on whether the dismissal of the eleven (11) Informations has indeed attained the status of permanence as to prevent the prosecution from refiling them. The notice requirement in the first paragraph of Sec. 8 as well as the notice of the order of dismissal are by no means trivial formalities; they are meaningful and significant. The offended parties, seeking justice and vindication for the wrong done, would naturally be keenly interested in the progress and outcome of the criminal prosecution. Hence, it is but proper that all of them be notified of the termination of the cases and given an equal opportunity to object to the dismissal.chan robles virtual law library
A view has been expressed that respondent’s rights to speedy trial and to speedy disposition of his cases were violated; this despite the fact that the right was not invoked by respondent before us. Accordingly, the twenty-six (26) month delay in the refiling of cases relative to the Kuratong Baleleng killings is claimed to be vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and hence sufficient to activate the protection of the Bill of Rights, specifically, on the rights to speedy trial and to speedy disposition of his cases. Sections 14 (2) and 16, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution respectively provides -chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 14. x x x x (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused x x x shall enjoy the right x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial x x x x
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
These provisions uphold the time-honored tradition of speedy justice for, as stated in the oft-repeated dictum, "justice delayed is justice denied." Their express inclusion in the present Constitution was in response to the common charge against perennial delays in the administration of justice which have plagued our judicial system.[15]chan robles virtual law library
The right to speedy trial under Sec. 14 and the right to speedy disposition of cases in Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, are kindred constitutional norms similar in nature and legal effects, sharing common operational principles, and subject to the same test for purposes of determining violations thereof. Thus, the cornerstone of both rights is to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial and disposition of cases.chan robles virtual law library
Speedy disposition of cases, like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.[16] Verily, these rights are more indistinct concepts than other constitutional rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the rights have been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, these rights cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months. There is no fixed point in the proceeding when a party may exercise or be deemed to have waived these rights. Finally, the amorphous quality of the rights sometimes lead to the drastic remedy of dismissal of a case when the rights have been infringed. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that an accused who may be guilty of a grave offense will go scot-free without being tried and held responsible therefor. Such a remedy is more radical than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial.chan robles virtual law library
At any rate, the framers of the Constitution recognized the right to speedy disposition of cases distinctly from the right to speedy trial in criminal cases. It should be noted that Sec. 16 covers all phases before, during and after trial, and extends protection to all parties in all types of cases: civil, criminal and administrative. In this respect, it affords a broader protection than Sec. 14 (2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial in criminal cases.[17]chan robles virtual law library
Against this backdrop, I turn to inquire into the parameters of the right to speedy disposition of cases. Just how broad is its mantle of protection as applied in criminal cases? When does the right attach during the criminal process, and when may it be properly asserted by a party? A criminal prosecution has many stages, and delay may occur during or between any of them. As applied in the instant case, it appears that the speedy disposition guarantee of the Bill of Rights is asserted to include the period of delay from the provisional dismissal of the case to its revival or refiling since "respondent is as much entitled to a speedy reinvestigation and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases against him."[18]chan robles virtual law library
Such interpretation, however, does not seem to be in consonance with the unmistakable language, nor by the obvious intent, of Sec. 16. The provision speaks of "speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." It clearly and logically contemplates a situation wherein there exists an outstanding case, proceeding or some incident upon which the assertion of the right may be predicated. Evidently, it would be idle, not to say anomalous, to speak of "speedy disposition of cases" in the absence of anything to dispose of in the first place.chan robles virtual law library
A review of pertinent jurisprudence attests abundantly to the indispensable requirement of a "pending case, proceeding or some incident," as sine qua non before the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked. Thus, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[19] we held that the long delay of three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was violative of the Constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases because political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Similarly in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan[20] involving an inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation, we ruled that such unjustified delay infringes upon the right to speedy disposition of cases.chan robles virtual law library
In Binay v. Sandiganbayan[21] we ruled out any violation of petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases despite a six-year delay from the filing of the charges in the Office of the Ombudsman to the time the Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Then in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.[22] we rejected the allegation of inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation. Finally, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan[23] we held that the inordinate delay of six (6) years by the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) in the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an Information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan violated petitioner’s constitutional guaranty to speedy disposition of the case.chan robles virtual law library
