RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
Vox populi vox Dei --
the voice of the people is the voice of God.
Caution should be exercised in choosing one’s battlecry, lest it does
more harm than good to one’s cause. In its original context, the
complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of
what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the
monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, “nec audiendi qui solent dicere
vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima
sit,” meaning, “And those people should not be listened to who keep on
saying, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God,’ since the
riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.”[1]
Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase
is revealed upon petitioners and their allies – that they may reflect
upon the sincerity and authenticity of their “people’s
initiative.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the
name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions
justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God’s
imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the
same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people’s
initiative is the “voice of the people”
and, therefore, the “voice of God.” After a thorough
consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with
his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the
voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the
Court must guard itself. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People’s Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
which reads:cralaw:red
Section 2. Amendments
to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this
Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled “Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin,
petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin,
Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding
members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), respondents.”[2] The case was docketed as G.R.
No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its
Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that
Republic Act No.
6735
(
R. A. No. 6735
),
An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned.” A majority of eight (8) Justices
fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the
opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the
adequacy of
R. A. No. 6735
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices
reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other
one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen
(13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in
favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor
of the minority opinion.[3]
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed
a similar case, entitled People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections[4] on the ground
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed PIRMA’s Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments
to the Constitution “it appearing that that it only complied with
the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325
(Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.” Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no
need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency
of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the different
premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such
re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with
the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered
signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the
Constitution
, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:cralaw:red
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The
legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be
provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative
districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per
district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least
one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day
of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior
thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district
for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by
law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a
President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of
all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
chan robles virtual law library
C. For the purpose of
insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a
unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new
Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory Provisions,” which shall read, as
follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent
President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their
term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a
vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death,
permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President,
the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of
the
1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in
which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives”
and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament;” that
any and all references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,” “Senator(s)”
or “Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the
“President” and/or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime
Minister.”
Section 3. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII
shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim
up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in
which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of
Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read
“Parliament;” that any and all references therein to “Member(s) of
Congress,” “Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of the House of Representatives”
shall be changed to read as “Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all
references to the “President” and/or “Acting President” shall be
changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 4. (1) There shall
exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament
which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall
have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed
of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive
departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice
President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of
the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the
cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for
the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days
from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent
President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall
be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall
perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by
the incumbent President.”
(2) The interim Parliament
shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local
government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall
continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of
the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper
right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted
as follows:cralaw:red
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the
1987 Constitution
,
changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential
to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve
greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing
an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from
one system to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein
petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend
the
Constitution[5] Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended
Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf
and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed
their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed
that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature
sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented
by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters,
were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. [6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to
the petition, citing as basis this Court’s ruling in Santiago,
permanently enjoining it “from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying
that this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct
the latter to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution,
which provides:cralaw:red
Sec. 4 x x x
Any amendment under Section
2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153
and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No.
174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for
contempt[7] of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued
by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act
with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I
believe the resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular
issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied Lambino, et al.’s petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution
on the basis of this Court’s Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are
resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of “grave
abuse of discretion” on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be
considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.[8]
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition
for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court
cannot, in any way, be characterized as “capricious or whimsical,”
“patent and gross,” or “arbitrary and despotic.” On the
contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be
stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent
COMELEC “from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted.” It being a fact that Congress
has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative
but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a
citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the
subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:[9]
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with
the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision’s ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the
highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey.
Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the
Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance
of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of
discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court’s supremacy as the
final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
chan robles virtual law library
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court
reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its
pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is
the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there
is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings.[10] As a warning to lower court judges who
would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,[11]
held:cralaw:red
Now, if a judge of a lower court feels, in the fulfillment of his
mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine
promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but
rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views
he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted
by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a
principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,
unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants.
And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he
cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to
place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of
having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he
has only one legal way to do that. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed
this Court’s ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,[12] a unanimous Court implicitly
recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking
it, thus:cralaw:red
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it
only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a “grave abuse of discretion” the
COMELEC’s obedience and respect to the pronouncement
of this Court in Santiago. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this
Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in
declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for
reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote,
it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows
that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or
reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was
upheld.[13] In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco,[14] this Court ruled that the
denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies
that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to
be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a
modification of the judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for
initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare
decisis does not bar its re-examination.
