RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
DISSENTING OPINION
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
PUNO, J.:
“It is a Constitution we are expounding…”[1]
– Chief Justice John Marshall
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of
the controversy is the critical understanding of the first and foremost
of our constitutional principles — “the Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.”[2] Constitutionalism
dictates that this creed must be respected with deeds; our belief in
its validity must be backed by behavior.
This is a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus
to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for
Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered
voters who have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the
date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments
to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996,
the Movement for People’s Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign
people’s power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution
Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on
December 6, 1996, a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin
Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,
Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for all
elective officials.
The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first
be submitted to the people and would be formally filed with the COMELEC
after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters in the country. It thus sought the
assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by
fixing the dates and time therefor and setting up signature stations on
the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC
issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering
all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the
petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation;
and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the
regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in
establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the
purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for
prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from
further considering the Delfin Petition. They impleaded as
respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
(Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the People’s
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was
likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to
amend the
ConstitutionThey argued that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative
may only be implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such
law has yet been enacted by Congress; that
Republic Act No. 6735
relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend the
Constitution
;
and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by
the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as
the initiative to amend the Constitution was concerned. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on
Elections.[3]
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
chan robles virtual law library
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for
prohibition. The Court ruled that the constitutional provision
granting the people the power to directly amend the
Constitution
through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling law is
necessary to implement the exercise of the people’s right.
Examining the provisions of
R. A. 6735
,
a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was
“incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution
is concerned,”[4] and thus voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that even if
R. A. 6735
sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should still
be dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated
by law. Under Section 2, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
and Section 5(b) of
R. A. 6735
,
a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at
least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district is represented by at least three
per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of
voters. The decision stated:cralaw:red
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should
be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it
should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress
should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional
mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) DECLARING
R. A. 6735
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300
of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED as against private respondents.[5]
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and
Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue
N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and
Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the
deliberation[6] agreed that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for
lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate
Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo
J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that
R. A. 6735
was sufficient and adequate to implement the people’s right to amend
the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such
right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the
Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the
Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law
on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of
R. A. 6735
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court’s decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)[7] of
the eight (8) majority members maintained their position that
R. A. 6735
was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition,
while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the
position of the minority that
R. A. 6735
sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution.
Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in
the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and
Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan
voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members,
namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima
and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained
his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial
adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore
denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse the decision
of March 19, 1997.[8]
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA
Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5)
million signatures in compliance with
R. A. 6735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among
others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation;
(2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in
support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and
(3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition
would be submitted to the people for
ratification: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President
the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the
Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can
serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the
term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving
Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose,
Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8
of Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari
seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for
initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court’s decision on the Delfin
Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as
said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the
motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of
parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also
urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It explained:cralaw:red
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it
only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to
resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the
Court re-examine its ruling as regards
R. A. 6735
On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second
issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that
purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a
need for such a re-examination x x x x[9]
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and
Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the
ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to
utilize anew the system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this
time to change the form of government from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of
Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide
drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the
parliamentary form of government in the country through charter
change. They proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:cralaw:red
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:cralaw:red
Section 1. (1)
The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be
provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative
districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per
district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least
one member.
(2) Each Member of
Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his
district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by
the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without
limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list
system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be
equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the
parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2,
3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to
read, as follows:cralaw:red
Section 1. There shall
be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of
all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He
shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose
of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a
unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new
Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory Provisions,” which shall read, as
follows:cralaw:red
Section 1. (1)
The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and
shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution
unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the
interim parliament.
(2) In case of death,
permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President,
the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted,
all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary
form of government; provided, however, that any and all references
therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives” and “Houses
of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament;” that any and all
references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,” “Senator(s)” or
“Member(s) of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as
“Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President”
and/or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted,
all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be
inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any all references therein to
“Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives” and “Houses of
Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament;” that any and all
references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,” “Senator(s)” or
“Member(s) of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as
“Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President”
and or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the
ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and
the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive
departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice
President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of
the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the
cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the
interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election
of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been
elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament
from among themselves.
chan robles virtual law library
(3) Senators whose term
of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) Within forty-five
days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is
the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by
a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime
Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent
President.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) The interim
Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election
of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of
the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.[10]
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of
which were written the abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:cralaw:red
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII
of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the
present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and
economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated
non-government organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well
as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for
initiative containing the proposition were also circulated to the local
officials and multi-sectoral groups. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which
culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and
explain to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution.
Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers
for verification based on the voters’ registration record. Upon
completion of the verification process, the respective local election
officers issued certifications to attest that the signature sheets have
been verified. The verified signature sheets were subsequently
transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the
signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the
Constitution entitled “In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the
1987 Constitution through a People’s Initiative: A Shift from a
Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by
Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for
the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary
System.” They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to
reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented
to the people. They alleged that they were filing the petition in
their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters
who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached
thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets
bearing the signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have
been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers,
and allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all
registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered
voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners
averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A.
6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people’s exercise of
the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an
Order:cralaw:red
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than
sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC
of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to
express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to
the petition for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S.
Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr.,
Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.,
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio
Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives
Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia
Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops
Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of
Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago
and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador,
and Randall C. Tabayoyong. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for
Initiative. It cited this Court’s ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC[11] permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the August 31,
2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply
with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of
the plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of
the petition:cralaw:red
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due
course to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago
ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration
and final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to
declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and
insufficient in standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act
No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the COMELEC provide for
sufficient details and authority for the exercise of people’s
initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and
complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing
to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an
express constitutional mandate and disregarding and contravening the
will of the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law,
respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the sovereign people and
must accordingly act on the petition for initiative.
1. The framers of the Constitution intended to give
the people the power to propose amendments and the people themselves
are now giving vibrant life to this constitutional provision.
2. Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March
1997, the right of the people to exercise the sovereign power of
initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.
3. The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a
political question which shall be determined solely by the sovereign
people.
4. By signing the signature sheets attached to the
petition for initiative duly verified by the election officers, the
people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign
power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the Delfin petition.
1. It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not
other statements in the body of the decision that governs the rights in
controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a duty mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for plebiscite.[12]
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene
B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V.
Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela,
Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students,
Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald
Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators
Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo
M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada;
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana
Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L.
Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and
filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C.
Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.,
Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate
of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr.,
also filed their respective motions for intervention and
Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement
Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya,
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F.
Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a
Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were
granted by the Court.
chan robles virtual law library
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition
for initiative as it merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the
principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law
providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution; that the proposed
changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere
amendments; that the petition for initiative does not meet the
required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have
been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between
the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to
the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the
verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the
signatures attached to the petition for initiative; and that
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent
the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the
Court’s resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the
petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners, the OSG
prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render judgment:
(1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably
sufficient to implement the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for
subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments
to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of
the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing
the COMELEC to grant the petition for initiative and set the
corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying
the petition for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago
v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement
the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the
Constitution. It invoked the permanent injunction issued by the
Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law
shall have been passed by Congress. It asserted that the
permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all
other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on the following issues:[13]
1. Whether petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition
in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the
proposal to amend the Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the
Commission on Elections complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the Court’s decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no sufficient law implementing or
authorizing the exercise of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the
Petitions for Initiative filed with the COMELEC have complied with its
provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a political question to be determined
solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before
it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:cralaw:red
I
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the
present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who
allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado
are not the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were
not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires
that the petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per
cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the
registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by
Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous
signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories
to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their
signatures in the signature sheets is the following:cralaw:red
x x x My signature herein
which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.[14]
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to
execute separate documents to authorize petitioners to file the
petition for initiative in their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and
Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this
Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who
may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3
of Rule 65 read:cralaw:red
Section 1. Petition
for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent
tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or
mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and
Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for initiative
dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at
bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm.” The doctrine started with the
English Courts.[15] Blackstone observed that at the beginning of
the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation.”[16]
As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized:
(1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable;” (2)
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and,
(3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used
to reach the decision.”[17]
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by
the framers of the U.S. Constitution.[18] According to
Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent
“arbitrary discretion in the courts.”[19] Madison agreed but
stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of
altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.”[20] Prof.
Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to
abandon a precedent.”[21] He added that their ideas “reveal a
deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of
law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this
internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for
over two centuries.”[22]
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy’s observation although stare decisis developed its own life in
the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars.[23] The first, known as vertical
stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the
decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts.
The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts
must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes
that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice
but not a command.[24] Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis.[25] Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis’ view on
the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare
decisis is not.a universal and inexorable command. The rule
of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed
or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which is again called upon to consider a question once
decided.”[26] In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.”[27] In
contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation
of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a
statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been
drafted by the Congress itself.”[28] This stance reflects both
respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons,[29] viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it
promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where[30] (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social
and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist
judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow
the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192
cases.[31] The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board
of Education[32] which junked Plessy v. Ferguson’s[33] “separate but
equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In
Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that “separate.is
inherently unequal.” Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of
stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from
the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court
has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in
order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[34] we reversed our original ruling that
certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[35] we overturned our
first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will
show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in
fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following
determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and
its merits.[36]
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.[37] It established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule
is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so
far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or
come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should
not bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of
intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be
insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its
implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is an
intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet.
It improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws.
It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws
implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted. It is
elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing
good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate
decisions. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this
Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts
can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of
the ruling of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is
intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the people
to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in
Santiago did not induce any expectation from the people. On the
contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could
amend the Constitution by direct action. Moreover, reliance is a
non-factor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in
decisions involving contracts where private rights are
adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the
sovereignty of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on
ground cannot be blinked away. The urgent need to adjust certain
provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in
the new millennium is given. The only point of contention is the
mode to effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly,
constitutional convention or people’s initiative. Petitioners
claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered voters
who want to amend the Constitution through people’s initiative and that
their signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC.
The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to
implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution
through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who
are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government
authority emanates. New developments in our internal and external
social, economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of
the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this
Court to allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the people’s initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that
R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be
directly proposed by the people through initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to
give life to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it
is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement
the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent is
palpable from the following:cralaw:red
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the
right of the people to initiate changes to the Constitution:cralaw:red
The policy statement declares:cralaw:red
Sec. 2. Statement of
Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act
is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines “initiative” as “the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose,” and “plebiscite” as “the
electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:cralaw:red
(1) That “(a) petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;”[38] and
(2) That “(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised
only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.”[39]
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which
provides that “(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the
clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to implement
people’s initiative. No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:[40]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to
cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The
Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x
x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill
No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735
similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his
sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the
House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative as a
mode whereby the people can propose amendments to the
Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:[41]
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the
committee, we wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497,
entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on
may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional
basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary legislative power
upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions,
Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere.
This was a citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution
saw the application of the principle of separation of powers. While
under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle
remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973
Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative
power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that he
Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in
its citizens participating through the right of suffrage and indicating
thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still
preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize direct action of
the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a practical
recognition of what we refer to as people’s sovereign power. This
is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:cralaw:red
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved legislative
power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution provides, and I quote:cralaw:red
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed
by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, or which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI
which describes legislative power, there are reserved powers given to
the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at
the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and initiative. We
are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress
with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution
is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on
amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
chan robles virtual law library
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the
duty to implement the exercise by the people of the right of initiative
and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is
the response to such a constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum under Philippine law has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not
new. In a very limited extent, the system is provided for in our
Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section
99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to
initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports
of the sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative
and referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of all persons who
have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six months, who
are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided in
Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent
quotations but will just submit the same to the Secretary to be
incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are
extensively applied by the Local Government Code as it is now mandated
by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples
of initiative and referendum similar to what is now contained in House
Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill No.
21505, the various constitutions of the states in the United States
recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of
any statute or to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a
referendum. These states are Alaska, Alabama, Montana,
Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other
states.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which
initiative and referendum applies is also without ay limitation, except
for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b)
of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing
of the petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of supporters
to present a proposition to submission to electors – is substantially
similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among
us who may have been in the United States, particularly in California,
during election time or last November during the election would have
noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They
were propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during the
voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure,
initiative and referendum is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various
consolidated bills is patterned after American experience in a great
respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow
me to try to bring our colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has
basically only 12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr.