Invariably, the foregoing cases demonstrate that the broad protective cloak of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases becomes available only in instances where preliminary proceedings have been initiated, or a case has already been filed or any other incident pertaining thereto already had. As we succinctly stated in Binay v. Sandiganbayan[24]chan robles virtual law library
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.chan robles virtual law library
It goes without saying therefore that the right to speedy disposition of cases is unavailing in the absence of any proceedings conducted before, during, or after, trial. Significantly, there is no precedent, for indeed there is none, to support the novel conclusion that even after the dismissal of the cases, an accused may still invoke the constitutional guarantee.chan robles virtual law library
In the case before us, nothing was left to be done after the issuance of the 29 March 1999 Order of Judge Agnir dismissing all criminal charges against respondent relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. During the hiatus following the dismissal of the criminal charges, no formal proceeding remained outstanding. Not even court processes were issued to restrain respondent’s liberty or subject him to any form of public accusation; he was free to go about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue on with his life. Respondent was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made. Hence, it was only at the time when he was subjected to another pre-indictment investigation and accused anew that respondent may invoke his right to speedy disposition of his cases. The delay after the charges against him were dismissed, like any delay before those charges were filed, should not be included in reckoning the time and determining whether he was denied his right to a speedy disposition of his cases.chan robles virtual law library
The provisional nature of the dismissal of the original criminal cases is quite immaterial. The fact that the cases were dismissed conditionally or "without prejudice" to the subsequent filing of new cases, does not make the order of dismissal any less a disposition of the cases. Although provisional, it nonetheless terminated all proceedings against respondent such that there remained in the meantime no pending case which the court could act upon and resolve, and which could be made the basis for the application of the right to speedy disposition of respondent's cases.[25]chan robles virtual law library
Clearly, we would be reinventing the wheel, so to speak, if we are to include within the protective shield of the right to speedy disposition of cases the reinvestigation and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases. The matter of reinvestigation and refiling of cases at some future time are not by themselves "pending incidents related to the dismissed cases;" they are mere possibilities or expectancies. The State has no definite decision yet on whether to really commence a reinvestigation and refiling of the cases, and only indicates, at the most, a probable action at some future time. Until such time that the State decided to exercise these rights, they cannot ripen into a pending case, proceeding or incident for purposes of the speedy disposition safeguard.chan robles virtual law library
Certainly, the constitutional pledge mandates merely the swift resolution or termination of a pending case or proceeding, and not the initiation or institution of a new case or proceeding. It has no application to inexistent proceedings but only to those currently being undertaken. Were we to hold otherwise, we would in effect be granting to every accused an unbridled license to impose his will upon the State and demand that he be immediately reinvestigated and a case filed against him. The determination of whether to file or when to file a case lies within the sole discretion of the prosecution depending upon the availability of his evidence and provided that it is filed within the prescriptive period. As American Jurisprudence would hold.chan robles virtual law library
It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of justice" when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty "would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself." From the perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when probable cause is established is undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but untried x x x x From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. And from the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts.[26]chan robles virtual law library
To reiterate, respondent’s right to speedy disposition of his criminal cases attached only at that precise moment the Department of Justice constituted a panel of prosecutors and conducted a new preliminary investigation. Even then, the conduct of the prosecutors cannot be assailed as violative of the speedy disposition guarantee. As shown by the records, the government can hardly be accused of foot-dragging for, in fact, they lost no time in commencing the new preliminary investigation and thereafter filing the corresponding Informations in court upon the appearance of new witnesses against respondent and his co-accused. The expeditious action of the government in the instant case certainly cannot be viewed with suspicion.chan robles virtual law library
In fairness to petitioners, they cannot be faulted in demonstrating alacrity in performing their mandate, nor can they be castigated for the so-called "unusual haste" in reopening the cases against respondent. No impure motive should be imputed to them other than the fact that they regularly performed their duty in their apparent desire to unravel the Kuratong Baleleng mystery.chan robles virtual law library
For the petitioners, this is a classic case of "damn-if-you-do-and-damn-if-you-don’t" situation. Petitioners are being put to task for their alleged negligence and delay in reviving the cases, but then again, they are also being pilloried for persecuting the respondent because of the supposed "unusual haste" and "uncharacteristic vigor" in pursuing the criminal cases against him and his co-accused.chan robles virtual law library
For the reasons stated,
I decline to extend to respondent the protection guaranteed by Sec. 16.
