.
Click here for the separate opinions of the Justices: |
Concurring Justices:
Panganiban, C.J.,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna,
JJ. |
Dissenting Justices:
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Corona,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,
and Velasco, Jr., JJ. |
EN BANC
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its
enviable sang-froid, inimitable lucidity, and luminous scholarship are
all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a waste of pen
and ink to write separately if only to express my deep admiration for
his disquisition. It is compelling because it derives from the
fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty resides in the
people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual
empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno’s opinion will in the
short term engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to
amend the
Constitution
,
but once the political passion of the times have been shorn, it will
endure as an unequivocal message to the taongbayan that they are to be
trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno’s opinion. I only
write separately to highlight a few other points which also inform my
vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC[1] and PIRMA v. COMELEC[2]
had not acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in any case.
I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it
necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a
decision can stand as precedent. That principle has informed the
members of this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious
petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately reflected on
the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon
Rep. Act No. 6735
in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the
statute. All the Court said then was that the law was “inadequate”.
Since this “inadequate” law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed
by Congress, it remained part of the statute books.[3]
I maintain that even if
Rep. Act No. 6735
is truly “inadequate”, the Court in Santiago should not have simply let
the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the
law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code
provides that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”[4] As
explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,[5]
“[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the
revered Justice Cardozo’s words,] ‘fills the open spaces in the
law.’”[6] Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action
premised on
Rep. Act No. 6735
on the ground that the law is “inadequate” would have been found in
grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to “fill
the open spaces” in Santiago further highlights that decision’s status
as an unfortunate aberration.
chan robles virtual law library
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of
having recently decried a majority ruling that was clearly minded to
reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly say so.[7] Yet the
principle is not immutable.[8] The passionate words of Chief Justice
Panganiban in Osmeña v. COMELEC[9] bear quoting:cralaw:red
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the
Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous
holding in NPC vs. Comelec.
Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial
doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than consistency and
stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence.
As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand
still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in cadence with the
march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be
perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated
from stare decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions.[[10]]
It should do no less in the present case.[11]
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as
constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish
the legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That
ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno’s clear demonstration why Santiago should not be
respected as precedent, I agree that the COMELEC’s failure to take
cognizance of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735
constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible through the petitions
before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC[12],
Sanchez v. COMELEC[13], and Sambarani v. COMELEC[14] that “the
functions of the COMELEC under the
Constitution
are essentially executive and administrative in nature”.[15] More
pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC[16], the Court held that the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the
jurisdiction of the poll body under its constitutional mandate “to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of a xxx plebiscite”.[17]
Rep. Act No. 6735
is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under
Rep. Act No. 6735
is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are
essentially executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent
duty of the COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions
after they have been filed is administrative in character. By any
measure, the COMELEC’s failure to perform its executive and
administrative functions under
Rep. Act No. 6735
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under
Republic Act No. 6735
as they allegedly embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735
classifies as a “prohibited measure,” a petition submitted to the
electorate that embraces more than one subject.[18] On this
point, reliance is apparently placed on the array of provisions which
are to be affected by the amendments proposed in the initiative
petition.
Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735
is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle that the
laws passed by Congress “shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof”.[19] The one-subject requirement under
the
Constitution
is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title.[20] An act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.[21]
The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the
Constitution should apply as well in the interpretation of Section 10
of
Rep. Act No. 6735For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition
embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no
matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment
if the amendments are germane to the subject of the petition.
chan robles virtual law library
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly
propose the changing of the form of government from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may
strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of
the executive and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it
ineluctably encompasses only a single general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is
susceptible to division into several general spheres. To cite the
broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III enumerates the
guaranteed rights of the people under the Bill of Rights; Articles VI,
VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure of government;
while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy
principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section
10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735
is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which do not
belong to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative
petition sought not only to change the form of government from
presidential to parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights,
said petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10, as that
petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each subject
bearing no functional relation to the other. But that is not the case
with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more
than one subject since the proposed amendments seek to affect two
separate branches of government. The very purpose of the initiative
petitions is to fuse the powers of the executive and legislative
branches of government; hence, the amendments intended to effect such
general intent necessarily affects the two branches. If it required
that to propose a shift in government from presidential to
parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to
be segregated to a different petition from that which would propose
amendments to Article VI (Legislative Branch), then the result would be
two initiative petitions ─ both subject to separate authentications,
consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one general
proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one
petition would ultimately fail while the other succeeds, could thus
allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without
transferring executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd
result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings
of Section 10. The Constitution indubitably grants the people the right
to seek amendment of the charter through initiative, and mandates
Congress to “provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.” In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative
on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for
example the implementing law also provides that certain provisions of
the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that
prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the
implementation, and not the restriction of the right to initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a
bar to amendment under the Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for
the merit of such a requirement, since it would afford a measure of
orderliness when the vital question of amending the
Constitution
arises. The one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus when
deliberating whether or not to vote for the amendments. These factors
of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the fact that the
one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right
to initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of
invalidating the requirement, a better course of action would be to
insist upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has
consistently adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-subject,
one-title rule.[22] There is no cause to adopt a stricter
interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under Section
10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the
Constitution
amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference
source from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a
constitutional convention. It was submitted that this consideration
influenced the Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2,
Article XVII, which expressly provided that only amendments, and not
revisions, may be the subject of initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme
value to the record of deliberations of a constitutional convention or
commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of
a record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate
or constrict processes which change a constitution or its provisions,
then the entire initiative process authorized by the
Constitution
should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of
these petitions, I would like to point out that resort to the records
of deliberations is only one of many aids to constitutional
construction. For one, it should be abhorred if the provision under
study is itself clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the Court
held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:[23]
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk.We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face."[24]
chan robles virtual law library
Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of
constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record does not
provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the
provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is not controlling
by itself, and while the historical discussion on the floor of the
constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive.
