RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
DISSENTING OPINION
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
“The
people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is
the creature of their will, and lives only by their will. But this
supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake, resides only in the
whole body of the people; not in any subdivision of them.”
-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented
in the persuasive and erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno.
However, I make some additional observations in connection with my
concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987
for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the
truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is
also subordinate – the will of the people. No less than its very
first paragraph, the Preamble,[1] expressly recognizes that the
Constitution
came to be because it was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign
Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in
Article II, Section 1, of the
Constitution
,
which explicitly declares that “[t]he Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.” Thus, the resolution of
the issues and controversies raised by the instant Petition should be
guided accordingly by the foregoing principle.
chan robles virtual law library
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign
people, then, in the event that the people change their will, so must
the
Constitution
be revised or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the
Constitution
inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and embody. The
Constitution
itself, under Article XVII, provides for the means by which the
revision or amendment of the Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the
Constitution
may be made (a) by Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The Congress and
the constitutional convention possess the power to propose amendments
to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply because the
Constitution so provides, but because the sovereign people had chosen
to delegate their inherent right to make such proposals to their
representatives either through Congress or through a constitutional
convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly
empowered by the People Power Revolution of 1986, reserved to
themselves the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative, to wit –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEC. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
chan robles virtual law library
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.[2]
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the
right to amend the Constitution because, as previously discussed, such
right is inherent in them. The section only reduces into writing
this right to initiate amendments to the Constitution where they
collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall
exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b)
supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters
therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no such petition may be
filed within five years after the ratification of the
Constitution
,
and not oftener than once every five years thereafter; and (e) a
delegation to Congress of the authority to provide the formal
requirements and other details for the implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution
through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to
Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution
The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to express
their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready to
listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes
and guarantees the sovereign people’s right to initiative, rather than
limits it. The enabling law which Congress has been tasked to
enact must give life to the said provision and make the exercise of the
right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in
any way that would render the people’s option of resorting to
initiative to amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and
less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to amend
or revise the
Constitution In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the
Constitution
,
the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to
the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the
instant Petitions, and which has led me to the conclusions, in support
of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The Commission on Election
(COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed
by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado; (b) The
Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in Santiago v. Commission on Elections;[3] (c) It is the sovereign people’s inherent right to propose changes to the
Constitution
,
regardless of whether they constitute merely amendments or a total
revision thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino
and Aumentado’s petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the oppositors
before this Court.
I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it
summarily dismissed Lambino and Aumentado’s petition for initiative
entirely on the basis of the Santiago case which, allegedly,
permanently enjoined it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a
sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in
earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this Court
against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed
by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative
to amend the Constitution.
The Conclusion[4] in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be
given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to
provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that
system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) DECLARING
R. A. No. 6735
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
chan robles virtual law library
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996
is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED
as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court
made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18
December 1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people’s
initiative.[5] It was this restraining order, more particularly
the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was
expressly made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that
the COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado’s
petition for initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to the
first paragraph of the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first
and second paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive
portion, merely express the opinion of the ponente; while the definite
orders of the Court for implementation are found in the dispositive
portion.
We have previously held that –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion or
the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and
which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the
decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi
for such a resolution. Where there is conflict between the dispositive
part and the opinion of the court contained in the text of the
decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that
the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely
a statement ordering nothing. Hence execution must conform more
particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of
the decision.[6]
Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and
the dispositive portion of the Santiago case? Apparently, there
is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
the enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only
makes permanent the TRO[7] against COMELEC enjoining it from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction
contemplated in the Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited to
the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of
the Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo
should be
controlling. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado’s petition for
initiative on the basis of this Court’s Resolution, dated 23 September
1997, in the case of People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission on Elections, et al.[8] The
Court therein found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution for it only complied with the Decision in the Santiago
case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA
Petition on the basis of res judicata because PIRMA participated in the
proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of and, thus, must be
bound by the judgment of the Court therein. As explained by
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to
the Resolution in the PIRMA case –
chan robles virtual law library
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the
pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19
March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is
substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the
roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet
not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly,
the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as “a non-stock,
non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,” with “ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA” as among its “officers.” In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were
made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the
body of the petition therein, “proposes to undertake the signature
drive for a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.” In
Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding
members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly
represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC.
In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged
in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for
People’s Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was
noted that said movement was “[l]ater identified as the People’s
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for
brevity.” In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSA’S did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by
their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had
joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the
principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.[9]
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata,
the same cannot be said to the Petition at bar. Res judicata is
an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its
requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.[10]
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present
herein, the last has not been complied with. Undoubtedly, the
Santiago case and the present Petition involve different parties,
subject matter, and causes of action, and the former should not bar the
latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution was filed by Delfin alone. His petition does not
qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can acquire
jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required number of registered
voters, and actually imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering
the voters’ signatures. In the case before us, the petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed
their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Their
petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation;
and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty
nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC of
the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to
express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution, the personalities concerned and the
other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases differ.
Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs sought by the
parties from the COMELEC, as well as from this Court.
chan robles virtual law library
For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative
filed by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord
due course to a petition which on its face complies with the rudiments
of the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily dismissing
the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The haste by which the
instant Petition was struck down is characteristic of bad faith, which,
to my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of COMELEC’s positive
duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and
responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought
protection and justification for its craven decision in the supposed
permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the Santiago
case. The COMELEC had seemingly expanded the scope and
application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more than
what it actually states, which is surprising, considering that the
Chairman and majority of the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should
be able to understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal
consequences and intricacies of the pronouncements made by the Court in
the Santiago case and the permanent injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of
Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon the COMELEC the mandate to set a
date for plebiscite after a positive determination of the sufficiency
of a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, viz –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 4. x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition.