Speaker, saw this system of initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the
needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since
we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass
this bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would
not be an appropriate term to use at this time, and surely it is not
the case although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt
necessity of our times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the
soonest possible time to spur economic development, safeguard
individual rights and liberties, and share governmental power with the
people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone,
together with the Senators when they are minded to agree with us, are
left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined.
Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It means that the
people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration
and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of
initiative. One is an initiative to amend the Constitution. This
can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative to
amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill been an
existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming
majority of the barangays in the Philippines would have approved by
initiative the matter of direct voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a
petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or
barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it must
be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a
definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and
regulations to give teeth to the power of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of
the people to approve or reject something that Congress has already
approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities
or the barangays into two or three, we must first get the consent of
the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker.
However, referendum can also be petitioned by the people if, for
instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is
approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already
become a law, then the people could petition that a referendum be
conducted so that the acts of Congress can be appropriately approved or
rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the
petition. As envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from
the people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a
proposition so that the people can then submit a petition, which is a
piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in
the example I have been citing is whether there should be direct
elections during the barangay elections. So the petition must be
filed in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be clear
stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have
direct democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker.
It will not be all that easy to have referendum or initiative
petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee
report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to
exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters
thereof, shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are
not taken from the air. They are mandated by the
Constitution. There must be a requirement of 10 percent for
ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all districts. The same
requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied
to the different sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition
on initiative or referendum for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a
certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is
for a district, there is also a certain number required of all towns of
the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a province
then again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is
required. All these are based with reference to the
constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be
supervised and shall be upon the call of the Commission on
Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of
the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the
petition, publish the same and set the date of the referendum which
shall not be earlier than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the
determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the
petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must
first be determined by the commission as to its sufficiency because our
Constitution requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains
one subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an
initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than two
topics sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact,
that is one of the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative
bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum is approved by
the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15
days following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do
is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino
people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House,
cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for initiative and
referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is
past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had
already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have
enough time this year at least to respond to the need of our people to
participate directly in the work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our
colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee
Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared
text of my speech, together with the footnotes since they contain many
references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced
as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the
sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador Escudero III,
viz:[42]
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent
years highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the people for a truly
popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who
actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of whom
are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of
the population feel increasingly that under the system, the people have
the form but not the reality or substance of democracy because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives to many
questions vitally affecting their lives. There have been
complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge
their campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986
Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a
means whereby the people can exercise the reserve power to legislate or
propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case their chose
Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That reserve
power known as initiative is explicitly recognized in three articles
and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section
1; the same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article
XVII, Section 2. May I request that he explicit provisions of
these three articles and four sections be made part of my sponsorship
speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not
self-executory. There is a need for an implementing law that will give
meaning and substance to the process of initiative and referendum
which are considered valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It
is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably
open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure
groups, vested interests, farmers’ group, labor groups, urban dwellers,
the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we
consider that through this bill we can hasten the politization of the
Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened
public opinion, and hopefully produce better and more responsive and
acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the
parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented groups an
opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum,
thus, the competition which they will offer to Congress will hopefully
be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are
common interests dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side’s
competitive goals can still take place in an atmosphere of reason and
moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished
Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our
respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill
would be approved early enough so that our people could immediately use
the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off
point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee
on Local Government, it took sometime before the committee could act on
these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay
naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my dear colleagues,
could be one of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal and
political consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore
respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for
the “[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as legislated and when
possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its
language, purpose and history.”[43]
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices,
nevertheless, ruled that “x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned” for the
following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the
Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on
the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for
initiative on the Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to
throttle the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution
through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative
policy for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by
direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted
certain details in implementing the people’s initiative in R.A. 6735,
does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is
insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not
fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined.
Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can
be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1),
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized by
this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking
it down as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due
recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend
the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and can be undertaken through people’s initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of people’s initiative to
amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the
changes proposed by petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a
revision which cannot be done through people’s initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from
proposing substantial amendments amounting to revision, the
oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations during the
Constitutional Commission, viz:[44]
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x
This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments
this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending
the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt
that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
x x x
x
x x x
x
x x x x
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting
an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section
1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:[45]
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of
the people, by initiative, to submit a proposal for amendment only, not
for revision, only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner
Davide’s proposed amendment on line 1 refers to “amendment.” Does
it cover the word “revision” as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words “amendments” and “revision?”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because “amendments” and
“revision” should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to “amendments” not
“revision.”
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also clarified this point[46] -
MR. OPLE. To more
closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to
“Amendments” “OR REVISIONS OF” to read: “Amendments OR REVISION
OF this Constitution.”
