PHILIPPINE SUPREME
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Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND
DIVISION
PROSPERITY CREDIT
RESOURCES, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 114170
January
15, 1999
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
AND METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC.,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
MENDOZA,
J.:
For review in this case
is a decision[1]
of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 28684-SP dated
November 26, 1993 setting aside a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95).
On August 3, 1984, petitioner
Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. gave a loan to private respondent
Metropolitan
Fabrics, Inc.[2]
To secure the payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged to
petitioner
seven parcels of land located at 685 Tandang Sora Avenue, Bo. Banlat,
Quezon
City.[3]
The lots comprise a commercial
compound
with Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road.
By October 27, 1987,
private respondent’s loan amounted to P10.5 million.[4]
As private respondent defaulted in the payment of the loan, petitioner
foreclosed the mortgage and, in the ensuing public bidding, became the
highest bidder and purchaser of the seven (7) lots subject of the
mortgage.
Later, private respondent
negotiated with petitioner for the redemption of three lots covered by
TCT Nos. 317705, 317706, and 317707,[5]
all located on the southern and middle portions of the compound. As the
reacquisition of these three lots by private respondent would leave the
remaining four lots on the northwestern side without access to Tandang
Sora Avenue, petitioner acceded to private respondent’s request on the
condition that petitioner be given a right of way on the existing
private
road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by private respondent.
The parties’ agreement was embodied in a Memorandum of Undertaking,
dated
September 18, 1987, the full text of which reads:[6]
MEMORANDUM
OF
UNDERTAKING
KNOW ALL MEN
THESE
PRESENTS:
That
METROPOLITAN
FABRICS, INC. is the registered owner of that certain land covered by
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 317709, more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land
(Lot 11 [Existing Road] of the consolidation-subdn. plan (LRC)
Pcs-27706,
approved as a non-subdn. project, being a portion of the consolidation
of Lots 373-E, (LRC) Psd-16383; 377-B, Fls-2163-D; 377-C-1,2,3, & 4
(LRC) Psd-5025; 777-C-5-A, & B, (LRC) Psd-9474; 384-A &
387-B-1,
(LRC) Psd-254813; 388-A & C, Psd-30663; 388-B-1,2,3,4 & 5,
Psd-54827;
389-A-1,2 & 3, 389-B-1 (LRC) Psd-10087; and 388-B-2-C, (LRC)
Psd-18842;
LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 5975) situated in the Bo. of Banlat, Quezon City,
Metro
Manila, Is. of Luzon . . . containing of an area of FIVE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (5,367)SQUARE METERS, more or less.
That the
above-described
lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and
egress
for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL
RESOURCES,
INC. or its successors-in-interest, the mortgagee of Lots 1,4,5,6,7,8
and
9 of the consolidation-subdivision plan, Pcs-27706 of Transfer
Certificates
of Title Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703, 317704, 317705, 317706 &
317707,
respectively, in the name of METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC.
DONE this Sep.
18
1987 in the City of Manila.
On November 7, 1991, petitioner
filed an injunctive suit in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch
95). Petitioner alleged that, in violation of the terms of the
Memorandum
of Agreement, private respondent refused to allow petitioner to make
excavations
on one side of the access road for the installation of water pipes;
that
it banned entry of petitioner’s trucks and those of its tenants between
11:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M.; and that it
subjected
the vehicles to unnecessary searches. Petitioner sought the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring private respondent
"to allow [petitioner] to proceed with the MWSS installation project
over
the road lot in question, to allow [petitioner’s] and [its] tenants’
delivery
trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without
undergoing
unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize [petitioner’s] right
of
way over the said lot."[7]
Petitioner prayed that, after trial, the writ be made final.
On December 21, 1991,
private respondent filed an answer with counterclaim, alleging that
petitioner’s
right to undertake excavations on the access road was not provided for
in the Memorandum of Undertaking.[8]
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that it was petitioner
which
caused damage to private respondent’s tenants by undertaking, without
its
consent, construction works on the access road which raised its level
to
about a meter and caused serious flooding of the nearby buildings
whenever
it rained;[9]
and that, as a result, its tenants demanded compensation for damage to
their merchandise and equipment occasioned by the flooding. Private
respondent
prayed for P2.1 million as counterclaim.[10]
The trial court required
the parties to submit position papers in connection with petitioner’s
prayer
for a preliminary mandatory injunction.[11]
After the parties had done so, the trial court granted, on February 14,
1992, petitioner’s prayer for a preliminary writ, conditioned upon the
filing by petitioner of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00.
The trial court said in part:
. . . . . . . . .
[T]he
court finds that to deny plaintiff’s application for a preliminary
mandatory
injunction writ would be to disregard its right of way in respect of
the
road lot in question, a right clearly set forth in defendant’s
memorandum
of undertaking of September 18, 1987; indeed, no cogent reason appears
to warrant treating the terms "for whatever kind of passage" contained
therein as nothing more than a useless, meaningless redundancy.