I am not convinced.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates “stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled.”[15] As used in our
jurisprudence, it means that “once this Court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same as in the earlier controversy.”[16]
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare
decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by
arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in
the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:cralaw:red
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
litigants and the opposite way between another. ‘If a group of cases
involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would
be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles.
If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I
shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast;
it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights."
Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception
if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of
justice in the courts.[17]
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness
may be appreciated by considering the observation of American
philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:cralaw:red
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar
individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better
or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice
rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that
agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity
after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he
or they will be guilty as charged.[18]
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining
and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, “It is x
x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
considered anew, might be decided differently by the current
justices. This policy x
x x ‘is based on
the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law
are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should
be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with
reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.[19]
Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly
onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a
number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and
extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or
inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed
to discharge their
task. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more
than nine (9) years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino
people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law
students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this
Court’s Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine
was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even
the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have
been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the
deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or
set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al.
Indeed, this Court’s conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
remains a precedent and must be upheld.
III
The proposed constitutional changes
constitute revisions and not mere amendments
Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution
lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:cralaw:red
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution
may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered votes, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum,
as means by which the people can directly propose changes to the
Constitution
,
were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus,
under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the
distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by
a uniform process. This is not so under our present
Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision
becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of
people’s initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a
Constitutional Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:cralaw:red
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:cralaw:red
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru
initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory
that this matter of initiative which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it
from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision.
xxx
xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide’s
proposed amendment on line I refers to “amendments.” Does it not
cover the word “revision” as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words “amendments” and “revision?”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because “amendments” and
“revision” should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to “amendments” not
“revision”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[20]
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits
amendments, it is imperative to examine whether petitioners’ proposed
changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of the
1987 Constitution
:
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative
Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive
Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government,
from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the
Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms
of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister
who shall be vested with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of
amendments, hence, within the coverage of a “people’s initiative.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was
also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an
amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:
chan robles virtual law library
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is
to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document
which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered.[21]
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any
distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change
contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,[22] the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:cralaw:red
"Revision" and
"amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the
charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is
an essential difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a
redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure
of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or
charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to
prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from
the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general
plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its
purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while
amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a
city's form of government may be accomplished by a process of
"amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which
only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.[23]
However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes
distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it
has been held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule
city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its
amendment."[24]
In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form
and scheme would probably be interpreted as a “revision” and should be
achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners’ proposed changes appear to
cover isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon careful
scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the
very structure of our government and create multifarious
ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a
“domino effect” or, more appropriately, “ripple effect” on other
provisions of the Constitution.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the
Constitution
includes the power to amend any section in such a manner that the
proposed change, if approved, would “be complete within itself, relate
to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or
article of the
Constitution
or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose.”[25] This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of
government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers
of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary
form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree,
dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as
expressed through a “vote of confidence.” To my mind, this doctrine of
separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our
Constitution
, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,[26] the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:cralaw:red
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised
constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose
x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the
proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such
measure became law a substantial revision of our present state
Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by
a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government
is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth
in Adams v. Gunter[27]:cralaw:red
The proposal here to amend
Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative
branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the
earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of the government in this state and
tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect
the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify
revisions rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the
following “omnibus provision”:cralaw:red
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from
the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory
Provisions” which shall read, as follows:cralaw:red
x x x x x x x x x
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and
4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended x x
x
x x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they
shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall
be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system
of government x x
x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Section 4. (1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments
to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles
