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                     G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006

G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006

SEPARATE OPINION

QUISUMBING, J.:

1.  With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition as one mainly involving a complex political question.[1]  While admittedly the present Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for the conduct of a People’s Initiative, such as the percentages of signatures – being 12% of the total number of registered voters, provided each legislative district is represented by at least 3% – they are not the main points of controversy.  Stated in simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite.  Technical questions, e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before coming to us, are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand.  What deserve our full attention are the issues concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People’s Initiative.

2.  It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to “directly” propose amendments through their own “initiative.”  The subject of the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in order to change our form of government from presidential to parliamentary.  Much has been written about the fulsome powers of the people in a democracy.  But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and that all government authority emanates from them.   Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution.  Whether the initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a People’s Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however insubstantial or radical -- must be submitted to a plebiscite.  Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that matters.[2] chan robles virtual law library

3.  I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et al.  For the COMELEC was just relying on precedents, with the common understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v. COMELEC[3] and PIRMA v. COMELEC,[4] the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any petition for a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution by no less than this Court.  In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado’s petition, I could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion when they merely relied on this Court’s unequivocal rulings. Of course, the Santiago and the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now.  But until the Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to respect and obey this Court’s mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.

4.  Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted.  On page 4 of the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that “even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters”, the COMELEC could not give the Petition due course because of our view that R A No. 6735 was inadequate.  That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno’s scholarly ponencia.  Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC.  In my view, the only doable option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary system of government should replace the present presidential system. chan robles virtual law library

5.  I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of government as a political question soonest.  (This I say without fear of media opinion that our judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled, for it is not.)  Thus I vote for the remand of the petition.  Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the period mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days from said certification.  Only a credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring closure to the instant political controversy.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

[1]       Political questions have been defined as “Questions of which the courts of justice will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide, on account of their purely political character, or because their determination would involve an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers; e.g., what sort of government exists in a state….” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1319 citing Kenneth v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed. 316. chan robles virtual law library