RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the
amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners
incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the
1987 Constitution Further, the amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
filed with the COMELEC a petition entitled “IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING
AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE: A
SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM.” The case was docketed as EM
(LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended
petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition
for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition
in their own behalf and together with those who have affixed their
signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino
citizens, residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they
constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters
in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at
least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for
initiative is based on their constitutional right to propose amendments
to the
1987 Constitution
by way of people’s initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:cralaw:red
SEC. 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
chan robles virtual law library
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.”
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that “(T)he
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right,” the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6735
,[1] are sufficient enabling details for the people’s exercise of the power. The said sections of
RA 6735
state:cralaw:red
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1.
contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.2. the proposition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in
not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.
x x x x
Sec. 7. Verification of
Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and
obligation to give due course to the petition for initiative, in
compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to
“enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.”[2]
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes
they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed
that the COMELEC issue an order:cralaw:red
1.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2.
Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at
least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a
plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days
after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency
of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their
sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution
denying due course and dismissing the petition for initiative.
The COMELEC ruled that:cralaw:red
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:cralaw:red
“Sec. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through
initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.”
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a
non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its
implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted
RA 6735
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v.
Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the
required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district is represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot
be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA
6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of
the right of the people under a system of initiative. However,
neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court
that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people
remains nothing but an “empty right,” and that this Commission is
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations
omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners’ Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:cralaw:red
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO
RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF
THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION
AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO
DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND
INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR
SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE’S
INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND
COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING
TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN
EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
chan robles virtual law library
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE
THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW
GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997,
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE
AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A
POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN
PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR
INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE
CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE
DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.[3]
Petitioners Failed to Allege and
Demonstrate All the Essential
Facts To Establish the Right
to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:cralaw:red
Sec. 1. Petition for
certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and established:cralaw:red
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x[4]
The Court has invariably defined “grave abuse of discretion,” thus:cralaw:red
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it
must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the
judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law traditions.[5]
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when
it acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough.[6] The only question involved
is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of
discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.[7] An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible
only by an appeal.[8]
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience
to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections.[9] In said case, the Court En Banc permanently
enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the
petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by
Congress to provide for the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in
denying due course to the petition for initiative as “capricious,
despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.” In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC
merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court’s ruling in
Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and
requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation
thereto,
RA 6735
was found by the Court to be “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the constitutional
provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was
“permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.” The decision of the Court En Banc
interpreting
RA 6735
forms part of the legal system of the Philippines.[10] And no
doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be modified or
reversed except by the Court En Banc,[11] certainly not by the
COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its
decision, the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.[12] As
succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:[13]
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as
finally settled. The inferior court is bound by the judgment or
decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution
according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or
judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It
can give no other or further relief as to any matter decided by the
Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in any manner
intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such
matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by
the authority of adjudged cases. And any further departure from
them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system,
bring its parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization,
disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any
rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the
Supreme Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would
be repugnant to the principles established by the constitution, and
therefore void.[14]
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as
well as the pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like
petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the
People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et
al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed
with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, By People’s Initiative” (the Delfin
petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and
date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the
necessary publications of said order and their petition in newspapers
of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election
registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist
petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting thereon, the
COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a
petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its
order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
(later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:cralaw:red
1.
RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned”; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300[15]
invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is
without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition
insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of
registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that “the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of
the system.” The dispositive portion of the decision reads:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:cralaw:red
a) GRANTING the instant petition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) DECLARING RA 6735
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
chan robles virtual law library
c) DECLARING void those parts
of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996
is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED
as against private respondents.[16]
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another
petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the spouses
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as
PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.[17] The said petitioners,
undaunted by Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213
signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying, inter alia, that
COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures collected in
behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC)
declare the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a
plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in
Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a
plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term
limits of elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by
the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution
dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent
restraining order issued against it by the Court in Santiago.
PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the
Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing, their
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed
by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that
the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of
the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a
grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:cralaw:red
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it
only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to
resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the
Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue,
the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted
that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was
no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is
not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members
of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and
Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a
re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.[18] (Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes
the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have
applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because
the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin
petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that
the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made
permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin
petition.
The OSG’s attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of
the Court’s decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing
that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in
connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a
part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be
considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and
does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo
thereof.[19]
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago
permanently enjoining the COMELEC “from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system” is thus as much a part of
the Court’s decision as its dispositive portion. The ruling of
this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all
Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to the
present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
conformably with the Court’s ruling in Santiago did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping
with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court
to find the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the
amended petition based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago would be
sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “there is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearings.”[20] This truism applies with equal force to the
COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions
applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution “assume the same
authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called
upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto.”[21]
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the
Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary,
the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the
minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue,
albeit unconvincingly, that the Court’s declaration therein on the
inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement
the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not
constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly
baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight
Justices,[22] or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually
took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five
Justices,[23] while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on
the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as
they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the
system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight
Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement
therein that RA 6735 is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned” constitutes a definitive ruling on the
matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration
of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six
Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The
Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed
“to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse
the Decision of 19 March 1977.”[24] In fine, the pronouncement in
Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the
definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to
resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards
RA 6735
By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P.
Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was
no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined
that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling.
Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the
case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by
the Court in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its
original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for
reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not.
The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely
followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition
before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred
with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to
dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration
of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine
enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither
did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people’s right to
directly propose constitutional amendments through the system of
initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as
in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including
no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then
a member of the House of Representatives,[25] have filed separate bills
to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are
pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate
Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People’s Initiative to Amend
the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa “Loi” P. Ejercito Estrada;
Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People’s Initiative
to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a
System of People’s Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution
introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending
bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House
Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No.
05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026
filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are
similarly entitled An Act Providing for People’s Initiative to Amend
the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills
uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the
process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people
directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after
Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event,
i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the
re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to
the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare
decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies
have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with
respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or
constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual
opinions of the members who compose it – the Supreme Court, as an
institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be “incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the
Constitution
is concerned” and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any
change in the Court’s composition.[26] Indeed, it is vital that
there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately
made after ample consideration. Parties should not be encouraged
to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on
fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.[27]
Proposals to Revise the Constitution, As in the Case of the Petitioners’
Proposal to Change the Form of Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative, Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its
pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with
other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative,
still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper.
Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of
petitioners to change the form of government from the present
bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to “amend” Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:cralaw:red
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:cralaw:red
“Section 1. (1) The
legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be
provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative
districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per
district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
“(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day
of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior
thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district
for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by
law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts.”
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
are hereby amended to read, as follows:cralaw:red
“Section 1. There shall be a
President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The
Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the
Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from
the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory
Provisions,” which shall read as follows:cralaw:red
Section 1. (1) The incumbent
President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their
term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a
vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice
President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent
President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume
all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII
as amended.
Section 2. “Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby
be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government;
provided, however, that any and all references therein to “Congress,”
“Senate,” “House of Representatives” and “House of Congress,”
“Senator[s] or “Member[s] of the House of Representatives” and “House
of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament”; that any and all
references therein to “Member[s] of the House of Representatives” shall
be changed to read as “Member[s] of Parliament” and any and all
references to the “President” and or “Acting President” shall be
changed to read “Prime Minister.”
chan robles virtual law library
Section 3. “Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3
and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended
and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other
Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent
with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as
to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government;
provided, however, that any and all references therein to “Congress,”
“Senate,” “House of Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be
changed to read “Parliament”; that any and all references therein to
“Member[s] of Congress,” “Senator[s]” or “Member[s] of the House
of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and of
“Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of
these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members
of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a
Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He
shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He
shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over
its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until
the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments
to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles
of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
“Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim
Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister
shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and
responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of
the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
[Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of Parliament, shall
immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its
session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among
themselves.] The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the
interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President.[28]
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered
voters have been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition
constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the
country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election
Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these signatures
were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification
was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered voters
contained in the official COMELEC list used in the immediately
preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the
Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:cralaw:red
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT
OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE
OTHER?[29]
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII
would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive
government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure
harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government,
promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive
governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:cralaw:red
Article XVII
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:cralaw:red
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section
2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different
modes and procedures for proposals for the amendment and revision of
the Constitution:cralaw:red
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article
XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed
by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms
“amendment” and “revision” and provided for their respective modes and
procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of
the distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E.
Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions, explained:cralaw:red
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
“amendment.” However, the Committee finally agreed to use the
terms – “amendment” or “revision” when our attention was called by the
honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the
connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result
of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous –
or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered
by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following
distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of an existing
Constitution: “Revision” may involve a rewriting of the whole
Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a
constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The
intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the
addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that
these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article
governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.[30]
Further, the framers of the
Constitution deliberately omitted the term “revision” in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to
reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress
or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it
was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken
through the system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the
Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a constitutional
convention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on
the system of initiative was included in Section 1 of the draft Article
on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:cralaw:red
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:cralaw:red
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution.[31]
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the
members of the Commission agreed to remove the provision on the system
of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate
provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the
provision on initiative from the other “traditional modes” of changing
the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of
initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized
that the system of initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative.