Plain common sense dictates that the provision cannot be applied to
situations
not contemplated by it. Verily, we cannot expand the letter and spirit
of the provision and read into it a meaning that is not there.
chan
robles virtual law library
This does not, of
course,
mean that respondent is utterly unprotected in this regard. On the
contrary,
there are other constitutional and statutory mechanisms to guard
against
possible and actual prejudice to the accused, resulting from the
passage
of time. Primarily, the statute of limitations under Art. 90 of The
Revised
Penal Code is the principal safeguard against prosecuting overly stale
criminal charges. The statute represents legislative assessments of
relative
interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving
justice; it protects not only the accused from prejudice to his
defense,
but also balances his interest in repose against society's interest in
the apprehension and punishment of criminals.[27]
This statute provides predictability by specifying a limit beyond which
there is an irrefutable presumption that the rights of an accused to a
fair trial would be prejudiced.[28]chan
robles virtual law library
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.[29]chan robles virtual law library
Moreover, the sweeping command of the Due Process Clause always protects defendants against fundamentally unfair treatment by the government in criminal proceedings. Procedural fairness required by due process decrees the dismissal of an indictment if it be shown that delay caused substantial prejudice to the rights of an accused to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.chan robles virtual law library
But even if we proceed on the assumption that respondent may rightfully invoke the speedy disposition clause for the respondent, still I find that the circumstances of this case fail to measure up to the criteria set forth under the Balancing Test.chan robles virtual law library
In Caballero v. Alfonso[30]
we adopted a four-factor Balancing Test to determine whether an accused
has been denied the constitutional right to speedy disposition of his
case,
i.e., (a) length of the delay, (b) reason for the delay, (c) assertion
of the right or failure to assert it, and, (d) prejudice caused by the
delay.
chan
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With these relevant
factors, the otherwise abstract concept of speedy disposition of cases
is provided with at least a modicum of structure. The Balancing Test,
in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are
considered,
prescribes flexible standards based on practical considerations. It
necessarily
compels courts to approach speedy disposition cases on an ad hoc basis.
No single factor in the Balancing Test is definitive because all four
(4)
must be weighed against the others in determining whether a violation
of
the right to speedy disposition of cases occurred. In other words,
these
factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a
difficult
and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a
fundamental
right of the accused, this process must be carried out in full
recognition
of the accused’s interest in the speedy disposition of his case as
specifically
affirmed in the Constitution.[31]chan
robles virtual law library
I proceed to consider
the four (4) factors in the Balancing Test in seriatim. The length of
delay
is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until it is shown that the
delay
has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary delay from presumptively
prejudicial
delay, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go
into the balance.[32]
Considering the serious nature of the charges against respondent, and
more
importantly, the criminal cases sought to be filed being deeply
impressed
with public interest, involving as they do high ranking police
officers,
I am of the view that the claimed two (2) years and three (3) months
lag
between the provisional dismissal of the first criminal cases on 29
March
1999 and the filing of new Informations on 6 June 2001 sketches below
the
bare minimum needed to provoke such an inquiry. At any rate, I will
assume,
without conceding, that it is sufficiently long for purposes of
triggering
a full analysis under the three (3) remaining factors.
chan
robles virtual law library
The banner the
litigants
seek to capture is the second factor - the reason the government
assigns
to justify the delay. Here too, different weights should be assigned to
different reasons. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the
trial
in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the
government.