chan robles virtual law library
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals,
petitioners will “change the very system of government from
presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from
bicameral to unicameral,” among others. They allegedly seek other
major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants
per district, a change in the period for a term of a Member of
Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the
election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive power,
and so on and so forth.[47] In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit
that “the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in
the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties
of the branches of the government, the political rights of the people,
and the modes by which political rights may be exercised.”[48]
They conclude that they are substantial amendments which cannot be done
through people’s initiative. In other words, they posit the
thesis that only simple but not substantial amendments can be done
through people’s initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words “simple”
and “substantial” are not subject to any accurate quantitative or
qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test,
oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some
one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same
test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners seek to change
basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for
a smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a
parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National
Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), III
(Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial
Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI
(Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National Economy and
Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education,
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family),
XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or
Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple
arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are “simple” or
“substantial.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to
determine whether the said changes are “simple” or “substantial” as to
amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded
political scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should
contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of
liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and
imposes certain limitations on the powers of the government as a means
of securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of
government which deals with the framework of government and its powers,
laying down certain rules for its administration and defining the
electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the
mode or procedure for amending or revising the constitution.[49]
It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the
constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will
not change the fundamental nature of our state as “x x x a democratic
and republican state.”[50] It is self-evident that a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any
less democratic or any less republican in character. Hence,
neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of
whether the proposed changes are “simple” or “substantial.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any
quantitative or qualitative test to determine whether an “amendment” is
“simple” or “substantial.” Nor did they provide that “substantial”
amendments are beyond the power of the people to propose to change the
Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional
distinction between “amendment” and “revision,” i.e., “amendment” means
change, including complex changes while “revision” means complete
change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The
legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between
“amendment” and “revision.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“amendment” as “[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made to a
statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument;
specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or
correction.”[51] Black’s also refers to “amendment” as “the
process of making such a revision.”[52] Revision, on the other
hand, is defined as “[a] reexamination or careful review for correction
or improvement.”[53] In parliamentary law, it is described as
“[a] general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which
the entire document is open to amendment.”[54] Similarly, Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary defines “amendment” – as “[a] correction or
revision of a writing to correct errors or better to state its intended
purpose”[55] and “amendment of constitution” as “[a] process of
proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x
constitution.”[56] In contrast, “revision,” when applied to a
statute (or constitution), “contemplates the re-examination of the same
subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the
substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect
rule.”[57]
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we
owe a lot of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, (later President of the
U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly
spelled out the difference between “amendment” and “revision.” He
opined: “the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to
a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for
effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular
provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.”[58]
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they
effected changes in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the
changes to the 1935 Constitution which included the conversion from a
unicameral system to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the
tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year term without
reelection to a four-year term with one reelection, and the
establishment of the COMELEC, together with the complementary
constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were considered
amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was,
however, considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was “a
completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and
economic concepts.”[59] Among those adopted under the 1973
Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the
presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and
administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet; the
reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the
two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system
of government; the enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18)
years of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy,
property, and other substantial requirements to widen the basis for the
electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary,
the civil service system, and the Commission on Elections; the complete
nationalization of the ownership and management of mass media; the
giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the
prohibition against alien individuals to own educational institutions,
and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the
conditions of the masses.[60]
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes
in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant innovations
introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang
Pambansa, in place of the interim National Assembly, and (2)
Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to issue
decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang
Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or
threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of
instruction to form part of the law of the land. In 1980, the
retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was
restored. In 1981, the presidential system with parliamentary
features was installed. The transfer of private land for use as
residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was
also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang
Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro
Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was
created while the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land
reform and social housing programs were strengthened.[61] These
substantial changes were simply considered as mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated
the 1973 Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No.
3, known as the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a
plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or Freedom
Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the
outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of
eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions
of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the
original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been
restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the
Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of
the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for
appointment thereto and an increase in its authority, which now covers
even political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. While
many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like those on
the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new
1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment
and revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged
that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to
Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional
Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of
the same Article, it is said, limited the people’s right to change the
Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In other
words, the people cannot propose substantial amendments amounting to
revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the
oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely on the
opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on
how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987
Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in
a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue,
are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an
unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution
derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the
convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and
adopted it.[62] “Debates in the constitutional convention ‘are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law.’”[63] Indeed, a careful perusal of the
debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the
conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction
between “amendment” and “revision.” For during the debates, some
of the commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former
Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,[64]
that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and
revision, thus:[65]
MR. SUAREZ: We
mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
“amendment.” However, the Committee finally agreed to use the
terms – “amendment” or “revision” when our attention was called by the
honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the
connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result
of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous –
or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered
by Honorable Justice Makasiar,[66] wherein he made the following
distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of an existing
Constitution: “Revision” may involve a rewriting of the whole
Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a
constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The
intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the
addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two
terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing
amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
To further explain “revision,” former Justice Antonio, in his
concurring opinion, used an analogy – “When a house is completely
demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a
changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house?
Some of the material contained in the old house may be used again, some
of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the
fact that you have altogether another or a new house.”[67]
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution
used the word “revision,” they had in mind the “rewriting of the whole
Constitution,” or the “total overhaul of the Constitution.”
Anything less is an “amendment” or just “a change of specific
provisions only,” the intention being “not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the
addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.” Under this view,
“substantial” amendments are still “amendments” and thus can be
proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of
the Commissioners on the difference between “simple” and “substantial”
amendments or whether “substantial” amendments amounting to revision
are covered by people’s initiative, it behooves us to follow the
cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to
give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The
illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz:[68]
x x x the constitution does
not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the
people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the
people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark
or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have
accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding,
and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense
designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less
conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are
legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since
in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while
in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussion and deliberations of their
representatives. The history of the calling of the convention,
the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the
people at the time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be
quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered form
the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or
technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to
accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great
principles of government – not to defeat them.[69] One of these
great principles is the sovereignty of the people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted
initiative as a mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start
with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco
describes as “the basic political creed of the nation”[70] as it “lays
down the policies that government is bound to observe.”[71]
Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article
II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that “the Philippines is
a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.” In a republican state,
the power of the sovereign people is exercised and delegated to their
representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v.
Paredes, this Court held that “a republican state, like the Philippines
x x x (is) derived from the will of the people themselves in freely
creating a government ‘of the people, by the people, and for the
people’ – a representative government through which they have agreed to
exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for
the common good and general welfare.”[72]
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated
to Congress or to a convention, the power to amend or revise our
fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated power to
amend or revise the Constitution was abused particularly during the
Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed several times to satisfy
the power requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was
passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from
above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime through an
extra constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the
people. A main reason for the people’s revolution was the failure
of the representatives of the people to effectuate timely changes in
the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by
calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of
the people defaulted in using this last peaceful process of
constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in
their own hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution
with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the
1987 Constitution as it stressed the power of the people to act
directly in their capacity as sovereign people. Correspondingly,
the power of the legislators to act as representatives of the people in
the matter of amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for
the spring cannot rise above its source. To reflect this
significant shift, Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution was
reworded. It now reads: “the Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.” The commissioners of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word
“democratic,” in our first Declaration of Principles, viz:cralaw:red
MR. NOLLEDO. I am
putting the word “democratic” because of the provisions that we are now
adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For
example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the
people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that
recognize the validity of interference by the people through people’s
organizations x x x x[73]
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word
“democratic” to “republican,” and, therefore, the first sentence
states: “The Philippines is a republican and democratic state x x
x x
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word
“democratic” to “republican”? The constitutional framers of the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with “republican.” Was
this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
chan robles virtual law library
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x “democratic” was added because of
the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the
Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people’s
organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the
participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances x
x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid,
“democracy” here is understood as participatory democracy. [74]
(emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:[75]
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old
formulation under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words
“republican state” because “republican state” would refer to a
democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept “republican
state,” we are stressing the participation of the people x x x x So the
word “republican” will suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right.
