RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO
B.
AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,
Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR.
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA,
Intervenor.
x-------------------------------------------x
|
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson
Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson,
Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented
by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of
Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of
Health Action for Human Rights,
Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT
INCIONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)
and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III,
JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG MASANG
PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL
BINAY,
SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR.,
and
RENE
A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
-versus- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
ROMEO A.
BRAWNER,
RENE V.
SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER,
and
John
Doe and Peter
Doe,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x
|
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato
Puno, that the Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC[1] is not a
binding precedent. However, it is my position that even if
Santiago were reversed and
Republic Act No. 6735
(
R. A. 6735
) be held as sufficient law for the purpose of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution
, the petition for initiative in this case must nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with
R. A. 6735
, even as they blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged people’s initiative. Section 5(b) of
R. A. 6735
requires that “[a] petition for an initiative on the
1987 Constitution
must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.” On the other hand, Section 5(c)[2] of the same
law requires that the petition should state, among others, the
proposition[3] or the “contents or text of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed.” If we
were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the
Constitution
,
as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the
required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the
proposed changes to the
Constitution However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.
chan robles virtual law library
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they
printed a mere 100,000 copies of the text of the proposed changes to
the
Constitution
According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents
all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which
the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if
he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to the signature
sheets which were distributed for signing, he said that he merely
assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for
certain whether their representatives complied with this requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to
this Court, indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed
changes was not attached to the signature sheets. All that the
signature sheets contained was the general proposition and abstract,
which falls short of the full text requirement of
R. A. 6735 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional
changes in the petition for initiative to be signed by the people
cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII,
Section 2 of the
Constitution
unequivocally states that “[a]mendments to this
Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein.” Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution
,
they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are
proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a general
idea of the proposed changes, as the
Constitution
speaks of a “direct” proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the
Constitution
left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative
to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed
that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendments would be shown
to the people during the process of signature gathering. Thus –chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of
the complete committee report provides: “upon petition of at least 10
percent of the registered voters.” How will we determine that 10
percent has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire,
is it by signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some
voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when
they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.[4]
It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of
R. A. 6735
,
the full text of the proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or
attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the
petition must be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning
and effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free,
intelligent and well-informed choice on the matter.
chan robles virtual law library
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of
the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard
against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed
changes is contained in or attached to the petition, intercalations and
riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the
proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have
been fully apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud,
corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum process, such
provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to
substantially comply therewith is fatal.[5] The failure of
petitioners in this case to comply with the full text requirement
resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of
R. A. 6735
:cralaw:red
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:cralaw:red
(a)
No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; x x x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the
Constitution
, has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)[6] of the
Constitution[7]
To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away
with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one
bill, so that those favoring one provision would be compelled to adopt
the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both
provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing
alone, could succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is
essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the
electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the
initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed
within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in turn
guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope
and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition
for initiative relate only to one subject matter, that is – the shift
from presidential to a parliamentary system of government.
According to petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are merely
incidental to this main proposal and are reasonably germane and
necessary thereto.[8] An examination of the text of the proposed
changes reveals, however, that this is not the case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The proposed changes to the
Constitution
cover other subjects that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the
petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a
parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes include the
abolition of one House of Congress,[9] and the convening of a
constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the
Constitution.[10] Also included within its terms is an omnibus
declaration that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and
VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of
government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.
chan robles virtual law library
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to
relate only to a shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to
affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the
constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a
shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily
result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A
parliamentary system can exist in many different “hybrid” forms of
government, which may or may not embrace unicameralism.[11] In
other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure and
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor
effect of the other. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly
with the proposed change in our system of government. As a
subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the
Constitution presents a range of issues that is far removed from the
subject of a shift in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is
supposed to convene and propose amendments to the
Constitution
after the proposed change in the system of government has already taken
place. This only goes to show that the convening of the
constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a change to a
parliamentary system of
government. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII
which are inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The
statement does not specify what these inconsistencies and amendments
may be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could
eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The subject and
scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled out with
certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on
the other constitutional provisions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people’s initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the
Constitution
,
but a revision thereof. The distinction between an amendment and
revision was explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:cralaw:red
“Strictly speaking, the act
of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions
of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the
whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some
of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the
original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That
intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered
or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.
The act of amending a
constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to
consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve
specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their
effect.”[12]
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between
amendment and revision has indeed guided us throughout our
constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two
terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past
constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution.
The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was
Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling
out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either
amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein
described. Although the distinction between the two terms was
theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as material
because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes
by choosing between the two modalities.