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should
be
weighed less heavily. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing
witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay.[33]chan
robles virtual law library
I find it hard to accept that in the criminal cases against respondent the government is on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying the prosecution of respondent. It simplistically and unrealistically assumes that the availability of witnesses Yu and Enad prior to 2001 renders the seeming lethargy of the government unjustifiable. It completely disregards other considerations affecting the decision of the government to stay its entire prosecutorial machinery.chan robles virtual law library
The government may delay for a variety of reasons such as to gain time in which to strengthen and document its case. The government may also delay, not with the view of ensuring conviction of the accused, but because the government lacks sufficient resources to move quickly. The species of governmental delay that are anathema to the right to speedy disposition of cases are those which are purposely or negligently employed to harm or gain impermissible advantage over the accused at the trial. The reason is that, in such circumstance, the fair administration of justice is imperiled.chan robles virtual law library
In the present recourse, there is nothing to demonstrate that the delay in reviving the cases against respondent was deliberately availed of for an impermissible purpose. It was not explained what improper tactical advantage was gained or sought by the government; nor can I discern any such advantage from the records. To be sure, if as claimed by respondent this whole mess is nothing more than a pure and simple political vendetta, carried out by a possè bent on lynching him politically and personally - which I am not inclined to acknowledge at this stage - the government could have moved against respondent with deliberate haste, for delay is not exactly to its best interest.chan robles virtual law library
Neither can we safely conclude that the public prosecutors are guilty of negligent omission. Insufficiency of evidence is a legitimate reason for delay. The government is naturally not expected to go forward with the trial and incur costs unless it is convinced it has an iron-clad case to make a worthwhile indictment. Verily, it needs time to gather evidence, track down and collect witnesses, as well as document its case. As to how much time it needs depends on such other factors as the availability of witnesses and resources to enable it to move quickly. In U.S. v. Lovasco[34] it was held -chan robles virtual law library
x x x x investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay under taken by the Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the accused," precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided. Rather than deviating from elementary standards of "fair play and decency," a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able to promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition" to that of mere speed.chan robles virtual law library
In no mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural safeguards provided an accused can also present obstacles. It is doubly difficult in this particular case considering the recantation and disappearance of all available vital witnesses for the prosecution.chan robles virtual law library
If we were to turn the tables against the respondent, we say that the unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution may be attributed to the conventional tendency of our people never to antagonize the powerful and the influential. We are not insinuating that respondent had a hand in the recantation or desistance of the complainants, or the non-appearance or the shortage of witnesses for the prosecution; what we are simply saying is that accusing an individual of respondent's stature naturally engenders fear of physical harm, real or imagined, and can intimidate even the most stout-hearted and temerarious individuals. This circumstance should have been given weight in resolving the present controversy.chan robles virtual law library
The third factor - the
extent to which respondent has asserted his right to speedy disposition
of his case - further weakens his position. When and how a defendant
asserts
his right should be given strong evidentiary weight in determining
whether
the accused is being deprived of the right. The more serious the
deprivation,
the more likely an accused is to complain. But the failure to invoke
the
right will make it difficult for an accused to prove that he was denied
thereof.[35]
chan
robles virtual law library
I do not think that
the vigor with which respondent defended himself in the original cases
against him, and the vigilance with which he assailed the filing of the
new Informations now subject of the instant petition, is the equivalent
to an assertion of his right to speedy disposition. The trouble with
this
observation is that every accused in a criminal case has the intense
desire
to seek acquittal, or at least to see the swift end of the accusation
against
him. To this end, it is natural for him to exert every effort within
his
capacity to resist prosecution. But is it correct to assume that, in
every
instance, the accused in resisting his criminal prosecution is also
asserting
his right to speedy disposition?chan
robles virtual law library
Respondent’s reliance on Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which some have said is based on the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, cannot be equated with a positive assertion of the right to speedy disposition. A perusal of the records would reveal that the issue of applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117, was raised by respondent for the first time before the Court of Appeals, in his Second Amended Petition - undoubtedly a mere afterthought. It was not his original position before the trial court, which centered on the "lack of valid ‘complaints’ to justify a preliminary investigation of cases which had long been dismissed." It was not even his initial position in the early stages of the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Within the context of the Balancing Test, respondent’s tardy, inexplicit and vague invocation of this right makes it seriously difficult for him to prove the denial thereof.chan robles virtual law library
Finally, the fourth factor is prejudice to the accused. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of accused which the speedy disposition right as well as the speedy trial right are designed to protect. There are three (3) of such interests: (a) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and, (c) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.[36] Of the three (3), the most significant is the last because the inability of the defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.[37]chan robles virtual law library
Needless to say, respondent
was never arrested or taken into custody, or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in any manner. These render the first criterion inapplicable.