However, the committee felt that in view of the introduction of the
aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall,
it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism,
of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word
“democratic” to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are
instances where the people would act directly, and not through their
representatives. (emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of
initiative, referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in the
1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced
the provision on people’s initiative said:[76]
MR. OPLE. x x x x I
think this is just the correct time in history when we should introduce
an innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting
in the people and their organizations the right to formulate and
propose their own amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a
manner that will be binding upon the government. It is not that I
believe this kind of direct action by the people for amending a
constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to
know that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the
people and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose
amendments or revision to the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people’s initiative as a
safety valve, as a peaceful way for the people to change their
Constitution, by citing our experiences under the Marcos government,
viz:[77]
MR. SUAREZ. We agree
to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we are
providing a channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the
people through this initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not
sufficient channel for expression of the will of the people,
particularly in the amendment or revision of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But
we know what happened during the 20 years under the Marcos
administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of
speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the
President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could
not be obtained, we would have to provide for a safety valve in order
that the people could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for
amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the
National Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to
call a constitutional convention, the members thereof would not heed
the people’s desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are
providing for the implementation of what is now popularly known as
people’s power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people’s initiative could avert a revolution, viz:[78]
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x
the amending process of the Constitution could actually avert a
revolution by providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the
Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes
what political law authors call the “prescription of
sovereignty.” (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
which expressed the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments
to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To
that extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the
Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be reminted and now
provides: “The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people
through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the
Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least,
the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the
direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the
sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to
propose “simple” but not “substantial” amendments to the
Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty
should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally
developed in law.[79] Legal sovereignty, he explained, is “the
possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the
legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party
endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not
subject to law ‘for it is the author and source of law.’ Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence.”[80]
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the
supremacy of the people’s will over the state which they themselves
have created. The state is created by and subject to the will of
the people, who are the source of all political power. Rightly,
we have ruled that “the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic
principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and
bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They
knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme,
the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.”[81]
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and
visionary lawyer in the United States in the 1780s, laid down the first
principles of popular sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention of the 1787 Constitution of the United States:[82]
There necessarily exists, in
every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for
that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with
sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our
governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x
x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does
not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people.
As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people
are superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in
this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our
constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis
supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the
people is sovereign - - - not the elected President, not the elected
Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of
the people which is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of
government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In
our case, the people delegated to Congress the exercise of the
sovereign power to amend or revise the Constitution. If Congress,
as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or revise the
Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who delegated
the power has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by
direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this power to
make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate
to Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to
substantially amend the Constitution when by their sovereignty, all
power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo to argue
that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the
point:[83]
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of
sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and agents of
the state which constitute its government, for it is only through this
instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However
ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject
to withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby
says:cralaw:red
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of
government and reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight
and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and
improbable occurrence; yet so long as such right of control is
recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be
founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the
sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they
are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not
political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the
Constitution is shared with the people. We should accord the most
benign treatment to the sovereign power of the
people to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution especially
when the proposed amendments will adversely affect the interest of some
members of Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public
weal to private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate)
to frustrate the power of the people to determine their destiny (the
principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses
acknowledging the right of the people to exercise initiative and
referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor of the
people.[84] Initiative and referendum powers must be broadly
construed to maintain maximum power in the people.[85] We
followed this orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v.
Commission on Elections.[86] There is not an iota of reason to depart
from it.
V
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that “[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of
the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as
expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated
their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely political
question which is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable
Court’s power of judicial review. Whether or not the 1987
Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the
people alone must resolve in their sovereign capacity.”[87] They
argue that “[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a
right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the
determination by the people to exercise their right to propose
amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls
squarely within the ambit of a ‘political question.’”[88]
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:[89]
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of
the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President
that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of
that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his
theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President’s
authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in
the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign
act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process
when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is
indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves
– of course – who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power
which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry
must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to
and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the
requirements for the exercise of the people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by the people “upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.”[90]
Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a
political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be
resolved by the people is addressed to them and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves
contentious issues of fact which should first be resolved by the
COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it
allegedly lacks the required number of signatures under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires that
the petition for initiative be supported by at least twelve per cent
(12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors
contend that no proper verification of signatures was done in several
legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the
names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures
reduces the signatures submitted for their respective legislative
districts to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a
certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo,
Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First and Second District,
Davao City, stating that his office has not verified the signatures
submitted by the proponents of the people’s initiative. The
certification reads:cralaw:red
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District,
Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters as per
documents submitted in this office by the proponents of the People’s
Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER
ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORS used as basis for such verification of
signatures.[91]
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further
clarified that although Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer,
Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later issued
certifications stating that the Office of the City Election Officer has
examined the list of individuals appearing in the signature sheets,[92]
the certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names
of the signatories, but not their signatures.
Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of the
signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to ensure the
identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature
sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners
failed to obtain the signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the
total number of registered voters in the First Legislative District of
South Cotabato. For the First District of South Cotabato,
petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General Santos City, 2,186
signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for Tampakan and 10,301
signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488
registered voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted
to this Court a copy of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election
Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures
from Polomolok were not verified because the Book of Voters for the
whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato.[93]
Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the total number of
signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a
total of 8,676 signatures which falls short of the three per cent (3%)
requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino
likewise submitted to this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin
A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that
the list of names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the
names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have
not actually verified the signatures.[94]
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further
bolstered by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of
similarly worded certifications from the election officers from
Zamboanga del Sur[95] and from Compostela Valley.[96]
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of the
verification process as it alleged that verification in some areas were
conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election
officers. It filed with this Court copies of certifications from
Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification was conducted by
local officials instead of COMELEC personnel.[97]
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification
conducted by the election officers sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of
verification in Davao City and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner
Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the
oppositors-intervenors also issued certifications showing that they
have verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the
people’s initiative. He presented copies of the certifications
issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative
Districts of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the
proponents of the people’s initiative. His certification for the
Second District states:cralaw:red
This is to CERTIFY that this
Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing in the
Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City,
submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay,
Centro, Davao City for verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED
VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.[98]
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory
certification regarding the verification process conducted in Davao
City. It reads:cralaw:red
Regarding the verification
of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has previously
issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of
Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively,
specifically relating to the voters who supported the people’s
initiative. It was stated therein that the names submitted,
comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469
individual voters in the 3rd District, were found [to] be registered
voters of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office
based on the Computerized List of Voters.