As a rule, the word “shall” commonly denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and that the
presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is mandatory.[11]
Under the above-quoted constitutional provision, it is the mandatory or
imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency
of the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in case such petition is
found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the
proposed amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after its certification.
The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate
under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the
summary dismissal of the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million signatures of
registered voters. Should all of these signatures be authentic
and representative of the required percentages of registered voters for
every legislative district and the whole nation, then the initiative is
a true and legitimate expression of the will of the people to amend the
Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing
their voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements
made by the Court in its Decision in the Santiago case, especially as
regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No.
6735 as the enabling law for the implementation of the people’s right
to initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that
Republic Act No. 6735
is insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to more questions
rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a
judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for
insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a
declaration thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the
ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in
his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of
R. A. No. 6735
relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the
“completeness and sufficient standard tests” with respect to
permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate
legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in
Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of
R. A. No. 6735
was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that
Republic Act No. 6735
was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical declaration
therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The express
finding that
Republic Act No. 6735
is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate opinion of former
Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not
concurred in by the other members of the Court.
Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient and inadequate, is already
tantamount to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, it
was rendered in violation of established rules in statutory
construction, which state that –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court does not decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be
lis mota presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority,
152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided
the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition for the simple reason that it
does not constitute an initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could
acquire jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735
has not been adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the way
Republic Act No. 6735
was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by
Congress. The dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in
the Santiago case reveal the other side to the argument, adopting the
more liberal interpretation that would allow the Court to sustain the
constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735
It would seem that the majority in the Santiago case failed to heed the
rule that all presumptions should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute.
The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its
Decision in the Santiago case and again open to judicial review the
constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735
;
in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality,
having satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests
for the valid delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in
the conclusion made by Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting
opinion[12] in the Santiago case, that reads –
R. A. No. 6735
sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC
in promulgating the law’s implementing rules and regulations of the
law. As aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the law;
viz: “The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act
is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.” Spread out all
over
R. A. No. 6735
are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law
states the number of signatures necessary to start a people’s
initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, what the
COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a
proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the
amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any
initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on
the difference between an “amendment” and a “revision” of the
Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my additional thoughts
on the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado’s petition for initiative argue
that the proposed changes therein to the provisions of the Constitution
already amount to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done
through people’s initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution on people’s initiative refers only to proposals for
amendments to the Constitution. They assert the traditional
distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment
referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a
revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.[13]
However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no
quantitative or qualitative test that can establish with definiteness
the distinction between an amendment and a revision, or between a
substantial and simple change of the Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado’s
petition for initiative basically affect only Article VI on the
Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive
Department. While the proposed changes will drastically alter the
constitution of our government by vesting both legislative and
executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with the President as the
Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive power;
they would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the
Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by the oppositors to
the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the
nominal substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for
Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As eloquently pointed
out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the changes proposed to transform
our form of government from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of
our state as a democratic and republican state. It will still be
a representative government where officials continue to be accountable
to the people and the people maintain control over the government
through the election of members of the Parliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial
portion or even the whole of the Constitution, what or who is to stop
them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it
is worded, refers only to their right to initiative on amendments of
the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
who, according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution to amendments? This Court which has
the jurisdiction to interpret the provision? Bearing in
mind my earlier declaration that the will of the sovereign people is
supreme, there is nothing or no one that can preclude them from
initiating changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so.
To reiterate, the Constitution is supposed to be the expression and
embodiment of the people’s will, and should the people’s will clamor
for a revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should
prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987
Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it is
worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people of
their inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such change
would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for
their actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation
of the limitation which the said provision imposes upon it. It is
the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the
Constitution, regardless of the extent thereof.
IV
Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due
course to and take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado’s petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution. I reiterate that it would
be a greater evil if one such petition which is ostensibly supported by
the required number of registered voters all over the country, be
summarily dismissed.
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not
necessarily mean that the same would be found sufficient and set for
plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of reviewing the
petition to determine whether it complies with the requirements for a
valid exercise of the right to initiative. Questions raised by
the oppositors to the petition, such as those on the authenticity of
the registered voters’ signatures or compliance with the requisite
number of registered voters for every legislative district, are already
factual in nature and require the reception and evaluation of evidence
of the parties. Such questions are best presented and resolved
before the COMELEC since this Court is not a trier of facts.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denying due course to the Petition for
Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set aside for
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for
further proceedings.
In short, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[1] The full text of the Preamble reads:cralaw:red
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government
that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace,
do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
[2] Article XVII, Constitution.
[3]
G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[4] Id. at 157.
[5] Id. at 124.
[6]
Olac v. Rivera, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321,
328-329; See also the more recent cases of Republic v. Nolasco, G.R.
No. 155108, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400; and PH Credit Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821 (2001).
[7] Supra note 2 at 124.
[8] G.R. No. 129754.
[9]
Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to the
Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in G.R. No. 129754, PIRMA v.
COMELEC, pp. 2-3.
[10]
Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650 (1999).
[11]
Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, 16 October
1997.
[12] Santiago v. Comelec, supra note 2 at 170-171.
[13]
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 352.
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