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee
report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:cralaw:red
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru
initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory
that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be
limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. x x x[32]
The intention to exclude “revision” of the Constitution as a
mode that may be undertaken through the system of initiative was
reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a
suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:cralaw:red
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together
with the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is
presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day
periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is
another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution
which would further require the process of submitting it in a
plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting
an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section
1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.[33]
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also
made the clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner
Regalado Maambong:cralaw:red
MR. MAAMBONG. My first
question: Commissioner Davide’s proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
“amendments.” Does it not cover the word “revision” as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
“amendments” and “revision”?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because “amendments” and
“revision” should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to “amendments” not
“revision.”[34]
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:cralaw:red
AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:cralaw:red
(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(4) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes
a substantial differentiation not only between the two terms but also
between two procedures and their respective fields of
application. Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section
2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is
strictly limited to amendments – not to a revision – thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for
“amendment” and “revision” as different modes of changing the
fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two
terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by
Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary,[35] the controversial decision which gave
imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, as follows:cralaw:red
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an
existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole
constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act
to amend is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the
addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a
mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.[36]
Other elucidation on the distinction between “amendment” and “revision”
is enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent
authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves
alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may
result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the
greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the
factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original
intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention
and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the
constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or
whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a
change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act
to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention
rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or
to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed
conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or
dangerous, or misleading in their effect.[37]
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board
of Trustees[38] had the occasion to make the distinction between the
two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which “amended” the
1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term “amendment:”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
“Amendment” of a statute implies its survival and not
destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds
something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in
part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it,
or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or
perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose
for which it was made, or some other object or purpose.[39]
On the other hand, the term “revision” was explained by the said US appellate court:cralaw:red
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on
the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house,
or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained in
the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed
the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether
another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as
contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to
the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely
revised or new constitution.[40]
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional
Commission, expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:cralaw:red
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that
may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate
a re-examination of the entire document – or of provisions of the
document (which have overall implications for the entire document or
for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document) – to
determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for
instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not
the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the
fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence,
I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of
“amendments” means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction
of a multiplicity of amendments![41]
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and
far-reaching effects on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely
withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should
be recalled that it took the framers of the present Constitution four
months from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the
draft Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional Commission of
1986, “gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of
sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that
intersected all dimensions of the national life.”[42]
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision
thereof should, in like manner, be a product of the same extensive and
intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a
system of initiative where the people would directly propose amendments
to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision
to a deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent
Assembly.
chan robles virtual law library
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the
principles upon which the government is founded, and regulating the
division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those
powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be
exercised.[43] The Philippines has followed the American
constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is
given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument,
under which governmental powers are both conferred and
circumscribed.[44]
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the
people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast
during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on
February 2, 1987.[45] In expressing that will, the Filipino
people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the
same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have
incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in which
the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards
that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.[46]
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution,
where the validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends
upon whether such provisions have been complied with, such question
presents for consideration and determination a judicial question, and
the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the
Constitution to determine such question.[47]
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms
“amendment” and “revision,” clearly makes a differentiation not only
between the two terms but also between two procedures and their
respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden
v. Jordan[48] is instructive. In that case, a “purported
initiative amendment” (referred to as the proposed measure) to the
State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted
to the electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The
proposed measure, denominated as “California Bill of Rights,” comprised
a single new article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or
substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California
State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the
likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and
judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation
system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The
proposed measure also included diverse matters as ministers, mines,
civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed
measure to the electors for ratification because it was not an
“amendment” but a “revision” which could only be proposed by a
convention. It held that from an examination of the proposed
measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California
State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment
amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather than amendment,
thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution
specifies (Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be revised by
means of constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by
initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the
electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in
McFadden, the differentiation required (between amendment and revision)
is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two
procedures and between their respective fields of application.
Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory
construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of
application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same
field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote,
respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application
appropriate to its procedure.[49]
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes
are in the nature of safety-valves – they must not be so adjusted as to
discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they
become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other
hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed
to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine.
Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular,
one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the
requisites for progress with the requisites for safety.[50]
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its
revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles VI
and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory
provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of
these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous provisions
of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific
powers of Congress and the President. These powers would have to
be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or
President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100)
sections will be affected or altered thereby:cralaw:red
1. Section 19 of Article III
(Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of
Congress to provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
as well as a system for absentee voting;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):cralaw:red
- Section 2
on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 7
on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 8
on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes
representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of
the President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 9
on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 16
on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and
Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (B) Section 3 on
duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President
and Congress;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (B) Section 5 on
power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of
compensation of government officials;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (B) Section 8
which provides in part that “no public officer shall accept, without
the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress
measures to minimize election spending x x x;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the
President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and
Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization
registered under party-list system;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (C)
Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the
President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission
on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 4
on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 4
on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over
local government units (LGUs);chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 5 on the power
of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such
guidelines as Congress may provide;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 11
on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political
subdivisions;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 14
on the power of the President to provide for regional development
councils x x x;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 16
on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 18
on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous
region as well as the power of the President to appoint the
representatives to the regional consultative commission;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 19 on the duty of the
first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the organic act
for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):cralaw:red
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 3
on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate
complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment
cases);chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 9
on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 16 which provides in part that
“x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the President,
Vice-President, etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of
assets and liabilities by public officials including the President,
Vice-President, etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):cralaw:red
- Section 2
on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of
natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every
contract;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 3
on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 4
on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 5
on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 9 on the
power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning
agency to be headed by the President;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 10 on the
power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic
corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 11
on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 15
on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of
cooperatives;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 16
which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form
private corporations;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 17
on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of
Congress to adjust the same;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):cralaw:red
- Section 1
on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x
- Section 4
on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian
reform;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 18
(6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to
Congress effective measures to promote human rights;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 19
on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):cralaw:red
- Section 4
on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in
educational institutions;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 6
which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the
Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official
communication;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 9
on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 11
on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote
scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):cralaw:red
- Section 2
on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new
national anthem, etc.;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 5
(7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by
the President in times of war or national emergency declared by
Congress;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 11
on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass
media;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 12
on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the
President on indigenous cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):cralaw:red
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 2
on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system
of initiative;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- Section 3
on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or
revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that “the big
bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected.”[51]
Petitioners’ proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only
Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing transitory
provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other
numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the
quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners’
proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects it will have on
the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the
revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a
consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for
effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular
provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.[52]
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below
Dean Sinco’s more comprehensive differentiation of the terms:cralaw:red
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves
alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may
result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the
greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the
factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original
intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention
and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the
constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or
whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a
change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act
to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention
rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or
to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed
conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or
dangerous, or misleading in their effect.[53]
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary, following the above distinction, entails a
revision of the Constitution as it will involve “alteration of
different portions of the entire document” and “may result in the
rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without
doubt, fundamentally change the basic plan and substance of the present
Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental
law divides governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal
branches: the legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative
power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and
to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the
President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see
that the laws are duly executed and enforced. Judicial power,
vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to
construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what has
been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers
furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards against the
establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite
separation of power is dissolved as there is a fusion between the
executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the President
becomes a mere “symbolic head of State” while the Prime Minister
becomes the head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of
the people, but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament
is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative
districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not
have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of
confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of
government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would
be effected, not to mention that the Constitution’s basic plan and
substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of
separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not
entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the
proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision
of the Constitution rather than an amendment or “such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.”[54] As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of the
petitioners’ proposition, rather than to “within the lines of the
original instrument” constitute “an improvement or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed,” is to “substantially alter the
purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the
Constitution as now cast.”[55]
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners’ contention that any change less
than a total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity
the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might,
conceivably, be presented where the question would be occasion to
undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no
case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, “a switch from the presidential
system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its
effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus
clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the
quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental
qualitative alteration that effects revision.”[56]
chan robles virtual law library
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by
petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for
the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any
legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo
RA 6735
is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is valid,
still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of
RA 6735
requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:cralaw:red
1. Contents or text of
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. The proposition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. The reason or reasons therefor;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than
one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:cralaw:red
Sec. 7. Verification of
Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and voters’
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the
signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the
election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even