It must be clarified that
the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by mistake
for the reason that the signature verification has not been fully
completed as of that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this
Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the
signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures appearing
in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x [99]
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated
May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to
support their claim that said officer had conducted a verification of
signatures in said area. The certification states:cralaw:red
This is to certify further,
that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the
May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for
verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters
as per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to
15.07% of the total number of registered voters of this
Municipality.[100]
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures
in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud and
irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were
cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1)
No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be
concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have
already been submitted to it for “verification.” The camp of
Mayor Binay was able to witness the “verification process” only because
of their pro-active stance;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) In District 1,
the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for
verification. 36,219 alleged voters’ signatures (83% of the number of
signatures submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures
allegedly “passed” COMELEC’s initial scrutiny. However, upon
examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the
said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay
manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word “OK” and 3,443
signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236 “apparently verified
signatures.” Before the COMELEC officer issued the Certification,
Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not less than 55
letters of “signature withdrawal,” but no action was ever taken thereon;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(3) In District 2,
29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged
voters’ signatures (80% of those submitted) were rejected
outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the
COMELEC’s initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon closer
examination;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) In the absence
of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did not
know how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the
camp of Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go
for their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely “listened” to their
objections and other observations. As mentioned earlier, the
COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with the many “letters
of signature withdrawal” submitted to it;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(5) Signatures of
people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the
Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old
alleged signatory;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(7) A Calara M.
Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature
Sheets.[101]
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not
understand what they have signed as they were merely misled into
signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these allegations are
rulings that a person who affixes his signature on a document raises
the presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the
document contains. Courts have recognized that there is great value in
the stability of records, so to speak, that no one should commit
herself or himself to something in writing unless she or he is fully
aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on
him.[102] In the same vein, we have held that a person is
presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has
signed.[103] But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot
resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the
constitutional requirement that the petition for initiative be signed
by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves
contentious facts. Its resolution will require presentation of
evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC according to its
rules. During the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC,
through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it
has not examined the documents submitted by the petitioners in support
of the petition for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the
oppositors to buttress their claim that the required number of
signatures has not been met. The exchanges during the oral
argument likewise clearly show the need for further clarification and
presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.[104]
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for
initiative was this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A.
6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of
the form and substance of the petition. I respectfully submit
that this issue should be properly litigated before the COMELEC where
both parties will be given full opportunity to prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative
and its compliance with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and
its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the
COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by
the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.[105]
VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC
relied on this Court’s ruling in Santiago permanently enjoining it from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC’s reliance on Santiago
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm
doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a
sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision allowing
people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the
records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices[106]
voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices[107]
voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1)
justice[108] abstained from voting on the issue holding that unless and
until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not ripe
for adjudication.[109]
Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the
motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for
Justice Torres inhibited himself.[110] Of the original majority
of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A.
6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally
part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined
the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any
equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:cralaw:red
It is one thing to utter a
happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under fire – to
think for action upon which great interests depend.” So said
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my
concurrence to the holding of the majority that “R.A. No. 6735 is
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation” and now to interpose my dissent thereto.
x x x
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately
providing the legal basis for the exercise by the people of their right
to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to uphold
the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it does not
sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative
proceedings to amend the Constitution without the required names and/or
signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency
of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a
sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and
another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not
ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that
R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that
could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a
deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot
write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the
late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:cralaw:red
As it stands, of the
thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of
whether the motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision
should be granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr.
Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices
Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the motion;
while Justice Vitug “maintained his opinion that the matter was not
ripe for judicial adjudication.” In other words, only five, out
of the other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide’s June 10, 1997
ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its failure to pass
the so called “completeness and sufficiency standards” tests. The
“concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations” which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution
requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not
complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the “majority” was
initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia, the same is
inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the
constitutionally required “majority.” The Court’s declaration,
therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force
necessitating, in my view, the reexamination of the Court’s decision in
G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the Court “not to tarry any longer”
nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No.
129754) to relieve the Court’s pronouncement from constitutional
infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a
precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in
the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an
authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or
in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,[111] which
was a habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner’s
state court conviction was not an “actual adjudication” barring
subsequent consideration by the district court on habeas corpus.
In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal division ruling, the
Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition
“affirmed by an equally divided Court:”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition
“affirmed by an equally divided Court.” On what was apparently
the first occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6
L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point of division
without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a
similar division during the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief
Justice Marshall explaining that “the principles of law which have been
argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court
being divided in opinion upon it.” Etting v. Bank of United
States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later
elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks
the Court to overturn a lower court’s decree. “If the judges are
divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made.
The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in full force.
It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of
affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the
fact that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the
action of the court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce
its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal,
or writ of error, were dismissed.” Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107,
112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally
divided Court entitled to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton
v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708
(1960).xxx” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been
cited with approval in a number of subsequent cases,[112] and has been
applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor
Child,[113] wherein a putative father sought to set aside a decree
granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of
noncompliance with the requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of
T.N.F. (T.N.F.),[114] which lacked majority opinion supporting holding
that an action such as the putative father’s would be governed by the
state’s one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare
decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did
not agree on a common rationale, as two of four participating justices
agreed that the state’s one-year statute of limitations applied, one
justice concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented.