However, it is different now under the
1987 Constitution
Apart from providing for the two modes of either Congress constituting
itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional
convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes to the
Constitution
This mode refers to the people’s right to propose amendments to the
fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.
chan robles virtual law library
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or
revision under the past constitutions is not determinative of what the
two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose
either amendments or revision. The changes introduced to both the
Constitutions of
1935
and 1973
could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the
authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since
the same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the
1987 Constitution
clearly limits the right of the people to directly propose
constitutional changes to amendments only. We must consequently
not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to
the present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are
revisory or amendatory in nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive Secretary[13]
related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new
charter proposed by a constitutional convention. The authority or
right of the constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision
was not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what
constitutes “amendments” for the purpose of a people’s initiative,
therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior
experience. We must thus confine ourselves to Dean Sinco’s basic
articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco’s explanation that a revision may either be
of the whole or only part of the Constitution. The part need not
be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it
only involves some of the important provisions. For as long as
the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of
all the provisions of the Constitution “to determine which should be
altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced
with an entirely new one,” the proposed change may be deemed a revision
and not merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that
the same may be considered as either an amendment or revision. In
so determining, another overriding factor is the “original intention
and plan authorized to be carried out” by the proposed changes.
If the same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see
which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on
the entire document, then the same constitutes a revision and not a
mere amendment of the
Constitution
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the
quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in assessing what may be
considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we
focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also
consider what it means in relation to the entire document. No
clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and
each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own peculiar
conditions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that
the proposed changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply
on an arithmetical appraisal of the specific provisions which it seeks
to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,[14] the
California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination
of quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional
changes, in order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely
amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the proposed
changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the
California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or
substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced.
However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects that the
proposed initiative measure would have on California’s basic plan of
government. It observed that the proposal would alter the checks
and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and
mixed powers to an independent commission created under the proposed
measure. Consequently, the proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as
broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a
substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of
California. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by
the California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.[15]
Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called, would vest
in the United States Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers
of the California courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in
that state. It was observed that although quantitatively, the
proposition did “not seem so extensive as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration
of numerous existing provisions,” the same, nonetheless, “would
substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state
Constitution as a document of independent force and effect.”
Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board
of Equalization,[16] the Raven court said:cralaw:red
“apart from a measure
effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving many
constitutional articles, ‘even a relatively simple enactment may
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which
purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to
a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the
measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such
change.’” (Underscoring supplied and citations
omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court
examines both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed
measure on its constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in
either respect could amount to a revision.[17]
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same
manner. The experience of the courts in California is not far
removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out
to differentiate between amendment and revision. It is actually
consistent, not only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but
also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred
to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.[18] We must
thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our
Constitution
in both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether
these are simple or substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded
from the people’s right to directly propose amendments to the
fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in
determining the nature of the proposed changes. These tests are
consistent with Dean Sinco’s traditional concept of amendment and
revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision “may result in
the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part of
it, or perhaps only some of its provisions.” In any case, he
continues, “the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is
the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.”
Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of
the proposed changes. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by
the proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of the
eighteen (18) articles of the
1987 Constitution
,
namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive
Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth
transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a
parliamentary-unicameral structure of government. The
quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither broad nor
extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987
Constitution.
However,
it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious
qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The initiative
petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic
governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation
to government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple
effect that will strike at the very foundation of our basic
constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible
constitutional revision that may not be effected through a people’s
initiative. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners’ main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of
government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. An
examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of
the executive and legislative departments into one parliament that will
be elected on the basis of proportional representation. No term
limits are set for the members of parliament except for those elected
under the party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided by
law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state,
but the head of government is the Prime Minister. The latter and
his cabinet shall be elected from among the members of parliament and
shall be responsible to parliament for the program of government.
chan robles virtual law library
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the
executive and legislature shall be one and the same, such that
parliament will be the paramount governing institution. What this
implies is that there will be no separation between the law-making and
enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated
between the executive and legislature in a presidential form of
government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in the
fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be
eliminated. The workings of government shall instead be
controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in the
parliament. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers
among the three branches of government. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws.
This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in
one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse
in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions.
In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is
intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent
despotism and obtain efficiency.[19]
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of
formal institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of
the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet
are drawn from parliament. There are no effective limits to what
the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the
parliamentary majority. This goes against the central principle
of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of
government and provides for counteraction among the three
branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary
systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the
underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless
radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of
government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change.
