RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
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ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
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ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
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ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
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BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
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LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
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|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
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|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
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|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
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PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
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RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
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|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
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|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
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|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
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|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
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INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
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SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
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JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
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|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
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|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
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S E PA R A T E O P I N I O N
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VELASCO, JR., J.:
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Introduction
The
fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty
of the people, depends on the choices it makes between these opposite
principles: absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the
restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
—John Acton
In this thorny matter of the people’s initiative, I concur with the
erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno
upholding the people’s initiative and raise some points of my own.
The issue of the people’s power to propose amendments to the
Constitution
was once discussed in the landmark case of Santiago v.
COMELEC.[1] Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before
the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the
pronouncements made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation,
and its proponents and opponents will understandably take all measures
to advance their position and defeat that of their opponents. The
wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The
only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the present
step taken by the proponents of Charter Change, which is the People’s
Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the
1987 Constitution
:
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Amendments to this
Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph
of that section had been fulfilled. It determined that Congress
had not provided for the implementation of the exercise of the people’s
initiative, when it held that
Republic Act No. 6735
,
or “The Initiative and Referendum Act,” was “inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation.”[2]
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With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735
is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it should not have been considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws
in the drafting of the law, in the failings of the way the law was
structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was
inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators’ intent,
but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The
Court then saw the inclusion of the
Constitution
in
R A 6735
as an afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not
be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The
difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the
intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution
:
to give the people the power to propose amendments as they saw
fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the
intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of a statute.[3] The intent of the legislature was
clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically
struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The
Court focused on what
R A 6735
was not, and lost sight of what
R A 6735
was.
It is my view that the reading of
R A 6735
in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a basic
precept of statutory construction that statutes should be construed not
so much according to the letter that killeth but in line with the
purpose for which they have been enacted.[4] The reading of the
law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal
of upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to
propose amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with the
Constitution
itself. It should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the
people, and lets their cries for change go unheard, especially when the
Constitution
itself grants them that power.
The court’s ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present
petition because the fallo in the Santiago case is limited to the
Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et al., which
sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the “Petition to Amend
the
Constitution
,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative”
filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the
Court made the following conclusion, viz:cralaw:red
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition or initiative on amendments on the
Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be
given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to
provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that
system.
In the said case, the Court’s fallo states as follows:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
(a) GRANTING the instant petition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of
the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
(d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996
is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED
against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in
this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict between
the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former
prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the
disposition, not on the body, of the decision.[5] The dispositive
portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of
execution. The other parts of the decision may be resorted to in
order to determine the ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where
there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must
prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is
the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering
nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.[6]
A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is
an informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail
against its final order or decision. While the two may be
combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the
judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and
conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its
decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the
judgment itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a
decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those
of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter
in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and
generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed
to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as
expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.[7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately
becomes apparent that the disposition in the latter case categorically
made permanent the December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued
against the COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally
incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC
“from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments.” Undeniably, the perpetual proscription against
the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on
Charter Change through a People’s Initiative is just a conclusion and
cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench on its
constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the
Constitution.
R. A. 6735
gave the COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the
petition on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the
petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from
entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative under
R. A. 6735
and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon
by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for
certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said
petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law
has not been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though
considered inadequate in the Santiago case.
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Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of
PIRMA v. Commission on Elections[8] confirmed the statement of the
Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was “permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments.” Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained
in a Minute Resolution which reads:cralaw:red
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
Discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it
only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to “dispositions” in the
March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate, the dispositions in the
Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO
being made permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a
permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on
amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed in the
Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18,
1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of
RA 6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but
certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative
petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be
considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed
under RA 6735, since only amendments to the Constitution may be the
subject of a people’s initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the
Constitution; it is merely an attempt to amend it. The term
amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the
people’s efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,[9] explained:cralaw:red
Strictly speaking, the act
of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions
of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of
the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only
some of its important provisions. But whatever results the
revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried
out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of
all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be
altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced
with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of
changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of
the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential
on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.
In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the
entire Constitution. It was never its intention to revise the whole
Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few
provisions in our fundamental charter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that
pertain to the sovereign people’s political rights, courts must lean
more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people’s right
to exercise their sovereign power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty
and thus deserves the highest respect even from the courts. It is
not something that can be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over
by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of
the law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the
People’s Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153
and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition
for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether
or not the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is
sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required
by RA 6735.
It is time to let the people’s voice be heard once again as it was
twenty years ago. And should this voice demand a change in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand in its way.
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
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[1] G.R. No. 127535, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[2] Id.
[3] Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 196, 202.
[4] United Harbor Pilots’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763,
November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 522, 533.
[5] PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales,
G. R. No. 109648, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 155, 166-167.
[6] Id.
[7] Florentino v. Rivera, et al., G. R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 522, 529.
[8] G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
[9] V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concept 46 (1962).
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