RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952  REGISTERED VOTERS,                   Petitioners,

              - versus -         
                                                         

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,                                              Respondent.                 x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,                                                Intervenor.                 x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,                                         Intervenor. x-------------------------------------------x

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson, Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its  Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights,                                                                     Intervenors. x--------------------------------------------------------------x

 

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,                           Intervenor. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,                                          Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS  ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA  A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,                                                                       Petitioners, x---------------------------------------------------------------x

                         
                           -versus-                          

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN  S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners  RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,                                                                                     Respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 




 
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills.  At the crux of the controversy is the critical understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional principles — “the Philippines is a democratic and republican State.  Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”[2]  Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected with deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears.  In 1996, the Movement for People’s Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people’s power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.  Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition).  It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for all elective officials.

The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and time therefor and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time.  The petition prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the purpose.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin Petition.  They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative may only be implemented by a law passed by Congress;  that no such law has yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the Constitution was concerned.  The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on Elections.[3]

Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.    chan robles virtual law library

On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition.  The Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-executory.  An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of the people’s right.  Examining the provisions of R. A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,”[4] and thus voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.  It was also held that even if R. A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should still be dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law.  Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R. A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein.  The Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of voters.  The decision stated:


Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.

While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation[6] agreed that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R. A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to implement the people’s right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right.  Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R. A. 6735.

The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court’s decision.

After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)[7] of the eight (8) majority members maintained their position that R. A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R. A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution.  Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same.  Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication.  The motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.[8]

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition).  The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R. A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission;  and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:     

Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?

The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.

PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative.  PIRMA argued that the Court’s decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions.  PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.

The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997.  It explained:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R. A. 6735.  On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up.  Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose.  Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-examination x x x x[9]

In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.

Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.

On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country through charter change.  They proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:


Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:

Abstract:  Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?

The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials.  Copies of the draft petition for initiative containing the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.  

Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution.  Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for signing.

The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on the voters’ registration record.  Upon completion of the verification process, the respective local election officers issued certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified.  The verified signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the signatures.

On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled “In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People’s Initiative:  A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System.”  They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people.  They alleged that they were filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto.  Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.

As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people’s exercise of the power.  Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:


Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.       

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative.  It cited this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC[11] permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite.  They state the following grounds in support of the petition:


The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.

The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.

The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention.  All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.chan robles virtual law library

The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare decisis;  that there is no sufficient law providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution;  that the proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments;  that the petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;  that it was not shown that the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was;  that the verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court’s resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition.  Affirming the position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution;  (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;  and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the petition for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.

The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution.  It invoked the permanent injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress.  It asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.

On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case.  The parties were required to argue on the following issues:[13]


With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:


Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.

Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.

The argument deserves scant attention.  The Constitution requires that the petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.  The petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to support the filing of said petition.  Stated above their signatures in the signature sheets is the following:


There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.

Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court.  Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus.  Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:


Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court.  Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.


The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.”  The doctrine started with the English Courts.[15]  Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.”[16]  As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable;” (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.”[17]

The doctrine migrated to the United States.  It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.[18]   According to Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent “arbitrary discretion in the courts.”[19]  Madison agreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.”[20]  Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.”[21]  He added that their ideas “reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction.  It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.”[22]

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy’s observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States.  Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.[23]  The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts.  The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents.  Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.[24]  Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.[25]  Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes.  The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.  Justice Brandeis’ view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today.  In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.  The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.  Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.”[26]  In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.”[27]  In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.”[28]  This stance reflects both respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,[29] viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.  Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where[30] (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.[31]  The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education[32] which junked Plessy v. Ferguson’s[33] “separate but equal doctrine.”  Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation.  In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that “separate . . . is inherently unequal.”  Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality.  In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare.  In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[34] we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.  Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[35] we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings.  These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact.  In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.[36]

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.[37]  It established a 4-pronged test.  The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of Santiago.  On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules.  The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet.  It improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws.  It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted.  It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions.  The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them.  The end result of the ruling of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.

On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any expectation from the people.  On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by direct action.  Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated.  The case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.

On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked away.  The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is given.  The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people’s initiative.  Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want to amend the Constitution through people’s initiative and that their signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC.  The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates.  New developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of the Santiago case.  The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.


A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the people’s initiative.

Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through initiative.

When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators.  In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action.  This all-important intent is palpable from the following:

First.  The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate changes to the Constitution:

The policy statement declares:


It defines “initiative” as “the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose,” and “plebiscite” as “the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.”

It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:


It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that “(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.”

Second.  The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to implement people’s initiative.  No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:[40]

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.  The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x  The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives.  This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

Third.  The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent.  In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can propose amendments to the Constitution.  We quote his relevant remarks:[41]