It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and
involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our
constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would
be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure.[20] It cannot, by any standard, be
deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is
to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document
which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered.[21] (Underscoring
supplied) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise
shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more far-reaching
changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to
simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then
there would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent
assembly to propose further amendments to the Constitution. It
should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away
and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a
bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government. The
inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents’ plan to consider
all provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its
provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered
by the alleged people’s initiative. The proposal to convene a
constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically
jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky
grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their
proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the
presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend
to the “fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican
state.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of
government is therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect
of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to
the Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the
intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the
constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason
exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly what it
purports to be. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is no question here that only amendments to the
Constitution
may be undertaken through a people’s initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in the
Constitution
itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a
comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of
Article XVII, which state:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution
may be proposed by:cralaw:red
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
x x x
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval
of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the
Constitution
is limited to amendments and does not include a revision thereof.
Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to
distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section
1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments
and a revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent
assembly or calling for a constitutional convention. Section 2,
on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose
only amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments
amounting to revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope
between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a
cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide differing fields
of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the
Constitution
We need not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to
see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked. We should
thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this
distinction. Again, McFadden[22] is instructive: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
“The
differentiation required is not merely between two words; more
accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective
fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary
principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a
substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative
procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be
understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a
field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this
state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII
and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable
bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against
improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that
there was a real difference between amendment and revision. We find
nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911
(Art. IV, Section 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On
the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously
preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the
power to propose and vote on "amendments to the Constitution" is
reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while
leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to
constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will
be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of
article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any change less than a
total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity
the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation
involving the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of
the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts.”
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the
1987 Constitution, with the provisions on amendments and revisions
under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be
any clearer when they limited people’s initiative to mere amendments of
the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this
regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people’s voice,
as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a “constitution of
sovereignty” because it defines the constitutional meaning of
“sovereignty of the people.” It is through these provisions that
the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign
will and have canalized their powers which would otherwise be
plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign people have
decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise of
their sovereign power.[23] They are thus bound by the
constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or
thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed by the
Constitution itself.[24]
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to
the Constitution through people’s initiative because their
representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do so.
While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision
delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress,
Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign
power. In the words of Cooley:cralaw:red
x x x Although by their
constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign
powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested
themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so
far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the
governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to
and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by
them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the
legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people,
acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when
expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves
have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which,
consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed
out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however
large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working
of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode
than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it
would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed
by the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate
government.[25] (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of “the spring rising above its
source.” Nor is it one where the people’s sovereign power has
been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In
choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of
even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since
self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power.
The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by
virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they
themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy
their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a
revolutionary situation.[26]
It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and
republican state.[27] Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of
direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are
a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the
expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional,
but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the
powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and
keeper of the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[1] G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[2] Sec5. Requirements.— x x x
(c) The petition shall state the following:cralaw:red
c.1. contents or
text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.2. the proposition;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract
or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition.
[3] SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x
(d)
“Proposition” is the measure proposed by the voters.
[4] I Record, Constitutional Commission 387-389 (July 9, 1986).
[5] Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965 OK 118 (1965).
[6] Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
[7] The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his sponsorship presentation of H.B. No. 21505, thus:cralaw:red
x x x
D. Prohibited Subjects.
The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the subject
of an initiative or referendum petition. A petition that embraces more
than one subject cannot be submitted to the electorate as it would be
violative of the constitutional proscription on passing bills
containing more than one subject, and statutes involving emergency
measures cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after its
effectivity. [Journal and record of the house of representatives,
Second Regular Session, Vol. 6, p. 975 (February 14, 1989).]
chan robles virtual law library
[8] Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.
[9] The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution
states that Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members
of parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. No
counterpart provision was provided for members of the House of
Representatives who, as members of the interim parliament under the
proposed changes, shall schedule the elections for the regular
parliament in its discretion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[10] The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution
states that the interim parliament shall convene to propose amendments
to, or revisions of, the Constitution within 45 days from ratification
of the proposed changes.
[11] The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of Lords and the House of Commons.
[12] Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44,
quoted in Separate Opinion of J. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.
chan robles virtual law library
[13] 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
[14] 196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
[15] 801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
[16] 583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).
[17] Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
[18] Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the
distinction between amendment and revision, Justice Antonio relied not
only in the analogy presented in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.
2d 322, but cited also the seminal ruling of the California Supreme
Court in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.
[19] Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p.
71, citing Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 57.
[20] The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 1161.
[21] Id.
[22] Supra note 14.
[23] The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st
ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 567, citing B. Schwartz, I The
Powers of Government (1963).
[24] 16 C.J.S. §3 at 24.
[25] 14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.
[26] A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., p. A15.
[27] Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
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