of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
The above provisions will necessarily result in a “ripple effect” on
the other provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the
qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With
one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise
some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same
practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial
revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the
pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:cralaw:red
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and
many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be
affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one new
article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus
provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that “If any section,
subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in
conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section,
subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such
conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the
scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad
that if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
agreed upon by a constitutional convention.[28]
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere
amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be
changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will
affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the
alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot
be taken in isolation since these are connected or “interlocked” with
the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has
been held that: “If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is
necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain
that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution
and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a
convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed.”[29]
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the
nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the
subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed
this insight:cralaw:red
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The
answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on
initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or
how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being
proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine
constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the
structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use
in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention,
decisions are reached after much purifying debate. And while the
deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get
involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has
been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final
judgment. Careful debate is important because the electorate
tends to accept what is presented to it even sight unseen.[30]
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People’s initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution
reads:cralaw:red
Section 2. Amendments
to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means
that an enabling law is imperative for its implementation. Thus,
Congress enacted
R. A, No. 6735
in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However,
as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of
R. A, No. 6735 Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree
turn, enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must
be considered a sufficient law, thus:cralaw:red
1) The text of
R. A, No. 6735
is replete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the
clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the
people’s initiative; and
chan robles virtual law library
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of
R. A, No. 6735
demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people’s initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of
R. A, No. 6735
leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and
local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the
Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the
initiatives on national and local legislation, where
R. A, No. 6735
provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their
implementation,[31] however, as regards initiative on the
Constitution, the law merely:cralaw:red
(a) mentions the word “Constitution” in Section 2;[32]
(b) defines “initiative on the
Constitution” and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems
of initiative in Section 3;[33]
(c) speaks of “plebiscite” as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people;[34]
(d) reiterates the constitutional
requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the
petition;[35] and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.[36]
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure
how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This is
not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed
out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the
promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been
introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and
adequate process for people’s initiative, such as:cralaw:red
Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The manner of initiation - in a congressional district
through a petition by any individual, group, political party or
coalition with members in the congressional district;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Signature stations to be provided for;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting,
that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the
Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty
days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures
were obtained;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to
the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and
decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by
R. A, No. 6735
, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC
Does not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution and
R. A, No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated
and inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners
are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the
alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they
have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:cralaw:red
Section 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and
categorical. For a people’s initiative to prosper, the
following requisites must be present:cralaw:red
1. It is “the people” themselves who must “directly propose” “amendments” to the Constitution; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in “a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters;” and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of
registered voters “must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters” of “every legislative
district.”
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in
the “Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping”
contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have
caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as
registered voters “and as representatives” of the supposed 6.3
million registered voters. This goes to show that the
questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million
people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover,
nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3
million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino
and Aumentado were affixed therein “as representatives” of those 6.3
million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for people’s
initiative contemplated by the
Constitution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file
the petition “as representatives” of the alleged 6.3 million registered
voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally
proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that
amendments to the Constitution shall be “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters.” Obviously, the
phrase “directly proposed by the people” excludes any person acting as
representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered
voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the
right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the
people’s representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not
recognize acts of representation. For it is only “the
people” (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed
with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a
people’s initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.
chan robles virtual law library
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should “hear” and “heed” “the
people’s voice” is baseless and misleading. There is no
people’s voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative
is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and
their
allies. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue
that: (1) “[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign
people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the
fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of
the Petition for initiative is a purely political question;” and (2)
“[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right
explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination
by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the
system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the
ambit of a political question.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The “political question doctrine” was first enunciated by the US
Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.[37] Faced with the difficult
question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate institution
to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US Supreme
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that “the
sovereignty in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether
they exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a political
question to be settled by the political power.” In other words, the
responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to
the legislative and executive branches of the government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called “Dorr Rebellion” in the State
of Rhode Island. Due to increased migration brought about by the
Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased.