Thus,
the only conceivable harm to respondent from the lapse of time may
arise
from anxiety and the potential prejudice to his ability to defend his
case.
Even then, the harm suffered by respondent occasioned by the filing of
the criminal cases against him is too minimal and insubstantial to tip
the scales in his favor.
chan
robles virtual law library
Concededly, anxiety
typically accompanies a criminal charge. But not every claim of anxiety
affords the accused a ground to decry a violation of the rights to
speedy
disposition of cases and to speedy trial. The anxiety must be of such
nature
and degree that it becomes oppressive, unnecessary and notoriously
disproportionate
to the nature of the criminal charge. To illustrate, a prosecution for
the serious crime of multiple murder naturally generates greater degree
of anxiety, than an indictment for, say, simple estafa. The anxiety and
the tarnished "reputation and image of respondent who is, after all,
presently
and newly elected member of the Senate," does not amount to that degree
that would justify a nullification of the the appropriate and regular
steps
that must be taken to assure that while the innocent should go
unpunished,
those guilty must expiate for their offense. Verily, they pale in
importance
to the gravity of the charges and the paramount considerations of
seeking
justice for the victims as well as redeeming the sullied integrity and
reputation of the Philippine National Police for their alleged
involvement
in the perpetration of the ghastly crimes.chan
robles virtual law library
We cannot therefore hold, on the facts before us, that the delay in the reinvestigation and refiling of the criminal cases weighed sufficiently in support of the view that respondent’s right to speedy disposition of his cases has been violated. The delay simply does not justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictments.
Consistent with the views expressed above, I hold that no constitutional, statutory and procedural impediments exist against the subsequent re-indictment of respondent. Although we are dealing here with alleged members of the notorious Kuratong Baleleng Gang, against whom society must be protected, we must bear in mind that they too were human beings with human rights. Indeed, life is so precious that its loss cannot simply be consigned to oblivion in so short a time. Withal, the seriousness of the accusations against respondent and other high-ranking officers of the PNP goes into the very foundation of our law enforcement institutions. We must ferret out the truth: Is the Philippine National Police so contaminated to the core with corrupt and murderous police officers, worse than the criminal elements they are trained to exterminate? Let us give the courts a chance to find out - and more importantly - to absolve respondent and erase any taint in his name, if innocent. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.chan robles virtual law library
I vote to GRANT the
Motion for Reconsideration.chan
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Endnotes:
[1]
Giuseppe Mazzini, "Byron and Goethe."chan
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[2]
P/C Supts. Jewel F. Canson, herein respondent Panfilo Lacson, and Romeo
Acop, P/Sr. Supt. Francisco Subia, Romulo Sales, Supts. Almario
Hilario,
Luizo Ticman, Zozorabel Laureles, P/C Insps. Michael Ray Aquino, Gil
Meneses,
Cesar Mancao, Jose Erwin Villacorte, P/Sr. Insps. Rolando Anduyan,
Glenn
Dumlao, Sotero Ramos, P/Insp. Ricardo Dandan, SPO4 Vicente Arnado, SPO1
Wilfredo Cuantero and SPO1 Wilfredo Angeles.chan
robles virtual law library
[3]
See Annex 'A' of the Petition.
[4]
Order dated 5 June 2001.chan
robles virtual law library
[5]
Decision penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.,
concurred
in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Hilarion L. Aquino,
and
Josefina Guevara-Salonga. Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero,
dissenting.chan
robles virtual law library
[6]
Art. VIII, 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme
Court
shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights x x x xchan
robles virtual law library
[7]
TSN, 19 February 2002, pp. 292-293; see also, Minutes of the Revision
Committee
Meetings, 11 October 1999, 2:30 pm; id., 8 November 1999, 2:00 pm.
