RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952  REGISTERED VOTERS,                   Petitioners,

              - versus -         
                                                         

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,                                              Respondent.                 x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,                                                Intervenor.                 x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,                                         Intervenor. x-------------------------------------------x

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson, Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its  Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights,                                                                     Intervenors. x--------------------------------------------------------------x

 

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,                           Intervenor. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,                                          Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS  ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA  A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,                                                                      Intervenors. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,                                                                       Petitioners, x---------------------------------------------------------------x

                         
                           -versus-                          

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN  S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners  RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,                                                                                     Respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------------x

 

 
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God.     Caution should be exercised in choosing one’s battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one’s cause.  In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, “nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit,” meaning, “And those people should not be listened to who keep on saying, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God,’ since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.”[1]  Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies – that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their “people’s initiative.” 

History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God.  Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God’s imprimatur.   Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this   Court that the people’s initiative is the “voice of the people”
 and, therefore, the “voice of God.”   After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God.   It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself. 

The facts of the case are undisputed.

In 1996, the Movement for People’s Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:



The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled “Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.”[2]  The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325.   On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R. A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”  A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R. A. No. 6735.

On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.[3]

A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections[4]  on the ground that the COMELEC did  not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA’s Petition  for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution  “it appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.”  Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735.  Another Justice concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.

This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
















Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:


On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.[5]   Five  (5)  days  thereafter,  they filed an Amended

Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent  (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.

Several organizations opposed the petition. [6] 

In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing as basis this Court’s ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it “from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.” 

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying  that this Court set  aside  the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:



I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299.  Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for contempt[7] of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.


Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.’s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court’s Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC? 

In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of “grave abuse of discretion” on the part of the COMELEC.

Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[8]

The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as “capricious or whimsical,” “patent and gross,”  or “arbitrary and despotic.”  On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to take.  It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC “from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted.”  It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago.  Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:[9]

x  x  x  I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision’s ratio decidendi.  Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land.  It had no choice but to obey.  Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion.  Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec.  Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court’s supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.chan robles virtual law library

It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements.  It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.[10]  As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,[11] held:

Now, if a judge of a lower court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants.  And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that. 

Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al.  for it merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago.

Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,[12] a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.

Indeed, I cannot characterize as a “grave abuse of discretion” the COMELEC’s obedience  and  respect  to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago. 


It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned.  It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling.  Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.[13]  In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[14]  this Court ruled  that  the  denial  of  a  motion  or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.

With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.
        
I am not convinced.

The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates “stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.”[15]  As used in our jurisprudence, it means that “once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy.”[16]

There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. ‘If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[17]

That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:

The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other.  In this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged.[18]

Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, “It is  x  x  x  a  fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew,  might be decided differently by the current justices.  This  policy   x   x   x    ‘is  based on    the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.[19]  Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.              

Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago.  During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court’s Decision as a precedent.  In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA.  Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency.   I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al.  Indeed, this Court’s conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.


Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:




At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.  Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process.  This is not so under our present Constitution.  The distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of people’s initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:


Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether petitioners’ proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.

The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department);  Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department).  It further includes  Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.

Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from  bicameral-presidential  to  unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of  Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.

Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within the coverage of a “people’s initiative.”

I disagree.

The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:chan robles virtual law library

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous.  In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.[21]

Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated.  In Kelly v. Laing,[22] the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:


Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.[23] However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its amendment."[24]

In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a “revision” and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.

Although, at first glance, petitioners’ proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications.  In other words, the proposed changes will have a “domino effect” or, more appropriately, “ripple effect” on other provisions of the Constitution.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend any section in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would “be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose.”[25]  This is clearly not the case here.

Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches.  In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed through a “vote of confidence.” To my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.

In McFadden vs. Jordan,[26] the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:

It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x   x   x.  Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x   x   x.

Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter[27]:


The above provisions will necessarily result in a “ripple effect” on the other provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government.  With one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution.  In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:

There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed.  It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that “If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed.  x  x  x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention.[28]

Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed.  Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of government.  The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are connected or “interlocked” with the other provisions of our Constitution.  Accordingly, it has been held that: “If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed.”[29]

I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative.  On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:

But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality.  In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated?  Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?

In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying debate.  And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved.  It is only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment.  Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight unseen.[30]

IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People’s initiative

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:



On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its implementation.  Thus, Congress enacted R. A, No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R. A, No. 6735.  Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies. 
 
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn,  enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:


I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.

A thorough reading of R. A, No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local legislation.  Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced.  Unlike in the initiatives on national and local legislation, where R. A, No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation,[31] however, as regards initiative on  the Constitution, the law merely:

In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished.  This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution.  As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for people’s initiative, such as:


None of the above necessary details is provided by R. A, No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.


I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable.   The determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.       

To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:


The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical.   For a people’s initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:


In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.  

The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters.   As shown in the “Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping” contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters  “and as representatives” of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters.   This goes to show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2.   Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein “as representatives” of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for people’s initiative contemplated by the Constitution.               

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition “as representatives” of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters.   Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed.   To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall be “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters.”   Obviously, the phrase “directly proposed by the people” excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters.   The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.   Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people’s representative.   Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation.   For it is only “the people” (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.   Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people’s initiative.   Necessarily, it must fail.chan robles virtual law library

Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should “hear” and “heed” “the people’s voice” is baseless and misleading.   There is no people’s voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.              


Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) “[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million regis