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EN BANC G.R. No. L-6620 January 11, 1912
ALEJANDRA AUSTRIA, petitioner-appellee,
Addison B. Ritchey, for appellants. JOHNSON, J. :chanrobles virtual law library It appears from the record that one Antonio Ventenilla, died on the 13th of March, 1909, in the municipality of Mangatarem, Province of Pangasinan, leaving a will which, after due notice in accordance with the provisions of the law, was duly admitted to probate on the 14th of April, 1909, and the said Doña Alejandra Austria was appointed administratrix of his estate, by order of the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the 30th day of July, 1909, the said administratrix (Doña Alejandra Austria) with will annexed, presented a report of her administration of said estate, petitioned the court, after due notification to all of the parties interested, to distribute the estate in accordance with the will and the law. So far as the record show no action was taken upon said petition until the 5th day of October, 1910.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the 6th day of August, 1910, the said opponents, through their attorney, A. B. Ritchey, presented the following petition, asking that the will of the said Antonio Ventenilla be annulled: PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF A WILL.
It will be noted that the opponents made no effort to question the legality of he will, even though legal notice had been given in accordance with the law, until more than fifteen months had expired from the date on which the lower court duly admitted said will to probate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 625 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that:
This court has held, under the provision of this section, that "the probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution, and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator." (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Sahagun vs. Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanches vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)chanrobles virtual law library When no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise question relating to its due execution. (Chong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño et al., 8 Phil. Rep., 119.)chanrobles virtual law library The opponents not having appealed from the order admitting the will to probate, as they had a right to do, that order is final and conclusive, (Pimentel vs. Palanca, supra) unless some fraud sufficient to vitiate the proceedings is discovered. In the present case, however, the alleged fraud, in view of all the facts contained in the record, in our opinion, is not sufficiently proved to justify a reopening of the probate of the will in question, especially in view of the long delay of the parties interested.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The said section 625 was evidently taken from section 2356 of the Statutes of Vermont. In most of the states of the United States certain number of months is given to the interested parties to appeal from an order of the court admitting to probate a will. (In the matter of the estate of Giovanni Sbarboro, 63 Cal., 5; Thompson vs. Samson, 64 Cal., 330; In the matter of the estate of Richard T. Maxell, 74 Cal., 387; Wetherbee et al. vs. Chase, 57 Vt., 347.)chanrobles virtual law library Under said section 625 and the decisions of the court, it seems that the only time given the parties who are displeased with the order admitting a will to probate, is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions. Without deciding whether or not the order admitting a will to probate can be open for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has expired, we hold in the present case simply that the showing as to fraud is not sufficient to justify a reopening of the proceedings. The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, hereby affirmed with costs. Torres, Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur. |