There was no “narrower” reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming
justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the
statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he
reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue.[115] The
two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state’s one-year
statute of limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the
concurring justice on the standing issue.[116] Because a majority
of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground
for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare
decisis does not apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of
the justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not
authoritative interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.[117]
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,[118]
the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on the
matter,[119] held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to
stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The
Court held:cralaw:red
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be
declared unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially
interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority of the members
of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality
of the statute is brought in question or judicial relief sought against
its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of
this court in holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not
having been had, it follows that the statute in controversy must be
allowed to stand and accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a
presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in
quo warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt,
(Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded as a
judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law involved
concerning the constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division
of the court on question of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,[120] the
Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally
divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that
property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was
outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government’s decrees
terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing
their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects
the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative
“precedent.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,[121]
the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that printed
lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs’ lyrics, but which were
in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement of
plaintiffs’ copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loew’s,
Inc.,[122] which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not
binding upon it, viz:cralaw:red
Under the precedents of this
court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by authority, an
affirmance by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a
conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but
the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a
majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an
authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in
inferior courts.[123]
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,[124]
the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was unable to
reach a decision because two judges recused themselves and the
remaining members of the Court were so divided, it was impossible to
secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally
required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e.
affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for review.
The affirmance is a conclusive determination and adjudication as
between the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority for the
determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any
other court. It is not “entitled to precedential weight.” The legal
effect of such an affirmance is the same as if the appeal was
dismissed.[125]
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English
precedents,[126] an affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as
between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the
matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been
agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in
that or in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing
doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely
disposes of the present controversy as between the parties and settles
no issue of law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law
presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or
value. In other words, the decision only has res judicata and not stare
decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon other parties as
respects the controversies in other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar
and the Delfin Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the
Santiago ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start
with, the parties are different. More importantly, the Delfin
Petition did not contain the signatures of the required number of
registered voters under the Constitution: the requirement that twelve
per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of
all the registered voters therein was not complied with. For this
reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not the initiatory petition
which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In contrast,
the present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the
required number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin
Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado
petition, prayed for the calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino
people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado
petition on the basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established
the doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As
aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the
majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on the present
petitioners.
The Court’s dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment.
Suffice it to say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle
of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:cralaw:red
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:cralaw:red
First, it is barred by res judicata.
No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that
the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the
reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of
additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present
petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and
prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as “a non-stock,
non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,” with “ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA” as among its “officers.” In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were
made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the
body of the petition therein, “proposes to undertake the signature
drive for a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.” In
Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding
members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly
represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC.
In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged
in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for
People’s Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was
noted that said movement was “[l]ater identified as the People’s
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for
brevity.” In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by
their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had
joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the
principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.
(emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:cralaw:red
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment
must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action.[127]
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the
elements of res judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in
Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the
motions for reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10 June
1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered by
this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e.,
rendered only after considering the evidence presented by the parties
as well as their arguments in support of their respective claims and
defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and COMELEC
Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not
identical to the parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners
in the latter case were not parties to the former case. However,
a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto
and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA,
as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA,
representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case,
Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made parties to the
petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it
appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and
distinct group by removing some of the parties involved in Santiago v.
COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v.
Sabido[128]-
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by
simply including additional parties in the subsequent case or by not
including as parties in the later case persons who were parties in the
previous suit. The joining of new parties does not remove the
case from the operation of the rule on res judicata if the party
against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the
first action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by
simply joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA
petition but were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect
the operation of the prior judgment against those parties to the PIRMA
Petition who were likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are
bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
“It is a Constitution we are expounding” solemnly intoned the great
Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of
M’cCulloch v. Maryland.[129] Our Constitution is not a mere
collection of slogans. Every syllable of our Constitution is
suffused with significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed,
the rule of law will wither if we allow the commands of our
Constitution to underrule us.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the
sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with
this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people
to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its
abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to
make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and
categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom
all government authority emanates. This right of the people to
make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any
minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is any
principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is
non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.
chan robles virtual law library
This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise
of their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the
sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their
sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their brains to
comprehend changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves are
not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not their
sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of manipulation who
misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
Be it remembered that a petition for people’s initiative that complies
with the requirement that it “must be signed by at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein” is but
the first step in a long journey towards the amendment of the
Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves but a
proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be
debated by the people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe
method of telling what will be the result of the debate. There will
still be a last step to the process of amendment which is the
ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in a
plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the
proposal is approved by a majority of the people in the plebiscite will
it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we
cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide
for the people are not an obscure footnote in our Constitution.
The people’s voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear
them. Let us heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the
people’s sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to
let the people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated August 31, 2006,
denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with
some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures thereon
and to REMAND the petition at bar to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[1]
M’cCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
[2]
Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
[3] 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.
[4] Id. at 153.
[5] Id. at 157.
[6]
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not take part in the deliberation as he
was related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of petitioners.
[7]
Justice Davide (ponente), Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado,
Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan.
[8]
Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
[9]
People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
[10] Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
[11] G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[12] Petition, pp. 12-14.
[13] Advisory issued by Court, dated September 22, 2006.
[14] Exhibit “B,” Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
[15]
Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases,
80 Notre Dame Law Rev., 1911-1912, (May 2005).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Id. at 1913.
[18]
Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare
Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic
Adjudication, 53 Utah Law Rev. 53, 67 (2002).
[19] Id. at 68.
[20] Id. at 69.
[21] Id. at 67.
[22] Id. at 69.
[23] Consovoy, supra note 18, at 57.
[24] Id. at 58.
[25] Id. at 64.
[26]
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 405-06 (1932) (Justice
Brandeis, dissenting).
[27]
Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (Justice
Frankfurter, concurring).
[28]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice
Stevens, dissenting).
[29] Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1922.
[30] Id. at 1921.
[31]
Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil
Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 Boston College Third
World Law Journal, 335, 343 (Summer 1991).
[32] 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[33] 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[34] G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
[35] G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.
[36] Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1915.
[37] 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
[38] Section 5(b).
[39] Ibid.
[40]
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at 145.
[41]
85 Record of the House of Representatives 140-142 (February 14, 1989).
[42]
85 Record of the house of representatives 142-143 (February 14, 1989).
[43]
Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358.