to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made
by persons other than the election registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by
petitioners showed that the verification of signatures was made, not by
the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example,
the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur
reads in full:cralaw:red
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER’S CERTIFICATION[57]
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by
the Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two
(2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the 2nd
Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names
appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed
initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of
bonafide resident of the said Barangays and correspond to the names
found in the official list of registered voters of the Commission on
Elections and/or voters’ affidavit and/or voters’ identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures
of the registered voters for the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO
DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the
certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election
registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;[58] Cotabato City (Special
Province);[59] Datu Odin
Sinsuat, Maguindanao;[60] Matanog, Maguindanao;[61] Parang,
Maguindanao;[62] Kabantalan, Maguindanao;[63] Upi,
Maguinadano;[64] Barira, Maguindanao;[65] Sultan, Mastura;[66]
Ampatuan, Maguindanao;[67] Buluan, Maguindanao;[68] Datu Paglas,
Maguindanao;[69] Datu Piang, Maguindanao;[70] Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao;[71] Pagalungan, Maguindanao;[72] Talayan, Maguindanao;[73]
Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;[74] Mamasapano, Maguindanao;[75]
Talitay, Maguindanao;[76] Guindulungan, Maguindanao;[77] Datu Saudi
Ampatuan, Maguindanao;[78] Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;[79] Pagagawan,
Maguindanao;[80] Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;[81] Indanan,
Sulu;[82] Jolo, Sulu;[83] Maimbung, Sulu;[84] Hadji Panglima,
Sulu;[85] Pangutaran, Sulu;[86] Parang, Sulu;[87] Kalingalan Caluang,
Sulu;[88] Luuk, Sulu;[89] Panamao, Sulu;[90] Pata, Sulu;[91] Siasi,
Sulu;[92] Tapul, Sulu;[93] Panglima Estino, Sulu;[94] Lugus, Sulu;[95]
and Pandami, Sulu. [96]
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall
be done by the election registrar, and by no one else, including the
barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by
petitioners, instead of aiding their cause, justify the outright
dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the
illegal verifications made by barangay officials in the above-mentioned
legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for
initiative has failed to comply with the requisite number of
signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging
certifications because they themselves submitted the same to the
COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to support their
contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied with and
that their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form
and substance. They are in the nature of judicial admissions
which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.[97] This being
the case, the Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition
for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed
by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done
in other cases.[98]
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is
correct in relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover
initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its
refusal to heed the people’s will. The fact that there is no
enabling law should not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has already been
exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act
of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the
COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus. The submission of
petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public
right and to compel the persons of a public duty most especially when
mandated by the Constitution.[99] However, under Section 3, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper,
it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act
or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer
or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes
a duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor
judgment.[100]
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof.[101] In this case, petitioners failed to establish their
right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the
petition for initiative has complied with the requisite number of
signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters
therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites
the petitioners’ claim that they have complied with the same while the
oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging,
inter alia, that the signatures were not properly verified or were not
verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have alleged that
the signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as they
were misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition
for initiative and its compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on
initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be
resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands
the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not
warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former
statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing,
whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or
administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that “[a]n
initiative shall be conducted under the control and supervision of the
Commission in accordance with Article III hereof.” Pertinently,
Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said implementing rules
provide as follows:cralaw:red
Sec. 30. Verification of
signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and voters’
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The
Commission shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures
has not been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated and the
Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures
has been obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or
referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the
findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not
authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for
or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative.
Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to determine the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its
face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes
submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its
face, insufficient in form and substance. The remand of the case
to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the
contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the
abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not
empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further, the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.[102] A political question has two aspects: (1) those
matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically
designated to some other department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act.[103]
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,[104] Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained
the doctrine of political question vis-à-vis the express mandate
of the present Constitution for the courts to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government:cralaw:red
In the Philippine setting,
there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse
of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts “. to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.” This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was also not
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases
involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
x x x
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question
doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by
allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts
of any branch or instrumentality of the government “to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental
body, but of purportedly more than six million registered voters who
have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution,
the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a
non-political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution,
under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or method to
effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question,
therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the
Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.[105]
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,[106]
the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the
petition questioning the result of the general election holding that
“an examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost
uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the
proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional
amendments.” The cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,[107] Rice v. Palmer,[108] Bott v. Wurtz,[109] State v. Powell,[110] among other cases.
chan robles virtual law library
There is no denying that “the Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.”[111] However, I find to be tenuous
the asseveration that “the argument that the people through initiative
cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns
sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission
constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct
sovereignty of the people.”[112] In effect, it is theorized that
despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of
initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently
disregard the said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution altogether.
Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory
that while indeed “the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom
springs all legitimate authority”; nonetheless, “by the Constitution
which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the
state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to
take action in opposition to this fundamental law.”[113] The
Constitution, it should be remembered, “is the protector of the people,
placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against injury
by the people.”[114] This is the essence of constitutionalism:cralaw:red
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political
institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically
always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become
restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound
ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And
though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did
mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word.[115]
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative
is limited only to proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not
extend to its revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves
to observe the manner and method to effect the changes of the
Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but
did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for
initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes
the Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes the
limitations under which the electors of the state may change the same,
and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of
the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves,
does not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and
the Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of form.[116]
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and
abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicated the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument,
shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.[117]
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment
and revision in Article XVII of the Constitution. The Court is
mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the
Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty changes thereof are
not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly
ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed that it is “a
good Constitution” and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:cralaw:red
x x x should be beyond the
reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It
is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of
the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in
excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if
the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes
in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As
Montaign says: “All great mutations shake and disorder a state.
Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and
worse.[118]
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of
transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have approached and
grappled with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities
involved in the present case, and have given to its consideration the
earnest attention which its importance demands. I have sought to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I
share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:[119]
“it is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are
framed. Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the
protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions
are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds her
citadel, and are designed to check the
surging passions in times
of popular excitement. But if
courts could be coerced by popular
majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions
would become mere ‘ropes of sand,’ and there would be an end of social
security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance
can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at
all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a
violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and
respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands the
observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first
reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it
consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it
violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the
amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a
few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of
republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage
of political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon
the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be
advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be ‘voted up or voted
down,’ no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution.”[120]
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
The allegations of petitioners are quoted below, to wit:cralaw:red
24. At the outset, it is important to note that the case of Santiago v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, decided on 19 March 1997, dismissed the
Delfin petition based on three (3) grounds: (1) that
Republic Act No. 6735
was inadequate, (2) that Republic Act No. 6735 was incomplete and
insufficient in standard for subordinate legislation, and (3) that the
Delfin petition was non-compliant because it lacked the requisite
supporting signatures. Furthermore, consistent with the collegial
set-up of the Supreme Court en banc, the individual Justices cast
opposing votes on grounds one (1) and two (2), but was unanimous on
ground three (3). Finally, in view of the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents, the individual Justices of
the Supreme Court en banc, voted twice on the matter, the first on 19
March 1997 and the second on 10 June 1997.
25. The voting results among the individual Justices of the Supreme Court en banc on 19 March 1997 are summarized as follows:
|
Decision in case of Santiago
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, 19
March 1997 |
Supreme Court
Justice |
R.A. 6735 is adequate to implement Art. XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, and the delegation of authority to the Comelec is
complete, with a standard and thus constitutional |
R.A. 6735 is inadequate to implement Art. XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, and the delegation of authority to the Comelec is
incomplete, without a standard and thus unconstitutional |
Delfin is compliant |
Delfin petition is non-compliant for lack of supporting
signatures |
|
1. Bellosillo, J. |
|
(1) |
|
(1) |
|
2. Davide, J. |
|
(2) |
|
(2) |
|
3. Francisco, J. |
(1) |
|
|
(3) |
|
4. Hermosisima, Jr., J. |
|
(3) |
|
(4) |
|
5. Kapunan, J. |
|
(4) |
|
(5) |
|
6. Melo, J. |
(2) |
|
|
(6) |
|
7. Mendoza, J. |
(3) |
|
|
(7) |
|
8. Narvasa, C.J. |
|
(5) |
|
(8) |
|
9. Padilla, J. |
Inhibited |
Inhibited |
Inhibited |
Inhibited |
|
10.Panganiban, J. |
(4) |
|
|
(9) |
|
11. Puno, J. |
(5) |
|
|
(10) |
|
12. Regalado, J. |
|
(6) |
|
(11) |
|
13. Romero, J. |
|
(7) |
|
(12) |
|
14. Torres, Jr., J. |
|
(8) |
|
(13) |
|
15. J. Vitug |
Abstain |
Abstain |
|
(14) |
|
26. In relation to the foregoing, the
voting results among the individual Justices of the Supreme Court en banc
on 10 June 1997 are
summarized as follows:
|
Resolution in case of Santiago
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, 10
June 1997 |
Supreme Court
Justice |
R.A. 6735 is adequate to implement Art. XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, and the delegation of authority to the Comelec is
complete, with a standard and thus constitutional |
R.A. 6735 is inadequate to implement Art. XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, and the delegation of authority to the Comelec is
incomplete, without a standard and thus unconstitutional |
Delfin is compliant |
Delfin petition is non-compliant for lack of supporting
signatures |
|
1. Bellosillo, J. |
|
(1) |
|
(1) |
|
2. Davide, J. |
|
(2) |
|
(2) |
|
3. Francisco, J. |
(1) |
|
|
(3) |
|
4. Hermosisima, Jr., J. |
(2) |
|
|
(4) |
|
5. Kapunan, J. |
|
(3) |
|
(5) |
|
6. Melo, J. |
(3) |
|
|
(6) |
|
7. Mendoza, J. |
(4) |
|
|
(7) |
|
8. Narvasa, C.J. |
|
(4) |
|
(8) |
|
9. Padilla, J. |
Inhibited |
|
Inhibited |
|
|
10. Panganiban, J. |
(5) |
|
|
(9) |
|
11. Puno, J. |
(6) |
|
|
(10) |
|
12. Regalado, J. |
|
(5) |
|
(11) |
|
13. Romero, J. |
|
(6) |
|
(12) |
|
14. Torres, Jr., J. |
Inhibited |
Inhibited |
Inhibited |
Inhibited |
|
15. J. Vitug |
Abstain |
Abstain |
|
(13) |
|
27. Thus, on the second
and final voting by the individual Justices of the Supreme Court en
banc regarding grounds one (1) and two (2), no majority vote was
obtained, because only six (6) Justices agreed to invoke these grounds,
while six (6) other justices disagreed with these grounds, one (1)
Justice abstained on these grounds, and the two (2) remaining Justices
inhibited themselves from the proceedings.
28. In connection
with the collegial adjudication of the case of Santiago v. Comelec by
the Supreme Court en banc, it is useful to note the opinion of J.
