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SEPARATE OPINION

FRANCISCO, J.:

I fully agree with Mr. Justice Padilla's opinion that if the accused fails to surrender to the proper authorities and remain in the custody of the law then her right to appeal is deemed waived and forfeited. I wish to express, nonetheless, my observations on this issue.

An appeal is a statutory remedy for the correction of errors which might have been committed. With the accused lies the power and option to avail of the remedy, and with the appellate court belongs the power to affirm or reverse the accused's conviction. Appeal, however, presupposes jurisdiction over the person of the accused. And since appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right nor part of the due process, it may only be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law (Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135, citing Aguila v. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898, and Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397; Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 537; Borre v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 560; Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 254; U.S. v. Yu Ten, 33 Phil. 122).

Thus, an accused who escapes from prison or confinement loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court (People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196; People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79). A contrary view would encourage the accused to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide means for guilty parties to escape punishment (People v. Ang Gioc, 73 Phil. 366). In this case, the accused escaped from confinement and heretofore refuses to surrender to the proper authorities, thus she must be deemed to have abandoned the appeal (See People v. Quiritan, 197 SCRA 32; People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406; People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104).

In criminal cases, appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court via the following steps: by filing a notice of appeal in those cases,where the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed, by filing a Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where the penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua and the appeal would involve only questions of law (People v. Pagsanjan, 221 SCRA 735), and by automatic review where the penalty imposed is death (R.A. No. 7659, Sec. 22; Rule 122, Sec. 10, Revised Rules of Court). An appeal has "for its object simply and solely the protection of the accused.'' ¹ Appeal by way of automatic review is plainly another mode of appeal and has an objective similar to any other modes of appeal, i.e., the protection of the accused. If the accused has escaped, then he refuses to avail of the protection of the Court. Why then should the Court insist in protecting him. In the same vein, "the law providing for automatic review of a death sentence seeks to favor the [accused]." ² If the accused has absconded or escaped from confinement then who is to be favored by the automatic review - a fugitive from justice? Hence, if the escape of the accused may be deemed waiver of the right to appeal in any other mode of appeal, then the same must apply to an appeal by way of automatic review. I fail to see, in this connection, any cogent reason why an automatic review should be given a status different from the other modes of appeal. I thus find, and with due respect to my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Puno, unacceptable the proposition that an appeal by way of automatic review is not subject to waiver. If the constitutional rights of the accused enshrined under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, such as right against unreasonable searches and seizures, right against self-incrimination, right to remain silent, among others, can be waived, then with more reason with the right appeal which is merely of statutory origin.

I am not unaware of the cases cited by my esteemed colleague Mr- Justice Puno establishing the rule that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. But in the words of a known author, "[e]ven those Justices most opposed to overruling constitutional decisions have acknowledged that the 'law may grow to meet changing conditions' and that the doctrine of stare decisis should not require a 'slavish adherence to authority where new conditions require new rules of conduct" ³ Considering the ,manifest intent of the legislature in enacting the death penalty law to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes and to serve as effective deterrence, it is high time for the Court to depart from the old doctrine which, to my mind, promotes nothing except disobedience to and repudiation of our judicial system.