[44]
I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (July 9, 1986).
[45] Id. at 400, 402-403.
[46]
v record, constitutional commission 806 (October 10, 1986).
[47]
Opposition-in-Intervention filed by ONEVOICE, p. 39.
[48]
Opposition-in-Intervention filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30.
[49] Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398.
[50] Section 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
[51] Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004).
[52] Ibid.
[53] Id. at 1346.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Third Edition, p. 67 (1969).
[56] Id. at 68.
[57] Id. at 1115.
[58]
Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 2nd ed., p. 46.
[59]
Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, No. L-361432, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367-368.
[60]
J. M. Aruego, The New Philippine Constitution Explained, iii-iv
(1973).
[61]
E. Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 422-425
(1984).
[62]
N. Gonzales, Philippine Political Law 30 (1969 ed.).
[63]
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February
22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337 quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365,
3 Alt. 220 (1886).
[64] L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367.
[65]
i record, constitutional commission 373 (July 8, 1986).
[66]
The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio.
[67]
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 64, citing Wheeler v.
Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1946).
[68]
T. M. Cooley, I A Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations 143-144 (8th ed. 1927).
[69]
H.C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law S. 47, p. 67
(2nd ed. 1897).
[70] V. Sinco, supra note 58.
chan robles virtual law library
[71] Ibid.
[72] No. L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948).
[73]
IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (September 17, 1986).
[74] Id. at 752.
[75] Id. at 769.
[76] Id. at 767-769.
[77] Id. at 377.
[78] Id. at 395.
[79] Sinco, supra note 58, at 22.
[80] Id. at 20-21.
[81]
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996,
257 SCRA 727.
[82]
G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 530.
[83] Sinco, supra note 58, at 29.
[84]
State v. Moore, 103 Ark 48, 145 SW 199 (1912); Whittemore v. Seydel, 74
Cal App 2d 109 (1946).
[85] Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53 (1998).
[86]
G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492, 516-517, citing 42
Am. Jur. 2d, p. 653.
[87] Memorandum for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152.
[88] Id. at 153-154.
[89] L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360-361.
[90] Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.
[91]
Annex “3,” Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors
ONEVOICE, INC., et al.
[92]
Certification dated April 21, 2006 issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer,
Annex “B,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et
al.; Certification dated April 20, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S.
Casquejo, Annex “C,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel,
et al.; Certification dated April 26, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon
S. Cascuejo, Annex “D,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et
al. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[93]
Annex “1,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Antonino.
[94]
Annex “10-A,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al.
[95]
Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Alternative Law Groups,
Inc.
[96] Annexes 30-31, Id.
[97] Annexes 44-64, Id.
[98] Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.
[99]
Exhibit “E,” Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
[100]
Annex “A,” Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.
[101]
Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.
[102]
Helvey v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).
[103]
BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins & Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).
[104] ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
We printed 100 thousand
of this petition last
February and we
distributed to the different organizations that were volunteering to support us.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100
thousand of these were printed?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
It could be more than that, Your Honor.
x x x
x
x x x
x
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they
can(?)
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
Okay, so you got 6.3 Million
signatures, but you only printed 100
thousand. So you’re saying, how many did your friends print of
the petition?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
I can no longer give a specific answer to
that, Your Honor. I relied only to the
assurances of the people who are volunteering that they are going to
reproduce the signature sheets as well as
the draft petition that we have given them, Your Honor.
x x x
x
x x x
x
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
Did you also show this amended petition to the people?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Your
Honor, the amended petition reflects
the copy of the original petition
that we circulated, because in the original petition
that we filed before the COMELEC, we omitted a
certain paragraph that is, Section 4 paragraph 3 which
were part of the original petition
that we circulated and so we have to correct that oversight
because that is what we have circulated to the people
and we have to correct that…chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
But you just stated now that
what you circulated was the petition of August 25, now you
are changing your mind, you’re saying what you circulated was the
petition of August 30, is that correct?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
In effect, yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but
what you filed in the COMELEC on August 25 was
a different petition, that’s why
you have to amend it?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor, that
we have omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our
proposition.
x x x
x
x x x
x
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
Okay, let’s be clear. What
did you circulate when you gathered the signatures, the
August 25 which you said you circulated or the August 30?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
Both the August 25 petition that
included all the provisions, Your Honor,
and as amended on August 30. Because we have to include the
one that we have inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your
Honor.
x x x
x
x x x
x
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you
printed 100 thousand copies?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
That was the original printed
matter that we have circulated by the month of
February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:cralaw:red
That is all you can assure us?
ATTY. LAMBINO:cralaw:red
That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have
asked some
friends, like for example (like) Mr.
Liberato Laos to help me print out some more of this
petition… (TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 7-17)
[105] Section 2 (1), Article IX – C, 1987 Constitution.
[106]
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres.
[107]
Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo
J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban.
[108] Justice Jose C. Vitug.
[109]
Only fourteen (14) justices participated in the deliberations as
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla took no part on account of his relationship
with the lawyer of one of the parties.
[110] Citing conscience as ground.
[111] 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).
[112]
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Arkansas
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L.
Ed. 2d (1987); France v. Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 729 S.W. 2d 161 (1987).
[113] 40 P. 3d 886 (2006).
[114] 781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska, 1989).
[115] Id. at 982-84 (Compton, J., concurring).
[116] Id. at 975-78.
[117] Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d 98 (1976).
[118] 112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933).
[119]
Penned by Justice Whitfield, and concurred in by Chief Justice Davis
and Justice Terrell; Justices Ellis, Brown and Buford are of the
opinion that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933, is a special or local law not
duly advertised before its passage, as required by sections 20 and 21
of article 3 of the state Constitution, and therefore invalid.
This evenly divided vote resulted in the affirmance of the validity of
the statute but did not constitute a binding precedent on the Court.
[120] 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942).
[121] 329 F. 2d 541 (1964).
[122] 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
[123]
Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S. Ct. 621 (1910).
[124] 331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975).
[125] Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108.
[126]
Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H.
L. Cas. 274.
[127]
Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA
808, 811, 812; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R.
No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[128]
No. L-35440, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong,
No. L-29689, April 14, 1978, 82 SCRA 337.
[129] Supra note 1.
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