However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State
Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the
rural districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led
to the “Dorr Rebellion.” Despairing of obtaining remedies for their
disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers
invoked their rights under the American Declaration of Independence to
“alter or abolish” the government and to institute a new one. The
reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional
convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the document
for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State
government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous
situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing
state governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of
offices. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered
and searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He
brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme
Court, Luther’s counsel argued that since the State’s archaic
Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances
through democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead
chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of
replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme
Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for
judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,[38] Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the
phrase “political thicket” to describe situations where Federal courts
should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the
competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme
Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative
districts in Illinois “as a political question and that the
invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections,
create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter’s “political
thicket,” nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of
the term “political question.” Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,[39] this Court
ruled that properly, political questions are “those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.” In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,[40]
the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,[41] this
Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr[42]
in determining whether a question before it is political, rather than
judicial in nature, to wit:cralaw:red
1) there
is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of
deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the
Court’s undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack
of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of
embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues
raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are
justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of.
chan robles virtual law library
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this
Court are political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving them
under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.[43] As
pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,[44] the present Constitution
limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope
of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have
normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to
decide. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Conclusion
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is
my view that the so-called people’s initiative to amend our
Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is
actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of
our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the
oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who
affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In
fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to
be amended and the proposed amendments were not explained to all those
registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to
the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what
petitioners and their group asked them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v.
The Executive Secretary.[45] The Court then ruled that
“This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect,”
although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among
others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens’ Assemblies “was and
is null and void ab initio.” That was during martial law when
perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator.
Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There
is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used
as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people’s initiative for
those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with
our present government structure. Consequent1y, we must not
change it. America has a presidential type of government.
Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super power. It is then
safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the people
running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and
capable, may be elected as members and leaders of the
unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower
House continue to hold their respective positions with limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and
the marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for the
homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for
the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before
us is crucial with transcendental significance. And history will
judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we allow the revision of
our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and revere, on
the basis of a doubtful people’s initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or
structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and
the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more
knowledgeable people elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under
the circumstances in this case, the voice of God is not audible.
chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
[1] Works, Letter 164. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases_%28P%E2%80%93Z%29#endnote_ODoQ.
[2] G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[3] Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
[4] G.R. No. 129754, September 23,
1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding
members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.
[5] Entitled “In the Matter of
Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People’s
Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral
Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing
Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential
to the Parliamentary System.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[6]
Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel
L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P.
Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby
A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P.
Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P.
Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela,
Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students,
Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald
Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron
D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong.
[7] “Grounds for contempt
3. From the time the so-called People’s Initiative (hereafter PI)
now subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did
nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably winked at,
as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its
personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that had no
legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable
Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall
them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the
Senate on August 29, 2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair
sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI out of
prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On
contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat
in Makati as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out
of 43,405 signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati
District, to him, showed the “efficiency” of Comelec personnel. He
could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice but to get the
constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [Const., Art.
VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including administration critics’
turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an
exercise that could never be free, orderly, honest and credible,
another constitutional requirement. [Nothing has been heard about
probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other
observers that respondent Chairman, straining at the leash, was
lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting
that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30%
of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he
been asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the
matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial
position (different from conceding that it is enjoined).
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for
their part, even issued widely-publicized written directives to the
field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to Commissioner
Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was trying to be
careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting implicitly, in
hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.
[8] Intestate Estate of Carmen de
Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13,
1989, 170 SCRA 246.
[9] Supra.
[10] Development Bank of the Philippines v.
NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
[11] 56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.
[12] Supra.
[13] Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
[14] G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
[15] Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R.
No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307, citing Moreno, Philippine Law
Dictionary (1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil.
397, [1947]).
[16] Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 303, citing Government v.
Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G. 1840.
[17] Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921), pp.
33-34.
[18] William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,) 1973, p. 49.
[19] Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.
[20] July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.
[21] Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.
[22] 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.
[23] State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.
[24] City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.
[25] Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.
[26] 196 P.2d 787.
[27] Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.
[28] Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.
[29] Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).
[30] Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT
OR REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2006.
[31] See Sections 8-12 for national initiative
and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and referendum.
[32] Section 2. Statement of Policy. – The
power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is
hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
[33] Section 3. Definition of terms.-
x x x
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[34] See Section 3(e).
[35] Section 5 (b) – A petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on
the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5)
years thereafter.
x x x
[36] Section 9 (b) – The proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
[37] 7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).
[38] 328 US 549 (1946).
[39] 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
[40] 103 Phi. 1051 (1957).
[41] G.R. No. 35546, September 17, 1974, 50 SCRA 559.
[42] 369 US 186 (1962).
[43] G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.
[44] G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668.
[45] Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.
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