PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
EN BANC
RODOLFO C.
FARIÑAS,
MANUEL M. GARCIA,
FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO,
AND AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
AS MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND ALSO AS
TAXPAYERS,
IN THEIR OWN BEHALF
AND IN
REPRESENTATION
OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE MINORITY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
147387
December 10, 2003
-versus-
THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE,
AND SECRETARY
GENERAL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x.
CONG. GERRY A.
SALAPUDDIN,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
152161
December 10, 2003
-versus-
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Before the Court
are two petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section
14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly
repeals
Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 67.
Candidates
holding elective office.- Any elective official, whether national or
local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petition for
certiorari
and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C.
Fariñas,
Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the
time
of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority
bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the
Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives
Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the
Department
of the Interior and Local Government, (DILG), the Secretary of the
Senate
and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petition for prohibition
in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member
of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the
COMELEC.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Legislative
History
of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep.
Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices,"
is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
House Bill
(HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION
PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881,
OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE 'OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,' AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;"[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Senate Bill (SB)
No.
1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST,
PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Bicameral Conference
Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate[3]
and sixteen (16) members of the House of Representatives,[4]
was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the House and
Senate
versions of the bill.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 29, 2000,
the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report,[5]
signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as
reconciled
and approved by the conferees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the plenary session
of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras
proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report.
Rep.
Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House
could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol
thereupon
moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference
Committee
in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed
his
objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority
of the House approved the return of the report to the Bicameral
Conference
Committee for proper action.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In view of the proposed
amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees[7]
to the Bicameral Conference Committee.[8]
Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R.
Bunye,
the House elected another set of conferees[9]
to the Bicameral Conference Committee.[10]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 7, 2001,
during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report
on the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep.
Dilangalen
observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral
Conference
Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was
a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral
Conference
Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine
the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the
approval
of the report until the other members were given a copy thereof.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After taking up other
pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral
Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB
No.
1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3
negative
votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps.
Fariñas
and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider.
Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts
on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep.
Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference
Committee
Report and asked if this procedure was regular.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the same day, the
Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on
the
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thereafter, Rep.
Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel,
Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R.
Belmonte,
Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B.
Barbo
and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P.
Nazareno
as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742,"
and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Petitioners'
Case
The petitioners now
come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election
Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
Article
VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed
in its title.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to the petitioners,
the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep.
Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the
dissimilarity
in the subject matter of Rep.
Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the other. Rep.
Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use
of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run
for
an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity
by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate
of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of Rep.
Act No. 9006.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners also
assert that Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 66.
Candidates
holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public
appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
They contend that
Section
14 of Rep.
Act
No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal
of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the
one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue
in
public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for
another
elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained;
thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains — they are still
considered
ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates
of candidacy.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners assert
that Rep.
Act
No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended
its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be
declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that
"this Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the
due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the petitioners
maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed.
The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13]
that Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
"Accountability
of Public Officers:"[14]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 1.
Public
office is a public trust. - Public officers and employees must at all
times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest
lives.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, the
respondents
Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
for
not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate
during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom,
upon
the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The Respondents'
Arguments
For their part, the
respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this
Court
to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the
petitioners
have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for the
fact
that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members
of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that
they
have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep.
Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers
since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Invoking the "enrolled
bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners' allegations
that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep.
Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the
Speaker
of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the
respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof
beyond
cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondents contend
that Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate
Section
26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The title of Rep.
Act No. 9006, "An
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it
encompasses
all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the
filing
of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
They argue that the
repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep.
Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect
of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by his
filing
of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he
is permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto
resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep.
Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of
considering
an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing
of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the
repeal
of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing
as
they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for
any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective
positions,
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondents assert
that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep.
Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title
of
the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general
subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and
every
means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution
merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to
find
expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to the
respondents,
Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66
of the Omnibus
Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection
clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to
appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these
two
sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of
their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive
officials
are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be
similarly
treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons
or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights
conferred
and responsibilities imposed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Further, Section 16,
or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep.
Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution
as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property.
Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of
violations
thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be observed,
i.e.,
charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a
hearing
before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any
case,
the issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet,
been charged with violation of Rep.
Act No. 9006.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the
respondents
submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
excluding
from the Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate during the
May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep.
Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until
declared
otherwise by the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's Ruling
Before resolving the
petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural
issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the
legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitions were filed
by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives,
and as taxpayers and registered voters.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Generally, a party
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.[15]
The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the
constitutionality
of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy
is "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult
constitutional questions."[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, being merely
a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
"overarching significance to our society,"[17]
had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary
of
the Department of Energy,[18]
this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took
cognizance
of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then
Senator
Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives
assailing
the constitutionality of Rep.
Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other
Purposes).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court likewise took
cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives
which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep.
Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)
in Chiongbian v. Orbos.[19]
Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then
members
of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the
validity
of Rep. Act
No.
7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Members of Congress,
such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to
challenge
the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
government
agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming
Corporation,[21]
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[22]
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[23]
Albano v. Reyes,[24]
and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Certainly, the principal
issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo[26]
as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on
accountability
of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies
this
Court's adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural
matter
on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months
away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the
same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite
apropos:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x
x x All await the decision of this Court
on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance
which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of
suits,
strong reasons of public policy demand that its constitutionality
x x x be now resolved. It may
likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable
necessity
for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away,
reinforce
our stand."[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Every statute is
presumed
valid.[28]
The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible
and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is equally well-established,
however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution,
have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by
the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.[30]
And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the
Constitution, it is the judiciary's solemn and sacred duty to nullify
the
same.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Proceeding from these
guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised
by
the petitions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the core of the controversy
is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep.
Act No. 9006, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 14.
Sections
67 and 85 of the Omnibus
Election Code
(Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic
Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first
proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential
decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof
inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or
amended
accordingly.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The repealed provision,
Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 67.
Candidates
holding elective office.- Any elective official, whether national or
local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 26(1).
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription
is
aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches.
The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.[33]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To determine whether
there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down
the rule that —chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Constitutional
provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object.
Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract
or
index of the Act.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The title of Rep.
Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices."
Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles
but
also the objectives thereof:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 2.
Declaration
of Principles.- The State shall, during the election period, supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for
the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or
ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media
time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public
information
campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful
and credible elections.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The State shall ensure
that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court is convinced
that the title and the objectives of Rep.
Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section
67 of the Omnibus
Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said
repeal
of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the
title be a complete index of its content.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The purported dissimilarity
of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions
of Rep. Act
No.
9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for
election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule.
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.[37]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The deliberations of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are
particularly
instructive:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEN.
LEGARDA-LEVISTE:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Yes, Mr. Chairman,
I
just wanted to clarify.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
So all we're
looking
for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would
cover
this provision referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election
Code, is that correct? That's all. Because I believe x
x
xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (REP.
SYJUCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are looking for
an
appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEN.
LEGARDA-LEVISTE:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Because I really
do
not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term
"fair
election practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by
Senator
Roco, those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an
election
practice and, therefore, I think, I'm very comfortable with the title
"Fair
Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so that we
don't come back again until we find the title. I mean, it's one
provision
which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but
this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as
the title implies.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (REP.
SYJUCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Yes.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEN.
LEGARDA-LEVISTE:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
So I would want to
beg
the House contingent, let's get it over with. To me, ha, it's not a
very
touchy issue. For me, it's even a very correct provision. I feel very
comfortable
with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to
appeal
to the x x x para
matapos
na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title. Is that what
you're
x x x?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (REP.
SYJUCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It's not the title
per
se, it's the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. I'm
happy
that there is already one comfortable senator there among x x
x
several of us were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that
when we rise from this Bicam that we're all comfortable with it.cralaw:red
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Yes. Anyway, let's
listen
to Congressman Marcos.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MARCOS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mr. Chairman, may
I
just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of
provisions
deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the
complete
title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to
enhance
the holding of free, orderly, honest x x x elections
through
fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to
discuss
later one.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Secondly, I think
the
Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is
perfectly
adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public
office
that may be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Surely this
provision
in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus
Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I
think
that in the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and
it should not be considered a rider.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEN.
LEGARDA-LEVISTE:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I agree, Mr.
Chairman.
I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it
is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of
this
bill. And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to
this
so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair
election
practices because x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Yeah, I think what
is
on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for
a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection
on constitutionality. I think that's the theory. So, there is
acceptance
of this.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Maybe we should
not
call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the
special
provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MARCOS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I think we just
change
the Section 1, the short title.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Also, Then we say
—
on the short title of the Act, we say x
x
xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MARCOS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
What if we say
fair
election practices? Maybe that should be changed x
x
xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
O, sige, fine,
fine.