Francisco which reads as follows:cralaw:red
“On March 19, 1997, the Court in G.R. No. 127325, speaking through Mr.
Justice Davide, declared that R.A. No. 6735 [is] inadequate to cover
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation, but
nowhere did the Court declare R.A. No. 6735 as unconstitutional.
A perusal of the March 19, 1997 decision starting from page 1 (title
page) and ending on page 38 (dispositive portion with the Justices’
signatures), in fact, shows that the Court shun from categorizing R.A.
No. 6735 as an unconstitutional enactment. The probe was limited
to the issue of whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient to cover an
initiative on the constitution.
“In the subsequent motion for reconsideration which stressed the
undisputed intent of R.A. No. 6735 to cover an initiative on the
Constitution that the Court is duty bound to recognize and enforce, Mr.
Justice Davide introduced the so-called “completeness” and “sufficient
standard” tests in his June 10, 1997 ponencia to avoid such an
insurmountable issue …chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
“The foregoing shows that the issue on the adequacy or inadequacy of
R. A. No. 6735
to implement an initiative on the Constitution was dislodged from the
realm of statutory construction to which it rightly belongs and brought
into the sphere of constitutional law. The Court’s declaration
that “
R. A. No. 6735
is incomplete, inadequate and wanting in essential terms and
conditions” was suddenly given significant to refer “to the
completeness and sufficient standard tests.” Failure to hurdle
this “completeness and sufficient standard tests” makes the law,
R. A. No. 6735
,
unconstitutional. But for R.A. No. 6735 to be declared
unconstitutional, certain parameters must be observed the absence of
which will render the declaration infirm. And here the
Constitution
is unequivocal …
chan robles virtual law library
“As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the
deliberations on the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration of
the March 19, 19979 decision should be granted or not, only the
following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice
Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan,
Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the
undersigned voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug “maintained
his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial
adjudication.” In other words, only five, out of the other twelve
justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide’s June 10, 1997 ponencia finding
R. A. No. 6735
unconstitutional for its failure to pass the so-called “completeness
and sufficiency standards” tests. Obviously, seven votes are
needed to reach a “majority,” not six. The “concurrence of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations”
which Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to
declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not complied
with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the “majority” was
initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia, the same is
inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the
constitutionality of
R. A. No. 6735
was settled with finally, sans the constitutionally required
“majority.” The Court’s declaration, therefore, is manifestly
grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my view,
the re-examination of the Court’s decision in G.R. No. 127325. It
behooves the Court “not to tarry any longer” nor waste this opportunity
accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court’s
pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
29. Under the premises, it
reasonably follows that the opinion and declaration in the Decision
dated 19 March 1997 in the case of Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No.
127325, declaring Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and
insufficient in standard for subordinate legislation, must be
considered only as the separate opinion of J. Davide, concurred by C.J.
Narvasa, J. Bellosillo, J. Kapunan, J. Regalado, and J. Romero, and not
as the majority decision of the Supreme Court En Banc, because upon the
reconsideration and final resolution of these matters on 10 June 1997,
no majority vote was secured to opine and declare the implementing
statute as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in standard, as only
six (6) Justices voted that the implementing statute was inadequate,
incomplete and insufficient in standard, while six (6) other Justices
voted that the implementing statute was adequate, complete and
sufficient in standard, one (1) Justice abstained on these issues, and
two (2) Justices inhibited themselves from the proceedings.
x x x
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATE.
In its Resolution dated August 31, 2006, respondent COMELEC denied due
course to the petition for initiative, reasoning that while they do
have the solemn constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative, the same must
be supposedly read in light of the other provisions of the Constitution
on initiative, specifically citing Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution as its basis, which according to the respondent COMELEC is
not a self-executory provision which needs an enabling law for its
implementation. The respondent COMELEC went on further to state
that while Congress enacted RA 6735 as the enabling law, the same was
supposedly struck down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Santiago v. COMELEC for being incomplete and inadequate.
However, the respondent COMELEC, in refusing to entertain or give due
course to the petition, precariously anchored its reasons on and merely
limited itself to clearly inapplicable provisions of the Constitution,
i.e., Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Section
2, Article XVII presupposes that the “right” to people’s initiative has
yet to be exercised. This was clearly not the situation facing
the respondent COMELEC when the petition was filed before it. It
is important to note that when the petition for initiative was filed,
the right of the people to propose amendments to the constitution which
is sacredly enshrined in the constitution itself, has already been
exercised by 6,327,952 voters. They have already taken the
initiative. As will be further explained in the succeeding
paragraphs, the exercise of this right is guaranteed by the spirit and
intent of the Constitution and all technicalities must yield to this
constitutionally-enshrined right.
