FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
150413
July 1, 2003
-versus-
ALEXANDRA LAO,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Petition for Review
assails the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the
Judgment[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land
Registration
Case No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995,
respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay
City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a
parcel
of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan
Ap-04-007770,
consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square
meters
under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration
Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase
from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who
inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited
the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from
Edilberto
Perido by transfer.cralaw:red
In the alternative,
respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land
Act, based on her and her predecessor’s open, public, actual,
continuous,
exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona
fide
claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.chanrobles virtual law library
At the hearing in the
lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido
Amoroso,
who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932;
Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondent’s purchase of the property
from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who
assisted
respondent in her application for registration. Respondent
likewise
presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[3]
dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor,
the
survey plan and technical description of the property, and the tax
declarations
in the name of respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest.cralaw:red
On June 28, 1996, the
trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the
applicant
acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera
and
Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her
predecessors-in-interest
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in
the
concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land for more
than
thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was declared for
taxation
purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that
the
land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise,
this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same
property,
as well as technical description and other documents presented, that
the
land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest
zone or public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interest’s
possession to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public
possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years.[4]
The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus
places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise
known
as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770
and
containing an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine (9,349)
square
meters as supported by its technical description now forming part of
the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of
ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino
citizen,
with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.chanrobles virtual law library
Once this Decision
becomes
final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith
issue.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed
to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
56230.
On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
trial
court.[6]
Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors: THERE IS NO
SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT
PROPERTY
IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.[7]
A. RESPONDENT
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS OF
POSSESSION.[8]
B. THE TAX
DECLARATIONS
PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY
REQUIRED
PERIOD OF POSSESSION.[9]
C. RESPONDENT FAILED
TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT
THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[10]
In sum, the issues presented
before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the
quantum
of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an
owner,
of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was
able
to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and
alienable
land of the public domain.cralaw:red
Section 14 (1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply.
- The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have
been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, Section
48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of
Presidential
Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section
48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945.cralaw:red
Thus, before one can
register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that
(a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945
or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable
and
disposable land of the public domain.cralaw:red
Respondent submits that
Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which
reduced
the required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to
the filing of the application. Said law became effective on April 15,
1990.
However, petitioner maintains that the required period of possession
remained
the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions amended
sections
44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48
(b).
In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or
incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1)
possession
of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of
the
land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In
Public
Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals,[11]
we held that:
Under the public land
act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en
concepto
de dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under
C.A.
No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957,
Republic
Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment
required
adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January
25,
1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No.
141,
extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this
decree,
"the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of
the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945.cralaw:red
The aforequoted ruling
was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[12]
thus:chanrobles virtual law library
This Court has held
in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally,
"Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands
of
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved
on January 25, 1977." As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this
chapter.cralaw:red
Petitioner argues that
respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had
been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. According to petitioner, respondent’s witnesses did not
state the exact period when respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
started
occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping statements to
the effect that respondent had been in possession of the property for
more
than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively determined
whether
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have truly been in
possession
of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore,
respondent
failed to show how the property was transferred from Generosa Medina to
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial
settlement of property was established. Consequently, respondent
can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina and her
predecessors-in-interest.cralaw:red
There is merit in the
petition.cralaw:red
Candido Amoroso, respondent’s
first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and
that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no
evidence
was presented to support his claim. Respondent submitted the tax
declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including
that
of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained
to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required period.
Respondent’s other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known
about the property since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and
that
Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-examination,
however,
he testified that he based his information on Edilberto’s ownership of
the land on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family
whenever
he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did
not
know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and
possessor
of the property.[13]
Finally, respondent
failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document
evidencing
the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and
Ma.
Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the
relationship
between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale
between
her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria
inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not
tack
her possession with those of Generosa and her
predecessors-in-interest.
At most, respondent’s possession can only be reckoned from the time
that
Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent having thus
failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the
land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the
first
requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.cralaw:red
Petitioner further submits
that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application
is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution,[14]
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land.[15]
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed
to belong to the State.[16]
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain.[17]
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[18]
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,[19]
it was held that:
x x x a title may be
judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it
pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets
are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation
thereof
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership
and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073
clarified
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that
the
latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.cralaw:red
In the case at bar,
no certification from the appropriate government agency or official
proclamation
reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by
respondent.
Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions
of
the land, which contained no information regarding the classification
of
the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public
domain.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent argues that
she was not required to present any certification stating that the land
is open for disposition because no opposition to her application was
ever
made by the appropriate government agencies. She claims that in
the
absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are
agricultural
in nature and thus susceptible to private ownership.cralaw:red
As an applicant for
registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation
to show that the property involved is agricultural. Being the
interested
party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being
registered
is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere
presumption
that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public
domain.[20]
Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,[21]
we held:
It was rather sweeping
for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his
application
for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove
that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs
applications
for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden
of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms
part of the public domain.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the absence
of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the
State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials
or agents.[22]
It bears stressing at
this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
requires
an express and positive act from the government.[23]
It cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for original registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad.
452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land
Registration
Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,
Branch
18, is DENIED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 27-33.
[2]
RTC Records, pp. 68-69.
[3]
Id., at 5.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
RTC Records, pp. 68-69.
[5]
Id., at 69.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Rollo, p. 33.
[7]
Id., at 14.
[8]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Id., at 21.
[10]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
G.R. No. 112172, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 96.
[12]
G.R. No. 116372, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 451.
[13]
TSN, April 19, 1996, p. 10.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution: All lands of the
public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. xxx.
[15]
Seville v. National Development Company, G.R. No. 129401, 2 February
2001,
351 SCRA 112, 120.
[16]
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 156 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 128,
139.
[18]
Pagkatipunan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129682, 21
March
2002.
[19]
G.R. No. 135527, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 716.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50260, 29 July 1992,
211
SCRA 868, 876.
[21]
G.R. No. L-68533, 23 May 1986, 142 SCRA 57.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 214 Phil. 606, 610.
[23]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, 21 August 1991, 201 SCRA
1, 9.
[24]
Pagkatipunan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra. |