Let's a brainstorm. Equal x
x
xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. PADILLA:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mr. Chairman, why
don't
we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful
and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa
known
as the Omnibus Election Code?"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Why don't we
remove
"fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. PICHAY:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That's not an
election
practice. That's a limitation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ah — ayaw mo iyong
practice.
O, give me another noun.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MARCOS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Fair Election.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
O, Fair Election
Act.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MACARAMBON:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nagbi-brainstorm
tayo
dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of
free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public
service
through fair election practices?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. PICHAY:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Fair election
practices?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MACARAMBON:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Yeah. To ensure
equal
opportunity for public service through fair x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Wala nang
practices
nga.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. PICHAY:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Wala nang
practices.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It shall be cited
as
Fair Election Act.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(Informal
discussions)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. PICHAY:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Approve na iyan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Done. So, okay na
iyon.
The title will be "Fair Election Act."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The rest wala nang
problema
ano?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VOICES:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Wala na.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MACARAMBON:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Wala na iyong
practices?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Wala na, wala na.
Mahina
tayo sa practice, eh. O, wala na? We will clean up.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MARCOS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Title?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The short title,
"This
Act x x x"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (REP.
SYJUCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
You're back to
your
No. 21 already.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
REP. MARCOS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The full title,
the
same?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
ROCO):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Iyon na nga. The
full
title is "An Act to enhance the holding x
x
x" That's the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short
title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act."[38]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The legislators
considered
Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to
be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause
with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into
law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe
that
the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government
policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of
the
government.[39]
It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether
it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve
the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within
its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters
for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.[40]
Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of
the
Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra[41]
upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the
same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,
Congress
may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the
election
process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election
laws
— the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of
Congress
— is achieved.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the avowed
purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should
be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes,
the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
the legislators and the public.[42]
In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not
apprised
of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members
of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding
its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators
were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of
the
Omnibus
Election Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution[43]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners' contention,
that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining
to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution,
is tenuous.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The equal protection
of the law clause in the Constitution
is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.[44]
The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in
this manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The equal
protection
of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It
is
not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.[45]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Substantial
distinctions
clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom
only upon stringent conditions.[46]
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure[47]
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.[48]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Another substantial
distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the
Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers
and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging
in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part
in political and electoral activities.[49]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
By repealing Section
67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure
in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any
position
other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of
the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since the classification
justifying Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials,
is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the
equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.cralaw:red
The Enrolled Bill
Doctrine Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their
plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be
nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the
said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a. Creation
of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
b. No communication
from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by
the
BCC on November 29, 2000;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
c. The new Report
submitted
by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor without
copies
thereof being furnished the members;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC
has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was
not
signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its
senator-members
at the time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
e. There was no
meeting
actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was
instantly
made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
f. The Senate has
no
record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened
on November 23, 2000;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
g. The
"Effectivity"
clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise
bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were
couched
in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil
Code and jurisprudence, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, it was
surreptitiously
replaced in its final form as it appears in Section 16, R.
A. 9006, with the provision that "This Act shall take effect
immediately upon its approval;"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
h. The copy of the
compromise
bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members during
its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same Section 16
as it now appears in R.
A. 9006, but Section§ 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and
SB
1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
i. The alleged BCC
Report
presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a
detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure;" andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
j. The
disappearance
of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise bill
submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported
proposed
amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph
7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 12.
Limitation
on Elected Officials.- Any elected official who runs for president and
vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy.[50]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioners, thus,
urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is
not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a
bill
by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification
of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive
of its due enactment. A review of cases[51]
reveals the Court's consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds
no
reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the
irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress,
e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the
House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.[52]
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep.
Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates
its
ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,[53]
viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
But the
cases,
both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing
that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At
any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure
of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules
are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred The
Effectivity
Clause Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity"
clause (Section 16) of Rep.
Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take effect immediately
upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,[54]
this Court laid down the rule:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x x the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval,
or on any other date without its previous publication.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Publication is
indispensable
in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended
x
x x[55]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Following Article 2
of the Civil
Code[56]
and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep.
Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect
fifteen
days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general
circulation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In conclusion, it bears
reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into
the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the
legislative
branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged
on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative
power.[57]
No such transgression has been shown in this case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petitions
are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Annex "A," Petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Annex "B," id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Senators Raul S. Roco, Francisco S. Tatad, Vicente C. Sotto III,
Gregorio
B. Honasan, Robert S. Jaworski, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, Loren
Legarda-Leviste
and Sergio Osmeña III.