The actions of the respondent COMELEC in limiting itself to clearly
inapplicable provisions of the Constitution resulted into a myopic view
of the constitutional provisions on initiative. By so doing, the
respondent COMELEC sorely missed Section 4, paragraph 2 of the same
Article XVII, which clearly mandates and obligates the respondent
COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite, thus:cralaw:red
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition.
As stated in the very resolution of the respondent COMELEC, it had
already made a determination that the minimum requirements for the per
centum of the signatures of the registered voters have been met.
The pertinent portion of the COMELEC resolution reads as follows:cralaw:red
Thus, even if the signature in the instant Petition appear to meet the
required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district is represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot
be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A.
No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
Clearly therefore, the petition has met the requirements of the “twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein” and thus, the respondent COMELEC
should not have made a draconian resolution to trash the petition as
there was absolutely no basis for the respondent COMELEC to have denied
due course to the petition and for it not to proceed in setting the
date of the plebiscite.
Thus, in denying due course to the petition for initiative despite the
clear and unmistakable duty of the respondent COMELEC under the
unequivocal terms of the Constitution to set the date of the
plebiscite, the respondent COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of its jurisdiction.[121]
I am convinced that the petition is bereft of merit.
[1] Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
[2] Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
[3] Petition, pp. 12-14.
[4] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.
[5] Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appears, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480.
[6] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
[7] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares
Construction Co., G.R. No. L-35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.
[8] People v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[9] G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[10] Article 8, New Civil Code provides that “[j]udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[11] Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA 284.
[12] Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.
[13] 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
[14] Id. at 453.
[15] Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative in the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws.
[16] Supra note 10, p. 157.
[17] G.R. No. 129754.
[18] Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.
[19] Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
[20] Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
[21] Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
[22] Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D.
Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M.
Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Jr. fully concurred in the ponencia of
Justice Davide.
[23] Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno,
Ricardo J. Francisco, Jr. and Artemio V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice).
[24] The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six
Justices, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan, voted to deny the motions for lack
of merit; and six Justices, namely, Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza,
Francisco, Jr., Regino C. Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the
same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was
not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Teodoro R. Padilla
and Torres inhibited from participation in the deliberations.
[25] House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress.
[26] See Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 480.
[27] London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898]
A.C. 375, cited in COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
117-118.
[28] Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
[29] Id. at 7.
[30] I Records of the Constitutional Commission 373.
[31] Id. at 371.
[32] Id. at 386.
[33] Id. at 392.
[34] Id. at 402-403.
[35] No. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.
[36] Id. at 367.
[37] SINCO, Philippine Political Law 43-44.
[38] 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
[39] Id. at 330.
[40] Id.
[41] Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006.
[42] Introduction to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission.
[43] BLACK, Constitutional Law 1-2, citing 1 BOUV. INST. 9.
[44] SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.
[45] Proclamation No. 58, 83 O.G. No. 23, pp. 2703-2704, June 8, 1987.
[46] See McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97 (1909).
[47] Id.
[48] 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
[49] Id. at 798.
[50] Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).
[51] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 36.
[52] Id. at 39.
[53] Supra note 38.
[54] McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
[55] Id. at 799.
[56] Supra note 41.
[57] Annex “1363.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[58] Annex “1368.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[59] Annex “1369.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[60] Annex “1370.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[61] Annex “1371.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[62] Annex “1372.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[63] Annex “1374.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[64] Annex “1375.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[65] Annex “1376.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[66] Annex “1377.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[67] Annex “1378.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[68] Annex “1379.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[69] Annex “1380.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[70] Annex “1381.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[71] Annex “1382.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[72] Annex “1383.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[73] Annex “1385.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[74] Annex “1387.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[75] Annex “1388.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[76] Annex “1389.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[77] Annex “1391.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[78] Annex “1392.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[79] Annex “1393.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[80] Annex “1395.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[81] Annex “1396.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[82] Annex “1397.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[83] Annex “1398.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[84] Annex “1399.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[85] Annex “1400.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[86] Annex “1401.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[87] Annex “1402.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[88] Annex “1404.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[89] Annex “1405.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[90] Annex “1406.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[91] Annex “1407.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[92] Annex “1408.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[93] Annex “1409.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[94] Annex “1410.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[95] Annex “1411.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[96] Annex “1412.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[97] Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.
[98] See, for example, Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508.
[99] Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394.
[100] Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.
[101] Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.
[102] Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
[103] Id.
[104] G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.
[105] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 36.
[106] 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
[107] 22 Minn. 400 (1876).
[108] 96 S.W. 396 (1906).
[109] 63 N.J. Law 289.
[110] 77 Miss. 543 (1900).
[111] Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
[112] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.
[113] COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 56, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
[114] Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).
[115] ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT THE LAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
[116] McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).
[117] McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
[118] Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
[119] 15 N.W. 609 (1883).
[120] Id. at 630.
[121] Petition, pp. 15-20.
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