The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino[25] that “the proceedings of
the [constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of
the proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case it is
the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former
courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through
the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.”[26] The
proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than the framers’ understanding
thereof.[27]
If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for
interpretation of any amendments adopted via initiative, such absence
would not preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in a
manner consistent with how courts generally construe the
ConstitutionFor example, reliance will be placed on the other provisions of the
Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic constitutional
framework. The constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that
unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the
sufficiency of the initiative petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the COMELEC the task of
determining the sufficiency of the petitions, including the
ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters,
including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative
district have indeed signed the initiative petitions.[28] It should be
remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions
outright, and had yet to undertake the determination of sufficiency as
required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the
initiative petitions that the Court may at this juncture pronounce the
initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the factual
predicates leading to the suggestion is uncertain, considering that the
trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the
necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated that
petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court that
purportedly established the petitions are insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question
that we should ask, I submit, is whether it serves well on the Court to
usurp trier of facts even before the latter exercises its functions? If
the Court, at this stage, were to declare the petitions as
insufficient, it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as
guilty even before the lower court trial had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC[29] inveighs against the propriety of the Court
uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of facts, and resolving
factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or
tribunals:cralaw:red
[P]etitioner in this case
cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing new evidence
before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then
ask it to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the
COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question
may not be raised for the first time on appeal, and documents forming
no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered
in disposing of the issues of an action. This is true whether the
decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or an
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was
rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case.
Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly
justice.[30]
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the
petitions constitutes in effect a trial de novo, the Justices of the
Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial court judges.
This is an unbecoming recourse, and it simply is not done.
VI.
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a
plea that it make the choice whether to amend the Constitution or not.
This is a matter which should not be left to fifteen magistrates who
have not been elected by the people to make the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987
Constitution. It is merely a vote to allow the people to directly
exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I
share would not even guarantee that the Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan
initiative petitions would be submitted to the people in a referendum.
The COMELEC will still have to determine the sufficiency of the
petition. Among the questions which still have to be determined by the
poll body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is whether
twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters nationwide, including
three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district,
have indeed signed the initiative petitions.[31]
And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient,
the matter of whether the Constitution should be amended would still
depend on the choice of the electorate. The oppositors are clearly
queasy about some of the amendments proposed, or the imputed motives
behind the amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the
petitions as sufficient, would allow them to convey their uneasiness to
the public at large, as well as for the proponents of the amendment to
defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public
to be involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation
should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more
politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the
Constitution should be amended would lie directly with the people. The
initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most
elemental; wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to
the august halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of this Court, as
it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the academic
yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of
the affluent and the impoverished alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional
change engaged in by a people who are actually empowered in having a
say whether these changes should be enacted, gives fruition to the
original vision of pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a
half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was
recorded as saying in his famed Funeral Oration, “We differ from other
states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from public life not as
‘private’ but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person
all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill
together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken
undiscussed.”[32]
Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has
been peddled that an act or vote that assists the initiative process is
one for the willful extinction of democracy or democratic institutions.