[4]
Representatives Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., Imee R. Marcos, Benasing O.
Macarambon,
Jr., Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Roseller L. Barinaga, Hussin U. Amin,
Edmundo
O. Reyes, Jr., Constantino G. Jaraula, Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles,
Francis
Joseph G. Escudero, Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, Ernesto A. Nieva,
Aniceto
G. Saludo, Eduardo R. Gullas, Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Sergio
Antonio
F. Apostol, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. and Roy Padilla, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Annex "C," Petition.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles
[6]
Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 62, February 5, 2001, pp.
12–13.chan
robles virtual law library chan robles
[7]
Representatives Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr., Jacinto V. Paras, Augusto
"Boboy"
Syjuco, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Carlos M. Padilla, Aniceto G. Saludo,
Jr., Gerardo S. Espina, Ricardo V. Quintos and Isidro S. Rodriguez, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
See note 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Representatives Carlos M. Padilla, Salvio B. Fortuno, Dante V. Liban,
Roan
I. Libarios, Nestor C. Ponce, Jr., Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Magtanggol
T.
Gunigundo and Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr.
[10]
See note 6 at 20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 64, February 7, 2001, p.
29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id. at 32–35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
202 SCRA 779 (1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
SECTION 1, ARTICLE XI, CONSTITUTION.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 (1962).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485
(2000);
Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmeña v.
Comelec,
199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v.
Carague,
196 SCRA 221 (1991); Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965).
[18]
281 SCRA 330 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
245 SCRA 253 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
235 SCRA 630 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
232 SCRA 110 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
235 SCRA 506 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
175 SCRA 264 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
246 SCRA 334 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835 (1969).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII, CONSTITUTION reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec.
1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality
of the Government.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
A rider is a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
(Alalayan
v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Alalayan v. NPC, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Emphasis ours.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Records of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions
of Senate Bill No. 1742 and House Bill No. 9000 (Committee on Electoral
Reforms), November 23, 2000, pp. 95–99.
[39]
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 US 422, 80 L Ed 772 (1935). See
also
Garcia v. Corona, 321 SCRA 218 (1999); Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 54
(1999);
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Morfe v.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws
(SECTION 1, ARTICLE III, CONSTITUTION).
[44]
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Ichong v. Hernandez, supra, citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations,
pp. 824–825.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
For example, under the Constitution, the grounds by which the tenure of
the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate may be
shortened
may be summarized as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
Sec. 16, Art. VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b)
Sec. 16(3), Art. VI: Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c)
Sec. 17, Art. VI: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the
appropriate
Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(d)
Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. VI: Voluntary renunciation of office.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Further,
under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution, the President and the
Vice-President,
along with other impeachable officers, may be removed from office "on
impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Section 46, Chapter 7, Title I, Subtitle A. Civil Service Commission,
Book
V of the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in part, that "No officer
or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except
for
cause as provided by law and after due process." Further, Section 23,
Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the 1987 Administrative
Code enumerates the "grave offenses" which are grounds for dismissal
upon
the commission of first offense as follows: dishonesty, gross neglect
of
duty, gross misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, falsification of official document,
physical
or mental incapacity or disability due to vicious habits, among others.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Officers and employees holding primarily confidential positions have
terms
of office which expire upon loss of confidence in them by the
appointing
authority. (Hernandez v. Villegas, 14 SCRA 544 [1965]).chan
robles virtual law library chan robles
[49]
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I Subsection A. Civil Service Commission,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)
reads
in full:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec.
55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service
including
members of the Armed Forces, shall engage, directly or indirectly, in
any
partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote
nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the
political
activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be
understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views
on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names
of
his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That
public
officers and employees holding political offices may take part in
political
and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions
from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving
subordinates
prohibited in the Election Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
MEMORANDUM of the Petitioners in G.R. No. 147387, pp. 19–20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra; Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA
131
(1969); Casco (Phil.) Inc. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
[52]
Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
277 SCRA 268 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
146 SCRA 446 (1986).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
Id. at 452.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This
Code shall take effect one year after publication.
[57]
See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, supra;
Tañada
v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997); Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991);
Osmeña
v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Luz Farms v. Secretary of the
Department
of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA
774
(1967).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chan
robles virtual law library chan robles
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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