ACCORDINGLY,
plaintiff’s
subject application is hereby granted and the Court hereby directs that
upon the filing and approval of the corresponding injunction bond in
the
sum of P500,000.00, . . . let corresponding preliminary mandatory
injunction
writ be issued directing defendant to allow plaintiff to proceed with
its
MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow
plaintiff’s
and its tenant’s delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same
at any time and without undergoing unnecessary searches, and to
otherwise
recognize plaintiff’s right of way over the said road lot, pending the
termination of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is issued
by this Court.[12]
On March 2, 1992, the trial
court issued the writ upon filing of the required bond by petitioner.[13]
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders
granting
injunction which the trial court denied.[14]
However, it increased the injunction bond to P2.1 million.[15]
Private respondent filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals
to annul the aforesaid orders, dated February 14, 1992 and March 2,
1992,
of the trial court. On November 26, 1994, the appellate court granted
the
petition and set aside the questioned orders after finding that the
trial
court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.[16]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 28, 1994,
petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari
alleging
that:[17]
1. THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT EXERCISED CERTIORARI POWERS TO
REVERSE
AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, UPON
FINDING
THAT THE LOWER COURT "MISUNDERSTOOD" THE RIGHT OF HEREIN PETITIONER
PROSPERITY
OVER THE ROAD LOT IN QUESTION.
2. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN RIVAS V.
SEC (190 SCRA 295) DESPITE THE DIVERSITY IN FACTUAL SETTING OF THE
INSTANT
CASE VIS-A-VIS THAT OBTAINING IN THE CITED CASE.
3. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THE MERITS OF THE MAIN CASE IN A CERTIORARI
PROCEEDING PRACTICALLY RENDERING ACADEMIC THE HEARING PROPER YET TO BE
CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
4. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT MADE FINDINGS OF FACTS ON THE BASIS OF THE
REPRESENTATION
AND RECITAL OF FACTS MADE IN THE MFI PETITION AND PROCEEDED TO
INTERPRET
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERTAKING WITHOUT CONSIDERING FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING ITS EXECUTION WHICH WERE YET TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A FULL
BLOWN
TRIAL.
The assignment of
errors
raises a single question: whether, in issuing a writ of preliminary
mandatory
injunction ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake
excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water
pipes,
the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion.
As held in Pelejo
v. Court of Appeals,[18]
to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
the following must be shown: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal
right; (2) that his right has been violated and the invasion is
material
and substantial; and (3) that there is an urgent and permanent
necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The right of the complainant
must be clear and unmistakable because, unlike an ordinary preliminary
injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
requires
the performance of a particular act or acts[19]
and thus tends to do more than maintain the status quo.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged right to the
preliminary
mandatory injunction on the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September
18, 1987, which provides that:
(T)he
above-described
lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to
ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY
FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-in-interest.
There is no question as
to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give
petitioner
the right to use the private road as a means of entry into and exit
from
its property on the northwestern side of the compound. The question
concerns
the meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial
court
read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make
excavations
on the side of the access road in order to install a network of water
pipes.
The word "passage" does not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey
a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access
road.
The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Webster’s Dictionary,
is
that it is "the act or action of passing: movement or transference from
one place or point to another."[21]
Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Black’s Law
Dictionary, the "act of passing; transit; transition."[22]
To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes requires
the
consideration of evidence showing the parties’ intention in using the
word
which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time,
petitioner
cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right justifying the
issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the
trial
court should have observed caution and denied petitioner’s application
for the preliminary writ.
Petitioner contends
that resort should be made to facts surrounding the execution of the
Memorandum
of Undertaking which, according to it, shows the intention of the
parties
to give petitioner the right to install water pipes along the side of
the
access road.[23]
It cites Rule 130, Section11[24]
of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC.11. Interpretation
according to circumstances. - For the proper construction
of
an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the
situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown,
so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret.
That is precisely what
we are saying. The recourse petitioner proposes must await the
presentation
of the parties’ evidence during trial and the determination of their
intention
must be made by the trial court, not by this Court. Petitioner cannot
circumvent
the process by asking this Court to determine the facts surrounding the
execution of their agreement. Indeed, for us to undertake such inquiry
would be to expand the scope of the present review and intrude into the
domain of the trial court. Petitioner will have ample opportunity to
substantiate
its allegations on this point during the trial of the case. Rule 130,
Section
11, which petitioner invokes, is actually a rule for interpretation of
documentary evidence formally offered at the trial. It does not apply
to
preliminary proceedings concerning the issuance of ancillary remedies.
Anent petitioner’s contention
that the writ of certiorari does not lie because the error
sought
to be corrected is an error of judgment, suffice it to say that the
lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary
mandatory injunction despite the doubt on petitioner’s right to it.
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated November 26, 1993, and its resolution,
dated
February 28, 1994, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo [Chairman],
Puno, and Martinez, JJ.,concur.
Buena, J., took
no part.
_____________________________
Endnotes:
1
Per Justice Arturo Buena, Chairman, and concurred in by Justices
Artemon
Luna and Alfredo Lagamon.
2
Petition, Rollo, p. 12.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Petition, CA Rollo, p.5.
6
Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 103-104.
7
Petition, Annex L, Rollo, pp. 117-118.
8
Id., Annex P, id., p. 169.
9
Id., Annex J, id., p. 111.
10
Id., Annex P, id., p. 70.
11
Id., Annex N, id., p. 121.
12
Petition, Annex A, CA Rollo, p. 31-A.
13
Id., Annex C, id., p. 33.
14
Id., Annex B, id., p. 32.
15
Ibid.
16
Petition, Annex A, Rollo, p. 51.
17
Petition, id., pp. 20-21.
18
117 SCRA 665 (1982).
19
1964 Rules of Court, Rule 58, Section 1 is substantially the same as
Rule
58, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
20
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company v. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433
(1912); Bautista v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 1078 (1957).
21
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1650 (3rd ed., 1993).
22
Black’s Law Dictionary 1012 (5th ed., 1979).
23
Petition, Rollo, pp. 29-32.
24
Now Rule 130, Section 13 of the Revised Rules On Evidence.