[8]
See also Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 2001 Ed., at 660.chan
robles virtual law library
[9]
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932).chan
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[10]
See Respondents Memorandum, at pp. 49-53.
[11]
195 US 100.chan
robles virtual law library
[12]
One of the earliest declarations by this Court on the matter is
enshrined
in Republic v. Agoncillo (L-27257, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 579.) where
Chief Justice Fernando, then an Associate Justice of the Court,
articulated
the doctrine that the institution of a case after having been dismissed
without prejudice cannot be the basis of the claim of twice being put
in
jeopardy. Citing the case of Jaca v. Blanco (86 Phil. 452 [1950])
Agoncillo
unequivocally pointed out that "x x x (I)n the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary, we find no reason why the court may not, in
the interest of justice, dismiss a case provisionally, i.e., without
prejudice
to reinstating it before the order becomes final or to the subsequent
filing
of a new information for the same offense." Ortigas & Company
Limited
Partnership v. Velasco (G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455)
made
the clarification that a dismissal of a case, even if made without
prejudice,
and the lapse of the reglementary period within which to set aside the
dismissal operates to remove the case from the Court's docket; in which
event, the case can no longer be reinstated by mere motion in the
original
docket action, but only by the filing of a new complaint. This ruling
was
reiterated in Banares II v. Balising (G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000,
328
SCRA 36) which declared that since a final order of dismissal is beyond
the power of the court to modify or alter, a party who wishes to
reinstate
the case has no other option but to file a new complaint.chan
robles virtual law library
[13]
The following executed affidavits of desistance: Myrna Abalora, mother
of victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora; Rufino Siplon, father of
victim
Rolando Siplon; Carmelita Elcamel, wife of victim Wilbur Elcamel;
Leonora
Soronda Amora, mother of victim Joel Soronda Amora; Nenita Alap-ap,
wife
of victim Carlito Alap-ap; Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel
Montero;
and Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillaschan
robles virtual law library
[14]
Namely, Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri.
[15]
De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, 1999 Ed., at p. 877.
[16]
Caballero v. Alfonso, G.R. No. L-45647, 21 August 1987, 153 SCRA 153.
[17]
See Abadia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105597, 23 September 1994, 236
SCRA 676.
[18]
Decision, at p. 14chan
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[19]
G.R. Nos. 72335-39, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 70.
[20]
G.R. No. 130191, 27 April 1998, 289 SCRA 725.
[21]
G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA 65.
[22]
G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145.
[23]
G.R. No. 108595, 18 May 1999, 302 SCRA 149.
[24]
Supra.chan
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[25]
See also Bañares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000,
328
SCRA 36, citing Olympia International v. Court of Appeals, No. L-43236,
20 December 1989, 180 SCRA 353, 361, wherein we held "that dismissal
without
prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that the dismissal order
was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details,
and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the
matter.
It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the
complaint." And in Ortigas & Company, Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R. No.
109645,
25 July 1995, 234 SCRA 455, 486, "the dismissal of the case, and the
lapse
of the reglementary period to reconsider and set aside the dismissal,
effectively
operated to remove the case from the Court's docket." These doctrinal
principles
may be applied to provisional dismissals in criminal cases.chan
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[26]
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 (1977).chan
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[27]
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).chan
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[28]
Ibid.chan
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[29]
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970).chan
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[30]
Supra. See also Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October
1999; Dansal v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145;
and, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 116259-60, 253 SCRA 773. In
all
these cases, the Court applied the four factors in the Balancing Test
for
purposes of determining whether the accused was deprived of his right
to
speedy disposition of cases.
[31]
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).chan
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[32]
Ibid.chan
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[33]
Ibid.chan
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[34]
See Note 28.chan
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[35]
Ibid.chan
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[36]
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).chan
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[37]
Barker v. Wingo, supra.chan
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