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PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
G.R.
Nos.
138539-40
ANTONIO C.
ESTELLA,
D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The Case Antonio C. Estella appeals the August 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69) in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I. The trial court found him guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The Sheriff is directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In Criminal Case No. RTC 2144-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and the Information dated 07 January 1997 filed against him for violation of P.D. 1866 is dismissed with costs de oficio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live ammunitions, subject of the offense, are ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The Information dated January 7, 1997, charged appellant thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996 at about 11:15 o’clock in the morning, at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, in the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control, one (1) tin can labeled ‘CLASSIC’ containing twenty (20) small bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 589.270 grams each wrapped with a piece of reading material; one (1) tin can labeled ‘CLASSIC’ containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 41.126 grams; two (2) white sando plastic bag each containing one (1) [brick] of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.710 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper; [o]ne (1) white sando plastic bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.820 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper, all in the total of 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana, without any authority to possess the same."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred After the Information had been read to him in Filipino, a language he fully understood,[4] appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte,[5] pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 11, 1997. After due trial, the RTC convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana), but acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms. On November 4, 1998, his counsel filed a Notice of Appeal.[6] The Facts Version of the Prosecutionchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In its Brief,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "Prior to November 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnaceha accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the search warrant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred On their way to Purok
Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair located
about
two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of
appellant,
and being rented by appellant’s live-in partner, named Eva. They
approached
appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed
appellant
the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron
asked
appellant if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so,
to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years, identified the house depicted on a photograph as that house belonging to the accused."[9] Ruling of the Trial Court In finding appellant guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, the court a quo relied heavily on the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Intelligence and Investigation Officer SPO1 Antonio Buloron. He was among the members of the police team that searched appellant’s alleged house. Since the defense failed to present proof of any intent on the part of SPO1 Buloron to falsely impute to appellant such a serious crime, the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the police officer’s testimony.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Moreover, the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of the place named in the search warrant led the police to the house. Thus, appellant could not deny that he owned it.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, the lower court ruled that the search warrant did not cover the seized firearm, making it inadmissible against appellant. He was thus acquitted of the charge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Hence, this recourse.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The Issueschanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred A. The
trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the conjectural
and
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court’s Rulingchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Main Issue:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Once again, this Court is confronted with a situation that involves a well-enshrined dogma in our Constitution: the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures.[12] The exclusionary rule prescribed by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of this right.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The conviction or the
acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity of the police
officers’
search and seizure, as well as the admissibility of the evidence
obtained
by virtue thereof. Without that evidence, the prosecution would not be
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant claims that the hut,[14] which was searched by the police and where the subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another house[15] as his real residence. To support his claim, he presents a document[16] that shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that just because "appellant has another house in a place away from the hut that was searched does not necessarily mean that the hut is not occupied by him or under his full control."[17] The prosecution cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that place, to show that the hut in question belongs to appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. "Narding" Estella.[18] We cannot sustain the OSG’s supposition that since it was being rented by the alleged live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control of it. In the first place, other than SPO1 Buloron’s uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant -- if he indeed had any. Moreover, the testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the position of the prosecution. We quote from his testimony:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "Q Do you know who is
the owner of that house?
Q Who is that Narding
Estella?
Q And you know that
that has been rented to people?
Q Now, so far how many
people rented that place or that house?
Q Why did you know that
that place was rented?
Q How long has Eva been
renting that house?
Q Do you know who was
living with Eva?
Q So, what you know
is that Eva lives alone in that house?
Q And you do not know
anybody who is renting that house?
Q And you do not know
if the accused was renting it or not?
At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella and rented by someone named Eva. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was under his full control, is merely conjectural and speculative. We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion or conjecture.[20] To lead to conviction, evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt.[21] It must engender moral certainty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Neither do we find merit in the OSG’s argument that appellant cannot deny ownership or control of the hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting on a rocking chair and drinking coffee.[22] Indeed, to uphold this proposition would be to stretch our imagination to the extreme.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The OSG maintains that when appellant was "shown the search warrant and asked about the existence of prohibited drug in his possession, appellant went inside the hut, took his stock of marijuana and turned it over to the police officers."[23] This, according to the prosecution, clearly showed that he was not only occupying the hut, but was in fact using it to store the prohibited drug.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from assessing the probative value of witnesses’ testimonies on the basis of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs).[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court erred in adopting the prosecution’s dubious story. It failed to see patent inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies about the search undertaken.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred A review of the TSNs shows that SPO1 Buloron, the prosecution's principal witness, testified that appellant had allegedly gone inside the hut; and that the latter had done so to get his stock of illegal drugs, which he turned over to the police. Ironically, Captain Barnachea, who was purposely presented by the prosecution to corroborate SPO1 Buloron's story, belied it when he testified thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "PROS. QUINTILLAN:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q And you saw him and
then the search warrant was presented, isn’t it?
Q And when it was presented
what did Tony Estella do?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q And when Tony was
shown that search warrant what did he do immediately after being shown
that search warrant?
Q And when he stood
up what else did he do?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q And where did Antonio
Estella go when the police entered the house?
Q And how far is that house from Antonio Estella?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred INTERPRETER:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
COURT:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BOTH COUNSEL:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PROS. QUINTILLAN:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is undisputed that even before arriving at the hut, the police officers were already being assisted by Barangay Captain Barnachea. Thus, it was highly improbable for him not to see personally appellant’s alleged voluntary surrender of the prohibited drug to the authorities. And yet, his testimony completely contradicted the policemen’s version of the events. He testified that appellant, after being served the search warrant, remained outside the hut and did nothing. In fact, the former categorically stated that when the police officers had gone inside the hut to conduct the search, appellant remained seated on a rocking chair outside.[27]Barnachea’s statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1 Buloron’s claim that, after being apprised of the contents of the search warrant, appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the police.[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Apart from the testimony of Barnachea -- which contradicted rather than validated the story of SPO1 Buloron -- no other evidence was presented to corroborate the latter’s narration of the events. Without any independent or corroborative proof, it has little or no probative value at all.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In a criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable, and in harmony with the usual course of human experience -- not by mere conjecture or speculation.[29] While the guilty should not escape, the innocent should not suffer.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Search Incident to Lawful Arrestchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The OSG argues that "even assuming that appellant was not the occupant of the hut, the fact remains that he voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. After appellant had surrendered the prohibited stuff, the police had a right to arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the immediate vicinity of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful objects as an incident to the lawful arrest."[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. As earlier adverted to, there is no convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecution’s story.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy.[32] The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter’s person -- that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.[33]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred In the leading case Chimel v. California,[34] the Supreme Court of the United States of America laid down this rule:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred There is no comparable
justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than
that
in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through
all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself."[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Presence of the
Accused or the Witnesses During the Searchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Objections to the Legality of the Searchchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Finally, the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence seized through that search because, during the trial, he did not raise these issues.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality of the search. In fact, when SPO1 Buloron was presented as a prosecution witness, the former’s counsel objected to the offer of the latter’s testimony on items allegedly confiscated during the search. Appellant’s counsel argued that these items, which consisted of the marijuana and the firearm, had been seized illegally and were therefore inadmissible.[37]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Further, in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits,[38] appellant once again questioned the legality of the search conducted by the police, a search that had yielded the evidence being used against him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Finally, on October 21, 1997, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence[39] reiterating his objection to the search and to the eventual use against him of the evidence procured therefrom.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty.[40] Not only did its evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[41] To overcome such presumption, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of the court to set them free.[42] This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. Estella for insufficiency of evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred Puno, (Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Penned by Judge Rodolfo V. Toledano.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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