Such a consideration should of course properly play its course in the
public debates and deliberations attendant to the initiative
process. Yet as a result of the
harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court
perturbed with the prospect of constitutional change to relieve those
anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates
the amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense
of the people’s will or what the Constitution allows. A vote so
oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even as it
may gain the admiration of those who do not want to see the
Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the
Constitution and the elements of democracy on which our rule of law is
founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is
but a culmination of the evolution over the centuries of democratic
rights of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of the Athenian
democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very
slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The
Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and
self-governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution
was originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men,
mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the
states for voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as
it may have already been within the first few years of the American
Union, met resistance from no less a revered figure as Alexander
Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn attributes
these disconcerting words:cralaw:red
The voice of the people has
been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has
been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are
turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give
therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the
government… Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass
of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing
but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy…[33]
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the
present age of modern democracy where a person’s poverty, color, or
gender no longer impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a
democracy that merely guarantees its citizens the right to live their
lives freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding allowance for a
means by which the people have a direct choice in determining their
country’s direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a constitution
may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it embodies an
even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution
saw fit to grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is but a
continuation of the line of evolution of the democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact
constitutional amendments, the initiative process should be
acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This
right granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be denied by the
votes of less than eight magistrates for reasons that bear no
cogitation on the Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
[1] G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[2] G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997.
[3] Petitioner Aumentado aptly refers to the comment of the late
Senator Raul Roco that the Santiago ruling “created a third specie of
invalid laws, a mongrel type of constitutional but inadequate and,
therefore, invalid law.” Memorandum for Aumentado, p. 54.
[4] See Civil Code, Art. 9.
[5] 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
[6] Id., at 10; citing I Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines 43 (1990) and Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process 113 (1921).
[7] See Dissenting Opinion, Manila International Airport
Authority v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006.
In my ponencia in Globe Telecom v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004,
435 SCRA 110, I further observed that while an administrative agency
was not enslaved to obey its own precedent, it was “essential, for the
sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative
agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain
thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the
previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned.”
Id., at 144. Happily, Justice Puno’s present opinion expressly
elucidates why Santiago should be reversed.
[8] As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: “We recognize that stare
decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element
of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy
reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however
recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and
verified by experience… This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from
the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction.”
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-121 (1940).
[9] 351 Phil. 692 (1998).
[10] As Chief Justice Panganiban then cited: “For instance,
Ebralinag vs. Davision Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256,
March 1, 1993, reversed the Court's 34-year-old doctrine laid down in
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil 2, August 12, 1959, and
upheld the right of Jehovah's Witnesses "to refuse to salute the
Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs." Similarly,
Olaguer vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned
the 12-year-old ruling in Aquino Jr. vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA
546, May 9, 1975, which recognized the jurisdiction of military
tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during
martial law. The Court likewise reversed itself in EPZA vs. Dulay, 149
SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its earlier ruling in
National Housing Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29, 1983, on
the validity of certain presidential decrees regarding the
determination of just compensation. In the much earlier case of
Philippine Trust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the
Court revoked its holding in Involuntary Insolvency of Mariano Velasco
& Co., 55 Phil 353, November 29, 1930, regarding the relation of
the insolvency law with the then Code of Civil Procedure and with the
Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246
SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of standing
to petitioner-organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110,
May 5, 1994.” Id., at 780.
[11] Ibid.
[12] 129 Phil. 507, 516 (1967).
[13] G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146, & L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.
[14] G.R. No. 160427, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 319, 326.
[15] Ibid.
[16] G.R. No. 155855, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 92.
[17] Id., at 104. Relatedly, the Court held that “[c]ontests
which do not involve the election, returns and qualifications of
elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of the judicial or
quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative agencies”. Ibid.
[18] See e.g., Memorandum of Oppositors-Intervenors Senators
Pimentel, Jr., et. al., pp. 19-22; Memorandum for Intervenor Senate of
the Philippines, pp. 34-35.
[19] See 1987 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26(1). See also Section 19[1]. 1987 Const, Art. VIII.
[20] See e.g., Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941);
Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al., 116 Phil. 736, 741 (1962).
[21] See Tio v. VRB, G.R. No. L-75697, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA
208, 214-215; citing Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 8
A.L.R. 466, 470. See also Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Nos. 147387 & 152161, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 503, 519.
[22] “As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction
of the one title - one subject rule.” Tatad v. Secretary of Department
of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359 (1997).
[23] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815; 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
[24] Id. at 337. I have previously expressed my own doubts in
relying on the constitutional or legislative deliberations as a
definitive source of construction. “It is easy to selectively cite
passages, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a
misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous. Minority or
solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude
witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by
the sole virtue of their publication in the authoritative congressional
record. Hence, resort to legislative deliberations is allowable when
the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave room for doubt on
the real intent of the legislature.” Southern Cross Cement Corporation
v. Phil. Cement Manufacturers, G.R. No. G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004,
434 SCRA 65, 95.
[25] 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
[26] Id. at 215.
[27] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 23,
at 338; citing Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203 S.W. 2d
734, 356 Mo. 808.
[28] See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
[29] G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365.
[30] Id., at 377. Emphasis supplied.
[31] See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
[32] From the “Funeral Oration” by Pericles, as recorded by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War.
[33] H. Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (1980 ed.), at 95.
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